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ABSTRACT 
After the First World War Britain no longer had the resources to 
defend her empire and island kingdom in a world of highly armed states. 
She had little choice but to seek an international limitation of armaments. 
Though the United States and Japan were prepared to limit their naval forces 
Britain neither possessed the means nor the will to induce the European land 
powers to reduce their armamentso She shied away from commitments because 
her foreign policy was designed to minimise risks, not to lay the foundations 
of a new international order by guaranteeing the security of other states* 
Between 1919 and 1922 the limitation of armaments was an important 
objective of British foreign policy but the Lloyd George Government like 
its successors refused to bind Britain to come to the assistance of states 
which felt threatened by their neighbours. Between 1922 and 1929 Britain 
did more to obstruct than promote international disarmament. In 1929 
the second Labour government responded to an upsurge in popular support 
for disarmament by reaching an agreement with the United States over 
naval armaments which it was intended should pave the way for a comprehensive 
international disarmament treaty. The partial failure of the 1930 London 
naval conference dampened the Labour Government's enthusiasm for disarmament 
but popular agitation and Britain's commitment to the league kept arms 
limitation on the agenda of British politicso 
Britain lacked faith in the efficacy of the League as an agency for 
disarmament, She did little to ensure the success of the Preparatory 
Commission in the crucial years 1926 to 1929. Eventually, however, public 
pressures forced the goverment to assist the League's efforts to achieve 
an international arms limitation agreement. 
As the international situation deteriorated in the years 1929 to 1931 
the disarmament movement in Britain gathered momentum. BY 1931 its 'ethical' 
goals had overtaken Britain's capabilities and the personal commitment of 
most of her political leaders* 
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CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY 
1916 
August Foreign Office memorandum proposes that Britain should 
make disarmament one of its war aims. 
1917 
April-May Imperial War Cabinet adopts a negative attitude to 
disarmament. 
December Disarmament given prominence in Labour party's statement 
of war aims. 
1918 
January Lloyd George in his Caxton Hall speech and Wilson in 
his Fourteen Points call for reductions in national 
armaments. 
December Candidates of all three political parties in the 'coupon' 
election pledge support for a league of nations and call 
for the abolition of conscription. 
1919 
January Opening of the Paris peace conference and establishment 
of the League of Nations Commission. 
League of Nations Union formed in London. 
June Victor powers at Paris pledge themselves to promote 
disarmament in a letter to the German government. 
Versailles, treaty imposes disarmament on Germany. 
United States and Britain sign a treaty of guarantee 
pledging themselves to come to France's assistance in 
the event of unprovoked German aggression. 
August Ten Year Rule: the Lloyd George government instructs 
the Fighting Services to assess Britain's defence 
requirements on the assumption that there will be no 
major war for at least ten years. 
1920 
May League Council appoints a Permanent Advisory Commission 
(PAC) to advise them on military, naval and air questions 
including disarmament. 
September Brussels International Financial Conference convened by 
the League calls for large cuts in public expenditure 
including defence budgets. 
December First League Assembly requests the Council to ap oint 
the Temporary Mixed Commission on Armaments (TNT 
United States Senate approves the Borah resolution 
calling on the United States government to enter into 
negotiations with Britain and Japan to achieve large 
reductions in naval armaments. 
February League of Nations Union sets up a disarmament committee. 
League Council sets up the Temporary Mixed Commission 
vi 
August Lloyd George government appoints Geddes committee on 
national expenditure. 
November Washington conference opens with an American proposal 
for the reduction and limitation of the battle fleets 
of the principal naval powers. 
1922 
January Cannes conference. 
February Viscount Esher presents his disarmament plan to the 
Temporary Mixed Commission. 
Washington naval treaty. 
April-May Genoa conference. 
July Cecil outlines proposals for a draft treaty of mutual 
guarantee to the Temporary Mixed Commission. 
September League Assembly adopts Resolution XIV linking security 
and disarmament. 
December Moscow disarmament conference attended by delegations 
from Russia, Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania fails to reach agreement on the limitation 
of land armaments. 
im 
March-May Fifth Pan-American conference at Santiago fails to 
extend the principles of the Washington naval treaty 
to the Central and South American states. 
June Baldwin government's air expansion programme announced. 
September League Assembly adopts the draft Treaty of Mutual 
Assistance. 
1924 
February Rome conference of experts fails to agree on the 
extension of the principles of the Washington naval 
treaty to non-signatory powers. 
July Labour government rejects the draft Treaty of Mutual 
Assistance. 
September (Geneva) Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes drafted by the First and Third 
Committees of the League Assembly. 
1925 
March British government reject the Geneva Protocol. 
September League Assembly calls on the Council to make a preparatory 
study for a world disarmament conference. 
October Locarno conference. 
December League Council appoints the Preparatory Commission 
for the Disarmament Conference. 
1926 
May First session of the League Preparatory Commission in 
Geneva. 
April Third session of Preparatory Commission ends in deadlock 
over naval disarmament. 
vii 
June-August Geneva (Coolidge) naval conference. 
November Russia proposes total disarmament at the fourth session 
of the Preparatory Commission. 
1928 
July Chamberlain announces that Britain and France have 
resolved their differences over naval disarmament - 
the Anglo-French Compromise. 
August Kellogg-Briand pact signed in Paris. 
1922 
April Sixth session of Preparatory Commission gives a second 
reading to a number of clauses in the 1927 draft 
disarmament convention and reaches a compromise on a 
number of contentious issues. 
Hugh Gibson of the United States announces his country's 
readiness to adopt new formulae over naval disarmament. 
June-September United States ambassador in London, Charles Dawes, and 
the new British prime minister, Ramsay MacDonald, reach 
agreement over cruiser strengths and parity between the 
British and American fleets. 
October MacDonald meets President Hoover in the United States. 
1930 
January-April London naval conference. 
April London naval treaty. 
November-December Final session of the Preparatory Commission. 
1931 
March-July CID Three Party Committee on Disarmament. 
July Leaders of the three political parties address a 
disarmament demonstration organised by the League 
of Nations Union in the Albert Hall. 
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INTR0DUCT10N 
Few wars in history have had such a profound effect on popular 
attitudes to war and peace as the First World War. When war once more 
broke out in Europe in September 1939 there were no crowds to greet the 
news with singing and wave after wave of cheering. The bloodshed, 
destruction and suffering of the years 1914 to 1918 had produced a 
deep-seated revulsion against war. 
The principal European victor powers, Britain and France, emergea 
from'the 1914-1918 war depleted in wealth and manpower and with a serious 
loss of confidence and morale. They had only survived the ordeal because 
of the intervention of the United States in 1917. When the American 
Senate refused to ratify the Paris peace settlement, they neither had 
the means nor the will to maintain indefinitely the terms they had 
imposed on their enemies. Britain's statesmen were not prepared to enter 
into commitments which might once again involve their countrymen in a 
European war. When they recalled the slaughter of the war years, the 
words most frequently on their lips were 'never again'. Every Armistice 
Day celebration from 1919 onwards was a pledge to the dead and a promise 
to the living that Britain would not become involved in another major 
conflict. 
As soon as the war ended there was an instant and insistent demand 
for rapid demobilisation. This was soon followed by a well-orchestrated 
agitation for large reductions in the nation's arms budget. Other nations 
too reduced the size of their armed forces. Wars are almost always 
followed by a measure of disarmament as nations transfer material and 
human resources from the necessities of war to the needs of peace. What 
(s - 
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was unique about this process in post-1918 Britain was its emotional 
appeal to a nation which came to believe that disarmament was the panacea 
for the world's ills. 
This study of Britain and disarmament in the first decade of peace 
is an attempt to examine a number of inter-related questions. To what 
extent did British governments have the support of public opinion in 
pursuing a policy of general disarmament? How far was general disarma- 
ment an objective of British foreign policy in the years 1916 to 1931? 
What lead did Britain give the international community in achieving 
disarmament? How much did Britain herself disarm and what effect did 
this have on her power, prestige and diplomacy? How far were the British 
people aware of the obstacles which stood in the path to general disarma- 
ment and to what extent did they appreciate the price which Britain 
would have to pay to achieve that goal? 
Though disarmament can take a number of different forms the term 
is used throughout this study as a convenient piece of shorthand for 
'the general limitation and reduction of national armaments by voluntary 
international agreement'. It will, however, be necessary to refer to 
other forms of disarmament. In the first placet disarmament was imposed 
on Germany and her allies by the victor powers in 1919 and that disarma- 
ment was enshrined in the peace treaties. Secondlyt as it has already 
been noted, nations disarmed unilaterally in the immediýte aftermath 
of the war without reference to other powers. Of all the nations of 
Europe only Denmark pursued the policy of unilateral disarm nt to 
its logical conclusion. Thirdly, disarmament resulted from international 
agreements amongst a limited number of powers. The Washington naval 
treaty in 1922, by limiting the capital ships each of its five 
signatories could retain, led to reductions in the battle fleets of 
the principal naval powers. Disarmament was in this case a consequence 
of the normal diplomatic processes. Fourthly, disarmament was an 
3 
objective embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations and pursued 
by its members, and those non-member states prepared to associate them- 
selves with it, to achieve that goal. 
In Britain, most advocates of disarmament assumed that peace would 
be best preserved by mutual, balanced and phased reductions in national 
armaments though a minority believed that the 'moral' example of 
unilateral disarmament would do most to prevent war. Though numerically 
small, the latter were a vocal and articulate group in British political 
life in the inter-war years. Though they sometimes merged, it is neces- 
sary to draw a distinction between these two groups. 
As early as 1824 a British Foreign Secretary, George Canning, had 
declared that to preserve the peace of the world was the chief objective 
of British foreign policy. For almost a century before 1914 British 
statesmen had reminded the British people that as a great trading nation 
Britain had a paramount interest in the preservation of peace. A Foreign 
Office memorandum in 1926 began: 'Broadly speaking the foreign policy of 
His Majesty's Government remains what it has been for many years... (1) to 
seek peace and ensue it, (2) to preserve the status guo and the balance 
of power, and (3) to protect and develop British interests in foreign 
countries. ' 
1 Other countries might have territorial ambitions but 
Britain had none. Her sole objective was to remain at peace. 
For centuries statesmen had assumed that the best way to preserve 
peace was to prepare for war though on as limited a scale as international 
conditions permitted. A strong nation deterred aggression and maintained 
its influence in a world of competing states. Britain ruled the waves 
because she was strong enough to protect her commerce and challenge any 
would-be aggressor. 
Before 1914 Britain was already over-extended in terms of her 
1. DBFP, Series IA, Vol. 1, Appendix. 
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military and naval commitments. She neither had the military and naval 
capability nor the financial resources to meet all the needs of imperial 
defence. In 1919, with fewer resources, she faced much larger commit- 
ments: responsibility for policing huge new tracts of territory in the 
Middle East and Africa, the containment of disruptive nationalism in 
India, Ireland, Egypt and Palestine, the occupation of the Rhineland 
for fifteen years and Constantinople and the Straits for a shorter 
period, and an unlimited though ill-defined commitment to the League 
of Nations. With responsibilities of this magnitude she could not 
afford armaments expenditure in excess of that required to police her 
empire and defend her sea communications. In a world of competing 
nation-states, she had no choice but to press for an all-round limitation 
of armaments. 
Between 1919 and 1923, the post-war Lloyd George, Bonar, Law and 
Baldwin governments succumbed to strong Treasury pressure to reduce 
the cost of Britain's naval, military and air forces. Reductions were 
made with the wholehearted support of the Press, Parliament and public 
opinion. The Service departments were obliged to resign themselves to 
a policy of retrenchment. Not one of the prime ministers of the 1920s 
was particularly responsive to their pleadings. Preparation for future 
wars was a low priority among those who believed that Britain was without 
a foe in the world. 
Although large reductions were made in British defence expenditure 
in 'the Years 1919 to 1931, in real terms it did not fall substantially 
below the level reached in the peak years of the pre-war arms race. 1 
Until the outbreak of war in 1939 Britain remained the strongest naval 
power in the world. 
Such reductions as were made, for the most Part unilaterally by 
successive British governments, took place at a time when the inter- 
national situation in Europe and Asia was far from stable. That 
1. See Appendix I. 
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instability alarmed British statesmen but did not prevent them from 
pursuing a policy of piecemeal, unilateral disarmament punctuated by 
the decision to expand the Air Porce in 1923 and to construct 10,000 ton 
811 gun cruisers in the years 1924 to 1928. On the eve of the world dis- 
armament conference in 1932 Britain's statesmen were to complain that 
Britain's example in reducing her armed forces had not been followed 
by other powers. This was to some extent true but they were well aware 
that Britain's self-imposed disarmament had been dictated by economic 
circumstances and public pressure. 
As nations became more highly armed in the last half of the 
nineteenth century Radical critics challenged the assumption that arma- 
ments prevented war. Unsuccessful efforts were made at the first Hague 
conference in 1899 and by the pre-war Liberal governments in Britain to 
check the arms race. Campbell-Bannerman launched his party's election 
campaign in December 1905 with a warning that the growth of national 
armaments constituted a great danger to the peace of the world. 'What 
nobler role could this country assume', he asked, 'than at the fitting 
moment to place itself at the head of a league of peace? ' 
1 In the last 
decade of peace the advocates of arms limitation mounted a campaign to 
capture the soul of the Liberal party. 
2 They did not entirely succeed 
but they made a lasting impression on the future prime minister, David 
Lloyd George. 
After the outbreak of war in August 1924 some foresaw that there 
would be a strong disarmament movement in Britain as soon as hostilities 
ended. A strong opponent of disarmament, the Cambridge ecclesiastical 
1. The Times, 22 December 1905. 
2. See S. Koss: Asguith, London, 1976, passim; A. J. A. Morris: 
Radicalism against War. 1906-1914, London, 1972, passim; 
K. Robbins: The Abolition-of War, The Peace Movement in Britain, 
1914-1919, Cardiff, 1976, PP. 7-26. 
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historian and Dean of Jesus College, P. J. Foakes-Jackson, warned the 
leader of the Tory die-hards in the House of Lords, Lord Willoughby do 
Broke, that when the war ended, there would be a clamour for instant 
disarmament. If it was not checked Britain would scrap her navy and 
disband her army as she had done a hundred years earlier but with even 
more dire consequences for her power and prestige in the world. 
1 
Four years of trench warfare brought a particularly strong reaction 
against armaments in Britain. Agitation for peace-time- compulsory 
military servicep a feature of pre-war British politics, virtually 
ceased. 
2 In post-war Britain armaments had few defenders and many 
critics. 
As the prospects of a second world war loomed ever larger in men's 
minds, the disarmament movement gained in momentum. As late as 1935 
ten and a half million of the eleven million six hundred thousand polled 
in the Peace Ballot answered the question: 'Are you in favour of an 
all-round reduction of armaments by international agreementV in the 
affirmative. Such was the public support for disarmament that the 
National governments of MacDonald and Baldwin were reluctant to embark 
on a programme of massive rearmament for fear of losing electoral 
popularity. 
3 
1. Foakes-Jackson to Willoughby de Broke, 9 November 1915, Willoughby 
de Broke Papers, WB/11/26. 
2. Conscription did not become part of the Conservative party's pro- 
gramme before 1914 but it was given considerable support. Many 
Conservatives were prominent in the National Service League which 
Lord Roberts founded in 1905, among them Lord Willoughby de Broke. 
For the Conservative party's attitude to conscription see National 
Unionist Association of Conservative and Liberal Unionist Organisa- 
tions' Campaigm Guide, 13th Edition, London, n. d. (1914), p. 200. 
For post-war attitudes to conscription, see P. Dennis: Decision by 
Default, London, 1972, i)assim. 
3. There were other reasons for Britain's failure to rearm to meet 
the threat of Nazi Germany, notably fears of inflation, but the 
'pacifist' mood of the British people provided the governments 
of the early 19308 with a convenient excuse for not pursuing policies 
considered to be economically and politically hazardous. 
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It was not only the Left who believed that armaments bred inter- 
national tensions and international tensions, war. 
1 Si vis 13acem. i3ara 
bellum had been discredited by recent events. rurthermore, Germany, the 
most highly armed nation and best prepared for war in 1914, had not been 
saved from the ignominy of defeat. Armaments neither prevented war nor 
guaranteed eventual victory. They gave the illusion of security only to 
create even greater insecurity in neighbouring states. 
In 1919 many believed that the world had entered a new era in which 
the old rules of international power politics were no longer relevant. 
It was assumed that the ordeal of war had changed the hearts and minds 
of a whole generation. The world could look forward to a long period of 
peace because there would never again be the same eagerness for war. 
That being so, there were new opportunities to create the machinery of 
lasting peace, opportunities which had eluded Britain and the world in 
2 the jingoistic pre-war days of 'We want eight and we won't wait' . 
Peace would be maintained not by the threat of war but by the pressure 
of a well-informed and enlightened public opinion acting as a brake on 
the aggressive policies of governments. If the countries of Europe 
espoused democracy, their peoples could be trusted to see that the arms 
race was never resumed. 
3 
Armaments and war would become an anachronism 
in a democratic world which possessed in the League of Nations, machinery 
for the settlement of international disputes. 
1. See Martin Wight's comment in Power Politics, Harmondsworth, 1979, 
p. 254: 'The doctrine that the arms race is the prime cause of war 
was widely believed after the First World War, and powerfully shaped 
thý public opinion in the parliamentary democracies that were 
reluctant to rearm against the Axis powers. It is an example of 
learning the wrong lesson from history. ' 
2. It is noteworthy that the Conservative Opposition spokesman on naval 
affairs in the pre-war House of Commons, Arthur Lee, became after 
the war a staunch advocate of naval disarmament and as First Lord of 
the Admiralty one of Britain's delegates at the Washington conference 
in 1921-22. Lee was credited with the authorship of the slogan 'We 
want eight and we won't wait' in the dreadnought controversy of 1908. 
3. See Philip Kerr's comment to Lloyd George: Kerr to Lloyd George, 
18 February 1919, Lloyd George Papers, F/89/Z/23- 
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The disarmers were broadly correct in their assessment of British 
public opinion but they exaggerated the extent to which public opinion 
in other countries had changed as a result of the war. Writing towards 
the end of 1931 Norman Angell, 
I 
author of the pre-war classic The Great 
Illusion, said that the most important achievement of the years 1929 to 
1931 was 'a certain subtle change of spirit and attitude, a change the 
profundity of which perhaps can only be grasped by those who fought in 
the peace cause before the war, and knew too well another attitude and 
spirit' .2A similar assessment was made by Gilbert Murray, 
3 the Chairman 
of the League of Nations Union and distinguished Oxford classical scholaro 
Returning from the world disarmament conference in July 1932 he recorded 
his impressions in a letter to the Manchester Guardian. 
4 There was, he 
said, ta unanimous and passionate demand all over the world for real and 
drastic disarmament'. He went on to report uncritically the comments of 
a Polish journalist in Geneva. 'If you ever suggested to a Polish 
peasant the need of preparation for war he would drop his spade and 
shake his fist in your face. ' If disarmament was not achieved there 
would be revolution. A year later in an address to the University of 
Wales at Aberystwyth at the opening of the 1933-34 academic year, Gilbert 
Murray said: 'I believe that any government which plunged into war now in 
Europe would be in danger of being torn to pieces by its own people. I 
believe that to be true of Germany, Italy and Russia. 
5 Fifteen years 
(Sir) Norman Angell, 1874-1967, journalist and author, Labour MP 
for Bradford Worth, 1929-31, Nobel Peace Prize, 1933. The Great 
Illusion first published as Europe's Optical Illusion in 1908 was 
translated into many different 
, 
languages, led to the formation of 
the Garton Poundation to disseminate Angell's views, and the dis- 
counting of war as an instrument of national policy by many pre-war 
Liberals. 
2. Norman Angell: The Unseen Assassins, London, (-TanuarY) 1932, p. 269. 
3. Gilbert Murray, 1866-1957, Australian by birth, Regius Professor of Greek, Oxford, 1908-36, Chairman of the League of Nations Union, 
1923-38. 
4.28-July 1932., 
5. Gilbert Murray: From-the Lemizue to the U. N., London, 1948, p. 56. 
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later Murray freely admitted that he had underestimated the violence of 
nationalistic passions in Europe. Mixing as they did with an unrepres- 
entative section of European opinion at Geneva and elsewhere on the 
continent of Europe, idealists in Britain too readily assumed that 
nationalism had been totally discredited by the First World War. 
Though these illusions blinded many Englishmen to the realities of 
the post-1916 world, a convincing case could be made for disarmament to 
those who did: not share the vision of a new international order. The 
well-informed, if not the nation as a whole, were aware of how near the 
British Empire had come to defeat in the 1914-1918 war and how much the 
war had contributed to the imperial problems which Britain faced in 
India, Egypt and elsewhere. Another war might spell the doom of the 
British Empire because it would become increasingly difficult to meet 
simultaneous attacks on Britain's far-flung territories with the neces- 
sary force to ensure victory. Nor was it the overseas empire alone 
which was menaced by war. In the new age of air power Britain's island 
fortress was no longer the impregnable bastion it once had been. Britain 
and the sea-lanes connecting her with the Empire were so vulnerable to 
air attack that Britain, more than any other power, had a vested interest 
in disarmament. It was now an illusion to rely on 'preparedness'. 
One of the foremost advocates of disarmament in the inter-war years, 
Philip Noel-Baker, 1 wrote in 1926 that disarmament had two main purposes: 
1. Philip Noel-Baker, 1889- , created Lord Noel-Baker, 1977, son of the Liberal MP, J. Allen Baker, founder and first commandan of the 
Friends' Ambulance Unit, a member of Lord Robert Cecil's staff at 
the Paris peace conference, League of Nations Secretariat, 1920-22, 
Cassels Professor of International Relations, University of London, 
1924-29, Labour MP for Coventry, 1929-31, Parliamentary Private 
Secretary to the Foreign Secretary, 1929-31, Personal Assistant to 
Arthur Henderson, President of the World Disarmament Conference, 
1932-33, Labour MP for Derby, 1936-70, author of The Geneva Protocol, 
1925, Disarmament, 1926, and other works. An Olympic athlete and 
twice captain of the British team at the Olympic Games. In the post- 
war'Attlee goverment he was Minister of State at the Foreign Office, 
Secretary of State for Air and Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations. A Nobel Peace Prize winner, 1959, and an international 
authority on arms control. 
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to reduce the risks of war and to reverse the trend of the previous 
sixty years towards the militarisation of national and international 
life. There was a danger, he said, that the average European might 
come to take for granted a degree of militarisation which was, in fact, 
of comparatively recent origin. Disarmament would be frustrated so long 
as the military e"lites, and the industrial-military complexes which sus- 
tained them, remained unchallenged. Britain was in a unique position to 
lead Europe back to the armament levels maintained before the modern age 
of militarism began. 
The benefits which would accrue to Britain and the world from inter- 
national disarmament were plain for all to see. Enormous savings could 
be made without endangering national security. Deprived of those offensive 
weapons without which no aggressor could deliver a 'knock-out' blow, states 
would be rendered incapable of launching aggressive war. 
British policy makers were motivated not only by the desire to reduce 
the risks of war but by, the opportunity of enbancing Britain's relative 
military and naval power. Thus by abolishing conscription and limiting 
military manpower three specific goals might be achieved. Continental 
powers would be deprived of the means of waging wars of aggression. The 
relative effectiveness of Britain's small but more highly mechanised pro- 
fessional army would be increased, and a damaging blow would be struck at 
the roots of militarism by removing from military glites the reserves of 
trained manpower on which, It was believed, their power and influence 
rested. Similarly, by limiting capital ship construction Britain would 
be spared a wasteful and expensive competition in ships of doubtful 
utility without sacrificing her naval power. By abolishing submarines 
she would reduce the risks of being starved into submission in some future 
conflict. A general limitation of air armaments would reduce her vulner- 
ability to air attack while leaving her free to use aircraft as a cheap 
and effective means of policing large tracts of her empire. 
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In their public utterances about the League and disarmament British 
political leaders were often guilty of raising false expectations. During 
the war they had introduced a note of idealism to justify the sacrifices 
being demanded of the British people. They had held before them the 
prospects of a bright new world in which wars would be no more. When 
peace returned, they were reluctant to dispel those hopes and shatter 
those illusions. Prisoners of their wartime promises, they only too 
frequently failed to acquaint the British people with the limitations 
of the League's authority and the realities of the post-war world. They 
failed to drive home the lesson that disarmament could only be achieved 
in a stable and secure international order. They failed to inform them 
that Britain's contribution towards creating that world order would 
inevitably be large and costly. The disarmament debate frequently took 
place in an atmosphere far removed from reality. 
Britain was never prepared to envisage replacing the pre-war system 
of competitive armaments by a plan for co-operative armaments inter- 
nationally deployed to preserve the peace of the world. Her policy makers 
in 1919 regarded such a plan as completely utopian and unrealistic. 
Article 8 of the Covenant, however, committed its signatories to the 
principle that the maintenance of peace required a reduction of armaments 
to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement 
of international obligations by common action. National armaments would 
henceforth serve two distinct purposes: to defend member states against 
external attack and internal subversion and-to enforce League sanctions. 
Disarmament and sanctions were two sides of the same coin but Britain 
chose to deal in a debased and defaced. coinage. 
British statesmen optimistically believed that member states would 
abide by the recommendations of the League. It was not likely, they 
thought, that nations would willingly endure the hardships and expense 
of another war after the ordeal of 1914 to 1918. Public opinion would 
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restrain governments from embarking on aggressive policies and the League 
would not be forced to resort to sanctions. Should it decide to do so, 
Britain could only lend her support if the action had the approval and 
assistance of the United States. When Balfour said in 1924 
1 that there 
was no battery of sanctions which could stop a determined and unscrupu- 
lous government bent on aggression, he was reflecting the view of Britain's 
foreign policy-making establishment. Hence, in the British view, the 
League could not function effectively in a world of highly armed states. 
The League of Nations was a pious futility in an armed world. 
2 In 
Britain people spoke of the League and disarmament in the same breath. 
That was not so in France, the successor states and much of Europe. 
It soon became obvious that general disarmament was-, -. not possible 
without the full agreement and co-operation of France. France held the 
key to European disarmament but she would not agree to reductions in 
armaments until she received what she regarded as adequate guarantees 
of her security. At no stage in the inter-war years did she regard the 
League as adequate. The United States' Senate, by refusing to ratify 
the treaty of guarantee signed on 28 June 1919, deprived France of an 
effective guarantee of her security and contributed much to her subse- 
quent intransigence and obstinacy. There is some force in the contention 
that the Senate's action was 'the decisive and symbolic event of the 
inter-war years'. 
3 
The successor states of central and eastern Europe felt equally 
apprehensive. They had gained territory at the expense of Germany, 
Hungary and Russia. Those in the east of Europe felt more threatened 
by Russia than by Germany. To force them to accept a measure of general 
1. Quoted by R. B. Henig: The Leag-ue of Nations, Edinburgh, 1973, p. 10. 
2. Lloyd George in 1931p Lloyd George Papers, G/138-9- Notes for the 
Three Party Committee on Disarmament. 
3. M. Wight: Power Politics, p. 202. 
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disarmament without a large and costly commitment to maintain their 
security was beyond the powers of Britain's statesmen. 
If Germany rearmed, no one in Britain was in any doubt about the 
threat she would pose to the peace of Europe. Only so long as she 
remained disarmed could Europe prevent the forcible revision of the 
1919 peace settlement. Germany was potentially the strongest power in 
Europe. She was the most highly industrialised and, apart from Russia, 
the most populous. There were three Germans to every two Frenchmen. 
If she rearmed she was well placed to plunge Europe into another war. 
Neither France nor the successor states, in isolation or in combination, 
would be capable of containing German expansion. That was recognised 
in France as much as it was in Britain. General disarmament was the 
prerequisite of any lasting reconciliation between the victor and the 
vanquished powers. 
No satisfactory solution to this dilemma was ever found. Britain 
was-psychologically, morally and legally committed to disarmament. The 
Paris peace conference had bequeathed to the victor powers responsibility 
for bringing about disarmament. Though that responsibility was nominally 
laid at the door of the League Council, it was effectively placed on the 
shoulders of Britain and France. By disarming Germany, Britain and France 
committed themselves to a process which could only lead to general disarma- 
ment in Europe and the world. The only other alternative was to acquiesce 
in the rearmament of Germany and the revision of the 1919 peace settlement, 
if needs must be, by force of arms. It was the latter course they were 
forced to embrace. Appeasement and rearmament were the only alternatives 
to general disarmament in Europe. 
Of all the European powers in 1919, Britain was the most secure. 
Throughout the 1920s and beyond, France and the successor states looked 
to her to provide the security they lacked. They were the consumers. 
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She was the unwilling provider. 
1 It was widely believed that her naval 
blockade of Germany and the Central Powers in the First World War had 
been an important factor in the Allied victory. It prompted the architects 
of the League to believe in the sufficiency of economic sanctions. They 
assumed that the British and American fleets would co-operate to maintain 
peace. Though they exaggerated the effectiveness of a blockade as a 
means of exerting international pressure, Britain's naval power was an 
essential and important ingredient of any collective security system. 
Energetically applied it could contribute much to deter and defeat 
aggression. 
In 1919 Britain faced a choice between maintaining naval and air 
squadrons to place at the disposal of the League should the occasion 
arise and reducing her armaments to conserve her financial resources. 
She unhesitatingly-chose the latter. Her policy makers were never in 
any doubt that the price Britain would be asked to pay was a costly one, 
threatening her trade and almost certainly requiring her to maintain 
armaments over and above those needed for her own security. By reducing 
her naval and air forces in the early 1920s she deprived herself of that 
margin of strength which she might have contributed to European security 
and the consolidation of the League's authority. In deploying her naval, 
military and air power, the interests of imperial defence took precedence 
over the League and European security. With the exception of the incon- 
clusive Cabinet discussions during the Abyssinian crisis in 1935, at no 
stage did she ever seriously consider putting at the disposal of the 
League any of her naval, military and air forces. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that British disarmament policy in 
the first decade of peace lacked consistency, coherence and direction. 
A. E. Zimmern: The Leame of Nations and the Rule of Law, London, 
1936, P. 333. 
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Formulated as a response to various domestic pressures it was only a 
first priority of government for two short periods in 1921 and 1929. 
Public support for disarmament wavered in the years 1919 to 1931. It 
was strongest in the years immediately after the First World War and more 
especially in the months which preceded the Washington Conference in 1921. 
Between 1926 and 1931, despite a certain disenchantment with the League's 
Preparatory Commission, the disarmament movement in Britain gained 
momentum. It was an important issue of British domestic politics from 
the failure of the Geneva naval conference in August 1927 to the opening 
Of the world disarmament conference in February 1932. 
At no stage in the inter-war years did British gover=ents come 
near to resolving the problems associated with European disarmament. 
No solution was possible without a wide-ranging political agreement of 
a nature totally unacceptable to official opinion. In 1928 one perceptive 
observer of the international scene warned the Foreign Office that of all 
subjects disarmament was the most dangerous if taken by itself. 
1 Few 
others, however, saw so clearly how futile it was for Britain to pursue 
disarmament as an isolated goal of foreign policy. 
It was the importance accorded to Anglo-American relations in 1921 
and again in 1929 which forced British policy makers to take international 
disarmament seriously. Britain was consequently forced to seek disarms- 
ment outside the jurisdiction of the League. The United States, a non- 
League power, was the second largest naval power in the world. She had 
the resources to challenge Britain's supremacy on the high seas. Britain 
was obliged to by-pass the League and enter into bilateral and multi- 
lateral negotiations with the United States and the other principal naval 
powers. The Washington Conference of 1921-22 achieved notable results 
and set a precedent for the future. At Geneva in 1927 and in London in 
Philip Kerr to Sir Ronald Lindsay, Permanent Under-Secretary of State 
at the Foreign Office, 18 December 1928, Lothian Paperso GD 40/17/242. 
Philip Kerr, Marquess of Lothian (1930), 1882-1940, Private Secretary 
to Lloyd George, 1916-21, British ambassador to the United States, 1938-40. 
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1930 Britain sought an agreement to limit naval armaments independently 
of the League. In both Britain and the United States the Washington 
precedent was highly favoured. There was much criticism of the more 
ambitious and all-embracing schemes of the Preparatory Commission in 
Geneva. When they contrasted the ease with which the naval powers had 
reached an agreement in Washington in the winter of 1921-22 with the 
Preparatory Commission's slow and ponderous procedures, British policy 
makers became increasingly sceptical about the League of Nations as an 
agency for promoting disarmament. Even the leader of the Labour peers 
in the House of Lords and former Lord Chancellor, Viscount Haldanet'did 
not conceal his doubts, 
1. R. B. Haldane, Viscount Haldane of Cloan (1911), 1856-1928, lawyer, 
statesman and philosopher, Liberal MP for East Lothian (Haddingtonshire), 
1885-1911, Secretary of State for Wart 1905-12, Lord Chancellor, 
1912-15,1924, Chairman of the Committee of Imperial Defence in the 
first Labour government, 1924, and as such a quasi-Minister of Defence, leader of the Labour peers in the House of Lords,, 1925-28. 
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PARTI 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE PRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION 
Before 1914 foreign policy in Britain was formulated by the 
Secretary of State on the advice of his permanent officials and with 
the tacit approval of his Cabinet colleagues. It was seldom debated 
by the House of Commons but when the Foreign Secretary spoke for his 
country he could claim to be reflecting the broad current of public 
Opinion. Though there were differences on points of detail between 
the parties and some deep differences within the Liberal party itself, 
there was broad agreement on one point. British and imperial interests 
had to be defended, if need be, by force of arms. Radical critics of 
the government might criticise the level of British naval expenditure 
but they did not question Britain's right to defend her interests and 
prepare for every contingency of national and imperial defence. 
During the First World War a number of small but vocal pressure 
groups waged a campaign for the democratic control of foreign policy. 
2 
When the war ended in 1918 there was no longer a broad consensus of 
opinion as to what that policy should be. Foreign policy became an 
element in party warfare. Liberal and Labour critics of the government 
were not prepared to leave foreign policy to the experts. With clear 
memories of the chain of events which had led to war in 1914, the Radical 
1. For the 'dissenting' tradition in British foreign policy, see 
A. J. P. Taylor: The Troublemakers, London, 1957. 
2. For an examination of these pressure groups see K. Robbins: 
The Abolition of War, and M. Swartz: The Union of Democratic - Control In British Politics during World War-On , Oxford, 1971. 
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critics of Grey's pre-war foreign policy became the dominant voice in 
the Liberal and Labour parties of the 1920s. 
None the less Conservative, and not Radical, attitudes were to 
dominate British foreign policy in the inter-war years. With the excep- 
tion of the two brief interludes of Labour government in 1924 and in 
1929-31, the Conservative party was in office for the whole of the period. 
Lloyd George's post-war coalition government was dependent on Conservative 
support and in the years of the National governments, 1931 to 1940, the 
Conservative party was the dominant partner in government. With slight 
modifications to accommodate British foreign policy to the changed circum- 
stances of the post-1918 world, the Conservative party triea to operate 
according to the pre-war traditions of diplomacy. Nevertheless, though 
the Conservative party dominated Parliament and British politics in the 
inter-war years, radical attitudes played no small part in moulding public 
opinion and in shaping public attitudes to foreign and defence policy. 
Homogeneity is seldom a characteristic feature of public opinion. 
On only rare occasions in the years 1919 to 1931 did public opinion 
coalesce to exert strong pressure on the government of the day. What 
is not in doubt, however, is that throughout the whole period successive 
governments were aware of certain domestic pressures restricting their 
freedom of action. 
In the Britain of the inter-war years three main strands of opinion 
can be isolated and identified. There were, firstly, the 'never again' 
isolationists who fought shy of all foreign entanglements, including 
the League of Nations, but who continued to believe, to some extent, 
in the old doctrine of 'preparedness'. There were, secondly, the 
'never again' pacifists who, after the experience of the First World War, 
believed that all war was wicked and that unilateral disarmament provided 
the surest path to peace. There were, thirdly, the League of Nations 
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enthusiasts who saw in the machinery of the League, which few of them 
fully understood, the one and only instrument for preserving peace. All 
three were concerned with the avoidance of war. All three endorsed the 
slogan: 'it must not happen again'. All three shied away from binding 
commitments which would have drastically curtailed Britain's freedom of 
manoeuvre though the League of Nations enthusiasts came nearest to 
endorsing a policy of collective security. British public opinion in 
the 1920s was basically isolationist at heart. 
Interacting with each other theserthree strands of opinion stripped 
war of its glitter and its glamour and created a climate which was well- 
disposed to disarmament. One influential publicist and statesman, not 
usually associated with the popular clamour for disarmament, Winston 
Churchill, said in 1929 that the prevention of war ought to become the 
main preoccupation of mankind. 
2 Fear of war haunted the imagination of 
a whole generation. Whatever doubts might be expressed about the utility 
of the League of Nations and those two much-proclaimed substitutes for 
wart arbitration and conciliation, most people in Britain believed that 
disarmament was the most effective way to prevent war. Even the 'never 
again# isolationists were uncertain about the value of armaments and 
though they, more than any other group, championed the cause of the 
Service departments they were far from being implacable opponents of 
disarmament. 
'Who in. Europe does not know that one more war in the West and the 
civilisation of the ages will fall with as great a shock as that of 
Rome? ' Baldwin asked in his presidential address to the Classical 
Association in January 1926.3 The same sentiments were echoed by the 
1. R. H. S. Crossman in War ad Democracy edited by E. F. M. Durbin 
and G. E. C. Catlin, London, 1938, pp. 276-8. 
2. W. S. Churchill: The World Crisis, Vol. 5, The Aftermath, London, 
1929, P. 451. 
3. The Times, 9 January 1926. 
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Daily Mail on the eve of Armistice Day 1927. 'Another great war would 
spell the suicide of the Western peoples, the ruin of Europe, and perhaps 
even the destruction of civilisation. I In February 1925 Baldwin's 
Secretary of State for Air, Sir Samuel Hoare, 
1 told the Commons that air 
warfare in the future might well mean the destruction of civilisation as 
they knew it. 
2 Nine months later The Times warned its readers that 'the 
war of the future must mean catastrophe to the whole population. Bombs 
of volcanic power will explode in crowded cities and a whole region may 
be laid under a pall of poison gas. ' War, it said, was no longer a 
legitimate instrument of policy. It welcomed the fact that an early 
comprehension of these horrors would increase the general and growing 
aversion to war. 
3 A similar view was expressed by Churchill in the fifth 
volume of The World Crisis published in March 1929. 'Should war come 
again to the world it is not with the weapons and agencies prepared for 
1919 that it will be fought, but with developments and extensions of 
these which will be incomparably more formidable and fatal.... Mankind 
has got into its hands for the first time the tools by which it can 
unfailingly accomplish its own extermination. ' 
4 If for the first time 
in its history mankind was capable of bringing about its own extermination, 
its survival clearly depended on the adoption of new remedies. It was 
difficult, therefore, for the man in the street to resist the conclusion 
that general disarmament was essential if war was to be avoided. 
In the immediate aftermath of the First World War the Lloyd George 
goverrment swiftly reacted to the mood of public opinion. Expenditure 
on armaments was considerably reduced and an agreement over naval armaments 
1. Sir Samuel Hoare, Viscount Templewood (1944), 1880-1959, Conservative 
MP for Chelsea, 1910-44, Secretary of State for Air, 1922-24,1924-29, 
Secretary of State for India, 1931-35, etc., Deputy League of Nations High Commissioner for Russian Refugees, 1921. 
2.180 HC Debs. 5th Series, col. 2210,26 February 1925. 
3.13 November 1925. 
4. p. 454-- 
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was concluded with the United States, Japan, France and Italy in 1922. 
After the successful conclusion of the Washington Conference popular 
interest in disarmament waned. In the middle years of the decade, as 
opinions began to diverge, public opinion was not so important a factor 
in the formulation of British foreign policy. As Foreign Secretary in 
Baldwin's second administration, 1924 to 1929, Austen Chamberlain 
1 
was 
reluctant to take public opinion into his confidence. This was especi- 
ally true in the critical years of the 1927 Geneva Naval Conference and 
the 1928 Anglo-French compromise over disarmament. More inclined to 
adopt the secretive methods of pre-1914 British diplomacy he only 
infrequently shared his thoughts about disarmament with the British 
people. What was true of Chamberlain was true of the whole of Baldwin's 
Cabinet with the notable exception of Lord Cecil. 
2 Until the League of 
Nations Union succeeded in mobilising an influential section of public 
oPinion in the late 192083 the Baldwin government could, to a large 
extent, ignore what agitation there was in the Press, Parliament and 
the country for disarmament. 
In an editorial on 20 August 1926 The Times commented: 'disarmament 
Sir (Joseph) Austen Chamberlain, 1863-1937, Unionist MP for 
E. Worcestershire, 1892-1914 and Birmingham West, 1914-37, Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, 1903-5 and 1919-21, Secretary of State for India, 
1915-17, Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons, 1921-22, 
Foreign Secretary, 1924-29. 
2. Lord Robert Cecil, Viscount Cecil of Chelwood (1923), Conservative 
MP for E. Marylebone, 1906-10 and (Independent) Conservative MP for 
Hitchin, 1911-23, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, 1915-16, Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
and Minister of Blockade, 1916-18, British representative on the 
League of Nations commission of the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, 
represented South Africa at the League of Nations Assembly, 1920-22, 
Lord Privy Seal, 1923-24, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster with 
responsibility for disarmament, 1924-27, resigned from the Baldwin 
government over differences with its disarmament policy, August 1927, 
chairman of a Foreign Office departmental committee on League of Nations affairs and a quasi Minister of State in the Second Labour 
Government, 1929-31, deputy leader of the British delegation to the 
League Assembly,, 1929-31, President of the League of Nations Union, 
1923-45. 
3. See Chapter Three below. 
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is a subject which more than any other divides mankind into cynics and 
enthusiasts. ' Editorial comment in The Times and other leading British 
newspapers belies that comment. However sceptical they might sometimes 
be about the likely success of international disarmament negotiations 
under the auspices of the League at Geneva, the leader writers of the 
British Press did not range themselves behind the cynics who derided 
disarmament. Some embraced disarmament with enthusiasm. The Daily 
Herald, the organ of the TUC and the Labour Party, the Daily News, the 
chief standard-bearer of Liberalism, and the Liberal Manchester Guardian 
gave disarmament wholehearted support. Others such as the independent 
but influential Observer edited by J. L. Garvin, Reynolds's News, the 
organ of the Co-operative Movement, the Conservative Daily TeleRraDh 
and The Times, gave the disarmament cause general support. Lord Cecil 
might in his correspondence bemoan Belgravia's cynicism about the League 
and disarmament 
1 
but the sentiments he heard expressed around the dining 
tables of Eaton Square were not typical of the British Press nor is there 
any evidence that they were typical of British opinion as a whole. 
Nothing could be more revealing about the Press's attitude to 
disarmament than the contrast between its warm and wholehearted support 
for the Washington Conference and its hostility to the Geneva Protocol. 
The Washington Conference had been called on President Harding's Initiative 
to find solutions to the problems of the Far East and to prevent a new 
naval arms race between Britain, the United States and Japan. The Geneva 
Protocol was drafted in committees of the 1924 League Assembly to promote 
disarmament by closely linking it with the compulsory arbitration of 
international disputes and the more effective enforcement of League 
sanctions. 
2 
1. Cecil to Davidson, 30 December 1927, copy in Austen Chamberlain 
Papers, AC 55/57. 
2. See pp. 255-63. 
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'Let there be no mistake about it, we shall not be drawn into a 
war with the United States', the Sundav Express told its readers on 
15 November 1920. Eight months later the Daily Telegraph, commenting 
on the unveiling of the Washington statue in Trafalgar Square said that 
together the United States and Britain constituted the strongest political, 
economic and moral force upon earth. There was hardly anything which 
they could not achieve if they set themselves to the task in unison. 
On 2 July 1921, some days before President Harding invited the 
principal naval powers to a conference in Washington, the Daily Telegraph 
took up the theme of the Press's role in promoting world peace. 'If the 
Press of the world were always united to seek Peace and ensue it, the 
cause of Peace would always prevail. Today the Press of the leading 
nations is more sincerely convinced of the folly and danger of entering 
a new rivalry of armaments than at any previous period of its history. 
It is convinced of its folly because armaments are an insatiable Moloch, 
and of its danger because when once armaments reach a certain pitch there 
is no stopping, and war, sooner or later, becomes certain. We doubt if 
any responsible statesman believes that the machinery of the League of 
Nations would be effective to stop war if once an era of rivalry set int 
and so there is a general desire, nay, a general demand, on the part of 
some of the great nations of the world for a limitation of armaments... 
the entire Press of, Great Britain is in President Harding's phrase "a 
sane Press". Not a voice has been raised against the important lead 
already given by the British Government to lighten the burden of naval 
armaments.... We have definitely abandoned the Two Power Standard; we 
have proclaimed to the world that we are willing to accept the basis of 
equality with any other single Naval Power.... The duty of the Press 
to help forward this movement was never clearer. ' 
: L. I July 1921. 
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The. Dailv Telegravh was not alone in recognising the role which the 
Press could play in promoting peace and disarmament. When the Washington 
Conference opened in November 1921 the Sunday Express asked: 'What can we 
do to help? We can organise public opinion.... Let us send across the 
Atlantic a message of faith to the peacemakers. Let us take up arms in 
defence of our children. They shall be saved from the agony we have 
endured. ' 
1 
The Press gave enormous coverage to the Conference itself. For 
more than a week before it convened, the Daily Mail advertised the fact 
that 11. G. Wells would be covering the Conference for them and advertise- 
ments to that effect were placed in a number of other papers. 
Four column reports of the opening proceedings of the Conference 
appeared in a number of papers. The Dailv Mail said that the purpose 
of the Conference was to end 'the mad competition in armaments' and to 
reach a durable settlement of the Pacific question. If it failed the 
armaments race would continue until there came 'a war in all probability 
much more terrible than the worst phases of the conflagration' that had 
not then been quite extinguished in Europe. It was the Conference's 
task to deliver the world from such a disastrous prospect. 
2 
The Times was afraid that the British public would not fully 
appreciate the significance of the Conference. 'There is nothing that 
matters so much to us as Englishmen, as Britons, as members of a great 
and free commonwealth of nations, as whether the Washington Conference 
succeeds or fails ... responsibility for the success of the Conference lies 
now in a very large degree upon this country and upon the British Empire 
as a whole. ' An, ardent desire for its complete success would be for a 
number of months the primary impulse of Britain's imperial policy. 
3 
1.13 November 1921. 
2.2 Noveiiber-1921. 
3.21 September 1921. 
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On the first Sunday after the Conference opened in Washington the 
Sunday Express exaggeratedly exclaimed: 'Never in the history of mankind 
was the world nearer its dream of brotherhood'. 
1 
Seldom, if ever, said 
The Times, had a conference held its first session under auspices so 
happy. Though disappointment was expressed by a number of papers over 
the Conference's failure to abolish submarines and tackle the problem of 
land armaments no disarmament treaty of the inter-war years was more 
warmly applauded. 
In striking contrast to the Washington Conference, the Geneva 
Protocol, in so far as it was noticed at all by the Press, met with 
scathing criticism. Reports that 'the future control of the British 
Navy' was being discussed by the League and that 'in certain circum- 
stances ... the British Navy will be at the entire 
disposal of the League 
of Nations' angered The Times and a number of other papers. 
2 So far as 
LhLe Times was concerned, there could be no question of loosening the 
nation's control over its most powerful weapon of defence. 'The mere 
idea that in any contingencies our Navy should be placed at the disposition 
Of an Organisation of foreign lawyers and diplomatists would excite the 
whole nation to fury, could they be persuaded to take it seriously. They 
know it to be utterly impracticable and they intend it to remain 80.13 
Three days later, in an editorial. marking the return of the Navy's 
Special Service Squadron to Britain after a ten months' cruise around 
the world, The Times referred to the Navy as 'this speaking instrument 
and symbol of the might and majesty of the Imperial State'. The navy 
clearly evoked greater loyalty than the League of Nations. 
The, Dailv Maill under totally different control from The Times, 
after Lord Northcliffe's death in 1922, was equally critical of the 
1.13 November 1921. 
2.17 September 1924. 
3.24 September 1924. 
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Protocol. It was admirably adapted for keeping Britain and the British 
Navy 'in constant hot water'. 
' 'People who make proposals of this sort 
live in their own world of theories and unrealities. They ignore the 
hard facts which condemn their dreams and illusions ... instead of reducing 
our maritime forces we should have to increase them substantially. ' 
Equally instructive are the varying responses to President Coolidge's 
initiative in convening a naval disarmament conference in 1927 and its 
subsequent failure some months later. 
2 'Great Britain's anxiety to 
reduce naval expenditure has not diminished but increased since the 
Washington Conference', the Daill Telep-raph wrote on 15 March 1927. 
Three days earlier The Times commented: 'There is no desire in the Navy 
to enter into a race of armaments with other countries. ' Both papers 
favourably contrasted the prospects of the forthcoming conference with 
those of the deadlocked Preparatory Commission in Geneva. 
3 'If any 
practical progress at all is to be achieved in the matter of naval 
disarmament, it will be achieved rather by this limited conference than 
by endless, largely theoretical and often insincere discussions in which 
navyless Powers do not hesitate solemnly to record their voices', the 
Daily Telegra-phcommented on 13 April. 
The Sundav Exi)ress did not take such a sangiline view of the 
conference's prospects. France and Italy's abstention made it 'unreal 
and unpractical'. The British Empire was in a very different position 
from the other participants. Its very existence depended on sea power 
and the defence of its sea communications. The safety and security of 
the Empire, not disarmament, was Britain's paramount interest. 
4 
When the Geneva conference failed to bridge the gap between British 
1.19 September 1924. 
2. See pp. 19B-211. 
3. See PP. 308-10. 
4.19 June 1927. 
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and American demands even the government's sternest critics were loath 
to place all the blame on the British delegation. It was widely recog- 
nised that the Americans shared some of the responsibility for the con- 
ference's failure. Just before the conference broke up the Surday Express 
and the Dailv Mailcounselled their readers not to take the matter too 
seriously. 'At the moment the British people are not worrying about 
Geneva and parity', wrote the Sundav Express. 
1 'They are like the child 
who was "more than usual calm: she did not give a single damn". They 
simply do not believe either in war or in naval competition with the 
United States. They therefore turn without a qualm or tremor to the 
delights of the holiday season. ' 'Even if the Naval Disarmament 
Conference at Geneva breaks up as some assert that it will', said the 
Daily Mail, 'there is not the least need for any Briton to allow his 
holiday to be overclouded by the news. 
2 
The Dailv TeleRraDh drew a slightly different conclusion. The 
true lesson to be drawn from the conference was that disarmament was 
a far more complex matter than the average man assumed. If two friendly 
nations like Britain and America could not agree on the limitation of 
cruisers it was not likely that the nations of the world would be able 
to agree about the limitation of land forces. 
3 
The Observer took a much more serious view of the Conference's 
failure. No progress would be made in European disarmament until the 
process began in Washington in 1921-2 was allowed to continue. 'If the 
Naval Conference had reached an agreement, confidence would have moved 
out on a flowing tide. ' Both Britain and the United States could do 
more for peace than they had already done. Peace could not be clinched 
without disarmament. 
4 
1.31 July 1927. 
2.30 July 1927. 
3.5 August 1927. 
4.28 August 1927. 
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In the years 1919-31 some papers did not waver in their support 
for disarmament while others only lent it their support when it promised 
immediate reductions in defence expenditure. The Daily Mail. co=ended 
the efforts of the Washington Conference and condemned the makers of the 
Geneva Protocol because the former would lead to a reduction in public 
expenditure whereas the latter threatened to impose fresh burdens on 
the British people which would be costly in their execution. 
Among the papers which consistently advocated disarmament throughout 
the 1920s the Daily Herald has an untarnished reputation. It did little, 
however, to throw light on the fundamental problems and issues which dis- 
armament posed and assumed only too readily that bold but simple policies 
would lead to a general reduction of armaments. Though not the mass 
circulation newspaper it was to become a decade later it was none the 
less broadly representative of opinion in the Labour Movement. In 1919 
it was one of the first papers to regret that disarmament had been 
relegated to a comparatively minor place in the League Covenant because, 
it said, with the notable exceptions of Lord Robert Cecil and Colonel 
House, 1 those who had drafted it did not believe that the 1914-18 war 
would be the last. 
2 Its pacifist sympathies, however, made it critical 0 
of Article 16 which committed the League to 'the emplo7ment of force 
against force'. 
3 In 1921 it was one of the few newspapers to mock the 
efforts of the 'peacemakers' at the Washington conference on the grounds 
that it was impossible to make lasting peace in a world of competing 
capitalist states. 
4 The abolition of war was such a revolutionary task 
that it could only be accomplished by men who believed in it. 
5 Though 
Col. E. M. House, 1858-1938, friend and confidant of President Wilson, 
Wilson's special envoy to the belligerent powers in 1915 and 1916, an American member of the League of Nations commission of the Paris Peace 
Conference and a consistent supporter of the League in the United States. 
2.31 March 1919. 
3.30 April 1919. 
4.11 November 1921. 
5.12 November 1921. 
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it was most critical of the 1923 air expansion scheme which the Baldwin 
government introduced to reduce the enormous disparity between British 
and French air power, it did not align itself with those who advocated 
unilateral disarmament. From France's occupation of the Ruhr, it drew 
the conclusion that it would be a mistake for Britain to throw away her 
armaments in a world of armed states. 
1 
In the last half of the 1920s the Dailv Herald criticised the conduct 
of all the great powers in the League and its Preparatory Commission but 
singled out the British government for being most responsible for sabotag- 
ing disarmament. 2 It commended the smaller powers for challenging them 
in the 1927 League Assembly and warmly welcomed their efforts to revive 
the Geneva Protocol. In December 1927 it embarrassed MacDonald and the 
leaders of the Labour tarty by enthusiastically endorsing Russia's 
proposals in the Preparatory Commission for total disarmament. 
3 When 
the Preparatory Commission adjourned its sixth session in May 1929 
without finalising its draft disarmament convention, it commented 
sarcastically that the Commission's record over the previous three years 
could not have failed to gladden the hearts of militarists everywhere. 
'One after another, every kind of limitation has been rejected.... 
Europe remains as before the war, an armed camp. ' 
4 When the Commission 
eventually completed its work in the days of the second Labour government 
it was, however, slightly more sanAiline about its achievements than some 
other papers. Though it admitted that the draft convention fell short of 
expectations it conceded that it represented the maximum which could be 
achieved by agreement. It did not believe that either France, Italy or 
the smaller powers of Europe were prepared to agree to any substantial 
1.11 May 1923. 
2.8,12,14,15# 19,26 and 27 September 1927. 
3.1,2 and 10 December 1927. 
4.7 May 1929. 
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reductions in armaments at that juncture. 
1 
Like the Daily Herald, the Daily News was a staunch advocate of 
disarmament. None the less in 1923 it gave general approval to the 
Baldwin government's, air expansion scheme. 'We cannot believe that the 
passive acceptance of French domination in the air would bring the 
abolition of air armaments at all nearer. ' Writing in the same issue, 
Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, 2a strong champion of disarmament 
in the immediate post-war years, said that regrettably Britain had to 
copy the jingoes of the 1870s and say: 'We have the planes, we have the 
men, we have the money too., 
3 
When in July 1923 MacDonald moved a motion in the House of Commons 
calling on the Baldwin government to summon an international disarmament 
conference without delay the Daily News criticised the Labour party for 
'its incomplete diagnosis of the evil to be remedied' and its almost 
total indifference to the League of N&tions' own efforts to promote 
disarmament through the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance. 
4 Almost a 
month earlier it admitted that it would have been much less sympathetic 
towards the government's air expansion scheme had it been in any doubt 
about Baldwin's wholehearted support for the draft Treaty. 
The conclusion of the Locarno agreements 
6 
in October 1925 led the 
1.11 December 1930. 
2. Maj. -Gen. Sir F. B. Maurice, 1871-1951, Director of Military Operations 
at the War Office, 1915-18, author of a famous letter to the Press in 
1918 accusing the Lloyd George goverment of deceiving Parliament and 
the public about the strength of the British army on the Western Front. 
3.28 June 1923. 
4.24 July 1923. For the work of the League of Nations in promoting 
disarmament and the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, see 
5.28 June 1923. The Daily News was mistaken in thinking that the draf t 
Treaty of Mutual Assistance had the full backing of Baldwin and his 
Cabinet. Because it had, to a large extent, been drafted by Lord 
Cecil the Daily News assumed that it represented the thinking of the 
British government. 
6. For the Loca-rno agreements, see pp. 263-9. 
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Daily News to write on Armistice Day 1925 in a mood of exultant 
jubilation: 'It [the First World War] may after all prove to have been 
in the true historical sense the war that ended war. ' On New Year'B Eve 
1925 it wrote: 'No year for a long time has opened with such bright 
prospects for peace abroad as that which begins tomorrow. ' The course 
of events in 1926 and 1927 were, however, to shatter its illusions. It 
became much more critical of the Conservative government's foreign policy. 
In an editorial entitled 'Shrinking Armies' it contrasted the substantial 
reductions which had been made by a number of continental powers since 
1923 with the inconspicuous part Britain had played in promoting disarma- 
ment. 
I In January 1927 it attributed the American goverment's decision 
to launch a new cruiser construction programme to 'the wickedness and the 
folly of British naval policy'. The not result of Britain's 'wantonly 
aggressive naval policy' was to stimulate international naval competition 
and threaten Britain's own naval supremacy. 
2 On 15 March 1927 it warned 
that 'it must be fairly evident to persons of ordinary intelligence not 
only that the British Admiralty has no intention of making any serious 
contribution to the cause of naval disarmament but also that in its 
jealous adherence to an out-of-date tradition of naval prestige, it is 
blind to the changing principles of defensive strategy, careless of the 
nation's financial needs, and out of touch with the spirit of the age'. 
After Cecil resigned from the Baldwin goverment in August 1927 
3 it drew 
the conclusion that 'sooner or later the dictation of the Admiralty will 
have to be boldly met and crushed'. 
4 In October 1927 it warned: 'We 
cannot contribute anything to the cause of constructive peace as long as 
1.9 August 1926. 
2.7 January 1927. 
3. Cecil's resignation from the Baldwin Cabinet, though precipitated 
by the government's refusal to make concessions to the American 
point of view at the Geneva Naval Conference, was due primarily 
to deep differences of opinion with his colleagues over disarmament. 
4.30 August 1927. 
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our statesmen create the impression that in all discussions on disarma- 
ment they are thinking first and only and all the time of their nation's 
"military security" and would rather lose an agreement than a single 
6 inch gun; and that their own idea of effective intervention at Geneva 
is to exercise the right of veto with almost automatic regularity. 
" In 
the 1929 general election the Daily News, having decided that peace and 
employment were the chief issues in the campaign, tried to persuade its 
readers that the Liberal 'party was the only party with a constructive 
policy for peace and disarmament. 
When the Preparatory Commission completed its task in December 1930 
the News Chronicle, the Daily News' successor, warned its readers that 
neither France nor Italy nor any of the smaller states of East and South 
East Europe would do anything more than talk about disarmament so long 
as Russia had a well-equipped army whose striking power was increasing 
from month to month. Europe was caught in a vicious circle. If the 
victor powers failed to carry out their Versailles obligations to disarm, 
they could not expect Germany to keep her side of 'the bargain'. 'In 
the welter of arguments', it said, 'one fact stands out supreme. Unless 
France disarms, Germany will inevitably re-arm. ' 
2 
Like the Daily Herald and the Daily News, the Manchester Guardian 
gave unequivocal support to disarmament. It was one of the first to 
point to the intimate connection between the League and disarmament. 
Without the League the world"would be forced once again to rely on alliances 
and armed defence. 
3 War would be the inevitable consequence of a new 
competition in armaments but unless a solution was found to some of the 
political problems which confronted Europe and the Far East there could 
1.22 October 1927. The Dailv News was commenting primarily on the 
actions of the British delegation at the Preparatory Commission 
in opposing the disarmament policies of the continental powers. 
2.10 December 1930. 
3.4 July 1919. 
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be no disarmament. 
1 
So terrible was the prospect of a new arms race 
that there was no place for partisan attitudes in British politics. 
The parties should confer together like a group of menaced friends to 
try and find a way of escape. Some of the greatest European powers were 
still saturated with pre-war ideas about armaments but Britain could by 
her energy and patience bring Europe a step nearer to that state of 
affairs when arms would only be used as a last resort, to enforce what 
Europe collectively decided to be just. In 1923 the Manchester Guardian 
was in no doubt that Britain could best accomplish that end by throwing 
her influence behind the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance. 
2 
By the end of the first decade of peace the Manchester Guardian 
was taking a far less sanguine view of the prospects for disarmament. 
The international scene, it said, was littered with a number of far- 
reaching proposals which no one took seriously. 
3 
Since 1919 there had 
been a great wash of eloquence in praise of disarmament and a greater 
expenditure of money and energy on preparing for war but in the wake of 
the Great Depression, however, it detected a slim chance that economic 
ruin might bring Europe to its senses. 
4 
Revnolds's Newspaper, though one of the smaller and less well-known 
Sunday papers of the 1920s, is worthy of notice because it reflected those 
radical attitudes which played such a major role in shaping public opinion 
in the inter-war years. Surveying the prospects of the Paris Peace 
Conference in January 1919 it concluded that armaments ought to figure 
prominently on the conference's agenda. It recognised, however, that in 
the long run how that problem was dealt with would depend on the success 
5 
or failure of the League of Nations. There was a danger, it warned, that 
1.12 July 1921 and 24 July 1923. 
2.24 July 1923. 
3.11 July 1931. 
4.13 July 1931. 
5.19 January 1919. 
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some nations might wish to convert the League into an alliance of 
militaristic powers. If on the other hand it was well and truly estab- 
lished, lenthroning right instead of forcelp the League could be relied 
upon to promote disarmament. 
1 
'Wherever we look in the world we see but wars and preparations for 
wars', it observed in December 1920. Ordinary people were not to blame. 
Statesmen, soldiers and sailors had brought the last war on the world. 
As soon as the nations of the world had recovered their strength they 
would bring yet another war on mankind. Unless the masses impressed 
their will on their rulers, mankind would, sooner or later, drift into 
another world war in which civilisation might perish from the face of 
the earth. 
2 
Almost a decade later it was drawing the same conclusion. The men 
who presented the greatest peril to peace were the soldiers and sailors 
whose careers depended on war and preparations for war. 'Unless we can 
set ourselves free from them they will lead us into the next war just as 
surely as night follows today. 
3 Commenting on the failure of the 1930 
4 London Naval conference to achieve complete success, it said that their 
hopes and expectations had been shattered because France was unable to 
think of security in any other terms than those of armaments. It would 
take a long time for French and Italian statesmen to redlise that world 
peace could not be built on armaments. 
No paper tried more earnestly than the Daily Telegraph to combine 
zeal for disarmament with a proper regard for Britain's defence require- 
ments. Though it regarded itself as peculiarly representative of the 
1. 11 May 1919. 
2. 19 December 1920. 
3. 23 June 1929. 
4. See pp. 222-4. 
5. 13 April 1930. 
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Services' point of view it went out of its way to pay tribute to the 
work which Lord Cecil had done for disarm nt when he resigned from 
the Baldwin government in August 1927. Many others, it said, shared 
Lord Cecil's view that the limitation of armaments was 'by far the most 
important question of the day' and that the attainment of international 
disarmament agreements was of greater value than any other political 
objective. 
1 
Notwithstanding its sympathy for Lord Cecil and disarma- 
ment the Daily Telegraph gave strong support to the Baldwin goverment 
by defending Britain's record over disarmament, contrasting it favour- 
ably with that of other countries. Along with many other newspapers it 
came to recognise, however, that there could be no further advance towards 
general disarmament until Britain and the United States adjusted their 
differences and came to a further agreement on the limitation of naval 
armaments. 
2 It supported the second Labour goverment's efforts to 
achieve disarmament and when in July 1931 the League of Nations Union 
mounted a major demonstration in favour of disarmament in the Albert 
Hall3 it described the meeting with noticeable enthusiasm as 'the most 
impressive demonstration in the cause of disarmament that had been 
witnessed in any country'. It bore witness to the whole world, it said, 
'that the whole heart of Great Britain' was in 'that liberating movement'. 
Like other organs of Conservative opinion it regretted, however, that 
Britain's example in disarmament had not been followed by the other 
great powers. 
4 
During the last years of Lord Northcliffe's proprietorship, The 
Times, though sometimes taking a line at variance with both the Lloyd 
George government and the Conservative party, gave general support to 
1.31 August 1927. 
2.15 and 23 April 1929. 
3. See PP. 102-4. 
4.13 JulY 1931. 
36 
disarmament and the government's efforts to reach a naval limitation 
agreement with the United States. After Lord Northcliffe's death The Times 
became 'a reliable party paper' of the Conservative iYarty. 
I In the years 
1922 to 1931 its equivocal attitude to the League and disarmament mirrored 
the changing responses of the Conservative party to the problems of 
European security and international disarmament. 
The Times was far from consistent in its attitude to the League and 
disarmament. In July 1921 it described disarmament as the first objective 
of the League of Nations. 
2 Seven months later it commended Balfour's 
work for disarmament with the words: 'No statesman who ever left our 
shores on the nation's business has ever had such wholehearted support 
as Mr. Balfour had in his great work for peace at the Washington Conference., 
3 
In 1918 it had called for a League of Nations 'with teeth' capable of 
coercing the unruly members of the international communit but when in 
1924 the League of Nations commended the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance 
and the Geneva Protocol to member states as instruments by which the 
unruly might be coerced, The Times gave them no support. When, however, 
its views were challenged by such pillars of the establishment as Lord 
Cecil and Lord Hardinge of Penshurst 
5 in two persuasive letters defending 
the Protocol, it admitted that the Protocol contained 'many excellent 
features' which deserved 'the warm sympathy of the British peoples'. 
6 
A few months later it was only too ready to take its cue from Austen 
Chamberlain and unequivocally reject the Protocol. 
1. J. Ramsden: The Am of Balfour and Baldwin. 1902-1940. A History of 
the Conservative Party, London and New York, 1978, P. 170. 
2.1 July 1921. 
3.23 January 1922. 
4.12 January 1918. 
5. Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, 1858-1944, Permanent Under-Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, 1906-10 and 1916-20, Viceroy of India, 
1910-16, British ambassador in Paris, 1920-22, chief Indian delegate 
at the 1924 League Assembly, regarded by many as one of the chief 
architects of the 1904 Entente Cordials. 
6.30 September and 3 October 1924. 
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If it wavered in its attitude to the Geneva Protocol, The Times 
wholeheartedly welcomed the Locarno treaties as a landmark in European 
history. It warned its readers, however, against too exuberant antici- 
pations. There could be no sudden leap into Utopia. 
1 It did not rate 
the chances of an international disarmament agreement at all highly. 
In February 1925 it had described the obstacles in the way of an agreement 
over land armaments as insuperable. 
2 In April 1926 it told its readers 
that disarmament was not a subject that powerfully moved European opinion. 
3 
War remained an inescapable risk in a world of sovereign states. Though 
it was sceptical about the chances of the Preparatory Commission ever 
accomplishing an acceptable disarmament convention, it recognised that 
there were dangers to peace which only disarmament could avert. It 
declared that a costly and dangerous international competition in land, 
sea and air armaments was wholly alien to British opinion. 
4 No one, it 
believed, would contest the elementary principle that an all-round 
reduction of armaments would greatly reduce the temptation to solve 
international conflicts by war. To translate that truism into a binding 
international agreement was, however, extremely difficult because it was 
no easy thing to establish the necessary confidence between nations. The 
jealousies and suspicions of years could not be dissipated in a day. All 
that the Preparatory Commission could ever hope to achieve was a code of 
rules which nations could subsequently adopt when they felt 'disposed to 
5 diminish their expenditure upon armed forces' . 
When in September 1927 after the failure of the Geneva Haval Conference, 
Chamberlain went to face criticism of British policy at the League Assembly, 
1.17t 21 and 24 October, 1 December 1925. 
2. . 13 February 1925. 
3.24 April 1926. 
4.12 March 1927. 
5.3 February 1926. 
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it commended him for refusing to allow Britain to be entangled in 
ambitious schemes for security and disarmament. Throughout 1927 and 1928 
it continued to give Chamberlain its uncritical support. In September 
1928 at the time of the disastrous Anglo-French compromise over disarma- 
ment it wrote: 'It is possible to blame the Government for many things 
but least of all for a foreign policy which has enhanced British prestige 
and should be a source of pride to the British nation. ' 
I It was not 
until after the defeat of the Baldwin government in May 1929 that The 
Times was prepared to admit that Britain bore some responsibility for 
the deadlock over disarmament. 'It is the British and American peoples 
with whom the hopes of progress primarily rest and whose responsibilities 
are by far the largest. Their failure to agree, as Continental critics 
have been justified in saying, has halted, and until it is amended, will 
continue to halt disarm" nt. t2 
At the conclusion of the London Naval conference in April 1930 
The Times succinctly expressed the attitude of most Englishmen to the 
inter-related problems of European security and international disarmament. 
'Public opinion in this country is instinctively averse from accepting any 
obligation which might commit it, more deeply than it is already committed, 
to active intervention in conflicts between other Powers arising in the 
indefinite future out of circumstances which it can neither foresee nor 
control. ' If a formula was devised which committed Britain to responsi- 
bilities no greater than those to which she was already committed, it 
would not satisfy France's demand for additional security. If it did 
not satisfy that demand and facilitate a reduction in French armaments, 
The Times asked, what useful purpose would it serve? 
3 
1.27 September 1928. 
2.19 June 1929. 
3.9 April 1930. 
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When in July 1931 the League of Nations Union held its demonstration 
in favour of disarmament in the Albert Hall The Times commented that it 
impressively demonstrated the strength of the British nation's determina- 
tion to do everything in its power to make the Disarmament Conference a 
practical success. It is not without significance, however, that though 
it fully reported the speeches of the participants including those of 
the three party leaders, Baldwin, Lloyd George and MacDonald, it made 
over its picture page, not to the colourful procession of demonstrators 
who, with their banners, made their way from the Embankment to the Albert 
Hall, but to EMS Warspite, and Rodne-Y of the Atlantic Pleet at anchor in 
Tor Bay. I 
Among the papers which campaigned for disarmament in the late 1920s 
none was more vocal in its support than the Observer. In March 1927 it 
prophetically wrote: 'Were it proved that the peace-movement after the 
Great War of 1914-18 had failed in spite of the League, there could be 
no rational belief whatever that any new peace-movement could succeed. ' 
2 
More than most other papers the Observer had a clear view of the vital 
role which Britain could play in promoting peace and disarmament. Europe 
wanted Britain's co-operation in maintaining peace, it said, because 'the 
war revealed, more conspicuously than at any time in historyp the decisive 
influence of sea power. The weapon of the blockade, by cutting off a 
belligerent from supplies of food and war material, compels him in the 
end to surrender. ' Control of this weapon was to a large extent in 
British hands. 3 It was for this reason among others that the Observer 
vigorously called for close Anglo-American co-operation. It deprecated 
those policies of the Baldwin government which had undermined Anglo- 
American co-operation. 'There will be absolutely no hope of any real 
1.13 MY 1931. 
2.13 March 1927. 
3.4 December 1927. 
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change for the better in the ministerial attitude until Bridgeman 
1 
goes. 
How I wish that the General Election was nearer. I cannot love these 
people', J. L. Garvin, the Observer's editor, wrote to Philip Kerr on 
17 January 1929.2 Two days later the Observer warned its readers that 
if the United States made large additions to her navy it would be because 
of the obtuseness of the British government. 'In the conditions of today', 
it said, 'we can hold the seas only jointly with America. 
3 
Two months later the Observer called on the government 'to take a 
trenchant and determined lead in the general cause of disarmament'. The 
first task awaiting the new government, which would be elected at the 
forthcoming general election, would be to seek disarmament through a 
conference with the United States. Settle that issue, it said, and 
progress with general disarmament would be assured. 
4 Nothing short of 
reductions, 'patent and comprehensive', would satisfy the world's will 
to peace. No rigid formulae could be allowed to obstruct the achievement 
of that objective. 
5 
In December 1929 the Observer could look back with 
gratitude and pride at the changes which had taken place in Anglo-American 
relations in the course of 1929. Patriotism, it suggested, should, in 
future, inspire the British people to seek co-operative disarmament. 
6 
There can be little doubt about the influence exercised by the Daily 
Mail in the inter-war years. In the early 1920s it could boast of a 
circulation in excess of one and a half million. Politicians of the 
standing of Baldwin and Austen Chamberlain were only too well aware of 
1. W. C. Bridgeman, 1864-1935, Viscount Bridgeman of Leigh (1929), 
Unionist MP for Oswestry, 1906-29, Secretary of Mines, 1920-22, 
Home Secretary, 1922-24, First Lord of the Admiralty, 1924-29. 
2. Lothian Papers, GD 40/17/240. 
3.19 January 1929. 
4.3 March 1929. 
5.5 May 1929. 
6.22 December 1929. 
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its power and influence. Chamberlain believed that its voice swayed his 
Cabinet colleagues 
1 
and Baldwin was forced to fight for his political life 
to counter a determined effort by the Daily MAil. and the Daily Express to 
remove him from the leadership of the Conservative Party. 
2 
In an editorial on American Independence Day, 4 July 1921, in which 
it called for much closer co-operation between the United States and the 
British Empire, the Daily Mail said that among the questions which would 
have to be discussed foremost was the question of disarmament. Always 
quick to point the connection between disarmament on the one hand and 
greater prosperity and lower taxation on the other, it went on to say: 
'Let us plan a reign of peace and set about re-starting trade and lighten- 
ing the burden of everybody. ' 
When in 1922 and 1923 the Daily Mail campaigned for an Anglo-French 
pact, one of its chief arguments was that without it Britain would find 
3 herself involved in a fresh competition in armaments. Furthermore, 
France's anxieties would lead her to maintain costly and burdensome 
armAments. 
4 When the Locarno treaties were initialled in October 1925 
it expressed the hope that Locarno would inaugurate an era of peace in 
Europe. 'The desire of the British nation is to end the period of mutual 
suspicion and of competition in armaments, to strengthen old friendships, 
and, whether in Europe or in the Far East, to get rid of prejudices and 
animosity', it wrote. 
5 
In March 1927, some three months before the naval disarmament 
conference convened in Geneva, the Dailv Mail criticised the goverment 
1. Austen Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 19 June 1926 and 20 February 1927, 
Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC 5/l/386 & 410. 
2. K. Middlemas and J. Barnes: Baldwin. A Biography, London, 1969, 
pp. 541-602. 
3.18 July 1923. 
4.7 July 1924. 
5.17 October 1925. 
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for spending too much on the nation's defence. 'The figures of the Navy 
Estimates, which were published yesterday', it wrote, 'and the debate on 
the Air Estimates in the House of Commons show that the defence expendi- 
ture of this country is still on much too high a footing.... There has 
thus been an increase not far from fifty per cent. since 1914.1 As a 
consequence no other nation had to bear such an extortionate burden of 
taxation. 1 
Though it was critical of the Baldwin government's defence expendi- 
ture it could not resist the temptation to report with patriotio pride 
the latest developments in British weaponry. On such occasions as the 
2 Hendon air pageant it dubbed RAP pilots 'Our Knights of the Air' . 
When the 1930 naval disarmament conference met in London its pro- 
ceedings were given prominence in the pages of the. Daily Mail. 'All 
our wishes here are and have always been for the swift and complete 
success of the Conference', it wrote. 'We [the British] have been 
advocates of disarmament for more than twenty years. As far back as 
the second Hague Conference we effected large reductions in our Navy 
3... 
American statesmen may rest assured that the British public and British 
Press in unison with the British Goverment will do all that is in their 
power to remove the obstacles in the way of a marked reduction in naval 
expenditure. 
4 
Nevertheless, for all its flamboyance, disarmament was, 
to a large extent, a tax-saving device so far as the Daily Mail, was 
concerned. 
1.11 March 1927. It failed to remind its readers that the cost of living 
had risen by about forty per cent. since 1914 and that, therefore, in 
real terms defence expenditure was scarcely in excess of the pre-war 
level. 
2.2 July 1927. 
3. It was misleading to say that as a result of the 1907 Hague conference 
Britain made large reductions in her naval expenditure. Though it is 
true that Britain's naval construction programme was slightly cur- tailed in a vain effort to persuade the German government to abandon 
its construction programme, naval expenditure continued to rise in the years 1907 to 1914. 
4.27 February 1930. 
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One of the first newspapers to nail its isolationist colours to the 
mast and proclaim its faith in the British Empire was the Sundav Express. 
When it became clear that the United States would not be playing a major 
role in either the League of Nations or European affairs the Sundav 
Express declared: 'We cannot afford, and we do not intend to police 
Europe, and our relationship with European politics must be determined 
by the national interest and not by emotional altruism. ' 
1 During the 
war John Bull, it said, had bitten off more than he could chew. He ought, 
therefore, to abolish all his foreign commitments until he could afford 
them. 2 More than a decade later it was still proclaiming the same 
message. 'We ought to turn our backs to Europe and look out over the 
seas., 
3 The British people should 'offer up grace to imperialism 
4 
and 
remind the world that Britain's navy had abandoned none of its pretensions 
and lost little of its power. Sea power was the breath of life and the 
5 
condition of freedom for Britain's island people and far-flung empire. 
Notwithstanding its isolationist and imperial sentiments, the 
L- was not averse to giving flamboyant if superficial support 92D-A. ay Expregg 
to disarmament. It welcomed the Washington Conference with jubilant 
emotion. 
6 It even went so far as to censure the delegates for disap- 
7 Pointing Europe's aspirations for land disarmament. If the conference 
failed, it warned, Britain would bear her share of the responsibility. 
8 
A decade later it described armaments with the facile comment that they 
were 'Just a bad habit' and went on to admonish the nations of the world 
1. 12 October 1919. 
2. 5 December 1920. 
3. 11 January 1931. 
4. 9 November 1919. 
5. 27 July 1924. 
6. 13 November 1921. 
7. 27 November 1921. 
8. 4 December 1921. 
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to keep before them 'the ideal of a world unarmed except for necessary 
policing and the maintenance of civil order'. 
1 
Throughout the years of peace, from 1919 to 1931 and well beyond, 
Britain's press assumed that there was a national consensus which strongly 
favoured disarmament. Disarmament, it believed, would confer enormous 
benefits on the British people and at the same time make a major contri- 
bution to the preservation of world peace. It was a widely held view 
that Britain's defence expenditure was far too high and that cuts in 
the defence budget would make a major contribution to the country's 
economic well-being. Both papers of the Left and those of the Right 
feared the consequences of a new international arms race. Few questioned 
the assumption that it would inevitably lead to another major war. 
For much of the 1920s the papers of the Right assumed that Britain 
had set an example in disarmament which other powers had failed to follow. 
The organs of the Left, though critical of France and other powers for 
maintaining excessively high armaments, were less inclined to praise 
Britain's example. They criticised successive British governments, and 
particularly Baldwin's second administration, for failing to give a 
bolder lead. They believed that Britain not only stood to gain more 
from disarmament than any other power but that she was also in a special 
position to give a lead to the rest of the world in promoting general 
disarmament. Neither the papers of the Left nor those of the Right gave 
any indication that they fully understood the price which Britain would 
have to pay if she were to give an effective lead to the world. 
It would be wrong to conclude that disarmament was a newsworthy item 
for Britain's newspapers. Whereas the Washington and London naval confer- 
ences of 1921-22 and 1930 were given wide coverage and great prominence 
there were long periods in the 1920s when disarmament received only scant 
1.22 February 1931. 
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coverage. It was difficult for journalists to excite the interest of 
their readers in the technical proceedings of the League of Nations 
Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference which held six 
sessions in Geneva between 1926 and 1930. On the other hand, the Geneva 
Naval Conference of 1927 was not given the attention it deserved nor was 
sufficient publicity given to the work of the League's Temporary Mixed 
Commission on Armaments which produced between 1922 and 1924 the draft 
Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the precursor of the equally unnoticed 
Geneva Protocol for the Settlement of International Disputes. In the 
middle years of the decade events in China and, to a lesser extent, in 
Egypt occupied the headlines and distracted the papers and their readers 
from giving adequate consideration to disarmament. As a result it was 
not until the end of the decade that the British people awoke to the 
challenge which disarmament posed to them as one of the most privileged 
and powerful nations of the world. 
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CHLPTER TWO 
THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND DISARMAMENT 
Disarmament was not an issue which divided the public on strictly 
party lines. Prominent members of all three political parties graced 
the platform in most of the major disarmament demonstrations in the 
decade before the 1932 world disarmament conference. The Conservative, 
Labour and Liberal parties all professed a commitment to disarmament but 
the conviction with which that commitment was expressed by their various 
spokesmen differed considerably. Though Cecil and a small band of 
Conservatives preached disarmament with as much fervour as any in the 
other two parties, they were more than outnumbered by those in their 
party who either openly despised their enthusiasm or were deeply sceptical 
about the feasibility of disarmament. In the public mind, disarmament was 
much more closely associated with the Labour and Liberal parties than it 
was with the Conservatives. 
Both the Conservative and Labour parties were divided in their 
attitude to foreign policy and those divisions reflected themselves in 
differences over disarmament. In the Conservative party there were those 
who, distrusting the League and all that it stood for, believed that 
Britain should concentrate her energies and resources on developing a 
self-contained empire, essentially non-European in character and free 
of all entangling European commitments. On the other hand there were 
those like Austen Chamberlain who believed that British interests were 
so inextricably bound up with the European'continent that Britain had 
no choice*but to take her share of European responsibilities. For the 
'imperialists' disarmament was a matter of convenience. For the 
'Europeans' it was a question of policy. 
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Within the Labour party there were three main groups. One section 
of the party believed in unilateral and total disarmament, the repudi- 
ation of war and the value of moral example. Another gave strong support 
to the League of Nations and worked to secure general disarmament by inter- 
national agreement. A third group, inspired by the teachings of Marx and 
Lenin, despaired of lasting peace in a world of competing, capitalist 
states. International disarmament by voluntary agreement was illusory 
and irrelevant. Both the pacifists and the Marxists were to a very large 
extent indifferent to the League's quest for disarmament. 
Of the three political parties, the Liberals were most consistent 
in advocating general disarmament. Before the 1914-1918 war the National 
Liberal Federation had been converted to disarmament. 
1 The war reinforced 
the Liberal party's commitment to disarmament. 
British political life from 1916 to 1931 was dominated by the 
Conservative party'. In all but three of those fifteen years the 
Conservatives were the dominant partner in governmentt playing a major 
role in shaping Britain's domestic and foreign policy. The Bonar Law and 
Baldwin Conservative governments enjoyed large majorities. Even in the 
brief periods of Labour government in 1924 and from 1929-1931, Conservative 
representation in the House of Commons never fell below two hundred and 
fifty seats. Though Baldwin's leadership of the Conservative party was 
to be savagely assailed by Lord Beaverbrook's Express newspapers and 
Lord Rothermere's Daily Mail, the Conservative party had the support of 
the vast majority of the nation's newspapers. British disarmament policy 
between 1916 and 1931 was, to a very large extent, shaped by the 
Conservative party and conservative attitudes. However, of the 100 m. 
1. E. B. Baker and P. J. Noel-Baker: J. Allen Baker, A Memoir, 
Londont 1927P pp. 165-7; A. J. A. Morris: Radicalism aRainst War. 
1906-1914, P. 329; Cf. S. Kosst Asguith, pp. 146-52 and S. Koss: 
Sir John Brunner, London, 1970, pp. 293-5. 
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votes cast in the six general elections from 1918 to 1931P less than 
44m. votes went to Conservative candidates. 
1 Though their opponents 
were divided on important domestic issues, they shared a common approach 
to foreign policy. The Conservative governments of the 19208 could not, 
therefore, ignore the alternative foreign policy its political opponents 
were advocating. 
Before 1914 the Conservative party had not distinguished itself by 
its devotion to disarmament. Many Conservatives called for increased 
defence expenditure and some advocated compulsory military service. 
They criticised the Liberal goverment for neglecting national and 
imperial defence and proclaimed that the needs of the army and navy took 
precedence over all other claims on the nation's resources because 
national defence was the first and most important priority of government. 
2 
When during the war a large section of opinion embraced the league 
idea, Conservatives were reluctant to link disarmament too closely with 
a future league of nations. Lord Lansdowne, the former Conservative 
Foreign Secretary and wartime advocate of a negotiated peace, suggested 
in a House of Lords debate in March 1918 that disarmament was fraught 
with such enormous difficulties that it would be a mistake to place it 
on the agenda of a future league. If the world succeeded in establish- 
ing lasting peace, disarmament would automatically follow. 
3 That was a 
view which most Conservatives were to share in the first decade of peace. 
Disarmament could not be engineered, except on the most limited scale, 
by international diplomacy. It was the spontaneous response of nations 
which felt secure. 
After 1918 most Conservatives assumed that for a long time to come 
Britain would look, not to the League, but to the navy to protect her 
1. The Labour party received 32m. votes and the Liberals 20m. 
2. The National Unionist Association of Conservative and Liberal Unionist 
Organisations: The Campaign Guide 
' 
(1914), pp. 175 and 192. 
3.29 EL Debs., 5th Series, Colo. 496-7v 19 March 1918. 
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imperial heritage. Britain could not afford 'experiments' so far as 
the safety and security of the Empire was conoerned. Even Lord Robert 
Cecil had serious doubts about the practicability of international 
disarmament. In July 1919 he told the Commons that the limitation of 
armaments was the most difficult of all the problems facing them. 
'Let anyone take a piece of paper and write down exactly what he would 
propose to do and he will find the difficulties enormous. How are you 
to measure the reasonable requirements of one country or another.... 
How are you to ensure that any limitation laid down will be obeyed? ' 
I 
It was only maverick Conservatives like Brigadier-General H. P. Croft, 
2 
the founder of the breakaway right-wing National party in 1917, and 
Oswald Mosley, shortly to defect to Labour before eventually founding 
the British Union of Fascists, who, in 1919, described disarmament as 
the supreme issue of the hour. 
3 
Conservatives were not unaffected, however, by anxieties about the 
British economy in the immediate post-war years. They joined in demands 
for cuts in defence expenditure. They shared the fears of their contem- 
poraries that the world might be witnessing a new arms race between the 
three principal naval powers, Britain, the United States and Japan. In 
a Commons debate on the 1921 Imperial Conference, Major-General Sir John 
Davidson 4 warned that if the competition was allowed to pass a certain 
point, war would be inevitable. Responding to his remarks, the Conservative 
Leader of the House and Lord Privy Seal, Austen Chamberlain, said that a 
1.118 HC Debs. 5th Series, cols. 980-1,21 July 1919. 
2. Henry Page Croft, lst Lord Croft, 1881-1947, Conservative MP for 
Christchurch, 1910-40. For an account of his career at this period 
see W. D. Rubinstein 'Henry Croft and the National Party, 1917-221 
in Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 9, No. 1, January 1974. 
3.118 HC Debs. 5th Series, cols. 1067-8,21 July 1919, and 120 HC Debs. 
5th Series, col. 277,27 October 1919. 
4. Maj. -Gen. Sir John Davidson, . 1876-1954, Director of Military Operations in France during part of the war, Conservative MP for Fareham, 1918-31. 
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new competition between Britain and America would be not merely a 
tragedy for those two countries but for the world as a whole. 
' In 
the first half of 1921 Conservatives were among those who pressed the 
Lloyd George government to take the initiative over naval disarmament. 
It was Conservative members of Lloyd George's post-war coalition govern- 
ment who shaped Britain's naval disarmament policy and negotiated the 
1922 Washington naval limitation treaty. 
2 
Conservatives shared the almost unanimous sentiment in favour of 
naval disarmament in the autumn of 1921. One of them said on the eve 
Of the conference: 'There has never been a period at which the opinion 
Of all classes, parties and creeds in this country has been so unanimous 
as it is today behind the Government in connection with the Washington 
Conference' and another: 'As a soldier, whose trade it has been to do 
some of the fighting, I shall welcome as cordially and as heartily as 
anybody the possibility of reducing our forces without endangering the 
future of the country., 
3 
A mixture of disenchantment and complacency set the Conservative 
party on a different course in the years 1922-23. The Campaigm Guide 
for the 1922 general election warned the electorate: 'It is given to 
no one to read the inmost thoughts of all governments and nations. 
Some day they may agree to universal disarmament but until that time 
1.143 HC Debs. 5th Series, cols. 787 and 850,17 June 1921. 
2. Walter Long, Viscount Long of Wraxall (1921), 1854-1924, First Lord 
of the Admiralty, 1918-21, had been Leader of the Opposition during 
Balfour's absence in 1906 and a contender for the leadership of the 
Conservative party on Balfour's resignation in 1911. He was to take 
the decisions which led to the abandonment of the Two-Power Standard. 
Viscount Lee of Fareham, 1868-1947, had as Conservative MP for 
Fareham, 1900-18 been chief Opposition spokesman on naval affairs 
before the war. Lee was First Lord of the Admiralty from 1921 to 
1922. A. J. Balfour, the former Conservative prime minister, was 
Britain's principal delegate at the Washington conference. Lee 
was the second member of the delegation. 
3. Major (Sir) J. D. Birchall, Conservative MP for Leeds, North East, 
and Col. C. R. Burns, Conservative MP for Torquay. 147 HC Debs. 
5th Series, cols. 2120 and 2123-4,4 November 1921. 
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the British Empire with its many responsibilities and the many millions 
which it is its duty to defend from aggression must maintain a Navy, 
Army and Air Force. ' 
1 Voices were raised to protest against the effects 
the government's economy measures were having on the efficiency of the 
three Services. Viscount Long claimed that ninety per cent. of serving 
sailors and soldiers were Conservatives and he and many of his colleagues 
were concerned about their morale. 
2 The Earl of Birkenhead in his 
Rectorial Address to the University of Glasgow posed the question was 
it even conceivable that war could ever be abolished? 
3 An increasing 
number of Conservatives began to revert to their pre-war philosophy that 
if a nation desired peace, it ought to prepare for war. 
With the arrival at Westminster of a small group of able young 
Members who had experienced the war at first hand, the divisions became 
more ma 
I 
rked. One of them, Victor Cazalet'4 said it was incomprehensible 
how anyone who underwent active service in the recent war coula be any- 
thing but a convinced pacifist for the rest of his life. 
5 Others such 
as Alfred Duff Cooper, Anthony Eden, Walter Elliot and Harold Macmillan 
1. National Unionist Association: The Campaign Guide. 1922, London, n. d. t 
PP. 18,366-7. 
2. Long to Chamberlain, 1 August 1922, Austen Chamberlain Papers, 
AC 24/4/51. 
3.7 November 1923. F. E. Smith, lot Earl of Birkenhead, 1872-1930, 
Conservative MP, 1906-18, Attorney-General, 1915, Lord Chancellor, 
1919-22, Secretary of State for India, 1924-28. 
4. Victor Cazalet, 1896-1943, had listened to Norman Angell address a 
meeting at Eton in 1913, joined the army in 1915, corresponded with 
Chamberlain and Churchill from the front line, enthusiastically 
welcomed along with his fellow officers the Lansdowne peace letter, 
been awarded the MC for bravery, been elected for Chippenham in 1924, 
had, at first, opposed rearmament but later became a champion of 
collective security and effective sanctions against Italy, served 
in the Second World War and died alongside the Polish prime minister 
in exile, General Sikorski, in a mysterious air crash in 1943. 
See R. R. James: Victor Cazalet, London, 1976. 
5.182 HC Debs. 5th Series, col. 353,24 March 1925. 
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did not share the cynicism of some of their older colleagues. 
1 Many of 
them continued to believe as late as the early 1930s that disarmament 
could be brought about by slow but patient diplomacy, if not immediately, 
then at some future date. 
The views of an older generation of Conservatives were expressed by 
Sir Frederick Banbury 2 in a debate on the naval estimates in July 1923. 
If Britain had spent more on her army and navy before 1914 she might have 
prevented that war, he argued. 'Had they listened to Lord RobertS3 we 
should not have had the war. 
4 When four days later the Commons debated 
an Opposition disarmament motion it was clear that most Conservatives did 
not regard disarmament as a matter of extreme urgency. It was in this 
respect, above all, that they differed from their political opponents. 
Conservatives were none the less in no doubt about the mood of the 
country. Moving a reasoned amendment to the Opposition motion on dis- 
armament Hugh O'Neill, the Ulster Unionist MP for Mid Antrim, said that 
to negative it 'would unfortunately not be in accordance with the feeling 
of the great mass of the people of the country' .5 Another 
Conservativet 
Major-General Sir John Davidson, asked: 'Who is the soul of the League of 
67 Nations? An Englishman, the Lord Privy Seal, backed by the English nation. 
. 1. 
Of this group, Walter Elliot was the most active campaigner for dis- 
armament. Duff Cooper, though making ambiguous speeches about dis- 
armament in Parliament, addressed League of Nations Union disarmament 
campaign meetings. Macmillan was on the Executive Committee of the 
Union and Eden was actively engaged in promoting disarmament as a 
junior Foreign Office minister at the time of the world disarmament 
conference. In his post-war memoirs Facing the Dictators, PP. 14-15, 
Eden made no attempt to retract from that position. 
2. Sir Frederick George Banbury, Ist Lord Banbury of Southam (1924), 1850-1936. 
Conservative MP for Peckham, 1892-1905, City of London, 1906-24. 
3. Field-Marshal Earl Roberts, 1832-1914, Commander in Chief of the 
British expeditionary force in the South Africa War, 1899-1902, 
resigned in 1905 from the Committee of Imperial Defence to campaign 
for compulsory military service. 
4.166 HC Debs. 5th Series, cola. 2590-1,19 July 1923. 
5.167 HC Debs. 5th Series, cola. 90-6,23 July 1923. 
6. Lord Robert Cecil returned to ministerial office when Baldwin formed 
his first administration in May 1923. 
7.167 HC Dabs. 5th Series, cola. 157-61,23 July 1923. 
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Cecil's membership of Baldwin's Cabinet enabled the Conservative party 
to adopt an ambivalent attitude to disarmament. It could either bask 
in his glory and masquerade as the party of the League and disarmament 
or disown him and champion national armaments and the balance of power. 
The clearest exposition of Conservative thinking about disarmament 
was made by the Foreign Secretary, Austen Chamberlain, in a debate on 
the proposed security pact in June 1925. Some four months before the 
Locarno conference, Chamberlain described the security proposals, which 
were to be embodied in the Locarno treaties, as 'a step, a practical 
step and a very large step, towards disarmament'. It was fear which 
caused nations to maintain large armies. Once that fear was removed, 
nations would begin to disarm. Disarmament treaties would not be needed. 
Economic pressures would oblige countries to disarm as soon as they felt 
1 
secure. 
From the beginning Chamberlain and many Conservatives were sceptical 
about the prospects of the League of Nations Preparatory Commission for 
the Disarmament Conference which began its work in 1926. Chamberlain 
criticised it because it was too ambitious and all-embracing. Duff 
Cooper told the Commons in luly 1927 that it would not do much harm if 
it failed. Progress towards disarmament was bound to be slow. It would 
be achieved not by conferences but by education and propaganda. 
2 That 
was a view which apparently the leader of the Conservative party, Baldwin, 
also shared. 
3 
Neither of them believed that disarmament would be 
realised in the near future. 
In its last two years in power, the second Baldwin government had 
to defend itself against a barrage of criticism for its handling of the 
1927 Geneva naval conference, its ill-judged attempt to reach a compromise 
1. 185 HC Debs. 5th Series, cols. 1566-7,24 June 1925. 
2. 208 HC Debs. 5th Series, cols. 1804-10,11 July 1927. 
3. 254 HC Debs. 5th Series, cols. 924-6,29 June 1931. 
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over disarmament with France in 1928, and the unconstructive policy it pursued 
in the Preparatory Commission between 1926 and 1928. To counter these criticisms 
the Conservative party weekly publication Hints for Speakers made nineteen 
separate references to the government's disarmament record in the period July 
to December 1928. Only three other issues, the safeguarding of industry with 
forty-two, unemployment with thirty-eight and housing with thirty-seven, were 
given more space and attention. No government had done more for disarmament 
than the second Baldwin government, Hints for Speakers claimed on 7 March 1929* 
Defence expenditure had been cut by L51m, since the government came to power 
and in real terms it was E15m. less than in 1914* 
1 
In the 1929 general election campaign the Conservative party could, 
with some credibility, bid for electoral support as the party of 'practical' 
disarmament. In a speech at Plymouth to an audience which must have contained 
some who earned their livelihood in the dockyards, Baldwin boasted that 
Britain had led the way in disarmament. "The Fleet is half the size it was 
in 1913. This is practical disarmament, and there is no nation in the world 
that can come anywhere near that. 12 If armaments, as some Conservatives had 
not been ashamed to say, 
3 
were a measure of a nation's greatness, Baldwin 
and the Conservative electoral machine made no attempt to convey that belief 
in 1929, 
However, in opposition Conservatives became increasingly apprehensive about 
Britain's naval and military weakness. They exaggerated the extent to which 
other nations were rearming and claimed that as a result of the 1930 
London naval treaty Britain had been relegated to a position of 
1. This was misleading. Defence expenditure had risen from L113.4m. in 1924 
to Z119.5m. in 1925 to fall back to -Cll3-3m- in 1929. In claiming that in 
real terms defence expenditure was Z15m. below the pre-war figure, Hints 
for Speakers was applying the retail price index. Adjusted to the wholesale 
price index defence expenditure in 1929 was L54m. more than in 1913. See 
Appendix I. 
2. Daily Vail, 14 May 1929* 
3. See, for example, the speech by Sir Gerald Strickland, the Cons. MP for 
Lancaster on 1 April 1926,193 RC Debs. 5th Series, cola. 2420-23. 
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naval inferiority. 
1 
The only useful service general disarmament could 
perform, they suggested, would be to redress the balance in Britain's 
favour. 
Conservatives, always less ready to believe that the peoples of 
the world were eager for disarmament than their opponents, were the first 
to recognise that the policy of making unilateral reductions in British 
armaments, adopted by successive governments in the 1920s, had made no 
real contribution to general disarmament. They also sensed that public 
attitudes were not exactly as Labour and Liberal spokesmen portrayed 
them. If the Air Force and the Navy were abolished tomorrow, Duff Cooper 
told the Commons in July 1927, 'there would be a revolution the day after 
because it would be a most unpopular stept. 
2 Conservatives were more 
aware of the latent imperialist sentiment of the British people. They 
never lost eight of the fact that international, as much as national, 
politics was about power. 
The Labour party was much more in tune than the Conservatives with 
the pacific mood of the British people in the inter-war years. It was 
an article of faith in the Labour party that armaments caused war and 
that the 1914-1918 war had been brought about by secret diplomacy, 
military alliances and competitive armaments. If these practices were 
abandoned and the rule of law substituted for the rule of force, the 
world would be set free from the scourge of war. Labour supporters 
believed that Europe, if not the whole world, had learnt a profound 
lesson from the war. If statesmen adopted new remedies for the age-old 
problems of war and peace, a new order could be built on the blood-drenched 
Hints for Speakers, 31 JulY' 1930 and 1 January 1931. Much of their 
publicity was directed to condemning the Soviet Union's rearmament 
programme. Hints for Speakers on 18 June 1931, ignoring the large 
fall in the value of the rouble, accused the Soviet Union of 
increasing its defence expenditure by fifty per cent. between 1928 
and . 1931. 
2.208 HC Debs. 5th Series, col. 1909,11 July 1927. 
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soils of Europe's battlefields. Britain was well-qualified to give a 
lead. Acting with resolution and determination, she could galvanise the 
'moral forces' of mankind. Those pressures would be sufficient to coerce 
the renegade opponents of disarmament. If she failed to act while 
memories of the war were fresh, the opportunity would be lost and might 
never occur again. Unless decisive action was taken in the first decade 
of peace, the world would once again tread the path to war. Nations 
would be forced to shoulder an ever-increasing burden of armaments, the 
social and moral progress of mankind would be halted, and the sacrifices 
of the 1914-1918 war would prove to have been in vain. 
Before 1914 Labour had done little to formulate a distinctive approach 
to foreign policy. Alongside radical critics of the Liberal government its 
spokesmen had assailed militarism and focused attention on the activities 
of armaments' manufacturers as the villains of the piece. Armed with the 
strike weapon, the Labour Movement did not feel completely powerless to 
prevent war. 1914 shattered its illusions and punctured its optimism. 
In August 1914 a large majority supported the war but MacDonald, 
the parliamentary leader of the party, and a few others, parted company 
with their colleagues to oppose the war. Arthur Henderson 
1 
succeeded 
MacDonald and thanks to his efforts Labour remained a united party. 
2 
Henderson was to serve in both the Asquith and Lloyd George coalition 
1. Arthur Henderson, 1863-1935, Labour MP for Barnard Castle, 1903-18, 
Widness, 1919-22, Newcastle, 1923, Burnley, 1924-31, Clay Cross. 
1933-35, Chairman (and leader)-of the parliamentary Labour party, 
1908-10,1914-17, resigned from the Lloyd George government over 
its refusal to sanction his attendance at the proposed Stockholm 
conference of socialist parties in August 1917, Home Secretary, 1924, 
Foreign Secretary, 1929-31, President of the World Disarmament Con- 
ference, 1932-33. As honorary secretary of the Labour party with 
an office at Eccleston Square and latterly at Transport House, he 
had a power base within the Labour party which gave him a unique 
influence but detracted from the time he was able to give to 
departmental responsibilities when he was in office. 
2. Unlike most of the continental socialist parties, the Labour party 
did not split as a result of the war. Henderson prevented MacDonald 
from being ostracised. 
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governments from 1915 to 1917. MacDonald devoted much of his time and 
energies to the formulation of an alternative foreign policy in the 
Union of Democratic Control (UDC) which, with Liberal critics of the 
war, Arthur Ponsonby 
1 
and Charles Trevelyan, 
2 he helped to create. 
The Labour party was to adopt, almost in its entirety, the programme 
outlined by the Union of Democratic Control (UDC) during the war years. 
In a four point programme in the autumn of 1914 the UDC suggested that 
Britain should propose as part of the peace settlement a drastic reduc- 
tion of armaments. To facilitate that policy she should advocate the 
nationalisation of the armaments industry and governmental control of 
the arms trade on a world-wide basis, 
3a 
policy which some Labour spokes- 
men, including Philip Snowden, had advocated in the last years of peace. 
In an independent study entitled National Defence-A Study in Militarism4 
MacDonald formulated a critique of international relations which was to 
make a deep impression on the Labour party. MacDonald argued that to 
contemplate using military power, under whatever auspices, to preserve 
1. Arthur Ponsonby, lst Lord Ponsonby (1930), 1871-1946, son of Queen 
Victoria's private secretary, served in Foreign Office and Diplomatic 
Corps, private secretary to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, succeeded 
him as Liberal MP for Stirling Boroughs, 1908-18, critic of Grey's 
policies, 1911-14, Labour MP for Sheffield, Brightside, 1922-30, 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1924P 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Dominions, 1929, 
Parliamentary Secretary at Ministry of Transport, 1929-30, 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1931, Leader of the Labour 
Opposition in the House of Lords, 1931-35. Advocated war resistance 
and pacifism in the inter-war years. 
2. Sir Charles Trevelyan, 1870-1958, Liberal MP, Elland, 1899-1918, 
Labour MP Newcastle Central, 1922-31, Parliamentary Secretary, 
Board of Education, 1908-14, resigned from government on outbreak 
of war, President of the Board of Education, 1924t and 1929-31, 
heir to the Trevelyan estates in Northumberland and brother of 
historian, G. M. Trevelyan, he moved steadily to the Left and 
resigned from MacDonald's government in March 1931 because of its 
failure to pursue socialist policies. 
3. See especially Pamphlet No. I by the UDC's Secretary, B. D. Morel, 
The Morrow of the War, 1914; Pamphlet No. 4 by H. N. Brailsford, 
The Origins-of-the Great War, 1915; and Pamphlet No. 7 The 
International-Industry of War, 1915. 
4. J. R. MacDonald: National Defence. A Study of Militarism, London, 1917. 
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peace was to play into the hands of the militarists. Only the triumph 
of democracy in every sphere of national and international life could 
ensure peace. Peace would be preserved by open diplomacy and the 
democratic control of foreign policy, not by a league of nations employ- 
ing arbitration and military sanctions. MacDonald spoke for those who 
were suspicious of a league endowed with powers of coercion. Those 
suspicions were, to a large extent, to mould the Labour party's attitude 
to the League and sanctions in the inter-war years. 
When Henderson resigned from the War Cabinet in August 1917 those 
who had supported the war and those who had opposed it were able to come 
together to formulate a distinctive foreign policy and elaborate a 
statement of war aims. A special conference held in London on 
28 December 1917 gave its approval to a Labour party statement on war 
aims which was to mark an important milestone not only in the develop- 
ment of the Labour party's thinking but in the nation's attitude to the 
future peace settlement. The statement declared that whatever might 
have been the real cause of the war, it was clear that the peoples of 
Europe had had no hand in bringing it about. In so far as the Labour 
party had supported the war, it had done so in order to make the world 
safe for democracy because the future peace of the world would only be 
assured if democracy became universal. The declaration called for the 
abandonment of imperialism, an end to secret diplomacy, the parliamentary 
control of foreign policy, the abolition of compulsory military service, 
'the common limitation of ... costly armaments', and the abolition of 
profit-making armaments firms 'whose pecuniary interest lay always in 
war scares and rivalry in preparation for war'. It went on to call for 
the establishment of a league of nations, an international court, an 
'International Legislature' representing 'every civilised State', and 
appropriate machinery for prompt and effective mediation between states 
in non-justiciable disputes. It affirmed the party's rejection of all 
5v 
attempts to turn the war into a war of conquest and expressed the hope 
that the working classes of all countries would unite against militarism 
and imperialism. 
1 
The statement was given wide publicity and was a contributory factor 
in Lloyd George's decision to make a statement of war aims to a trade 
union audience a few days later. 
2 It followed fairly closely policies 
advocated by the UDC but in other respects represented a compromise 
between those like MacDonald who distrusted international machinery for 
the preservation of peace and those like Henderson who believed that 
the best hopes for peace lay in the creation of a league of nations. 
When in February 1918 a conference of Labour and Socialist parties from 
eight Allied countries met in London at the invitation of the Labour 
party, the delegates agreed to*a statement which with one exception, 
its reference to conscription, echoed the policies outlined in Labour's 
own statement of war aims. 
3 
During 191S the Labour party strongly supported the popular agitation 
in favour of a league of nations. In a Cabinet meeting on 20 March 1918, 
G. N. Barnes 4 alluded to the 'strong views' held by the Labour party 
5 
and 
in December Cecil alerted the Prime Minister to 'the great agitation in 
favour of the League of Nations' which a number of prominent Labour 
1. Memorandum on War Aims, 28 December 1917, Labour Party Library. 
2. D. Lloyd George: War Memoirs, popular edition, London, 1938, 
PP. 1490-1517. See also pp. 128-9. 
3. Memorandum on War Aims, Inter-Allied Labour and Socialist Conference, 
London, February 1918, Labour Party Library. This was the third 
such conference of socialist parties which the Labour party had been 
instrumental in calling during the war. 
4. George Nicoll Barnes, 1859-1940, General Secretary of the Amalgamated 
Society of Engineers, 1896-1908, Labour MP Gorbals, Glasgow, 1906-18, 
Coalition Labour, 1919-22. Minister of Pensions, 1916-18, Minister 
Plenipotentiary, Paris Peace Conference, 1919. When Henderson 
resigned from the War Cabinet in August 1917, Barnes became Labour's 
chief spokesman in the government. He resigned from the Labour 
party in 1918 to fight the general election as a coalition candidate. He was firmly committed to the League and one of the few advocates in Britain of a League international military force. 
5. CAB 23/5. 
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leaders were promoting. 
1 Further endorsement was given in a second 
statement of war aims published by the party in June 1918.2 
Some members of the Labour party, influenced by the writings of 
Karl Marx and Lenin, came to a different conclusion. Britain had been 
caught up in an imperialist war, the inevitable conflict of competing, 
capitalist states. Subsequently they were to denounce the Paris peace 
settlement as a capitalist peace which only a socialist revolution could 
undo. Capitalist governments could not be trusted with armaments because 
their national policies were designed to promote the interests of the 
capitalist class and could only be understood in economic terms. 
3 The 
Labour party's task was to make the masses understand that the ruin 
wrought by the war was the result of imperialist capitalism. 
4 Even the 
ex-Liberal opponent of the war, Charles Trevelyan, was driven to ask 
whether the only way to a new international order was through revolution. 
5 
'If there is another war', the Communist, J. T. Walton Newbold, 
6 
told 
the Commons in December 1922, '1 shall try to stop it by revolution. ' 
7 
To those who believed that the British working classes were involved in 
a revolutionary struggle which cut across national frontiers, the League 
1. Cecil to Lloyd George, 19 December 1918, Lloyd George Papers, 
F/6/5/53. 
2. Labour Party Short Statement of War Aims, 25 June 1918, Labour Party 
Library. 
3. See, for instance, the remarks of the future Labour prime minister, 
C. R. Attlee, at the Labour party conference in 1923. See Labour 
Party: Report of-the 23rd Annual-Conference, London, n. d., pp. 229-33. 
4. Memorandum No. 149, Advisory Committee on International Questions 
of the Labour Party (kCIQ), July 1920, Labour Party Library. 
5. Quoted by Michael Howard: War and the Liberal Conscience, pp. 10-11. 
6. John Turner Walton Newbold, 1888-1943, author and lecturer, author 
of the pre-war polemic The War Trust Exposed, Communist MP for 
Motherwell, 1922-23, resigned from the Communist party in 1924 to 
fight as Labour candidate for Epping in 1929, a member of the 
Macmillan Committee on Finance and Industry, 1929-31, resigned 
from the Labour party in 1931. 
7.159 HC Debs. 5th Series, Col. 1398,4 December 1922. 
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and the progressive reduction of national armaments were irrelevant. 
The war transformed the fortAnes of the Labour party. In the 
December 1910 general election Labour candidates had polled a mere 
370,000 votes. In the 'coupon' election eight years later they received 
21m. votes despite the fact that the cards were stacked against them. 
Labour emerged from the war as a major political force and the Labour 
Movement as an estate of the realm. Less than six years after the end 
of the war MacDonald formed, the first Labour government. 
In the immediate post-war years the Labour party's attitude to 
disarmament can only be understood in the context of its bitter denunci- 
ation of the peace treaties, its outright repudiation of pacts and 
alliances, and its disillusionment with the League. The peace treaties, 
MacDonald wrote in 1923, had been devised by men who wore the labels of 
statesmen but had the minds of soldiers. 
1 There was little likelihood 
of disarmament because the ascendancy of the victor powers rested on 
force. 2 Britain and France had gone to war to destroy Prussian militarism 
but their treatment of Germany would ensure its survival. 
3 Treaty 
revision was Labour's main foreign policy objective in the years 1919 
to 1923. 
In their attempt to understand the origins of the war Labour 
spokesmen came to the conclusion that the pre-war alliances and ententes 
had been a major cause of that conflict. Britain, they concluded, should 
never again be tempted to make understandings similar to those she had 
made with France in the decade before 1914. Indifferent to the insecurity 
felt by the French nation, they accused France of seeking to dominate 
Europe by creating a network of alliances and maintaining excessively 
1. Daily News, 20 February 1923. 
2. ACIQ Memorandum No. 198 by H. N. Braileford, November 1921. 
Brailsford argued that the occupation of the Rhineland'necessitated 
the retention of large armies. 
3. ACIQ Memorandum No. 61 by Norman Angell, May 1919. 
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large military forces. In February 1923 MacDonald wrote: 'The best thing 
we have done is to refuse a military guarantee of safety to France. 'l 
Labour criticised the League because it was not the all-embracing 
world organisation they had hoped for. It had not brought together 
victor and vanquished in a peace of reconciliation. Labour was especially 
critical of Germany's exclusion and regarded the League as a tyrannical 
instrument of the victor powers. It stood condemned because of its 
record in the Russo-Polish war and its failure to deal equitably with 
the Vilna and Corfu disputes in 1922 and 1923. It was an inter- 
governmental organisation and not a league of peoples. There were sug- 
gestions in 1919 that the Covenant should be amended to make the League 
Council responsible to an elected Assembly, representative of electorates, 
not gover=ents. 
2 MacDonald seemed to go out of his way to slight the 
League in moving a Commons motion on disarmament in July 1923. Because 
the League lacked the confidence of some of the major nations of the 
world it was in no position to promote disarmament. 
3 
Disenchantment with the League led the Labour party to look to the 
international socialist movement as an agency for the promotion of general 
disarmament. The party had played a prominent part in the development 
of the Second International in the decade before the war. Its 1918 
constitution committed it 'to co-operate with Labour and Socialist 
organisations in other countries'. During the war it had maintained 
close contact with socialist parties in the Allied countries. When the 
war ended it was instrumental in the creation of the Labour and Socialist 
International (the LSI) whose London-based secretariat was presided over 
by a British trade union leader and Labour MP, Tom Shaw .4, We who 
1. Daily News, 20 February 1923. The Labour party's opposition to an 
Anglo-French pact was a constraint on Lloyd George's diplomacy in 1921-22. 
2. Labour Party: Report of the 19th Annual Conference, London, n. d., (1919), 
p. 24. The Times, 4 April 1919. 
3- 167 HC Debs. 5th Series, cols. 75-87,23 July 1923. 
4. Tom Shaw, 1872-1938, Labour MP for Preston, 1918-31, Minister of 
Labour, 1924, Secretary of State for War, 1929-31. 
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belong to the great International Working Class Movement', MacDonald 
told the Commons in July 1923, 'feel that we are creating an inter- 
national public opinion that will bear the strain of feeling secure 
without armaments. ' 
I Contact with European socialist parties modified 
the party's insular outlook and stiffened its resolve to pursue inter- 
nationalist policies. When the Labour party vacillated in its attitude 
towards the Geneva Protocol in January 1925 it was the unanimity of 
continental socialist opinion which persuaded the*party to campaign 
2 for the Protocol. A few months later continental socialist pressures 
led the Labour party to abandon-its outright opposition to the proposed 
security pact and in the autumn to give a qualified approval to the 
Locarno treaties. 3 Labour's European dimension acted as a strong 
counter thrust to its insular pacifism. In 1927 the LSI rejected the 
party's request, emanating from its pacifist wing, that war resistance 
should become part of its programme. 
4 
Ties with the German social democratic movement led the Labour 
party to adopt an uncritical attitude towards the Weimar Republic. It 
had more confidence in German social democracy 
5 than in French socialism. 
British socialists looked forward to a period of close collaboration 
with a social democratic Germany. They were, therefore, too ready to 
take at their face value, statements by Hermann MUler, the future German 
Chancellor, and others at the 1919 Berne conference of Labour and 
1.167 HC Debs. 5th Series, col. 87,23 July 1923. 
2. Manchester Guardian, 13 January 1925; Labour Party: Report of the 
25th Annual Conferencep London, n. d. (1925)t pp. 65-6,342; Minutes 
of the ACIQ, 11 February 1925, LP/IAC/236; ACIQ Memorandum, No- 334, 
February 1925; NEC Minutes, Vol. 34,1-3/25, Labour Party Library. 
3. MacDonald to Hamilton Fyfe, 24 March 1925; Mitrany to MacDonald, 
15 May 1925; Noel-Baker to MacDonald, 3 July 1925, MacDonald Papers, 
PRO 30/69/5/36. 
4. Labour Party: 
' 
Report of the 26th Annual Conferenc! al London, n. d (1926), pp. 63 and 256-7. 
5. In 1914 the German Social Democratic Party was the largest in Europe 
and the largest party in the Reichstag. 
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Socialist parties that Germany had once and for all turned her back on 
militarism. - They accepted uncritically 
the claims of the German trade 
union movement that they would be able to prevent the re-emergence of 
German militarism. 
1 
Such was the eloquence and persistence of the pacifist wing of 
the Labour party that the casual observer of the political scene might 
easily have concluded that the party was committed to pacifism and 
unilateral disarmament for most of the inter-war years. Many of those 
who had belonged to the war-time No Conscription Fellowship such as 
Clifford Allen 2 and-Penner Brockway became leaders of the Independent 
Labour Party (the ILP) which was then an integral part of the Labour 
party. The party had close links with the No More War Movement to which 
many members of the No Conscription Fellowship gravitated after its 
formation in 1921. Several attempts were made to win the Labour party 
for the programme of the War Resisters' International to which the No 
More War Movement was affiliated. At the 1922 conference R. C. Wallhead, 
4 
one of the founding members of the No More War Movement, succeeded in 
getting a resolution calling on the Socialist and Labour parties of 
all nations to oppose all wars, whatever their ostensible objective, 
passed by 3,231,000 votes to 194,000.5 When, however, a year later 
1. Labour Party: Report of the 22nd Annual Conference, London, n. d. 
(1922) 
pp. 25-30. Frequent reference was made to the role played by the 
Berlin trade unions in the collapse of the Kapp putsch in 1920. 
2. Reginald Clifford Allen, Ist Lord Allen of Hurtwood (1932), 1889-1939, 
imprisoned as a conscientious objector in the First World War, Chair- 
man and Treasurer of the ILP, 1922-26, a Director of the Daily Herald, 
1925-30. A close friend of MacDonald, he continued to support him 
after his breach with the Labour party in 1931. 
3. Archibald Fenner Brockway, Lord Brockway (1964), 1888- , imprisoned 
during the war as a conscientious objector, General Secretary of the 
ILP in 1928 and from 1933 to 1939, Editor of the New Leader,, 1926-29, 
1931-46, Chairman of the No More War Movement and the War Resisters' 
International, 1923-31, Labour (ILP) MP for E. Leyton, 1929-31. 
4. R. C. Wallhead, 1869-1934, Labour MP for Merthyr Tydfil, 1922-34, 
Chairman of the ILP, 1920-22, a founding member of both the No More 
War Movement and the War Resisters' International. 
5. Labour Party: Re-port of the 22nd Annual Conference, London, n. d. (1922), pp. 200-203. 
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. T. H. Hudson, 
1 
tried to persuade the annual conference to adopt a resolu- 
tion calling on the parliamentary Labour party to vote against all 
military and naval estimates, it was defeated by 2,924,000 votes to 
808,000. Arthur Henderson described the proposal as 'absolutely absurd 
and futile' and said that until conditions in the world had radically 
changed, Britain would need the navy - 'our Navy' as he put it - for 
national defence. 
2 In 1926 Brockway and Ponsonby were more successful. 
They persuaded the conference to adopt a resolution which called on 
workers to make clear to their governments that they would meet any 
threat of war by organising resistance including the refusal to bear arms, 
produce armaments, or render them any material assistance. Its effect, 
however, was to some extent neutralised by a National Executive Committee 
Motion backing the efforts of the Preparatory Commission and another 
resolution, moved by a member of Glasgow's Trades and Labour Councilt 
stating that there would be no security against war until the capitalist 
system had been overthrown. At the 1926 conference pacifists, inter- 
nationalists and Marxists all succeeded in persuading the party to endorse 
3 their views. 
Though the pacifists tried unsuccessfully to win the party for their 
programme of war resistance and total disarmament at the 1928,1930 and 
1931 conferences, the Russian proposals in the December 1927 session of 
the Preparatory Commission for universal and total disarmament were wel- 
comed by a majority of the party. MacDonald and his immediate colleagues 
were openly critical and chided the rank-and-file for their naivety. 
That did not prevent the National Joint Council, representing the General 
1. J. H. Hudson, 1881-1962, Secretary of the National Temperance 
Federation, Labour MP, Huddersfield, 1923-31, Ealing West, 1945-50, 
Ealing North, 1950-55, Parliamentary Private Secretary to Philip 
Snowden, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1924 and 1929-31. 
2. Labour Party: Report of the 23rd Annual Conference, London, n. d. (1923), pp. 229-33. 
3. Labour Party: Re-Dort of the 26th Annual Conference, London, n. d. (1926), pp. 63,253-7. 
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Council of the Trades Union Congress and the National Executive Committee 
of the Labour Party, from issuing a statement calling on the government 
to express its willingness to take them seriously with 'a view to preparing 
1 the way for the general acceptance of complete disarmament'. 
In the years 1928 to 1931 there was growing disenchantment with the 
gradualist approach to disarmament which the party's leaders had been 
advocating since 1923. Before the 1928 conference the National Executive 
Committee received a number of emergency' resolutions calling on the party 
to commit itself to total and complete disarmament. Wearied by a 
Succession of unsuccessful attempts to achieve disarmament by inter- 
national agreement, many Labour party supporters came to the conclusion 
that there was a simple choice between total disarmament and no disarma- 
ment at all. The Fabian doctrine of the inevitability of gradualness 
might be a sensible working philosophy for those intent on changing the 
economic and social order but for those-who hoped to save the world from 
impending disaster it was a futile policy. Could the risks of disarma- 
ment by example be any greater than the risks the country was taking in 
preparing for another war? If the Labour government was to satisfy the 
hopes and expectations of the electorate, it would have to break the 
circle of armaments while it was still in office. 
2 
It would be wrong to assume that a majority in the party were 
committed to these views throughout the inter-war years. The party almost 
always spoke with two distinct voices. On the one hand were those who 
Minutes of the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party, 
Vol. 44,8 December 2927. At the 1928 conference MacDonald accused 
those who welcomed the Russian proposals of being misled by words. In a speech in Glasgow in March 1928 Lord Thomson, Secretary of State for Air in 1924 and again in 1929, said that the Russian 
proposals were like offering the Glasgow hospitals Z10,000 on condi- tion that ninety-nine others did the same. M. CLnehester Guardian, 27 March 1928. 
2. See the debates at the 1930 and 1931 party conferences. Report of the 30th A=ual Conference, pp. 238-40 and Report of the 31st An Conference, pp. 184-7. 
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1 
having inherited the radical tradition's distaste for armaments and power 
politics, had been in many cases converted to pacifism as a result of the 
war. On the other hand were trade unionists who had practical experience 
of power relationships in industry and thus a shrewd appreciation of 
some aspects of international politics. The tensions between the two 
were never resolved, not even when the trade unionist, Ernest Bevin, 
1 
ousted the pacifist, George Lansbury, 
2 from the leadership of the Labour 
party in 1935. 
Before the war ended in November 1918 the Labour party had already 
set up an advisory committee on international questions (ACIQ) to brief 
the parliamentary party and its National Executive Committee on inter- 
national affairs. To that committee it recruited men and women with 
specialised knowledge and first-hand experience. From the beginning 
L. S. Woolf3 acted as the committee's unpaid secretary. The committee 
provided the party with a great number of imaginative proposals and 
educated it in the technicalities and complexities of international 
relations. 
Even before the Covenant of the League was drafted at Paris in 1919 
there were those in the Labour party who recognised the need for sanctions 
if the League was to promote disarmament. One of the first memoranda 
commissioned by the ACIQ in 1918 proposed that the League should either 
create an international navy or require its members with naval forces 
1. Ernest Bevin, 1881-1951, leader of the Dockers' Union, 1910-21, 
creator and first general secretary of the Transport and General 
Workers Union, 1921-40, Labour MP for Wandsworth, 1940-50, Minister 
of Labour and National Service and a member of the War Cabinet, 
1940-45, Foreign Secretary, 1945-50. 
2. George Lansbury, 1859-1940, Labour MP for Poplart 1910-12,1922-40, 
editor of the, Dail-v Herald, 1919-22, First Commissioner of Works, 
1929-31, Leader of the Parliamentary Labour Party, 1931-35. 
3. Leonard S. Woolf, 1880-1969, husband of Virginia Woolf (1882-1941), 
Ceylon civil service, 1904-11, author of International Government, 
1916, Literary Editor, The Natio , 1923-30, Joint Editor, The Political Quarterly, 1931-59, founded the Hogarth Press, 1917. 
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1 
to earmark warships for League use. 
I J. R. Clynes, 2 the deputy leader 
of the parliamentary Labour party, said in a Co=ons debate on the peace 
treaties that if the'League of Nations was to function successfully it 
would require 'some force or manner of physical support behind it,. 
3 
Three years later L. S. Woolf in an ACIQ memorandum entitled 'The League 
of Nations and Disarmament, 
4 
argued that until members of the League were 
given additional guarantees of their security there could be no large and 
universal measure of disarmament. In 1923 an ACIQ memorandum5 proposed 
an international disarmament authority with wide-ranging powers. 
Armaments, it statedv could only be reduced in so far as public confidence 
was created in the machinery for the maintenance of peace. Among its 
various proposals was One for neutral and demilitarised zones which, if 
they were violated, would entail warlike action by the guarantor powers. 
6 
During 1923 the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance was subjected to 
careful scrutiny by the Labour party. Though the party never gave the 
draft Treaty its approval, it came to recognise how essential was the 
part the League had to play in the post-war international order if peace 
was to be secure. Henderson played a key role in persuading the party 
to align itself with the League and make a more realistic appraisal of 
1. 'The Freedom of the. Seas', September 1918 by G. Lowes Dickinson. 
2. J. R. Clynes, 1869-1949, Labour MP for Platting, Manchester, 1906-31f 
Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Food, 1917-18, Food Controller, 
1918, Chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party, 1921-22, Lord 
Privy Seal and Deputy Leader of the House of Commons, 1924, Rome 
Secretary, 1929-31- 
3.118 HC Debs. 5th Series, cols. 961-4,21 July 1919. 
4. ACIQ Memorandum No. 251, July 1922. 
5. ACIQ Memorandum No. 278, Principles of a Disarmament Policy, 
Amended Draft, June 1923. 
6. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne contained provisions for a neutral 
zone. The idea of creating neutral zones attracted the leader 
of the party and in 1924 it was among the proposals he put to 
Poincar6 on 21 February: 'the creation between certain states 
of bands of neutralised territory under mutual or even collective 
guarantee and supervision'. The Times, 3 March 1924. 
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the international situation. The ACIQ, recognising that the main issue 
which was likely to divide the party was whether even a reformed League 
of Nations could rightly employ force, was chary about giving the draft 
Treaty its unqualified support. 
The 1924 Labour government surprised its Conservative critics by 
its moderation but angered some of its supporters in the Commons and 
many of the Liberal Members, on whom it depended, by continuing the 
defence policies, with the exception of plans to construct a naval base 
at Singapore, of the outgoing Baldwin administration. MacDonald devoted 
his energies to Anglo-rrench relations and a settlement of the reparations 
question. It was not until the London conference on reparations was 
brought to a successful conclusion in August 1924 that he was able to 
turn his attention to disarmament and the problems associated with 
European security. 
The Geneva Protocol, the product of a new accord between Britain 
and France, was drafted by committees of the 1924 League Assembly in 
the last weeks of the Labour government. Though it led to divisions 
within the Cabinet it eventually won the overwhelming support of the 
party as a whole. In February 1925 the National Executive Committee 
adopted a resolution, formulated by the ACIQ, stating that 'The Party 
stands by the Protocol on the grounds that it furnishes the only 
practical plan at present for obtaining disarmament and substituting 
arbitration for war as the method of settling disputes. It holds that 
this country should do everything in its power to obtain the acceptance 
of the Protocol and the holding of a Disarmament Conference. The Party 
should strongly oppose any suggestion of substituting for the Protocol 
any form of limited military alliance. ' 
I From the spring of 1925 the 
Labour party vigorously championed the Protocol and MacDonald became 
ACIQ Memorandum No. 334, February 1925; Minutes of the ACIQ, ll February 1925, LP/IAC/236; 14EC Minutes, Vol. 34,1-3/25. 
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one of its strongest partisans. In an article in Forward in September 
1927 MacDonald showed how far he had travelled since the war and its 
immediate aftermath. 'There must, in the present state of Europe, be 
sanctions and the aggrieved State victimised by a war ... must be supported 
by the League. This is the Protocol, not this phrase or that. 
" 
It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of Labour's 
attachment to the Protocol in the development of the party's thinking 
about international affairs. It enabled those who prided themselves on 
their internationalist outlook to unite with those whose basic tenet 
was absolute opposition to pacts and alliances. Pacifists and non- 
Pacifists alike believed that compulsory arbitration, one of the three 
basic principles of the Protocol, 
2 
was the only alternative to war and 
that it provided the best means of creating the right conditions for 
general disarmament. The party's comparative indifference to the 
negotiations in the summer of 1925 which led to the conclusion of the 
Locarno treaties, reveals how much less importance it attached to 
security arrangements. 
Far more than the other two parties, the Labour party devoted itself 
to analysing the technicalities of disarmament. It devised its own draft 
disarmament convention and subjected the proposals of the Preparatory 
Commission to detailed investigation. In this task, undertaken by the 
ACIQ, Philip Noel-Baker acted as one of the foremost mentors of the 
party. An intimate friend of Lord Cecil, a former member of the League 
Secretariat, an authority on international law, a well-travelled observer 
of the European scene and the holder of a chair in International Relations, 
he was in an ideal position to bridge the gap between the idealistic 
aspirations of the Labour party and the realities of international 
1.26 September 1927. 
2. See p. 255. 
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politics. He was responsible for many of the proposals which the ACIQ 
put before the party during the years of the second Baldwin government. 
Though much thought was given to international disarmament in the 
years 1924 to 1929, abhorrence of war led many Labour spokesmen to 
demand, first and foremost, arbitration coupled with the repudiation 
of war as an instrument of national policy. Labour would make 'all-in' 
arbitration one of the key issues in its campaign at the next general 
election, Hugh Dalton 
2 
informed the 1928 Brussels conference of the 
Labour and Socialist International 
(LSI) 
.3 Whereas 
Noel-Baker believed 
that the danger of 'criminal aggression' would never be entirely eliminated 
and the need for some form of collective security would remain, many 
in 
the Labour party continued to believe that to talk of force in inter- 
national relations was to invite the use of force. Until comprehensive 
machinery for the settlement of international disputes by arbitration, 
conciliation and judicial decision had been established, it would be 
impossible to persuade nations to reduce their armaments. 
4 Nowhere is 
this view more clearly stated than in Labour and the-Nation, the programme 
1. Together with Leonard Woolf, Noel-Baker was responsible for the 
section on foreign policy in the Labour party's 1929 general 
election manifesto. See Philip Noel-Baker: The First World 
Disarmament Conference, 1932-1933, And Why It Failed, Oxford, 1979, 
P-36. 
2. Edward Hugh John Neale Dalton, Lord Dalton (1960), 1887-1962g, 
son of a Canon of Windsor who had also been a tutor to George V. 
Labour MP, Peckham, 1924-29, Bishop Auckland, 1929-31,1935-59, 
formerly Lecturer and Reader in Economics, London School of Economics, 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1929-31, 
Minister of Economic Warfare, 1940-42, President of the Board of 
Trade, 1942-45, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1945-47, Chancellor 
of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1948-50, Minister of Local Government 
and Planning, 1951, Chairman of the NEC of the Labour party, 1936-37. 
An anti-appeaser. Probably one of the four or five most influential 
leaders of the Labour party from 1930 to 1950. 
3. Report and Resolutions of the Labour and Socialist International 
Congress, Brussels, August 1928, published in Zurich September 1928. 
See Labour Party Library, LSI/5/3. 
4. As early as 12 September 1924, H. N. Brailsford, however, challenged 
the basic assumption that nations could be trusted to accept an 
arbitration award by asking in the New-Leader whether Ulster or the 
Irish Free State would necessarily accept the verdict of the 
Boundary Commission. 
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on which the party fought the 1929 general election. Though it committed 
the party to 'a radical programme of disarmament' it gave priority to a 
pledge to sign the Optional Clause of the Statute of the Permanent Court 
of International Justice and the General Act of Arbitration formulated 
by the League in 1928. 
Divided on many issues, the Labour party could unite behind the 
banner of arbitration. Trade unionists knew its value in industrial 
relations. Pacifists saw it as the panacea for all international ills. 
Critics of sanctions supported it because it provided an alternative to 
warlike measures. It is not perhaps surprising, therefore, that the 
party's press and publicity department in 1928 and 1929 issued a number 
of pamphlets on arbitration but none on disarmament. 
Between its rejection of the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance in 
1924 and its return to office in 1929, the Labour party searched for 
palliatives which would neither involve military guarantees nor costly 
commitments. It sought to develop policies which would command the 
support of pacifist and non-pacifist alike. It continued to support 
efforts to control the manufacture and trade in arms but above all it 
pinned its faith on the arbitral and judicial settlement of disputes. 
Believing that public opinion would always act as a restraining influence 
on goverriments it sought to galvanise opinion at home and abroad behind 
those policies which it was convinced would preserve peace and prevent war. 
When MacDonald formed his second government in June 1929 his adminis- 
tration was far better disposed towards disarmament than its Conservative 
predecessor but it believed that certain pre-conditions would have to be 
realised before the task of securing reductions in national armaments 
was taken in hand. In 1924 MacDonald had devoted his energies to 
improving Anglo-French relations and settling the reparations question 
before seeking to promote disarmament through the Geneva Protocol. In 
1929 Anglo-American relations took priority over the general reduction 
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of armaments but MacDonald was in no doubt that an agreement between 
the powers was essential if nations were to disarm. 
1 When the London 
naval conference in 1930 revealed how irreconcilable were French and 
Italian interests, MacDonald and his Cabinet began to falter. By sign- 
ing the Optional Clause, the General Act of Arbitration, Conciliation 
and Judicial Settlement, and the Convention to Strengthen the Means of 
Preventing War, the 1929-1931 Labour government did everything possible 
to pave the way for disarmament without achieving a general reduction 
in armaments. 
There had been many in the pre-war Liberal party who had been 
deeply disturbed by the growth of national armaments and Britain's 
alignment with one of the rival continental alliances. 
2 What dis- 
tinguished Liberals from their Conservative opponents in pre-war Britain 
was their refusal to accept the international order as fixed and immutable. 
Liberals believed that the world was profoundly other than it ought to be 
and that through human reason and action it could be changed for the 
4 better. The Liberal government's failure to halt the arms race by 
bilateral negotiations with Germany convinced many Liberals, including 
Lloyd George, that a future arms race could only be prevented by general 
disarmament through international agreement. Having failed to prevent 
the Pirst World War, armaments weighed heavily on the Liberal conscience. 
Of all the prime ministers of the inter-war years, none was more committed 
1. In a Commons debate on the proposed security pact in June 1925, 
MacDonald distanced himself from the views which the Foreign 
Secretary, Austen Chamberlain, had expressed on disarmament. 
MacDonald said: 'I do not agree for a moment that any individual 
nation is evert by the force of economic pressure, going to reduce 
its armaments by a ship or a gun unless it gets a conference with 
other nations and come to an agreement with them. ' No nation 
would ever say: 'We have spent 20 per cent. too much on armaments, 
let us reduce it. ' 185 HC Debs. 5th Series, Col. 1579,24 June 1925. 
2. See, for example, E. B. Baker and P. J. Noel-Baker: J. A len Baker. 
A Memoir, Passim. 
3. L. W. Martin: Peace without Victor_V, New Haven, 1958, p. 13. 
4. M. Howard: War and the Liberal Conscience, p. 11. 
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to disarmament than David Lloyd George. It was the former Liberal 
Foreign Secretary, Viscount Grey of Fallodon, 
1 
who lent the authority 
of his name to the view that the pre-war arms race had made the 1914-1918 
war virtually inevitable. 
2 No other party gave such consistent support 
to general disarmament as the Liberal party in the inter-war years. 
In the secret conclaves of the Paris peace conference as much as 
on the floor of the House of Commons Lloyd George called for a general 
reduction of armaments in the first year of peace. Without disarmament, 
he said, the League of Nations would be like other conventions of the 
past - something that would be blown away by the first gust of war. If 
nations entered a new competition in armaments the war would prove to 
have been the greatest tragedy the world had ever seen. The omens were 
good. There would be no great eagerness for war in their generation 
because the menace posed by Germany's military might had disappeared 
from the European scene. If, on the other hand, those nations which 
had Promoted the League of Nations increased their armaments, peace 
would be an illusion and the League a sham. 
3 
It was the small band of Independent Liberals in the years 1919 
to 1921 who took the lead in the House of Commons in pressing the 
governMent to initiate discussions with other powers for reductions 
in national armaments. By the summer of 1921 their political opponents 
had, to a large extent, come to share their anxieties as different 
1. Sir Edward Grey, Viscount Grey of Fallodon (1916), 1862-1933, 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Offairs, 1892-95, 
Foreign Secretary, 1905-16, President of the League of Nations Union, 
1919-23. Though only a year older than Lloyd George, he was pre- 
vented from playing a fuller role in the politics of the 1920s by 
deteriorating eyesight. 
2. Viscount Grey of Fallodon: Twenty-Five Years, London, 1925, popular 
editions 19289 Vol. I, pp. 160-2 and Vol. III, pp. 265-75. See 
especially: 'The enormous growth of armaments in Europe, the sense 
of insecurity and fear caused by them - it was these that made war inevitable. ' 
3- 117 HC Debs. 5th Series, cols. 1222-6,3 July 1919; 118 HC Debs. 
5th Series, cols. 1048-9,21 July 1919; 119 HO Debs. 5th Series, 
cols. 2018-20,18 August 1919. 
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sections of the community expressed concern about the state of the 
British economy, the prospects of a new naval arms race, and the failure 
of the world to recover from the dislocation and distress of the war. 
A 1923 Liberal party pamphlet, The Liberal Foreign Policy, identi- 
fied four guiding principles: friendly relations should be cultivated 
with all nations, Britain should acknowledge that all nations had equal 
rights, all entangling engagements should be avoided and there should 
be no secret treaties or secret implications in any treaties, and, 
fourthly, there should be a system of organised co-operation among 
nations to settle international disputes and take common action to 
Prevent war and reduce armaments. The pamphlet claimed that all the 
ideals of Liberal foreign policy were embodied in the League of Nations. 
Liberals, therefore, gave their fullest support to the League, the 
Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Labour 
Office. In a section entitled 'International Security and Disarmament', 
the Pamphlet said that a treaty of mutual guaranteasl should be signed 
by all the members of the League and non-members should be invited to 
give their assent. It claimed that if such a treaty was concluded 
competition in armaments would cease and a scheme of international 
disarmament could then be carried into effect. Drastic curtailment 
of armament expenditure, it affirmed, was an important plank in the 
Liberal platform. 
2 
If Liberals were united in supporting disarmament, they, too, were 
divided over the price Britain should pay for general disarmament. Most 
Liberals gave their backing to the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance and 
The Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, later to be renamed the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, was formulated by the League's Temporary Mixed 
Co=ission on Armaments in 1922 and 1923. See 
2. The Liberal Publications Department: PamDhlets_and Leaflets for 1923, 
London# 1924. 
76 
the Geneva Protocol but Lloyd George, H. A. L. Fisher 1 and a few others 
did not disguise their opposition. Those who shared Lloyd George's 
Francophobia. were reluctant to commit Britain to guarantees which were 
primarily for the benefit of France and the successor states, the 
beneficiaries of what most Liberals regarded as a far from just 1919 
peace settlement. 
At the Paris peace conference Lloyd George laboured in vain to 
persuade his follow delegates to agree to abolish conscription. 
Conscription was an affront to the liberal conscience and most Liberals 
believed that conscription had enabled the continental land powers to 
plunge Europe into war in 1914. In an article in his own Daily Chronicle 
Lloyd George sumined up the Liberal view when he described armies as 
grabbing machines. Nations, Lloyd George said, should be deprived of 
those reserves of trained manpower which enabled them to launch 
aggressive wars. 
2 
Liberals were no less zealous in seeking to persuade the British 
People that the Admiralty exercised too great an influence over the 
formulation of foreign policy and absorbed too high a proportion of the 
nation's resources. They wholeheartedly endorsed the reductions made 
at the Washington conference, criticised successive governments for 
their naval construction programmes, and backed MacDonald's decision 
to reduce British cruiser strength in 1929 to bring about an improve- 
ment in Anglo-American relations. 
In the Liberal party manifesto for the 1929 general election pride 
of place was given to peace and disarmament. Writing to Philip Kerr, 
who was charged with drafting the party's manifesto, Lloyd George wrote 
1. H. A. L. Fisher, historian, university administrator, educationalist 
and Liberal Cabinet Minister, Vice Chancellor of the University of Sheffield# 1912-16, President of the Board of Education, 1916-22, 
British delegate to the League Assemblies, 1920-22, a member of the League's Temporary Mixed Commission on Armaments, 1921-22,1865-1940. 
2.6 January 1923. 
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in August 1928: 'After a criticism of the present Government, I would 
certainly put Peace first. ' 
1 The manifesto said that disarmament was 
the acid test of whether covenants, treaties, and pacts of peace meant 
anything. If the British government had confidence in the League of 
Nations, the Kellogg Pact and the Washington treaties, it would cut 
Britain's 'vast and swollen armaments' to the 'Police' level. 
2 
An early draft of the manifesto put the Liberal case for disarma- 
ment in its most cogent form. 
3 It was a fatal illusion, it said, to 
believe that a nation could obtain security through armaments. No 
country could make itself secure without making others insecure. 
Attempts to obtain security through armaments inevitably bred fear, 
suspicion and competition and that in turn led to alliances and war. 
The 1927 Geneva naval conference had failed because the delegates had 
been guided in all their discussions by considering what armaments each 
power would require in the event of war. The Anglo-French compromise in 
1928 had also failei because it was based on what was necessary for 
British and Prench security. So long as nations possessed armaments, 
which could be used for sudden and successful aggression, it was futile 
to expect lasting peace. Even if no war occurred, fear of war would 
keep the whole world in tension. If, on the other hand, nations divested 
themselves of armaments by reducing them to the level permitted to Germany 
in the peace treaty, the risks of war would be immensely reduced and the 
likelihood that disputes would be settled by peaceful procedures much 
increased. 
In a message to all Liberal candidates in the 1929 general election 
Lloyd George declared that the dominant issues before the electorate 
1. Lloyd George to Kerr, 11 August 1928, Lloyd George Papers, G/12/5/14. 
2. F. W. S. Craig: British General Election Manifestos, 1918-1945, 
Chichester, 1970, pp. 43-62. 
3. Lothian Papers, GD 40/17/110. 
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were unemployment, peace and disarmament. 
1 When, four months after the 
second Labour government came to power, the Liberal party met for its 
annual conference in the Albert Hall, Nottingham, Lloyd George devoted 
most of his speech to foreign affairs. Rejoicing in the steps which 
had been taken by the Labour government to re-establish good relations 
with the United States, he went on to warn the conference that land and 
air disarmament was more important than the reduction of naval armaments. 
So long as nations were highly armed they would never submit their dis- 
putes to arbitration and there would be no peace on earth or goodwill 
2 
among men. 
It was to be Lloyd George, backed by his two Liberal colleagues, 
the Marquess of Lothian3 and Sir Herbert Samuel, 
4 
who was to dominate 
the proceedings of the Three Party Committee on Disarmament which, in 
1931, prepared Britain's brief for the world disarmament conference. 
5 
Liberals were the pace makers in Britain's inter-war years' disarmament 
debate. 
The party manifestos for the 1929 general election afford ample 
proof of the importance disarmament had assumed in British political 
life at the end of the first decade of peace. Notwithstanding the fact 
that unemployment and the structural problems of British industry headed 
the agenda of political debate, a strong current of opinion thrust dis- 
armament to the fore as a major contemporary issue. The international 
community had established the League of Nations almost ten years earlier 
1. Daily Mail, 21 May 1929. 
2.4 October 1929. See the Liberal Publications Department: Selection 
of Pamphlets and Leaflets. 1929,, London, n. d., PP. 35-43. 
3. Philip Kerr succeeded as llth Marquess of Lothian in March 1930. 
4. Sir Herbert Samuel, Viscount Samuel (1937), 1870-1963, Liberal MP, 
Cleveland, 1902-18, Darwen, 1929-35, Parl. Under-Secretary, Home 
office, 1905-9, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1909-10, 
Postmaster General, 1910-14, Rome Secretary, 1916 and 1931-32, 
Leader of Parl. Liberal Party, 1931-35. 
5. See pp. 341-55. 
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but little had been done to eradicate the causes of international 
conflict. In the aftermath of the Locarno conference the international 
situation seemed to blossom with opportunities. It was difficult for 
the British public to resist the conclusion that its own government 
was dragging its feet and failing to profit from the improvement in 
international relations. Against such criticisms it is not surprising 
that the Conservatives decided to devote thirty-eight lines of their 
1929 election manifesto to defending their record in foreign and dis- 
armament policy compared with Labour's fifteen. Five years earlier 
the three parties had virtually ignored disarmament in their manifestos. 
Both internal pressures and external events made the reduction and 
limitation of armaments an important issue in domestic British politics 
in the years 1927 to 1931. 
None the less neither of the two parties of goverment had a 
coherent disarmament policy. After the disappointments of the 1930 
London naval disarmament conference, Labour lacked the inner conviction 
to work with redoubled vigour for international disarmament. Despite 
the Public interest aroused by the League of Nations Union and other 
organisations, neither the Conservatives nor Labour when in power 
Pursued a bold and resolute disarmament policy. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE ISAGUE OF NATIONS UNION AND 
THE CAMPAIGN FOR DISARMAMENT 
The League of Nations Union has been described as the single most 
important and influential pressure group in British foreign politics 
during the inter-war years and the most successful organisation of its 
kind since the Anti-Corn Law League. 
1 Between 1922 and 1935 no British 
goverment could afford to ignore it. With, by 1931, an individual 
membership of almost a million and over three thousand branches through- 
out the United Kingdom it could claim to represent the mainstream of 
Political opinion in Britain. 
2 Unlike the No More War Movement, the 
Union of Democratic Controlp the Fellowship of Reconciliation, and the 
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, it attracted wide 
support from all shades of opinion and all sections of the community. 
Its influence far outweighed that of any other national league of nations 
society. In no other country of the world would membership of an 
Unofficial organisation to promote the objectives of the League of Nations 
have led to the claim, frequently made by members of the League of Nations 
3 Union in Britain, that they belonged to 'the League' . 
1. D. C. Watt: Personalities and Policies, Studies in the Formulation 
of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century, London, 1965, 
p. 35, and R. H. S. Crossman in War and Democracyedited by 
E. F. M. Durbin and G. E. C. Catlin, P. 278. 
2. Annual Report of the Executive Committee to the General Council of 
the League of Nations Union for the year ending 31st December 1931, 
and Michael Howard: War-and the Liberal Conscience, London, 1978, 
p. 86. The Union's paid-up membership was less t&n half its nominal 
membership. In 1931 951,588 members were listed of whom only 
406,868 had paid a subscription. 
3- A. E. Zimmern: The League of Nations and the Rule of La p London, 1936, P. 331. 
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The Union was founded in January 1919 when representatives of the 
League of Nations Society and the breakaway organisation, the League of 
Free Nations Association, set up a General Council at a meeting in 
Central Hall, Westminster. Grey was elected President, Asquith, Balfour 
and Lloyd George honorary Presidents, and, to underline the Union's 
intention of looking to the churches and religious organisations for 
active support, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the President of the 
Free Church Council and the Chief Rabbi were made Vice Presidents. 
To its Executive Committee the Union recruited both those who had 
stressed the value of moral persuasion in the League of Nations Society 
and those who had formed the League of Free Nations Association because 
they believed that a league without effective military sanctions would 
be of no avail. 
The parent body, the League of Nations Society, had been founded 
by a number of prominent Liberals in May 1915 to advocate the estab- 
lishment of a league of nations after the war. Though it gained 
recruits from the Union of Democratic Control and other left-wing 
organisations, it failed to attract any prominent Conservatives. Not 
even the Conservative 'rebel', Lord Lansdowne, responded to its overtures. 
It was its pacifist tendencies, left-wing inclinations, allegedly pro- 
German sympathies, and lack of drive which led David Davies 
1 
and others 
to form a rival association in the summer of 1918. The League of Free 
Nations Associations aimed to win support from the Right as well as the 
Left in British politics by supporting the prosecution of the war to a 
victorious conclusion. 
2 
David Davies, Lord D avies of Llandinam (1932), 1880-1944, Welsh 
landowner, mine owner and philanthropist, Liberal MP for Montgomery, 
1906-29, Parliamentary Private Secretary to Lloyd George, 1916, the 
foremost advocate of an international police force in Britain. See, 
especially, his The Problem of the Twentieth Centurv,, London, 1930. 
2. G. W. Egerton: Great. Britain and the Creation 
- 
qf the League of Nations,, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1978P PP. 50-73. 
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The Union set itself the task of so mobilising public opinion behind 
the League that the British government would have no choice but to make it 
the cornerstone of Britain's foreign policy. To achieve that objective 
the Union formed branches throughout the country, conducted a vigorous 
propaganda, brought pressure to bear on MPs and government alike, sponsored 
and organised research, study and discussion, and attempted to influence 
such opinion formers as the churches, trade unions, women's groups, schools, 
colleges and universities. 
The Union invested the League of Nations with a religious glamour 
for hundreds of thousands of men and women who joined its ranks because 
they believed that a new era had dawned in the history of the world. 
In January 1919 the League of Nations Society was a small organisation 
of Liberal intellectuals with a membership of 2,230. The League of 
Free Nations Association had a mere 987 members. By the end'of the year 
the Union had over 14,000 members and branches in almost a hundred 
different places, some as far from the metropolis as Aberdare and Wrexham, 
Barnstaple and Weston-super-Mare. 
1 
PrOm the beginning the Union donned the mantle of social respect- 
ability. To its numerous committees it recruited those with an estab- 
lished place in society. Generals, admirals, titled members of the, 
aristocracy and pillars of the business community filled its committees 
and its coffers. The Annual Report for 1927 listed among its Vice 
Presidents Admiral of the Fleet, Earl Beatty, 
2 Lieutenant-General Sir 
Notes about Lord Grey by Gilbert Murray, 30 August 1935, Gilbert Murray 
Papers; T. Jones: Whitehall Diary, Vol. I, p. 61; L. Woolf: Beginning 
Again. An Autobiozra]2hv of the-Years. -15)11-1918, 
London, 1964, 
pp. 191-2; The Times, 13 and 23 January 1919; G. W. Egerton: Great 
Britain and the Creation of the League of-Nations, pp. 11-12,51-2,90-2. 
2. David Beatty, Earl Beatty (1919), 1871-1936, Naval Secretary to 
Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty, 1912p Commander of the Grand Fleet, 1916-19, First Sea Lord, 1919-27. 
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Hubert Gough 
1 
and fourteen members of the peerage. 
2 It reported that 
during the year twenty-four individuals had given one hundred pounds or 
more and that Cadbury Bros. Ltd. had donated two thousand pounds to its 
funds. It also reported that eight individuals had given donations 
ranging from fifty to five hundred pounds to the Union's disarmament 
campaign. 
3 
Almost from its birth Lord Robert Cecil was the hero and the darling 
of the League of Nations Union. He, more than any other, guided its 
destiny and made it an effective instrument in British political life. 
Without a substantial following in the Conservative party, he drew on 
the support of the Union's large and influential membership. If his 
position in the Union was weakened, he told Wilson HarriS4 in November 
1925, his influence in the Cabinet would be undermined. 
5A 
year after 
his resignation from the Baldwin government in August 1927, a backbench 
Conservative MP, Sir John Power, 6 told Thomas Jones, the Assistant 
Secretary of the Cabinet and a close friend of the Prime Minister, that 
if Baldwin brought Cecil back into his government it would be worth a 
million votes to the Conservative party at the next general election. 
7 
Sir Hubert Gough, 1870-1963, leader and spokesman of the rebel officers 
at the Curragh in March 1914, Commander of the Vth Army in France, 
Independent Liberal candidate in the Chertsey by-election. 
2. Marquess of Crewe; Earl of Derby; Duke of Devonshire; Earl of Home; 
Viscount Irwin; Lord Marshall; Lord Parmoor; Lord Phillimore; Marquess 
of Reading; Lord Revelstoke; Marquess of Salisbury; Earl of Selborne; 
Lord Shaw of Dunfermline; and Lord Shuttleworth. Lord Queensborough 
was honorary Treasurer, Viscount Grey and Viscount Cecil were joint 
Presidents, Baldwin, Clynes and Lloyd George honorary Presidents. 
3. Annual Report of the Executive Committee to the General Council, 1927. 
4. H. Wilson Harris, 1883-1955, formerly Diplomatic Correspondent of the 
Daily News., from 1923 a member of the headquarters staff of the Union, 
Editor of the Spectator, 1932-53, Independent MP for Cambridge 
University, 1945-50. 
5. Cecil to Wilson Harris, 20 November 1925, copy in Gilbert Murray Papers. 
6. Sir John Power Bt., died 1950, Conservative MP for Wimbledon, 1924-35, 
philanthropist and benefactor of the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs and the Institute of Historical Research. 
T. Jones: Whiteha; lLIL Duia ILLY, Vol. lIq diary entry 11 December 1928, P. 162. 
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That was no doubt an exaggeration but there can be no doubt about the 
loyalty and affection he commanded among those who took the League of 
Nations seriously in Britain. 
Writing from the Paris peace conference in March 1919, Cecil told 
the Union's President that governments had created the League but it 
would be for the peoples of the world to give it a living soul. Many 
people in Britain still needed converting and others had not yet realised 
how they could give effective expression to their internationalist faith. 
1 
The League of Nations Union had to become an organisation. with an 
evangelistic purpose. 
In the autumn of 1921*the League Assembly's Third (Disarmament) 
Committee suggested that limitation of armaments would never be imposed 
by governments on peoples but it might be imposed by peoples on govern- 
ments. It urged League delegates to carry on a vigorous propaganda to 
3 bring home to the peoples of the world the urgent necessity of disarmament. 
From the very first the Union struck a realistic note in its approach 
to disarmament. In January 1919 its acting Executive Committee sent the 
Prime Minister a memorandum expressing the view that there could be no 
reduction of armaments until a league of nations had been established. 
4 
It was not until December 1920 that the Union began to put pressure on 
both the government and the League to promote international disarmament. 
Though it called on the goverment to endorse the recommendations of the 
Brussels International Financial Conference5 for the reduction of armaments 
it repudiated a suggestion that the Union should initiate agitation against 
the Service estimates. 
6 
1. Cecil to Grey, 24 March 1919, copy in Lloyd George Papers, F/6/6/19. 
2. H. Wilson Harris: Life So Par, London, 1954, p. 200. 
3. League of Nations: Recor s of the Second Assembly. Plenar-Y Meetings, 
Geneva, 1921, pp. 655-6. 
4. The Times, 13 January 1919. 
5. See P. 172. 
6. Minutes of the Executive Committee, 4 and 9 December 1920. 
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The decision to set up an armaments committee in February 1921 
reflected growing popular dissatisfaction with the lack of progress 
in disarmament. At the Union's General Council meeting on 26 January 
1921, to which one hundred and ten branches sent representatives, a 
member of the Derby branch moved a resolution calling on the League to 
make definite proposals for the reduction of armaments. With a few 
minor emendations, the resolution was unanimously approved and forwarded 
to the League Secretariat at Geneva. 
I 
The committee was made upp for the most part, of men with dis- 
tinguished and specialised experience in military and naval affairs. 
2 
Its terms of reference were: 
1. To compare the military and naval expenditure of Great Britain 
in 1914 and 1921. 
2. To compare the military, naval and air forces maintained by 
the principal Allied and Associated Powers with those maintained 
by 
the ex-enemy states. 
To enquire into the feasibility of budgetary limitation of 
armed forces. 
To compare the Permanent Armaments Commission'83 report on 
1. Minutes of the seventh meeting of the General Council. 
2. Maj. -Gen. J. E. B. Seely 
(Chairman), lst Lord MottistOn8 (1933), 
1868-1947, Conservative MP for Isle of Wight, 1900-4, Liberal Mpg 
Isle of Wight, 1904-5, Liverpool, Abercromby, 1906-10, Ilkeston, 
1910-22, Secretary of State for War, 1912-14, Parliamentary Under- 
Secretary of State for Air, 1919; Charles Roberts, Liberal MP for 
Lincoln, 1906-18, Parl. Under-Secretary of State for India, 1915-16; 
(Sir) Leonard Bairstow, FRS, Professor of Aerodynamics at Imperial 
College, London, and a leading authority on aviation; David Davies, 
MP; Dr. J. C. Maxwell Garnett, General Secretary of the Union, 
1920-38; Rear Admiral R. A. Hopwood, General Secretary of the Navy 
League, 1919-22; Lt. -Gen. Sir Hubert Gough; J. M. Keynes, Cambridge 
economist and former Treasury civil servant; Maj. -Gen. Sir F. Mauricet 
Director of Military Operations at the War Office, 1915-18; (Sir) 
Archibald Hurd, a leader writer on naval affairs for Daily Telegraph 
and a joint editor of Brassev's Naval and Shipping Annual, 1922-28; 
Harold Judd, chartered accountant and Deputy Controller of Contracts 
at the Ministry of Munitions in 1917; and (Sir) Oswald Mosley (Bt. ), MP. 
3. See P. 229. 
s6 
the use of poisons including poison gas in war with the actual measures 
being taken by the British government and other governments. 
To enquire into the disposal of surplus arms by Great Britain 
ana the non-implementation of the St. Germain-en-Laye Convention of 
September 1919.1 
To enquire into the possibility of limiting the nature of 
armaments by abolishing all modern developments. 
To enquire into the possibility of a League of Nations force 
to supersede to a greater or lesser extent national armies and navies. 
2 
The committee issued an interim report in March and a final report 
in June. Both received full publicity and copies of the final report 
were distributed very widely among Dominion prime ministers, League of 
Nations societies in other countries, representatives of the American 
press in Britain, members of the government and the League Secretariat. 
The committee repudiated unilateral disarmament, rejected budgetary 
limitation, the international inspection and supervision of a disarma- 
ment convention, and attempts to prohibit offensive weapons such as 
poison gas. They proposed a limitation of battle fleets suggesting that 
ten should be the maximum number of capital ships Britain or any other 
naval power should be permitted to retain. Asserting that no external 
body could fully assess a nation's defence requirements, they proposed 
two sets of criteria for determining the level of national armaments: 
the forces needed to maintain law and order and those needed to deter 
aggression and fulfil a country's international obligations. They 
differentiated between forces needed for home defence and those required 
1. The Convention signed on 10 September 1919 was designed to impose 
national and international controls on the export of arms. It was 
never implemented because only four of its twenty-three signatories 
ratified it. 
2. Minutes of Executive Committee, 13 January, 3 and 10 February 1921. 
See also Women's Leader,, 22 July 1921. 
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for the defence of overseas possessions thereby providing colonial powers 
such as Britain and Prance with a justification for forces well in excess 
of those maintained by Germany and other European states without overseas 
colonies. They suggested that the League should submit a questionnaire 
to each member state enquiring what forces it required for each of these 
purposes. 
1 
In most respects their recommendations bore a striking 
resemblance to the proposals which the Service departments and the 
Committee of Imperial Defence were to make to the goverment on the eve 
of the Washington Conference. 
2 
The Union was far from complacent about European disarmament. It 
criticised the League's Temporary Mixed Commission on Armaments 
(TMC)3 
for its dilatoriness. On Maurice's advice it set up another committee, 
4 
five of whom had sat on the previous disarmament committee, to consider 
the implications of the Washington conference and the 1921 report of the 
League Assembly's Third (Disarmament) Committee. 
5 Realising that there 
could be no progress towards disarmament in Europe until the continental 
nations enjoyed a greater measure of security, the Union drafted a dis- 
armament treaty linking arms limitation with security. 
6 
1. Interim Report of the Committee on Limitation of Armaments, 
29 March 1921, Annex IBI in the Minutes of the Executive Committee, 
3 May 1921 and Minutes of the Executive Committeet 30 June 1921. 
See also the Daily Telegraph, 23 February, 2 March and 28 April 1921, 
The Times, 26 April 1921. 
2. See PP. 179-81. 
3. See pp. 229-30. 
4. Charles Roberts; Lt. -Gen. Sir Hubert Gough; Rear Admiral R. A. Hopwood; Prof. L. Bairstowt and Maj-Gen. Sir Frederick Maurice. 
5. Minutes of Executive Committee, 17 November 1921. 
6. The draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee which Cecil put before the 
TMC in 1922 bore a striking resemblance to the Union's disarmament 
treaty. In a paper given at Chatham House on 29 April 1921 Maurice 
first outlined proposals for a treaty linking disarmament with 
security. These, it would seem, were adopted by Cecil and put before 
the Union's Executive Committee on 5 January 1922. They were approved 
by them on 16 March in an amended form. The proposals which Cecil put 
to the TNC in July 1922, see reports in the Daily Telegraph and 
[Contd. overleaf 
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When the General Council met in Birmingham on 20 January 1922, 
Cecil tried to enlist its support for the draft treaty. Its third 
resolution contained the statement: 'in order to reassure. those States 
who are reluctant to limit their armaments for fear of attack by their 
neighbours, a joint and several defensive alliance open to all members 
of the League as well as to Germany, Russia and the United States on 
condition that armaments are reduced to an agreed level, should be 
proposed'. 
1 
On 18 February the Executive Committee wrote to the Prime 
Minister quoting the General Council resolution and calling on the 
government to look favourably on proposals for a general defensive 
alliance which might be regional in character but warning against agree- 
ments which might divide Europe into mutually antagonistic military 
alliances. Lloyd George's reply, though it referred to the proposals 
which had been considered at the Cannes conference, 
2 
showed scant sympathy 
for a general defensive alliance. 
3 
About that time Cecil informed Leon 
Bourgeois, 4 the veteran French statesman and the League's most enthusiastic 
champion in France, that the Union was disposed to advocate a much more 
effective scheme than 'the proposed general guarantee' [sic] suggested at 
Fn. 6. P. 87 contd. 
the 
, 
Morning Post, 5 July 1922, were almost identical to the amended 
draft in Annex 'A' of the Executive Committee's Minutes for 16 March 
1922. The evidence suggests that both the draft Treaty of Mutual 
Assistance, see P-242 below, and the Esher Plan, see p. 241 below, 
originated in the mind of the former Director of Military Operations 
at the War Office, Maj. -Gen. Sir Frederick Maurice. 
1. Report of the General Council, 20 January 1922. 
2. See pp. 235-6-- In the House of Commons in March 1925 Lloyd George 
stated that Britain's proposals for a pact were conditional upon 
disarmament and France's agreement to a European pact. 182 HC Debs. 
5th Series, Col. 335,24 March 1925. 
3- Minutes of the Executive Committee, 18 February and 27 April 1922. 
The Union's correspondence with Lloyd George was published in full 
in the Manchester Guardian 
, and commented on 
in eleven other newspapers* 
4. Leon Bourgeois, 1851-1925, Minister of the Interior, 1890, Prime 
Minister, 1895, chief French delegate at the 1899 Hague conference, 
chief French representative on the Paris peace conference's League 
of Nations Commission. See PP. 157-9. 
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Cannes. What the Union had in mind was a general defensive alliance 
with machinery for giving special rights to any country in particular 
danger. 1 The Union was prepared to countenance those special defensive 
arrangements which were particularly attractive to France. 
In October 1926 the Union published the proposals of another sub- 
committee on the reduction and limitation of national armaments 
2 in a 
pamphlet for general distribution. 
3 The report began by stressing the 
relationship between general disarmament on the one hand and arbitration, 
security, mutual defensive arrangements and enlightened economic policies 
on the other. It was the great powers' responsibility to take the 
initiative in disarmament. Their objective should be not to seek an 
exact balance of military strength but adequate security against attack 
and the initiation of an agreed process of arms reductions. In the first 
stage, the powers should agree to make no increases. The second stage 
would be an agreement to make a simple percentage red-action in either 
expenditure on armaments or trained manpower or, perhaps, both. A 
realistic objective, the report suggested, would be a twenty per cent. 
reduction spread over five years. The report rejected as impracticable 
in the prevailing climate of opinion the extension to other powers of 
the disarmament imposed on Germany and her allies by the peace treaties 
but it expressed the hope that if such a proposal should at some 
1. Cecil to Bourgeois, 17 February 1922, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Nss. 51095. 
2. Gilbert Murray (Chairman); Rear-Admiral J. D. Allen; C. Delisle Burns, 
university lecturer and historian; Col. David Carnegie, a Canadian 
member of the TMC, 1921-24, Liberal candidate for Canterbury, 1924, 
1927 and 1929; David Davies, MP; Vice-Admiral S. R. Drury-Lowe, 
H. A. L. Fisher; Dr. J. C. Maxwell Garnett; Brig. -Gen. H. Hartley, 
formerly Controller of the Chemical Warfare Department in the 
Ministry of Munitions; Sir Charles Hobhouse, a Liberal MP, 1892-95 
and 1900-18, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1911-14, 
Postmaster General, 1914-15; Maj. -Gen. Sir F. Maurice; Prof. P. J. Noel-Baker; Charles Roberts; Maj. -Gen. J. E. B. Seely, and S. Sherman (secretary). 
3. League of Nations Union Pamphlet No. 198: Armaments. Their Reduction 
and Limitation, London, October 1926. 
go 
subsequent date become acceptable to European opinion, Britain would 
throw her weight behind it. Without apologising for its partiality 
towards colonial powers, it suggested that they should be accorded 
special treatment because the League's writ did not ran among the Pathans 
of the North West Frontier or the Riff tribesmen of Morocco. Far more 
sweeping reductions could be made in forces deployed to repel foreign 
aggression than among those intended for preserving order at home and 
abroad. It optimistically assumed that the League Covenant, the Locarno 
treaties and other recently concluded arbitration treaties had created 
new conditions of security. 
The main object of a disarmament plan, the report suggested, was 
not to reduce the ultimate war strength of a nation but to prevent it 
making a sudden and successful attack on a neighbour. Continental 
conscript armies should, therefore, be transformed into national militias 
on the Swiss model by progressively reducing the period of compulsory 
military service. To halt the expansion of air forces air personnel 
and air budgets should be strictly limited. 
Differing from its 1921 predecessor, the 1926 committee came out 
in favour of international inspection and supervision but in most other 
respects it followed the cautious line adopted by the Baldwin government. 
It repudiated the suggestion that it would be possible to prohibit the 
manufacture of poison gas 
1 
or proscribe certain weapons or methods of 
warfare. 
2 
Noel-Baker dissented from this conclusion. In his chapter on 
chemical warfare in Disarmament (London, 1926, pp. 275-89) he 
suggested that no price was too high to pay to prevent gas warfare. 
Basing himself on the proposals of a foremost British authority, 
Maj. Victor Lefebure in The Riddle of the Rhine (London, 1921), 
Noel-Baker concluded t steps could be taken to prevent the 
manufacture of poison gas. 
2. Seely, dissenting from this view, wrote a minority report. He 
argued that Germany's violation of the rules of war between 1914 
and 1918 had been counter-productive. Self-denying ordinances were, therefore, more likely to be observed in the future than they had 
been in the immediate past. Hitler's reluctance to violate the 1936 submarine protocol would appear to add substance to Seely's view. 
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By far the longest section of the report was devoted to naval 
armaments. Declaring that battleships were the most costly of all 
ships to build and maintain and drawing attention to the fact that the 
largest battleships in the Battle of the Tsushima Straits 
I 
were 15,000 
ton vessels with 1211 guns, it tentatively suggested that the limit set 
by the Versailles treaty for Germany's navy -a maximum displacement 
of 10,000 tons - provided a useful guideline. It refrained from making 
any proposals for the limitation of cruisers and smaller warships but 
cast some doubt on the wisdom of the Washington precedent of restrict- 
ing the scope of a limitation treaty to a few powers. It demonstrated 
its orthodoxy by rejecting proposals for the establishment of an inter- 
national police force but it allowed David Davies to set out the case 
in a fairly lengthy minority report. Though the report was cautious 
and conservative in tone, it put on the agenda of the disarmament debate 
a number of proposals - among them percentage reductions and a radical 
lowering in the ma imilm displacement of battleships - which were to 
figure prominently in governmental discussions in the years immediately 
before the world disarmament conference. 
However much the Union might seek to grapple with the technicalities 
of disarmament it never lost sight of its primary purpose of trying to 
influence governments and mould public opinion. In order to achieve 
that goal it was forced to consider most critically and carefully its 
tactics and organisation. In so doing it pioneered techniques which 
other pressure groups have subsequently followed. 
The Union was from its birth not reluctant to bring pressure to 
bear at the highest level. When its Parliamentary Committee, chaired 
by Sir Samuel Hoare, failed to organise a deputation to the Prime Minister 
The Japanese navy's annihilation of the Russian fleet in the 
Tsushima Straits between Korea and Japan on 27 May 1905 in the 
Russo-Japanese war has been described as one of the most decisive 
naval battles in history. 
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1 
to press for naval disarmament in the summer of 1921, it was censured 
by the Executive Committee. It was among the first, however, to offer 
its congratulations to the government over the success of the Washington 
conference. 
1 Throughout the second half of 1923 and the first half of 
1924 it put pressure on the Baldwin and MacDonald governments to look 
favourably on the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, urging its branches 
to send resolutions to the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and even 
the Lord Privy Seal himself, 2 voicing their support for the draft treaty. 
3 
Having learnt from a misguided attempt in 1921 to organise agitation, 
the Union advised its branches to compose their own resolutions rather 
than use one drafted by headquarters. 
4 In May 1924 the Union sent 
MacDonald a letter urging him to give it favourable consideration5 and 
a month later the Executive Committee tried unsuccessfully to persuade 
him to receive a deputation. 
6 
The Union was not successful in its efforts but until comparatively 
late in the day it had been far from united in its attitude to the draft 
treaty. By the time it had reconciled its own differences to unite 
behind a set of proposed amendments, the CID, the Foreign Office and 
their political masters had taken an irrevocable decision to reject it. 
7 
MacDonald had in fact taken up an unsympathetic stance towards it a 
year before taking office. 
1. Minutes of Executive Committee, 30 June and 17 November 1921. 
2. Lord Robert Cecil no doubt hoped that these resolutions would 
strengthen his hand against the draft treaty's critics in the Cabinet. 
3. Report of the Fourth General Council of the Union, 19 July 1923. 
4. Minutes of Executive Committee, 19 June 1923; Maxwell Garnett to 
Curzon, 23 June 1923, FO 371/9419. 
5. C-35(24), 30 May 1924P CAB 23/48. 
6. Murray to Cecil, 21 June 1924, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Xss- 51132. 
7. For the differences within the Union, see Gilbert Murray in the 
weekly edition of the Westminster Gazette, 7 June 1924. For the 
response of the Baldwin and MacDonald governments, see 
8. MacDonald to Cecil, 22 February 1923, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss- 51081- 
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The Union met with no more success in seeking to persuade the 
second Baldwin government to adopt a sympathetic attitude towards the 
Geneva Protocol. Its deputation and agitation came too late to influence 
a government which had been ill-disposed towards the Protocol from the 
moment it took office. 
From these unsuccessful efforts, the Union turned increasingly to 
other forms of pressure. In November 1923 the Executive Committee had 
drafted a questionnaire to be put to all parliamentary candidates in 
the forthcoming general election. Its fourth question asked: 'Will you 
press for a general limitation of armaments in accordance with the pro- 
visions of Article 8 of the Covenant of the League? 12 At each successive 
general election the Union was to adopt similar tactics. It would have 
been rash for any parliamentary candidate to ignore an organisation 
which was well established in most constituencies in the country and 
had many influential supporters in all three political parties. Some 
did but the majority bowed to the pressure which the Union could exert. 
Shortly after the 1929 general election, Gilbert Murray reported that 
the Union's questionnaire had been put to all but eighty-three of the 
one thousand three hundred and eighty-seven candidates. Of the six 
hundred and fifteen recently elected Members of Parliament, two hundred 
and thirty-six could be relied on to support the definite points in the 
questionnaire and another one hundred and eighty-eight had given it 
general approval. Only twenty-eight Members had made non-committal 
replies. 
3 
1. A deputation from the Union consisting of Gilbert Murray, Lady 
Violet Bonham-Carter, J. W. Hills, MP, the Countess of Selborne, 
J. R. Clynes, MP, Tom Shaw, MP, and Dr. J. C. Maxwell Garnett 
called on the Prime Minister on 3 February 1925. For the govern- 
ment's rejection of the Protocol see 
2. Annex 'A' to Minutes of Executive Committee, 15 November 1923. 
3. Minutes of Tenth Annual Meeting of the General Council, 27-29 June 
1929 and the Annual Report of the Executive Committee to the 
General Council for 1928. 
I 
However much it might succeed in lobbying governments and Members 
of Parliament, the Union could not afford to ignore what it regarded as 
its main task: the education of public opinion. It tried to win the 
young by involving itself in syllabus planning, citizenship training 
and history teaching in schools. 
1 It was, nevertheless, the conversion 
of an adult electorate which was its main task. When it failed to 
persuade successive British governments to accept in principle the draft 
Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Geneva Protocol it blamed itself for 
its failure to educate public opinion. 
2 
In the years immediately after the war the Union had been quick to 
exploit the anxieties of the British people about the state of the 
economy and Europe's failure to recover from the war. In the same month 
that Lloyd George appointed the Geddes committee, 
3 
the Union issued a 
manifesto declaring that a reduction of armaments would save a number 
of European countries from 'bankruptcy, high taxes, small trade, low 
wages, unemployment, bad housing, high rents, neglected education and 
general social and industrial discontent. 
4 
Though its crude exaggera- 
tion must have antagonised the more discerning, it was not wholly 
unsuccessful in turning the campaign against Isquandermanial and 'Waste, 
which the Daily Mail and other newspapers were then waging, 
5 into a 
demand for reductions in armaments. In a society more interested in 
retrenchment than in generating employment through arms production, it 
was comparatively easy to win the business community and a considerable 
section of the electorate for disarmament. 
1. When the Board of Education issued its 1927 edition of Handbook of 
Suggestions for Teachers it added an appendix on the League of 
Nations and stressed the importance of the League in History and 
citizenship teaching. See pp. 113,125-6,428-50. 
2. Murray to MacDonald, 12 May 1925, MacDonald Paperat PRO 30/69/5/36. 
3. See P. 173. 
4. Minutes of the Executive Committee, 11 August 1921. 
5. See p. 172. 
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At the same time the Union decided to mount a disarmament campaign 
in the following autumn. A committee was established and it was decided 
to enlist the support of other organisations. Union speakers were 
requested to make disarmament the theme in all the meetings they 
addressed during the autumn. It was also agreed that disarmament should 
figure prominently in all the Union's summer school programmes. 
1 Before 
the end of July, sixteen regional conferences on disarmament had been 
planned for the autumn of 1921 in centres stretching from Carlisle and 
Newcastle upon Tyne in the North, to Exeter, Bristol and Reading in the 
South. 
2 
After the rejection of both the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance 
and the Geneva Protocol, the Union again turned its attention to the 
high level of armaments in most European countries. Prompted by Cecil's 
request 
3 
to provide him with a good head of steam as he pressed the 
government from within to promote international disarmament, the Union 
made disarmament the keynote of its propaganda activity in the closing 
months of 1925. In December the General Council passed a resolution 
urging the government to put disarmament in the forefront of its pro- 
gramme. It called on the government to instruct its advisers to prepare 
'forthwith' an effective disarmament scheme for submission to the League 
and do all in its power to see that the international disarmament con- 
ference, envisaged in the resolution of the Sixth League Assembly, 
4 
was 
held at the earliest possible moment. 
5 
In November 1926 the Union appointed a small committee to launch 
a massive campaign for disarmament. Chaired by the Conservative MP, 
1. Minutes of Executive Committee, 30 June 1921. 
2. Minutes of Executive Committee, 21 July 1921. 
3. Cecil to Murray (Chairman of the Executive Committee), 9 and 21 
October 1925, Gilbert Murray Papers. 
4. See p. 267. 
5. Minutes of General Council, 16 December 1925. 
J. W. Hills, 1 it consisted of Noel-Baker, Mrs. Oliver Strachey2 and the 
former Liberal MP. Henry Vivian. 
3 It also enlisted the services of four 
of the Union's headquarters staff including the General Secretary, 
Dr. J. C. Maxwell Garnett, and Wilson Harris. At its first meeting it 
adopted a set of detailed proposals, drafted by Noel-Baker. These 
included the formation of study circles, the sponsoring of pamphlets 
primarily for the use of speakers, and the manipulation of the Press. 
Noel-Baker suggested that Murray should encourage leading statesmen to 
write letters to The Times and other newspapers making the case for 
disarmament. Grey was, on more than one occasion at Noel-Baker's 
instigation, induced to write to one or other of the leading national 
newspapers in support of disarmament. 
4 Realising that the provincial 
press could also provide a useful platform for the campaign, Noel-Baker 
suggested that members of the Union's headquarters staff should offer 
to provide them with articles. Whenever the League published a report 
on disarmament the committee should seek to gain maximum publicity for 
it by letters to the Press. Union members should also be encouraged to 
write to MPs to bring indirect pressure to bear on the government. The 
support of the business world should be enlisted through recruiting 
prominent industrialists and financial experts to address them through I 
1. Maj. J. W. Hills, 1867-1938, Conservative MP for Durham City, 1906-22, 
Ripon, 1922-24,1925-38; served in France 1914-16, wounded 1916, 
Member of the TMC 1923-24, Financial Secretary to the Treasury, 1922-24. 
2. Mrs. Oliver Strachey, 1887-1940, Hon. Parl. Secretary of the National 
Union of Women's Suffrage Societies, Editor of Women's Leader, 
Secretary of Women's Employment Federation, Ind. parl. candidate, 1918, 
1922 and 1923. 
3. Henry Vivian, 1868-1930, Lib. -Lab. MP for Birkenhead, 1906-10, Liberal 
MP for Totnes, 1923-24. In 1906 he took an active part in the campaign 
to press the Liberal government to reduce armament expenditure and work 
for international disarmament at the forthcoming Hague peace conference. 
4. See Noel-Baker to Murray, 4 October 1924,8 September and 3 October 
1927, Gilbert Murray Papers. 
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Chambers of Commerce. 
1 Noel-Baker's sixth proposal was that a special 
fund should be launched to provide the campaign with adequate financial 
2 
resources. 
Noel-Baker had been extremely critical of the Union's propaganda. 
He did not believe that it made the best use of its leading supporters 
like Cecil and Grey. He felt that it could achieve far more by gaining 
entry to the conferences of such organisations as Rotary and the Head- 
masters' Conference than by conducting its own mass meetings. He 
believed that far too little was being done to mobilise the churches 
and educational institutions. The Union had completely failed to convey 
its message to the great crowds which assembled at sporting events such 
as the Cup Final, the University Boat Race and the Derby. Not enough 
was being done to use posters and the newer media such as the cinema. 
The Union's own Speakers' Notes gave it an opportunity it seldom used 
3 
to speak from a thousand platforms with one voice. 
There can be little doubt that the Union's campaign was designed 
to coincide with the work being done at Geneva by the League's Preparatory 
Commission. Much of the impetus for the campaign came, however, from a 
growing dissatisfaction with the government's inaction and the League's 
failure to secure an agreement for the reduction of armaments. Many felt 
that time was ninning out and that disarmament had become a matter of 
extreme urgency. 
4 It was that feeling which no doubt prompted some of the 
Union's wealthier supporters to contribute most generously to the campaign's 
5 
expenses. 
1. Among those who addressed Chambers of Commerce on behalf of the Union 
were Sir Arthur Haworth, Chairman of the Manchester Royal Exchange, 
and Sir Josiah (later Lord) Stamp, a financial adviser to successive 
governments, a member of the Dawes committee, a director of Nobel 
Industries and I. C. I. 
2. Minutes of the Disarmament Campaign Committee, 11 November 1926. 
3. Noel-Baker to Murray, - April 1926, Gilbert Murray Papers. 
4. Noel-Baker to Murray, 6 September 1927, Gilbert Murray Papers. 
5. Lady Cowdray donated five hundred pounds, Lord Revelstoke and Sir Thomas Barlow, one hundred pounds each, and Sir Daniel Stevenson 
promised forty pounds for every six months the campaign ran up to 
six and a half years. 
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When Cecil resigned from the government in August 1927, the 
campaign moved into top gear. Freed from the responsibilities of office, 
he set out to promote a cause to which he attached the greatest importance. 
Less than a fortnight after his resignation he proposed that the Union 
should concert its efforts with those of the Liberal and Labour parties. 
' 
By 14 September he had mapped out a rough draft of a programme and within 
three days a declaration had been drawn up and moves made to enlist the 
services of both MacDonald and Lloyd George. On 17 September he wrote: 
'I believe a vigorous disarmament campaign will sweep the country. 12 
Although he was anxious to have the support of the Liberal and Labour 
parties, Cecil was determined that the campaign should take on the 
character of a national crusade cutting across political boundaries. 
In October he approached the Archbishop of Canterbury to chair a meeting 
in the Royal Albert Hall which, he hoped, would take the form of a 
demonstration 'religious in character'. 
3 
Cecil was given an enthusiastic reception by the Union's General 
Council at a meeting specially convened on 21 October to hear him explain 
his reasons for resigning. A Union pamphlet containing his speech and 
the resolution passed at the meeting was published with the title Law not 
War and circulated not only in Britain but throughout the world. 
4 
Branches were invited to hold their own meetings to campaign for disarma- 
ment. BY 31 December 1927 six hundred had been held in different parts 
of the country and Cecil himself had addressed large rallies in Liverpool, 
Manchester, Hull, Scarborough and Birmingham. 
5 
The committee was enlarged and given the full-time services of an 
1. Cecil to Murray, 10 September 1927, Gilbert Murray Papers. 
2. Cecil to Murray, 17 September 1927, Gilbert Murray Papers. 
3. Cecil to Randall Davidson, 11 October 1927, Gilbert Murray Papers. 
4. Anniml Report of Executive Committee to General Council for 1927. 
5. Ibid. 
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organising secretary and assistant and the campaign was brought to the 
notice of the public by a house-to-house distribution of leaflets and 
handbills. The Annual Report for 1927 said that never before had the 
Union mounted such a massive campaign to win over the public. 
1 On 
15 February 1928 it was reported that of the one hundred and two meetings 
held during the previous week, it was known that sixty-two had been on 
disarmament and a week later that of the one hundred and four meetings 
held between 15 and 23 February, seventy-six had been on disarmament. 
2 
So incessant was the propaganda that fears were expressed that the 
public might become wearied of it. However, when there was talk of 
dropping the campaign, Cecil made it clear that he would take very little 
further interest in the Union if this were done and the campaign went on 
to attract even larger crowds. 
3 On 27 March it was reported that two 
thousand five hundred people had attended a meeting at Golders Green 
chaired by Bishop Gore 
4 
and addressed by representatives of all three 
political parties, Cecil had addressed over a thousand delegates at 
the Free Churches' Conference in Bridlington and Noel-Baker had spoken 
to six hundred delegates at a Co-operative conference in Manchester. 
5 
The meetings were planned as evangelistic crusades. On 6 December 
1927 Cecil had proposed that a form containing a pledge to work for 
arbitration and disarmament should be printed and distributed at their 
meetings. The pledge read: 
1. Annual Report of Executive Committee to General Council for 1927. 
2. Minutes of the International Disarmament Campaign Committee, 
15 and 23 February 1928. 
3. Minutes of the International Disarmament Campaign Committee, 
13 March 1928 and Cecil to Murray, n. d. and 3 March 1928, 
Gilbert Murray Papers. 
4. Charles Gore, 1853-1932, Bishop of Worcester, 1902-4, Birmingham, 
1905-11, Oxford, 1911-19. A Christian socialist, theologian, and founder of the Community of the Resurrection. 
5. Minutes of the International Disarmament Campaign Committee, 
27 March 1928. 
100 
'To Viscount Grey, Viscount Cecil and Mr. J. R. Clynes. 
I undertake to do my utmost by all constitutional means 
to forward the policy of International Arbitration and 
Disarmament. 
Signed .......................... .......... 
Address ................. 0 .............. 0 ......... 
When the pledge was received at the Union's headquarters it was to 
be acknowledged by a letter signed by Grey, Cecil and Clynes which would 
read: 
'We desire to thank you for your promise to help the 
cause of International Arbitration and Disarmament and 
trust you may be able to induce others to give a like 
undertaking. Without disarmament peace can never be 
secure. tl 
On 7 February 1928 Cecil reported a highly successful meeting in 
Glasgow at which six hundred new members of the Union had been enrolled 
and a large number of pledge forms distributed to members of the audience. 
Already several hundred had been returned to the Union's headquarters 
when a telegram was received asking for eight thousand additional forms 
for distribution in Glasgow churches on the following Sunday, 5 February 
1928.2 
The Annual Report for 1927 gave an assessment of the campaign's 
first year. A syllabus had been prepared for study circles and pamphlets 
and leaflets circulated to a wider public. 
3 A number of posters had been 
prepared to bring home the campaign's message to an even larger section 
of the public. 
4 A very successful conference organised by Noel-Baker 
1. Minutes of the International Disarmament Campaign Committee, 6 December 1927 
2. Ibid., 7 February 1928. 
3. Titles included On the Verge of Disarmament, Armaments, The Limitation 
of Navies, and Moral Aspects-of Disarmament. 
4. Among captions selected for Union posters were: 'Prepare for War - and You'll Get it', 'Armaments Cause Fear, Fear Causes War', and 'Europe Armed is Europe Doomed'. 
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had been held at the London School of Economics in May 1927.1 It con- 
cluded by noting how rapidly public interest in disarmament, arbitration 
and security had developed in recent months. 
2 The Union could rightly 
claim much of the credit. 
A month after the 1929 general election Gilbert Murray summed up 
the Union's achievements in the first ten years of its history. 1929, 
Murray claimed, had set the seal on the great conversion of the public 
which the Union had set out to achieve soon after its foundation. An 
average of ten meetings a night had been held for ten years. 'Unless 
our speakers are extraordinarily unpersuasive you would expect that to 
have some effect upon public opinion and I think it has', he said. 
3 
When the Preparatory Commission completed its task in December 1930 
the Union set to work to prepare public opinion for the forthcoming world 
disarmament conference and Cecil tried to secure the backing of all three 
political parties for a vigorous disarmament campaign in 1931. The 
partial failure of the 1930 London naval conference and a deteriorating 
European situation led Gilbert Murray and others to express serious doubts 
about disarmament. 
4 
Murray's disenchantment prompted Cecil to warn him 
that he would not be a party to any suggestion that the Union should 
weaken or slacken its advocacy of disarmament. A critical moment in the 
post-war crusade for disarmament had been reached. If the Union redoubled 
1. The speakers included the Belgian socialist, de Brouckere, Sir William 
Beveridge, the Director of the London School of Economics, Sir Josiah 
Stamp, Cecil and Murray. 
2. Annual Report of the Executive Committee to the General Council for 
1927 (May 1928). 
3. Minutes of the Tenth Annual Meeting of the General Council, 27-29 
June 1929 and the Annual Report of the Executive Committee to the 
General Council for 1928. 
4. On 7 October 1930 Murray had written to the Prime Minister saying 
that 'disarmament simply won't go'. He had gone on to urge the 
government to declare its support for Article 16 of the Covenant, 
i. e. sanctions, and to do all in its power to promote international 
economic co-operation. Murray to MacDonald, Gilbert Murray Papers. 
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its efforts it could achieve a great success. The government needed all 
the support it could get to fight the Service departments. The Union 
had to campaign to ensure that the Preparatory Commission's disarmament 
plan was actually implemented. 
1 
Ever aware of the objections which would be raised by the opponents 
of disarmament, the Union decided to stress in all its propaganda that 
reductions in armaments could be made without endangering national 
security or adding to Britain's international commitments. 
2 It specific- 
ally advocated an all-round twenty-five per cent. reduction in armaments 
3 
expenditure, the separate budgetary limitation of air armaments, a 
direct limitation of the larger weapons of land warfare, and a maximum 
10,000 ton displacement for all warships including battleships and air- 
craft carriers. 
4 
Between 1 January and 28 February 1931 the Union supplied speakerS5 
for almost six hundred meetings. In March it began to plan a massive 
demonstration for Saturday, 11 July 1931, in the Albert Hall. In an 
unsuccessful attempt to get the Prince of Wales to chair the meeting, 
Cecil described the purpose of the meeting as 'to impress the country 
with a sense of the extreme seriousness of the Disarmament Conference' 
and 'the very great danger' that would arise if the conference should 
fail and, in the second place, 'to have a demonstration of such importance, 
that it would have 'an influence even beyond the shores of this Island' 
which might convince the continental powers that in Britain they would 
1. Cecil to Murray, 15 and 20 October 1930, Gilbert Murray Papers. 
2. Minutes of the Political and Parliamentary Committee, 28 January 1931. 
3. Cecil had been bitterly disappointed at his failure to persuade a 
majority of the powers represented on the Preparatory Commission to 
accept budgetary limitation of air armaments. See P. 334. 
4. Minutes of the Political and Parliamentary Committee, 12 February 1931. 
5. Among those who spoke at disarmament meetings on behalf of the Union 
were Henderson, Cecil, Noel-Baker, R. S. Hudson, and three admirals: S. R. Drury-Lowe, J. D. Allen and Mark Kerr. 
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have to reckon with 'a practically unanimous sentiment'. 
' 
The Albert Hall meeting must rank as one of the most impressive 
political demonstrations of the inter-war years. It was preceded by 
a colourful procession, bedecked with banners and accompanied by four 
bands, from the Thames Embankment via Trafalgar Square. Among the three 
thousand marchers were members of the Women's International League for 
Peace and Freedom and the British Legion. The women outnumbered the men. 
Though the majority were those with memories of the First World War, 
young people, some bearing the flags of the nations, were well represented. 
Over eleven thousand filled the hall to hear the Prime Minister and two 
ex-Prime Ministers, Baldwin and Lloyd George. Thousands more heard the 
speeches relayed over loudspeakers in Kensington Gardens and at meetings 
in sixty different places as far apart as Aberdeen and Falmouth, Cromer 
and Carmarthen. 
2 
Chairing the meeting, Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, 
3 the 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff for two of the most fateful years 
of the First World War, told the audience: 'As one who has passed pretty 
well half a century in the study and practice of war I suggest to you 
that you should give your support to Disarmament and so do your best to 
ensure the promotion of peace. ' 
4 Prime ministers and religious leaders 
might well be expected to issue a call for disarmament but for a Field- 
Marshal to do so was of a different order. Robertson's presence on the 
11. Cecil to Sir Godfrey Thomas, Private Secretary to the Prince of Wales, 
7 May 1931, copy in Gilbert Murray Papers. 
2. Reynolds's Illustrated News, Sunda-v Express, 12 July 1931, Daily 
TeleRraph, Manchester Guardian and The Times, 13 July 1931. 
Annual Report of the Executive Committee to the General Council 
for 1931. Cecil to Murray, 16 July 1931, Gilbert Murray Papers. 
3. Sir William Robertson, 1860-1933, the first Field-Marshal to rise 
from the ranks, CIGS, 1915-1918, created a Baronet and voted 
410,000 by Parliament in 1919, had spoken for the Union on a number 
of previous occasions though as late as October 1921 he extolled 
the value of armaments. See Daily Telegraph, 20 October 1921. 
4. Quoted by P. J. Noel-Baker: The Private Manufacture of Armaments, 
London, 1936, p. 20. 
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platform symbolised not only that curious relationship which the Union 
had established with many of the Services' elder statesmen but that 
peculiar characteristic of the disarmament movement in Britain, the 
support it received from many who had devoted their lives to the arts 
of war. 
The meeting was a political demonstration with a religious flavour. 
Each of the three parties was represented by its leader. It had been 
engineered to demonstrate to the nation and the world that Britain's 
three political parties were united in their determination to achieve 
disarmament. Throughout the 1920s the Union had worked systematically 
to permeate the three parties to win them for the League and disarmament. 
In its early years the Union had been dominated by men and women 
whose instincts were conservative and whose party allegiances seldom 
aligned them with the Labour party. Relations with Labour were far 
from cordial. MacDonald, who had been piqued because the Union had 
totally ignored him at its inception, remained hostile to it. 
1 When 
in 1923 an honorary presidency was belatedly offered him, he rejected 
the offer. 
2 In 1920 the head of the Union's Labour Department was 
rebuffed when he tried to bring about closer relations between the Labour 
party and the Union. 
3 Labour was prepared to co-operate with the 
pacifist No More War Movement but not with the Union. When further over- 
tures were made in 1922 the party's Advisory Committee on International 
Questions recommended their rejection. 
4 Even in the late 1920s when 
Noel-Baker and a number of others were playing a prominent role in both 
the Union and the Labour party, suspicions lingered on. In September 
1. R. W. Lyman: The First Labour Government,, London, 1957, p. 168n. 
2. MacDonald to Murray, 9 and 12 July 1923; Murray to MacDonald, 
10,18 and 20 July 1923, Gilbert Murray Papers. 
3. Lt. -Col. S. L. Murray, Head of the Union's Labour Department, to 
MacDonald, 15 May 1920, MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/5/30. 
4. Minutes of the ACIQ, 19 October 1922, LP/IAC/l/178. 
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1930, Philip Snowden 
1 described the Union as 'a most harmful organisation' 
2 
and Cecil as 'a Tory Jesuit' . The Union was not particularly successful 
in bringing pressure to bear on the 1924 and 1929-1931 Labour governments. 
When a Union deputation consisting of Cecil, Walter Elliot and Vice- 
Admiral Drury-Lowe tried to persuade A. V. Alexander, 
3 the First Lord 
of the Admiralty, to reconsider the government's naval construction 
programme in July 1930, it met with no success. 
4 
If relations between the Union and the Labour party ma ginally 
improved during the 1920s, its relations with the Conservative party 
deteriorated, especially in the years of the second Baldwin government. 
5 
From the beginning many Conservatives had serious reservations about 
the League of Nations. The attitude of rank and file Conservative 
opinion is well illustrated by the comments of the Conservative MP for 
the Barnard Castle division of County Durham, Lieutenant-Colonel Cuthbert 
Headlam, 
6 
in 1925. On 19 April he noted: 'I worked late trying to prepare 
a speech for the League of Nations Union meeting at Frosterley7... One 
1. Philip Snowden, 1864-1937, Viscount Snowden (1932), Chairman of the 
ILP, 1903-16, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1924 and 1929-31, Lord 
Privy Seal, 1931-32. 
2. Snowden to MacDonald, 27 September 1930, quoted by D. Carlton: 
MacDonald versus Henderson, London, 1970, P. 19. 
3. A. V. Alexander, Viscount Alexander of Hillsborough (1950), 1885-1965, 
Labour and Co-operative MP for Sheffield, Hillsborough, 1922-ý31, 
1935-50, Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade, 1924, First 
Lord of the Admiralty, 1929-31,1940-45,1945-47, Minister of Defence, 
1947-50, formerly Secretary of the Parliamentary Committee of the 
Co-operative Congress. Served as a Captain in First World War. 
A Baptist lay preacher. 
4. Minutes of the Political and Parliamentary Committee, 22 July 1930. 
Admiralty to League of Nations Union, 22 July 1930, Cecil Papers, 
BL Add. Mss. 51100. 
5. See, for exampleg the attack on the Union in the Conservative party 
publication Hints for Speakers, in December 1927, entitled 'A 
Campaign of Misrepresentation!. 
6. Lt. -Col. (Sir) Cuthbert Headlam, 1876-1964, Conservative MP for 
Barnard Castle, 1924-29,1931-35, Newcastle upon Tyne, North, 1940-52, 
Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to the Admiralty, 1926-29, 
Chairman of the National Union of Conservative Associationst 1941. 
7. Frosterley, then in the Barnard Castle division, is a quarrying village 
with a population of Just over one thousand in Weardale, County Durham. 
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must be polite about the League and try and believe that it really can 
do what its supporters urge ... it is abundantly clear to any sensible 
human being that when once Germany - or any other great power for that 
matter... means to fight, she will do so, League or no League. 
" 
Cecil regretted that so many Union branches were controlled by those 
who were not members of the Conservative party. 
2 Believing that the 
Conservatives would be in power for a number of years after their election 
victory in October 1924, he tried to ensure that the Conservative party 
was adequately represented on the Executive Committee. If the Union 
was to exert effective pressure on the government it was essential for 
the party to be well represented on the committee. 
3 While a member of 
Baldwin's Cabinet, Cecil was careful not to associate himself with any 
of the Union's activities which ran counter to government policy. When 
the Union gave general support to the Geneva Protocol in the winter of 
1924-25, he was careful to remain aloof. He also realised that his own 
position in the goverment would be jeopardised if there was a breach 
between the Executive Committee and the Cabinet. 
4 
After his resignation 
in August 1927 he worked hard to prevent a breach and only many months 
later reluctantly came to the conclusion that it could not be avoided. 
That did not prevent prominent young Conservatives such as Harold 
Macmillan5 playing an active role in the Union's affairs while others 
1. Headlam Diaries, 19 (and 22) April 1925, Durham County Record Office, 
D/He/21. 
2. Cecil to Davidson, 30 December 1927, copy in Austen Chamberlain 
Papers, AC 55/57. 
3. Cecil to Murray, 21 November 1924, Gilbert Murray Papers. 
4. Cecil to Murray, 26 and 29 April 1926, Gilbert Murray Papers. 
5. Harold Macmillan, 1894- , Conservative MP for Stockton on Tees, 1924-29,1931-45, Bromley, 1945-64, a Conservative 'rebel' for 
most of the inter-war years and advocate of the 'Middle Way', he 
represented the government in North Africa for part of the Second 
World War, became Foreign Secretary in 1955, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer later that year, and Prime Minister in 1957. He resigned from the Union's Executive Committee in February 1929. 
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who either came to hold junior office such as Duff Cooper 
1 
and Walter 
Elliot 2 or had held it in the previous Baldwin administration like 
J. W. Hills continued to give it their support. Despite the efforts 
of these Conservative activists, relations between the party and the 
Union were strained when the December issue of the party publication 
Hints for Speakers described the Union's campaign for disarmament as 
'a campaign of misrepresentation'. This prompted Cecil to warn the 
party's chairman, J. C. C. Davidson, 
3 that if the Conservative party 
became identified with an anti-disarmament policy the electoral conse- 
quences might be extremely serious. 
4 
Relations between the Union and the Conservative party did not 
improve when Labour came to power in 1929. Baldwin rebuffed several 
requests for support and only reluctantly agreed to speak at the Albert 
Hall demonstration when he learnt that both MacDonald and Lloyd George 
had pledged their support. 
5 
1. Alfred Duff Cooper, Viscount Norwich (1952), 1890-1954, Conservative 
MP for Oldham, 1924-29, St. George's, Westminster, 1931-45 winning a 
celebrated by-election to vindicate Baldwin in his struggle with the 
Press Lords, Beaverbrook and Rothermere in 1931, Financial Secretary 
to the War Office, 1928-29,1931-34, Financial Secretary to the 
Treasury, 1934-35, Secretary of State for War, 1925-38, resigned over 
Munich, Minister of Information, 1940-41, Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster, 1941-44, Ambassador to France, 1944-47. 
2. Walter Rlliot, 1888-1958, Conservative MP for Lanark, 1918-23, 
Kelvingrove, Glasgow, 1924-45,1950-58, Scottish Universities 
1946-50, Under-Secretary for Health at the Scottish Office, 1923-24, 
1924-26, Under-Secretary of State at the Scottish Office, 1926-29, 
Minister of Agriculture, 1932-36, Secretary of State for Scotland, 
1936-38, Minister of Health, 1938-40. 
3- J. C. C. Davidson, Viscount Davidson (1937), 1889-1970, private 
secretary to Bonar Law, Parliamentary Private Secretary to Baldwin, 
1921-22, Conservative MP, Hemel Hempstead, 1920-23,1924-37, 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1923-24, Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Admiralty, 1924-27, Chairman of the Conservative 
Party, 1927-30. A close friend of Baldwin. 
4. Cecil to Davidson, 20 December 1927, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51080. 
5. See especially the memoranda by Fry, 1 and 9 April 1931, Murray's 
request for a statement in favour of disarmament, 28 May, and 
Baldwin's refusal, 11 June. See also Royden to Baldwin, 31 March; 
Zangwill to Baldwin, 29 May and 2 September; Fry to Zangwill, 
15 June; Duff Cooper to Fry, 12 November, and a memorandum by Fryt 
[Contd. overleaf 
However unsympathetic Baldwin himself might be towards the Union, 
the Conservative party could not afford to ignore it or the disarmament 
cause it had come to espouse. Sir Geoffrey Pry, Baldwin'B private 
secretary, reminded him in a memorandum on 9 April 1931 that disarmament 
might well become an important issue at the next general election and 
some sort of policy ought to be laid down by the Conservative party. 
Pressure was put on the Conservative party from the Union itself. 
Colonel Fisher of the Union's headquarters staff approached Sir Patrick 
Gower 2 of the Conservative and Unionist Central Office to counteract 
the impression that the Conservative party was wholly opposed to the 
3 Union. On 10 July 1931 Gower wrote to Geoffrey Lloyd, one of Baldwin's 
private secretaries, saying that he thought there was something to be 
said in favour of the Leader (Baldwin) emphasising the importance of 
Conservatives taking an active interest in the Union. Only if 
Conservatives played a prominent part in the Union could they ensure 
that it was run on 'non-Party' lines. 
4 Two months later Baldwin sent 
Fisher of the Union's headquarters staff a message stressing the 
importance of Conservatives participating in the County Federal Councils 
Fn. 5. P. 107 contd. 
12 November 1931; Baldwin Papers, Vols. 115 and 133. On 30 May 1931 Lord Stonehaven, Chairman of the Conservative Party, sent party 
agents a reasoned rejection which Conservative MPs and parliamentary 
candidates might use if they were approached to support the 
Disarmament Declaration which the Union and a number of other 
organisations were then promoting. Baldwin papers, Vol. 115. 
1. Baldwin Papers, Vol. 115. 
2. Sir (Robert) Patrick Gower, 1887-1964, private secretary to Austen Chamberlain, 1919-22* and successively to Bonar Law, Baldwin and MacDonald as prime ministers, 1922-29, Chief Publicity Officer, 
Conservative and Unionist Central Office, 1929-39. 
3. Geoffrey Lloyd, Lord Geoffrey-Lloyd (1974), 1902- , private secretary to Sir Samuel Hoare, 1926-29, private secretary to Baldwin, 1929-31, Conservative MP, Birmingham, Ladywood, 1931-45, 
Parliamentary Private Secretary to Baldwin, 1931-35, Secretary for Mines, 1939-40. 
4. Gower to Lloyd, 10 July 1931, Baldwin Papers, Vol. 134. 
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which the Union was about to set up. 
1 
Austen Chamberlain was coaxed into 
taking an active interest in the Union, sitting on its Executive Committee 
from 1932 to 1935.2 
Other Conservatives continued to play an important role in the Union's 
affairs but neither of the Conservative leaders of the 1930s disguised his 
distaste for the Union's activities. Baldwin described its propaganda as 
'poppycock and mush'3 and Neville Chamberlain, writing in rebruary 1938, 
rejoiced that the Union's influence and membership was then in decline. 
It was, he said, the sort of body which always appealed 'more to academic 
4 Liberals and Socialists than to red-blooded Conservatives' . No doubt he 
was right but there were others who regretted that the Conservative party 
had become estrangea from the Union. In July 1941 Anthony Eden told 
R. A. Butler 
5 
that Baldwin had never given enough support to the Union. 
6 
Though Baldwin was impressed by its strength, particularly at the time 
of the Peace Ballot in 1934-35, unlike Churchill, he never aligned him- 
self with it to try and redirect its energies into supporting rearmament 
1. Baldwin to Fisher, 16 September 1931, Baldwin Papers, Vol. 134. 
On 28 July Baldwin summoned Austen Chamberlain, J. W. Hills, Sir 
Thomas Inskip, Mrs. Blanche Dugdale, R. S. Hudson, Walter Elliot 
and Sir John Power to a meeting to discuss the party's relations 
with the Union. On 14 September J. W. Hills wrote to Baldwin to 
express his grave concern about the growing estrangement between 
the Conservative party and the Union. 
2. Austen Chamberlain had been critical of the Union's activities in 
1925 and at one time threatened to withdraw his support. On one 
occasion he described Gilbert Murray as 'that most conscientous and 
devoted soul but silly politician'. On another occasion he wrote: 
'I have no love for professors in politics ... they always think wrong. ' 
Austen Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 21 June 1925 and 30 May 1931, 
Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC 5/l/356 and 540. 
3. Baldwin to Austen Chamberlain, 17 February 1933, Austen Chamberlain 
Papers, AC 40/122. 
4. Chamberlain to Headlam, 25 February 1938, Headlam Papers, Durham 
County Record Office, D/He/47/42. 
5. R. A. Butler, Lord Butler of Saffron Walden (1965), 1902- , Under- Secretary of State for India, 1932-37, Parliamentary Secretary, 
Ministry of Labour, 1937-38, Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 
1938-41, Minister of Education, 1941-45, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
1951-55, etc. Conservative MP for Saffron Walden, 1929-65. 
6. R. A. Butler (Lord Butler): The Art of the Poslible, London, 1971, p. 88. 
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as the most practical way of backing the League when disarmament was no 
longer a feasible policy for Britain to pursue. 
If the Union was uncertain about its relationship with the Conserva- 
tive and Labour parties it was never in any doubt about the loyalty of 
the Liberal party. Its first President was the former liberal Foreign 
Secretary, Grey, and for most of the inter-war years its Chairman was 
the Liberal academic, Gilbert Murray. The Union also received strong 
support from those outposts of Liberalism, the nonconformist churches 
of England and Wales. By 1929 four hundred and sixty-three Congregational 
churches had taken out corporate membership of the Union and over two 
thousand churches and religious organisations were affiliated to it. 
1 
If the League of Nations was the product of European liberalism, the 
League of Nations Union was to a large extent a late flowering of the 
English liberal tradition. 
The membership of the Executive Committee in 1927 throws some light 
on the relative strength of the three political parties in the League of 
Nations Union. It was made up of twenty Liberals, fourteen Conservatives, 
nine members of the Labour party and four or five of no Imown political 
affiliations. Most of the Liberals were former Asquithians. The Lloyd 
George faction was not prominent in the Union's affairs. 
2 As the Executive 
Committee was elected annually by the branches its composition reflected 
to a large extent their views and allegiances. In January 1928 Gilbert 
Murray told Austen Chamberlain: 'It is a fact, though I regret it, that 
a disproportionate number of Union supporters are Liberals. The 
1. The figures for other denominations were Wesleyan Methodist, 437; 
Anglican, 354; Baptist, 195; Presbyterian, 169; Primitive Methodist, 
114; United Methodist, 102; Independent Methodists, 12; Unitarians, 
21; Society of Priends, 12; Roman Catholics, 8. Organisations such 
as the Brotherhood Movement in which Arthur Henderson was very 
active, were also affiliated to it. Minutes of the Christian 
Organisations Committee, 17 April 1929. 
2. Cecil to Davidsont 30 December 1927, copy in Austen Chamberlain 
Papers, AC 55/57. 
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Conservatives, unfortunately, hold aloof and the Labour party do the 
same because they ... think us too Conservative'. 
' Neither the Conserva- 
tive nor the Labour party had the weight in the Union's counsels to 
which their electoral support in the country entitled them. It is not 
altogether surprising that the Union never had the influence with the 
Conservative and Labour governments of the period to which it aspired. 
The League of Nations Union was one among a number of organisations 
in Britain campaigning for disarmament. 
2 Some had a much longer history 
than the Union and considerable experience in organising agitation before 
the First World War. 
3 The National Council for the Prevention of War, founded in 1904 
but not officially constituted until 1908 as the National Peace Council - 
a name to which it was to revert in 1931 - profited from the long experi- 
ence of such organisations as the British Peace Society, founded in 1816, 
and the International Arbitration and Peace Association of Great Britain 
and Ireland which came into existence in 1880.4 It supported a number 
of disarmament campaigns such as the 1927 Ponsonby Peace Letter5 and in 
1. Murray to Chamberlain, 6 January 1928, Austen Chamberlain Papers, 
AC 55/384. 
2. On the suggestion of Miss Kathleen Courtney who, after the Second 
World War was to become President of the Union's successor, the 
United Nations Association, a Central Disarmament Bureau was set 
up in March 1931 with the- services of a full-time organising 
secretary, Col. J. V. Delahaye, DSO, MC, to co-ordinate the 
activities of the various organisations working for disarmament. 
3. It adopted this name in 1924. 
4. K. G. Robbins:. The Abolition of War, pp. 7-8; F. H. Hinsley: Power 
and the Pursuit of Peace, Cambridge, 1967, paperback edition, 
PP. 93-101t 109-11,124-33; A. C. F. Beales: A History of Peace, 
London, 1931, rassim; A. T. A. Morris: Radicalism-a-vainst War, passim. 
5. The Ponsonby Letter, called after its main sponsor, Arthur Ponsonby, 
was presented to the Prime Minister on 8 December 1927. It was 
signed by 128,770 people and read: 'We, the undersigned, convinced 
that all disputes between nations are capable of settlement either 
by diplomatic negotiations or by some form of international arbitra- 
tion, hereby solemnly declare that we shall refuse to support or 
render war service to any Goverment which resorts to arms. 1 
The Times, 9 December 1927. 
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1930 campaigned in its own right for large reductions in naval armaments 
and the abolition of the battleship. Though it could boast that hundreds 
of different organisations were affiliated to it, 
1 its influence was 
slight in comparison with the League of Nations Union. 
2 
One of the most active pacifist organisations of the 1920s was 
the No More War Movement. Founded in February 1921 by former members 
of the war-time No Conscription Fellowship, it was affiliated to the 
War Resisters' International formed by European pacifist organisations 
at The Hague a month later in March 1921. It had strong support in the 
ILP and succeeded in persuading the Labour party conference in 1926 to 
adopt a resolution in favour of war resistance. 
3 Its members repudiated 
war by making a declaration stating: 'War is a crime against humanity. 
I am therefore determined: 1. not to support war or take part in any war, 
international or civil, 2. to work for total disarmament, the removal of 
all causes of war, and the establishment of a new social and international 
order based on the pacifist principle of co-operation for the common good. ' 
By 1928 it had a membership of just under 140,000 and one hundred and 
fourteen branches. Despite the fact that it commanded considerable 
support among rank and file members of the Labour party, it did not 
enjoy the confidence of the party's leaders. Its attempt to canvas 
support for Russia's proposals for total disarmament in 1927 
4 
particu- 
larly antagonised MacDonald. It made virtually no impact on the 
Conservative and Liberal parties and its influence did not extend beyond 
1. By 1935 it could claim to represent three hundred and fifty organisa- 
tions among them, the Boys' Brigade, Ethical Union, Fellowship of 
Reconciliation, Holiday Fellowship, National Association of School- 
masters, Union of Democratic Control and the Union of Post Office 
Workdrs. 
2. Lothian Papers, GD 40/17/91: Kenneth Ingram: Fifty Years of the 
National Peace Council. 1909-1958,, London, n. d., -passim. 
3. See p. 65. 
4. See pp. 65-6. 
- 
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those who adopted a pacifist standpoint. In 1937 it merged with the 
Peace Pledge Union. 1 
Much smaller but equally active in the pacifist cause was the British 
section of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. 
Founded at The Hague in April 1915 as an offshoot of the International 
Suffrage Alliance, a well-established organisation with a strong pacifist 
bias, the League never became a body with a mass membership. By 1926 its 
membership in forty different countries was a mere 50,000. The British 
section, which attracted a number of women prominent in public life, 
2 
was among the largest. It insisted that only total and universal dis- 
armament would be effective. It campaigned against conscription and, 
true to its pacifist principles, actively opposed the draft Treaty of 
Mutual Assistance. Perhaps its most spectacular demonstration in favour 
of disarmament was the teace Pilgrimage it organised in England in the 
summer of 1926. Setting out from places as distant from one another as 
the North of Scotland and Lands End, its seven colilmns converged on 
London on 18 June for a massive demonstration in Hyde Park. From twenty- 
two different platforms speakers representing all three political parties 
commended its twin objectives: the summoning of a world disarmament con- 
ference and Britain's signature of the Optional Clause in the Statute 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice. En route for London 
the peace pilgrims held meetings in a thousand different towns and 
villages, persuaded hundreds of churches to hold special peace services, 
and attracted during the course of the pilgrimage considerable local and 
1. Walter H. Ayles, Financial and Organising Secretary, to MacDonald, 
29 October and 17 November 1928; MacDonald to Ayles, 6 November 1928; 
Lucy Cox, General Secretary, to MacDonald, 20 February 1928, and Cox 
to Rosenberg, MacDonald's secretary, 6 March 1928; MacDonald Papers, 
PRO 30/69/31. W. J. Chamberlain: Fighting for Peace. The Story of 
the War Resistance Movement, London, 1929; Grace M. Beaton: Twenty 
Years Work in the War Resisters' International, London, 1945; 
K. G. Robbins: The Abolition of War, pp. 210-li. 
2. Among them Mrs. Philip Snowden, Mrs. H. M. Swanwick, Miss Ellen 
Wilkinson, Dr. Maude Royden, and Miss Catherine Marshall. 
---1-1-47 
national press coverage. Prominent in the demonstration was the young 
actress, Sybil Thorndike. On 6 July the Foreign Secretary, Austen 
Chamberlain, received a deputation from the pilgrimage. In 1931 the 
Women's International League was to be in the vanguard of the campaign 
for disarmament. Though it was rebuffed by Baldwin it collected one 
and a half million signatures for its international disarmament petition. 
Of all the peace organisations in 1918, none was at that time more 
influential than the Union of Democratic Control. Founded in the autumn 
of 1914 by such radical members of the Liberal party as Arthur Ponsonby 
and Charles Trevelyan and with the support of MacDonald and a few others 
in the Labour party, it campaigned principally for the parliamentary 
control of foreign policy but also for self-determination, a league of 
nations, to replace all military alliances, and the limitation of 
armaments. By 1918 it had almost a hundred branches, an individual 
membership of ten thousand, and an affiliated membership of 650,000, 
mainly in the ILP and the trade union movement. Within a year of the 
Armistice it had shrunk to thirty-two branches and another twenty-three 
groups. After the death of E. D. Morel, its brilliant organiser, " it 
ceased to make any great impact outside the ranks of the Labour Movement. 
The extent to which it had influenced the Labour party has already been 
indicated. 2 Another indication of its importance can perhaps be seen in 
the fact that nine members of the Cabinet and fifteen members of the 
goverment formed by MacDonald in 1924 were members or former members 
3 
of the UDC. 
1. Royden to Baldwin, 31 March 1931; Zangwill to Baldwin, 29 May and 
2 September 1931; Baldwin rapers, Vol. 115. Among Conservatives 
who backed the petition were Lady Astor, Lord Lytton, Duff Cooper 
and J. W. Hills. See G. Bussey and M. Tims: The Women's International 
League for Peace and Freedom. 1915-1965, London, 1965, rassim. 
2. See p. 57. 
3. M. Swartz: The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics durinR 
the First World War, Passim. 'The Work of the Union of Democratic Control' The Secretary's Report, October 1919. See also L. W. Martin: Peace without Victor-y, New Haven, Conn., 1958, PP- 54-60, and C. H. Rolph: Kingsley, The Life, Letters and Diaries of Kingsley Martin, London, 1973, P. 71 et sea. 
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Other organisations, not associated with the peace movement played 
a not insignificant part in promoting disarmament. Foremost among them 
was the British Legion whose membership even surpassed that of the League 
of Nations Union. Prominent among those presenting petitions at the open- 
ing of the world disarmament conference in February 1932 as well as in the 
Union's disarmament demonstration in London in July 1931 were members of 
the British Legion. In the October issue of the monthly magazine British 
Legion, Lieutenant-Colonel G. R. Crosfield, Chairman of the Legion's 
National Executive Committee, wrote: 'The old adage "if you wish for 
peace, prepare for war"... contains ... a real danger to minds which have 
not the leisure or the capacity to probe deeper ... A safer recipe and a 
much truer one is "if you want peace, then work for it". ' Moving the 
annual report at the Legion's 1929 conference, Crosfield said that he 
made no apology for putting peace first because organised ex-servicemen 
co-operating together throughout the world could do an immense amount to 
facilitate the cause for which the League of Nations stood. As early as 
1924 the Legion in its questionnaire put to all parliamentary candidates 
had asked: 'Are you in sympathy with and will you support the League of 
NationO'l 
Even the Navy League whose first objective was 'to enlist on Imperial 
and National grounds the support of all classes in maintaining the Navy 
at the requisite standard of strength ... with the object of securing 
British prestige on every sea and in every port of the World' felt 
obliged in 1928 to join with the Air League of the British Empire in 
issuing a joint manifesto supporting disarmament. It began: 'We endorse 
the great ideal of a. general limitation of armaments. But we feel that 
such disarmament is only practicable on the basis of its being general 
and simultaneously progressive... I Though some of its members were 
1. British Legion. Passim. Worthington-Evans Papers, Box 
11-61 
critical of the League of Nations and wished to have no dealings with 
the League of Nations Union, its general secretary did not refuse the 
Union's invitation to sit on its first disarmament committee. 
1 The 
staunchest champions of British naval power were not unmoved by the 
agitation for disarmament. Such was the all-pervasive influence of the 
disarmament movement in Britain in the 1920s. 
2 
Within two or three years of its foundation, the League of Nations 
Union had eclipsed in importance and influence those other organisations 
which were also working to win the British people for a peace programme. 
By 1923 it had become a far from negligible factor in British politics. 
When Baldwin formed his first administration in May 1923 he appointed 
Cecil Lord Privy Beal with responsibility for League affairs. Though 
Cecil had enhanced his reputation during the war as Minister responsible 
for the blockade in both the Asquith and Lloyd George coalition govern- 
ments, it is doubtful whether he would have re-entered ministerial office 
in so senior position if it were not for the influence of the Union. A 
month later Balfour resigned as one of the Union's Presidents. Explain- 
ing his reasons to Cecil, he described the Union 'as a very widespread 
organisation - probably, at certain moments, wielding considerable 
3 
electoral power' . There can be no doubt that Baldwin and the Conservative 
party came to believe this in the years 1927 and 1931. Though the 
1. See P. 85 above. The 26th Annual Report for the year 1921, London, 
1922 reports a special General Council in February 1922 in which (Sir) Patrick Hannon, Conservative MP for the Moseley division of 
Birmingham, an armaments manufacturer and prominent member of the 
Navy League, moved a motion which included the clause 'The Navy 
League shall cease forthwith all association, direct or indirect, 
with the League of Nations Union or any similar organisation or 
body. ' Carried by 31 votes to 22 with 12 abstentions it was no 
doubt intended to be a rebuke to the League's general secretary. 
It is doubtful whether such a motion would have been carried later 
in the decade. 
2. The 33rd Annual Report for theyear, 1928, London, 1929, contains 
the joint manifesto on disarmament. 
3. Balfour to Cecil, 4 June 1923, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51071. 
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government's failure to deal effectively with unemployment and other 
'bread-and-butter' issues was largely responsible for Baldwin's defeat 
in 1929, it was the Union, first and foremost, which brought disarmament 
to the fore as a major political question. That disarmament was an issue 
in the election is not in dispute. The manifestos of the three political 
parties leave us in no doubt. Disarmament was not an issue which the 
politicians could ignore. Having set out to win the election on a domestic 
platform, Baldwin was forced to devote more and more time to peace and 
disarmament in the course of the campaign. 
1 
The League of Nations Union was founded in the heady days of post- 
war optimism when many confidently believed that the world had been made 
safe for the peace-loving democracies. The corollary of that belief was 
that henceforth public opinion would be the most potent faetor in inter- 
national politics. Many assumed that the war had deprived potentates 
and kings, bureaucracies and military elites not only of their power but 
their right to decide the fate of nations. Sovereignty at last resided 
in the people. It would be the responsibility of voluntary organisations 
like the Union to ensure that they were not cheated of their newly- 
acquired birthright. 
The Union devoted much thought and time to a whole host of issues 
such as education for world citizenship, economic relations between the 
nations, industrial peace, conditions of employment and social insurance 
in Britain and throughout the world, the opium trade, and intellectual 
co-operation, but it saw its main purpose as being the mobilisation of 
public opinion behind the League and disarmament. It hoped by so doing 
to ensure that British foreign policy conformed with the principles of 
the Covenant. 
1. A comparison between Baldwin's Drury Lane speech on 18 April 1929, 
opening the campaign and specially prepared by a committee of lead- ing Conservatives, and his later speeches and articles, some almost 
entirely devoted to peace and disarmament, brings out the shift in 
emphasis. 
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The Union was among the first to recognise the intimate connection 
between international disarmament and collective security. Its failure 
to persuade the British goverment to back the draft Treaty of Mutual 
Assistance and the Geneva Protocol, had a sobering effect on its efforts 
to get the British people to take seriously the more onerous part of 
their League responsibilities. Though it did not cease to direct the 
nation's attention to both arbitration and security as two essential 
pillars of lasting peace, it concentrated its energies on seeking to 
secure the wholehearted support of the British people for disarmament. 
Although it failed in its task of seeking to determine the course 
of British foreign policy it acted as a constraint on the freedom of 
successive governments. It reached the peak of its influence in 1934-35, 
the years of the Peace Ballot and the Abyssinian crisis, when it helped 
to make foreign policy a major issue in the 1935 general election 
campaign. Throughout the years 1919 to 1935 it was far more successful 
in mobilising public opinion than the other peace organisations of the 
day. Unlike them it fastened on the fact that abhorrence of war was a 
feature common to both Left and Right in British politics. More than 
any other pressure group of the inter-war years it cut across social 
and political barriers. By bringing men and women of different political 
persuasions and differing social backgrounds into one movement, it came 
nearer to creating a national consensus than perhaps any other organisa- 
tion of the twentieth century. 
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PARTII 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS: 
BRITISH WAR AIMS AND THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE 
There was a marked reluctance on-the part of the Asquith government 
to formulate a set of war aims in the first two years of the First World 
War. 
1 
It defended its decision to go to war by portraying the conflict 
as a crusade against Prussian militarism for the maintenance of 'public 
right' in Europe. On 19 September 1914 Lloyd George described the war 
as a war 'for the emancipation of Europe from the thraldom of a military 
caste' 
2 
and in a speech at the Guildhall on 9 November Asquith declared 
that Britain was fighting to secure four objectives: the restoration of 
Belgium's independence, French security against aggression, adequate 
guarantees of the independence of small nations, and the destruction of 
Prussian militarism. 
3 Though not entirely absent from the thoughts and 
correspondence of Sir Edward Grey, 
4 the Foreign Secretary, arms limitation 
did not figure in the ministerial statements of the Asquith government. 
Except in the newly created Union of Democratic Control, the well- 
established ILP, and the editorial offices of the Liberal periodicals 
1. V. H. Rothwell: British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy. 1914-1918,, 
Oxford, 1971, pp. 18-19- 
2. E. R. Jones (ed. ): Selected Speeches on British Foreign Policy. 
1738-1914, London, 1914, P. 549. 
3. H. H. Asquith: 'Justice of Our Cause' and 'The-Dut-v of Every-man': 
Four Speeches, London, 1914, p. 224. 
4. G. W. Egerton: Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations, 
pp. 25-29; L. W. Martin: Peace without-Victory, p. 94; K. Robbins: 
Sir Edward GreV, London, 1971, PP- 336-48. 
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;I the Economist and The Nation, the pre-war quest for arms limitation was 
forgotten, as the emotional and physical energies of the British people 
were galvanised to destroy Germany's military power and, as some idealists 
suggested, to fight 'the war to end wars'. 
2 
On the eve of war, Grey warned the Commons that Britain could not 
afford to allow the whole of western Europe to fall under the domination 
of a single power. Throughout the war years the restoration of the 
European balance of power was the main objective of British policy. 
Though it was Germany's WeltPolitik which made a clash between the 
Wilhelmine and British empires virtually inevitable, it was the post-war 
settlement of Europe which engrossed the attention of British policy makers. 
Pespite the fact that the threat which Germany posed to British imperial 
interests beyond Europe was never far from the thoughts of Britain's 
statesmen, Europe was still regarded as the centre of the world even 
by the imperially-minded British nation. 
In August 1916 Asquith invited the members of the Cabinet's War 
Committee to define Britain's war aims. The possibility of a negotiated 
peace settlement arising from President Wilson's efforts to mediate between 
the belligerents and unduly optimistic forecasts by the General Staff of an 
early ending to the war, forced the Foreign Office to consider what 
3 Britain's priorities in a peace settlement ought to be. Field-Marshal 
Sir William Robertson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, responded 
to Asquith's invitation with a memorandum which envisaged a return to the 
conditions of Bismarck's Europe. With a marked anti-Slav and anti-French 
bias, Robertson suggested that Germany should retain her military and 
1. G. R. Crosby: Disarmament and Peace in British Politics. 1914-1919, 
Cambridge, Mass., 1957, pp. 18-42; K. Robbins: The Abolition of War, 
PP. 49-50,60,94. 
2. H. G. Wells coined the phrase 'the war to end wars' in September 1914. 
3. H. I. Nelson: Land and Power. British and Allied Policy on Germany's 
Frontiers. 1916-1919, London, 1963, p. 8; V. H. Rothwell: British War 
Aims and Peace Dirloýacv, PP. 38-42. 
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political predominance in Europe as the price for surrendering her claims 
to world power status. 
1 Balfour, at that time First Lord of the Admiralty 
but soon to replace Grey at the Foreign Office, preferred to balance a 
strong Germany against a powerful Russia. Fearful lest Germany remain 
truculent and aggressive, Balfour proposed that Britain should form an 
Anglo-French-Belgian alliance and insist on Germany ceding Alsace-Lorraine 
to France. Balfour concluded: 'If, therefore, Europe after the War is to 
be an armed camp, the peace of the world will depend, as heretofore, on 
defensive alliances, formed by those who desire to retain their possessions 
against those who desire to increase them. 
2 Preoccupied with the European 
balance of power and Britain's imperial interests, neither Robertson nor 
Balfour believed that the war would lead to a reduction in national 
armaments. 
Far more radical in outlook were two memoranda, one by the senior 
Foreign Office advisers, Sir Ralph Paget3 and Sir William Tyrrell, 
4 
and 
the other by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign 
Office, Lord Robert Cecil, who since February 1916 had been minister 
responsible for the blockade with a seat in Asquith's Cabinet. In a 
1. D. Lloyd George: War Memoirs, Vol. I, pp. 497-503; H. I. Nelson: 
Land and Power, PP. 8-14. 
2. CAB 37/157,4 October 1916. Balfour expressly excluded 'such subjects 
as restriction of armaments, the freedom of the seas, and the revision 
of international law' but in speculating on 'the unforeseeable and 
unpredictable future' he suggested that 'universal bankruptcy' might 
destroy 'universal armaments'. In January 1916 in a memorandum 
entitled 'Irresponsible reflections on the part which the pacific 
nations might play in discouraging future wars' Balfour had briefly 
discussed national self-determination, the limitation of armaments, 
and an 'Anti-War Federation' only to conclude that none of them held 
out much hope for the future. FO 899/3- 
3. Sir Ralph Spencer Paget, 1864-1940, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, 
1913-16, British ambassador to Denmark, 1916-18, Brazil, 1918-20. 
4. Sir William George Tyrrell, Lord Tyrrell (1929), 1866-1947, Private 
Secretary to Sir Edward Grey, 1907-15, member of the Phillimore 
Committee, 1917-18, Head of the Foreign Office's Political Intelligence 
Department, 1918, Under-Secretary of State, 1919-25, Permanent Under- 
Secretary of State, 1925-28, British ambassador to France, 1928-34. 
Tyrrell lost both his elder and his younger sons in the war. A Roman 
Catholic. 
-T 
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fifteen page memorandum of which three pages were devoted to disarmament, 
Paget and Tyrrell proposed a fundamental reconstruction of the map of 
Europe by applying the principle of national self-determination. Whereas 
Robertson and Balfour had looked to the balance of power, Paget and 
Tyrrell pointed to arbitration and disarmament as the best means of 
preserving peace. Peace, they suggested, was the most important of all 
British interests. They recognised that though public opinion in Britain 
would probably support disarmament there was little hope of Germany accept- 
ing it if the war resulted in a stalemate. If, however, Germany was 
defeated, her people might come to question the axiom 'that the safety 
of a State is exclusively secured in proportion to the extent of its 
armaments'. If the Allies convinced the German people that might was 
not right they would have achieved one of the essential elements in 
securing a reduction of armaments. Much would depend on the support of 
the United States, the establishment of a league of nations prepared to 
use force against a nation breaking its covenants, and the growth of a 
new international morality, however slow that might be. No scheme for 
the settlement of Europe after the war would be acceptable, they con- 
cluded, which did not concern itself with the question of disarmament. 
A month later Cecil circulated a memorandum which argued that neither 
the destruction of Prussian militarism nor a territorial settlement based 
on the principle of nationality would guarantee peace. Only a regularised 
and mandatory conference system -a league of nations - could preserve 
peace. Cecil's first draft, influenced no doubt by his Foreign Office 
colleagues Paget and Tyrrell, advocated disarmament but so devastating 
were the criticisms levelled against his proposals by his friend, 
'Suggested Basis for a Territorial Settlement in EuroPe', 7 August 
1916, CAB 4Z/17 and CAB 29/1. V. H. Rothwell (British War Aims and 
Peace DiDlomacy, p. 44) suggests that it was the work of a small 
Foreign Office committee of whom Paget and Tyrrell were the most 
senior members. 
123 
Sir Eyre Crowe, 1 that he decided to delete all reference to disarmament 
in the memorandum circulated to the Cabinet. 
2 Like all his Cabinet 
colleagues with the exception of Lloyd George, Cecil came to believe 
that disarmament would have to be relegated to be one of mankind's more 
distant and remote aspirations. He was, in fact, to remain sceptical 
about disarmament until after the League was established in 1920. 
Crowe's criticisms of Cecil's proposals were circulated in the Foreign 
Office and subsequently in the Cabinet in a lengthy and cogently argued 
memorandum. So persuasive were his arguments that little attention was 
paid to Paget and Tyrrell's advocacy of disarmambnt. Lloyd George alone 
among British statesmen was prepared to say that Crowe had not said the 
last word on disarmament. In the years 1916 to 1931 Crowe's arguments 
were to be echoed time and again by those who were sceptical about dis- 
armament. His memorandum must, therefore, rank as one of the most formid- 
able documents in the history of British disarmament policy. 
3 
Crowe conceded that the proposition 'that the world would be as 
secure and each nation as strong relatively to the rest if their armaments 
were proportionately reduced' was a most attractive one. The burden of 
his argument was, however, that as soon as any attempt was made to put 
theory into practice, insuperable difficulties arose. Even if the 
1. Sir Eyre Alexander Barby Crowe, 1864-1925, born and educated in Germany, 
author of the influential Foreign Office 'Memorandum on the present 
state of British relations with France and Germany' in 1907, secretary 
to the British delegation at The Hague Peace Conference, 1907, a 
British delegate at the 1908 International Maritime Conference in 
London called to codify the laws of maritime warfare, a strong upholder 
of the Admiralty point of view and instrumental in securing the rejec- 
tion of the Declaration of London, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, 
1912, Permanent Under-Secretary of State, 1920-25. After his death in 
1925 Baldwin described him as 'the ablest servant of the Crown'. 
2. CAB 27/626, September 1916 and Cecil Papers BL Add. Xss- 51102. For 
a discussion of Cecil's proposals for a league of nations and earlier 
proposals by Haldane and Balfour see G. W. Egerton: Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nationg, Pp. 34-9. 
3. 'Notes by Sir Eyre Crowe on Lord R. Cecil's Proposals for the 
Maintenance of Future Peace', 12 October 1916, FO 371/3082. 
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manpower of national armies could be limited by minute regulation, Crowe 
argued, such limitations could be easily offset by the deployment of more 
effective weapons and improved techniques of war. If some weapons were 
banned, states would produce others not proscribed in the disarmament 
treaty. Not even budgetary limitation, could inhibit the development 
of military science nor could anything limit the inventiveness of man. 
There were two more serious objections. International supervision 
was an impossible dream so enforcement would depend on the good faith of 
all the signatories. Secondly, proportionate reductions in existing 
levels of national armaments would not meet with general approval because 
they would freeze the status auo indefinitely. Schemes for regional 
disarmament were impracticable because sooner or later a non-signatory 
state would challenge one or other of the disarmed nations. Crowe con- 
cluded by urging in the strongest terms that Britain should refrain from 
bringing forward any scheme for the limitation of armaments. 
It was in 1916 that the appalling cost of the war came home to the 
British people. Tyrrell, like many others in public life, had lost a 
son in the fighting. The newspapers were full of casualty lists. The 
bloodshed led Cecil to call for a league of nations, Lansdowne to plead 
for a negotiated peace, 
1 
and Paget and Tyrrell to demand disarmament. 
For over a year the UDC and the ILP had been arguing that the adoption 
of arbitral procedures and reductions in national armaments were essential 
if future conflicts were to be averted. It is not easy to gauge whether 
their arguments made any impression on the Cabinet and the Foreign Office 
Lansdowne, the former Conservative Foreign Secretary and Minister 
without Portfolio in Asquith's coalition government, criticised 
Lloyd George's Ilmock-out blow' interview. 'Generations will have 
to come and go before the country recovers from the loss which it 
has sustained in human beings, and from the financial ruin and the 
destruction of the means of production which are taking place', he 
argued. CAB 37/159,13 November 1916. A year later, when no longer 
in the government, Lansdowne wrote a letter to the Dailv TelepraDh 
reiterating his arguments, made a year earlier to the Cabinet, for 
a negotiated peace. Britain, he believed, would never be in a 
position to dictate the peace terms. 
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but it would be ironical if they were able to influence the President of 
the United States without making any impact on policy makers in Britain. 
It is a strange coincidence that on 15 July 1916, three weeks before 
Paget and Tyrrell circulated their memorandum, The Nation called on the 
British government to make disarmament one of its war aims. 
Like Paget and Tyrrell, Lloyd George believed that if the war resulted 
in a stalemate the chances for disarmament would be slim. In September 1916 
he gave an interview to an American newspaper correspondent in which he 
repudiated the idea of a negotiated peace and called on the Allies to 
deliver a 'knock-out blow' to ensure that Germany was adequately chastised 
for her aggressive policies. Lloyd George was the chief spokesman of 
those who believed that there could be no lasting peace until Germany 
was forced to repent of her militarist past. 
When British and Dominion statesmen gathered in London on 20 March 
1917 for the first meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet Lloyd George told 
them: 'The conviction must be planted in the minds of the civilised world 
a conviction that will ripen into an instinct - that all wars of aggression 
are impossible enterprises; that they accomplish nothing but the destruc- 
tion of the aggressor. Men must in future be taught to shun war as every 
civilised being shuns murder... That is the only sure foundation for any 
league of peace. 
2 
Lloyd George had become convinced that two objectives - the destruction 
of German militarism and the democratisation of Europe - outweighed all 
others. Territorial issues were of secondary importance in comparison. 
1. L. W. Martin in Peace without-Victory has convincingly demonstrated 
Wilson's debt to radical opinion in Britain during the First World 
War. Neither V. H. Rothwell in British War Aims and Peace Diplomaev 
(p. 1) nor K. Robbins in The Abolition of War (p. 133) believe that 
the Cabinet was greatly influenced by these radical pressures before 
the end of 1917. 
2. D. Lloyd George: War Memoirs, Vol. I, PP. 1049-50. See also 
H. I. Nelson: Land-and Power, pp. 16-21v and V. H. Rothwell: British 
War Aims and Peace Diplomacy, P. 70. 
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He was, however, under no illusion that the destruction of German militarism 
and the democratisation of Europe would of themselves guarantee peace. The 
war had deepened his long-standing distaste for armaments and his dislike 
of the military. In his view, if Britain eventually succeeded in destroy- 
ing German military power but failed to halt the growth of national 
armaments, the sacrifices being made by the British people would have 
been in vain. Others, equally appalled by the bloodshed and Just as 
fearful of the prospect of future wars, drew different conclusions. Many 
of them looked not to the limitation of national armaments but to an 
institutionalised system of conference diplomacy which would substitute 
conciliation and arbitration for war. In the last two years of the war 
it was the league idea, not disarmament, which captured the public 
imagination and made a considerable impact on official thinking. Lloyd 
George's colleagues differed widely on what the precise function of a 
league should be and with what powers it should be invested. 
1 Whether 
it should be an instrument of coercion or an instrument of conciliation 
few, if any, assumed that it would, in the foreseeable future, bring 
about a sizeable reduction in national armaments. Lloyd George alone 
among British statesmen regarded disarmament as other than a distant 
dream. 
The Imperial War Cabinet did not share Lloyd George's commitment 
to disarmament. Its sub-committee 
2 
set up to consider the British 
1. For a full examination of official attitudes to the league idea in 
the years 1916-1918 see G. W. Egerton: Great Britain and the Creation 
of the League of Nations, PP. 35-79. 
2. The Imperial War Cabinet set up two sub-committees, one chaired by 
Curzon to discuss territorial war aims and the other chaired by 
Milner to discuss economic and non-territorial war aims. The Curzon 
committee advocated a moderate peace settlement which would not 
unduly weaken Germany while at the same time safeguarding British 
imperial interests. Among the members of the Milner committee were 
the Canadian prime minister, Sir Robert Borden, the historian and 
President of the Board of Education in Lloyd George's goverment, 
H. A. L. Fisher, the Labour leader, Arthur Henderson, the Colonial 
[Contd. overleaf 
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Empire's economic and non-territorial war aims was more concerned lest 
hatred of war, which they said had grown a 'millionfold' since August 
1914, might in the future lead to inadequate defence preparations. 
Despite the fact that Britain was at that moment fighting for her survival 
against a German U-boat campaign designed to starve her into submission, 
the committee ruled against any attempt being made to abolish submarines. 
They grudgingly conceded that some form of international machinery for 
the prevention of war should be established but they warned that it 
would be most harmful if 'it fostered the idea that any serious risk 
of future war had passed away'. 
1 
When its report was discussed by the Imperial War Cabinet on 
26 April 1917, Lloyd George was the only person to express regret that 
it had failed to make any positive recommendations about disarmament. 
There would be great disappointment at the end of the war, he said, if 
it was thought that nothing could be done to limit armaments. Five days 
later he told them that, to a large extent, the war had been caused by a 
great and highly professional army, the German army, exciting public 
opinion and eagerly seeking to test its strength. He would replace 
such armies by militias, essentially non-provocative in character and 
organised solely for defence. Lloyd George's remarks drew from his 
colleagues the comment that if land armies were reduced similar reductions 
would be demanded in naval armaments. Money saved on land forces would 
be money available for increased naval armaments to challenge British 
Fn. 2. D. 126 contd. 
Secretary, Walter Long, the South African Minister of Defence, 
General Smuts, and the New Zealand Minister of Finance, Sir Joseph 
Ward. Thomas Jones acted as secretary. L. S. Amery was his counter- 
part in the Curzon committee and seems to have been the more 
influential of the two in the drafting of the reports. 
1. CAB 23/40 and CAB 21/71. See also W. K. Hancock and J. van der Poel-0 
Selections from the Smuts Papers, Vol. III, Cambridge, 1966, Document 
No. 738 for the draft of its paragraph on the league and T. Jones: 
Whitehall Diary, Vol. I, pp. 29-34 for a fairly full summary of its 
proceedings. D. Lloyd George: War Memoirs, Vol. I, pp. 1066-7 gives 
a summary of the report. 
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sea power. Opposition to disarmament in Britain was particularly strong 
among those who believed that British naval supremacy was not merely a 
vital national interest but also an important guarantee of world peace. 
Crowe had criticised Cecil for advocating a revival of pre-war conference 
diplomacy because, he alleged, at the Second Hague Peace Conference in 
1907 almost the whole of the conference's energies had been directed 
towards weakening British sea power. 
1 Crowe and those who thought like 
him believed that the outcome of any disarmament treaty would be a 
relative weakening of British power and influence. Nevertheless, Lloyd 
George succeeded in persuading the Imperial War Cabinet to agree to the 
inclusion of disarmament on the agenda of any future discussions with the 
United States government on a league of nations though neither Cecil, 
Henderson nor Smuts, subsequently to be three of the foremost champions 
of arms limitation, supported him. 
2 
In 1917 the fortunes of the Allied powers were at their lowest ebb. 
There were mutinies in the French army and Russia sued for peace. General 
Staff manpower projections predicted that, if the war continued to the end 
of 1919, Britain would only be capable of putting 23 divisions in the 
field compared with America's 120 and France's 40. In August 1917 the 
government became so alarmed by pacifist propaganda and the war weariness 
of the British people that it set up the National War Aims Committee to 
counter these tendencies. In December the Labour party and trade union 
movement warned the goverment that the price for their continued support 
of the war effort was a clear statement of war aims which they could approve. 
Prompted as much by statements emanating from the Central Powers at the 
opening of their peace negotiations with the Bolsheviks at Brest-Litovsk 
as by domestic pressures in Britain, the government, in the last days of 
1.12 October, FO 371/3082. 
2. CAB 23/40. 
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1917, set to work to formulate a list of war aims which Lloyd George 
incorporated in a speech to a trade union conference on manpower in the 
Caxton Hall, Westminster, on 5 January 1918. Though the speech was a 
considered statement of war aims its main purpose was to intensify the 
war effort. 
Lloyd George's Caxton Hall speech could Justly claim to represent 
a national --consensus on Britain's war aims. Based on drafts by Cecil 
and Smuts it was composed after the Prime Minister had held careful 
consultations with Asquith, Grey, a-Labour party deputation, and his 
own Cabinet. In his speech, Lloyd George denied that Britain wished to 
destroy Germany or Austria-Hungary nor was it her intention to deprive 
the Ottoman Empire of any of its Turkish territories. In its dealings 
with friend and foe alike the British government was committed to the 
principle of national self-determination. It also sought 'some inter- 
national organisation to limit the burden of armaments and diminish the 
probability of war'. Lloyd George described 'the crushing weight of 
modern armaments, the increasing evil of military service, and the vast 
waste of wealth and effort involved in warlike preparation' as blots on 
western civilisation 'of which every thinking individual must be ashamed'. 
The reasons which British leaders in the First World War gave as to 
its Justification were frequently spurious in that they were often presented 
as primarily beneficial to other countries rather than to Britain herself. 
2 
British foreign policy during the war was formulated to promote British 
CAB 23/5; W. K. Hancock: Smuts, Vol. 1, Cambridge, 1968, p. 471; 
T. Jones: Whitehall Diary, Vol. 1, pp. 42-3; D. Lloyd George: War 
Memoirs, Vol. III PP. 1510-17; V. H. Rothwell:, British War Aims and 
Peace Diplomacy, pp. 147-53. Sir Ian Malcolm , one of Balfour's 
secretaries, put a different slant on the speech when he informed 
Balfour that IL. GIs speech has been well received but not enthusi- 
astically. The only cheers were for those passages about Alsace- 
Lorraine and standing by France to the death. ' Malcolm to Balfour, 
5 January 1918, Balfour Papers, BL Add. Mss. 49748. 
2. V. H. Rothwell: British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy, p. 287. 
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interests. Lloyd George never seriously believed that Germany would 
accept the conditions outlined in his speech. He was, none the less, 
bidding for the support of liberal opinion throughout the world and 
seeking to lay the foundations of an Anglo-American partnership which 
would exercise a dominant role in the peacemaking. 
Less than a month after making his Caxton Hall speech Lloyd George 
told the Allied Supreme War Council that nobody was bound by a speech. 
1 
The significance of the speech should, therefore, be sought not so much 
in what it revealed about the objectives of the British government as in 
Lloyd George's perception of the popular aspirations of the British 
people at the beginning of 1918. It reflected the domestic constraints 
which a democratically elected government in Britain had come to experience 
in the conditions of waging twentieth century total war. Large sections 
of the British public had come to question whether the European balance 
of power and British imperial interests could fully justify the kind of 
losses Britain had sustained in the course of the war. More than any 
of his colleagues Lloyd George was acutely sensitive to the popular mood. 
That was to be amply demonstrated in the closing weeks of 1918 by his 
electoral victory in the 'coupon' election. 
When the armistice was signed on 11 November 1918 a general election 
in Britain was long overdue. The short campaign which preceded the 
election was dominated by the efforts of competing candidates to satisfy 
the vindictive passions of the British people which victory had unleashed. 
Though candidates vied with one another in demanding reparations and the 
execution of the Kaiser, they were forced to pledge themselves to work 
for the abolition of conscription at the earliest possible opportunity. 
It was Lloyd George who made conscription more than an issue of British 
domestic politics. He told an audience at the Colston Hall, Bristol on 
1. Minutes of Supreme War Council, 2 February 1918, CAB 25/120; 
V. H. Rothwell: British War Aims and-Peace Diplomacy, p. 285. 
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11 December that the forthcoming peace conference would be a farce and 
a sham if it did nothing to abolish conscription. 'The first thing to 
do, believe me, ' he said, 'is to prevent a repetition of the blunders 
of the past by making it impossible for the great conscript armies to 
exist in the future. ' 
1 
On the eve of the election he issued a state- 
ment in which he said: 'I wish to make it clear beyond all doubt that I 
stand for the abolition of conscription in all lands.... These great 
military machines are responsible for the agony the world has passed 
through, and it would be a poor ending to any peace conference that 
allowed them to continue. ' 
2 
Although a small group of dedicated Englishmen had campaigned for 
the introduction of compulsory military service in the decade before the 
war, most people in Britain regarded conscription as an evil. In 1916 
the trade union movement had only reluctantly agreed to it and the 
Liberal party had been deeply divided by the Asquith government's 
decision to introduce conscription. It was widely believed that con- 
scription as much as increased military expenditure had enabled the 
continental land powers to prepare for war in the years before 1914. 
Nations like Britain which relied on voluntary enlistment demonstrated 
their peaceful intentions becausev it was argued, they would never be 
in a position to launch an aggressive war. There was a deep distrust 
of standing armies going back to the time of Cromwell. The war rein- 
forced the conviction that conscription was not only a violation of 
personal liberty but a contributory cause of war. 
The Paris Peace Conference 
When the delegations of the Allied and Associated powers gathered 
in Paris in January 1919 there was no clearly defined joint programme 
1. The Timesl 12 December 1918. 
2. Quoted by R. Chaput: Disarmament in British Foreign-Policy, London, 
1935, P. 253. 
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for peace despite the existence of the Fourteen Points. The three great 
European victor powers, Britain, France and Italy, which had endured 
immense privations and made enormous sacrifices to win the war, were in 
no mood to forgo the spoils of war in the interests of a peace of 
reconciliation. Europe was in a state of disarray. Three empires had 
collapsed. A fourth - the Ottoman Empire - was in the process of dis- 
integration creating a power vacuum in the Middle East which British 
'imperialists' were only too ready to fill. Fighting was to continue 
during the first half of 1919 in Russia, the Baltic region and in parts 
of central and eastern Europe. Conditions were such that no lasting 
political equilibrium could be established because Russia and the 
successor states were unkn quantities in the new balance of power 
created by the war. Russia which had contributed much to the eventual 
defeat of the Central Powers was absent from the peacemaking and the 
United States which had contributed little to the military victory of 
the Allied and Associated powers exercised great influence. Political 
conflict and social unrest in the United States, Britain, France and 
Italy weakened the authority of the principal peacemakers and deflected 
their attention from the problemsof peacemaking. Within four years of 
the end of the war all four had fallen from power, Orlando 
1 
of Italy 
before the conference came to an end. The war aims which had been care- 
fully fashioned during the course of the war seemed scarcely relevant in 
the harsh conditions facing Europe in the winter of 1919. 
Throughout the four years of war, the defeat of Germany had been 
Britain's major objective. All others, in retrospect, pale into 
insignificance. As late as the winter of 1918 the prospect of a German 
sphere of influence stretching from the North Sea across central Europe 
and southern Russia to the borders of India loomed menacingly in the 
Vittorio Emmanuele Orlando, 1860-1952, leader of the Italian delegation to the Peace Conference, Prime Minister of Italy, 1917-19. 
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minds of British policy makers only to disappear in the dissolution 
and general collapse of the Central Powers in the autumn of 1918. With 
the removal of that threat the British government was subjected to a 
number of domestic and external pressures which pulled it in diametric- 
ally different directions. Parliament and the public clamoured for 
rapid demobilisation and large cuts in public, including defence, 
expenditure. Marshal Foch, 
1 the supreme allied commander responsible 
for imposing the armistice terms on Germany, was demanding an enormous 
British army of occupation to deter German violations of the armistice. 
The Admiralty were insisting on the destruction of Germany's submarine 
fleet and a large proportion of her surface vessels. There were obliga- 
tions to the Dominions which could not be gainsaid and in the course of 
the war Britain had entered into secret commitments to her allies which, 
however unpalatable, she felt bound to honour. 
It was against this background of competing pressures that the 
British Empire delegation had to formulate a set of objectives. These 
came to include German reparations to meet the cost not only of physical 
damage, such as the loss of merchant ships, but of pensions and allowances 
to those disabled or widowed as a result of the war, the retention of 
those German colonies which Australia, New Zealand and South Africa had 
acquired during the war, and the acquisition of the strategically-placed 
Palestine and the oil-rich Mosul from the Ottoman Empire. The British 
government felt little enthusiasm for the absorption of former German 
colonial territories into the British Empire but it was not possible to 
resist the claims of the Dominion governments. Though Lloyd George and 
some of his colleagues wished to acquire former Turkish territories in 
Ferdinand Foch, 1851-1929, Chief of the French General Staff, 1916, 
Commander of the Allied armies in France, 1918, chief French military 
representative at the Paris peace conference and the most outspoken 
advocate of depriving Germany of the West bank of the Rhine. 
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the Middle East, Bonar Law 
1 
and others did not share this passion. Only 
a small minority of statesmen and their advisers realised, however, that 
the jealousy of other nations towards the British Empire was an important 
factor making for international instability. 
The threat which Germany had posed to Britain and British imperial 
interests before 1914 would largely disappear, British policy makers 
believed, if she was deprived of her navy and its overseas naval bases 
but the danger of a resurgent Germany disturbing the peace of Europe 
would remain so long as she was allowed to retain large military forces. 
Accordingly when Lloyd George and Wilson met in December 1918 they agreed 
that the ex-enemy states should be disarmed and conscription proscribed 
in their territories. Germany should, howeverv have the right to seek 
a revision of any 'provisional limitation' when once the League of Nations 
was established. They also agreed that decisions about disarmament should 
be taken before the peace conference separated and the League was created. 
When the peace conference convened Lloyd George did not receive, however, 
Wilson's full support for all his disarmament initiatives. In August 1919 
he complained: 'One of its [the Peace Conference's] main objectives was 
the reduction of armaments, yet what do we find? America, the protagonist 
of the League, is about to increase her navy and army to an enormous 
extent. ' 
2 On Christmas Eve, 1918, he assured the Imperial War Cabinet 
that if conscription was abolished in the ex-enemy states the rest of 
Europe would follow suit because the French people would not allow their 
1. Andrew Bonar Law, 1858-1923, succeeded Balfour as leader of the 
Conservative party as the compromise candidate in 1911, Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, 1915-16, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
1916-18, Lord Privy Seal, 1919-21, Prime Minister, 1922-23. A 
Canadian by birth but educated in Scotland, he was strongly opposed 
to the extension of British power in the Middle and Near East. 
See, especially, his correspondence with his Foreign Secretary, 
Curzon, 5,7,12,14,21 and 28 December 1922 and 8 January 1923, 
Bona Law Papers, 111/12/38,40,44,46,48,54 and 57. 
2. Lord Riddell: Lord Riddell's Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference 
and After. 1918-1923, London, 1933, P. 118. 
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children to be conscripted into an army for defence against a shadow. 
That assumption too, proved to be false. 
Germany would no longer pose any threat to the peace, in the 
British view, if she was deprived of her military and naval power and 
the extra-European dimension which her colonies had once given her. 
Having abandoned the Hohenzollerns Germany should be given an opportunity 
to establish her democratic credentials and play a role as a major 
European power. Though in their more cautious and sober moments British 
statesmen doubted whether any part of the German nation was untainted by 
militarism they hoped that democratisation would lead her people to adopt 
a #reasonable frame of mind'. Britain was opposed to depriving Germany 
of German-speaking territory in the Rhineland and in West Prussia, Posen 
and Silesia. To detach territory from Germany was to invite a war of 
revenge. The strategic arguments deployed by the French to justify 
large Polish acquisitions in the East and the separation of the Rhineland 
in the West met with little sympathy in British official circles. Britain 
wished to see Germany play an important role in the political and economic 
rehabilitation of Europe. A discontented Germany would be an element of 
instability in Europe anda prey to Bolshevism. 
The majority of Lloyd George's Cabinet favoured a close partnership 
with the United States in the task of peacemaking. Balfour, like Gray 
before him, wished to encourage American participation in European affairs 
to make good the loss of Russian power and influence, and, wherever 
possible, to bring American power to bear in support of British interests. 
The league idea had played a central role in Anglo-American relations 
throughout the war. It was widely recognised that a league of nations 
could cement and sustain an Anglo-American partnership and maintain a 
new balance of power in the post-war world. In their joint election 
1. CAB 23/42. 
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manifesto in November 1918, Lloyd George and Bonar Law had pledged the 
Coalition government to promote the formation of a league of nations. 
The league ideat initially the response of liberal opinion in Britain 
and America to the horrors of modern war, had been endorsed by all three 
political parties in the election campaign and applauded by those insti- 
tutions of greatest influence in British public life, the press, except 
the Morning Post, the churches, and the trade unions. 
The British government, however, entered the peacemaking without 
having reached agreement with the United States or any of its alli", on-, 
the league question and without any agreed and considered policy of its 
own. In the last year of the war President Wilson had vetoed diplomatic 
discussions and discouraged public debate. Within the British government 
there were serious differences of view. The Foreign Office favoured a 
conference system in which - to use the words used by Crowe in 1916 - 
fall are heard but none are coercedl. ý Others came to the conclusion that 
a league without sanctions would be of no avail. 
In December 1918 Smuts 
1 
circulated a Cabinet paper, later to be 
published under the title The Lea_-ue of Nations-- A Practical Suggestion, 
which tried to resolve these differences. Smuts proposed that responsi- 
bility for peace keeping and disarmament should rest with a league council, 
modelled on the Allied Supreme War Council at Versailles but with some 
1. Jan Christian Smuts, 1870-1950, South African soldier and statesman, 
born in Cape Colony, migrated to the Transvaal, State Attorney for 
the Transvaal, 1898, leader of guerrilla bands against the British 
in the South African war, represented South Africa at the Imperial 
Conference and in the Imperial War Cabinet, 1917, resided in Britain 
1917-18, member of the British War Cabinet, 1917-18, largely respons- 
ible for the creation of the Royal Air Force in 1918; during the 
course of the war he became vehemently anti-French and after the war 
opposed continental commitments which might drag Britain and the 
Commonwealth into a European war, Prime Minister of South Africa, 
1919-24, regarded by most authorities as one of the chief architects 
of the British Commonwealth of Nations. During 1917 Smuts made two 
ppeeches in Britain advocating disarmament after the war. In May he 
warned a meeting of the League of Nations Society in London that it 
was no use trying to prevent wars if nations were armed to the teeth 
and in the following October he told a Sheffield audience that the 
one great dominant war aim of the British people should be the 
abolition of militarism and standing armies. 
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representation for the smaller powers. Smuts warned the Cabinet that 
unless 'the taproot of militarism' was cut, all the league's labours to 
preserve peace would be to no avail. He, therefore, proposed that con- 
scription should be abolished in all member states, their armaments 
industries nationalised and placed under international control, and 
national armies and their equipment strictly regulated and restricted. 
Smuts' proposals made a great impression on both Lloyd George and 
President Wilson but met with strong criticism in the Foreign Office. 
His paper met with an unsympathetic response in the Imperial War 
Cabinet. Lord Reading 
1 
opposed the suggestion that the League should 
be responsible for disarmament and Churchill once again warned his 
colleagues that a league of nations would be no substitute for national 
defence. 
2 None the less all recognised that given the strength of 
popular feeling in Britain and President Wilson's commitment to the 
league idea, the creation of some kind of international organisation 
was unavoidable. The solution favoured by the majority of the Cabinet 
was a league modelled on the Allied Supreme War Council and the Imperial 
War Cabinet which would leave national sovereignty unimpaired. The 
criticisms levelled against Smuts' scheme convinced Lloyd George that 
it would be a mistake to attempt too much at the beginning. There was, 
in fact, such strong opposition to sanctions, territorial guarantees 
and compulsory arbitration that there was no chance of the Wilsonian 
conception of the league meeting with the approval of the British Cabinet. 
3 
Six weeks earlier on the day after the Armistice, Cecil had summed up 
the British attitude to the league in a speech at the University of 
1. Rufus Daniel Isaacs, lst Marquis of Reading, 1860-1935, Liberal MP, 
1904-13, Solicitor-General, 1910, Attorney-General, 1910-13, Lord 
Chief Justice, 1913-21, Special Envoy to the United States, 1918-19, 
Viceroy of India, 1921-26, Foreign Secretary, 1931. 
2.24 December 1918, CAB 23/42. 
3. G. W. Egerton: Great Britain and the Creation-of the League of Nations, 
Passim. 
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Birmingham. He told his audience that if only an international body 
could by discussion delay potential conflicts, public opinion would act 
effectively to enforce a peaceful settlement. Explaining his own view 
to the editor of the Spectator a few days later Cecil wrote: 'I rely on 
delay and not on decisions. 
" It was the British view that future wars 
would be averted not by the decisions and judgements of international 
organisations but by consultation between the powers, discussion, and 
delays which would allow tempers to cool. 
Disarmament did not figure in the league proposals which the British 
delegation took to Paris in January 1919. Opposing the limitation of 
armaments, the Admiralty had argued, in two memoranda presented to the 
Cabinet in October and December 1918, that there was no effective substi- 
tute for British sea power. 
2 The Times threw its weight behind the 
Admiralty. 'This war could not have been won for civilisation but for 
British sea power', it wrote on 11 December 1918. 'There can, therefore, 
be no question, so far as this country is concerned, of diminishing the 
sharpness of the weapon that has given us victory in this war. ' More 
guarded opposition was expressed by the Air Staff3 and the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson. 4 Both argued 
that Britain would be obliged to maintain sizeable forces in the post- 
war era and Wilson went so far as to describe a league of nations as 
5 'futile nonsense'. There was a deep reluctance to entrust the nation's 
security to an untried international organisation. The Admiralty went 
1. Quoted by V. H. Rothwell: British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy, 
pp. 212-3 and 213n. 
2. Correlli Barnett: The Collapse of British Power, London, 1972, pp-246-7; 
S. Roskill: Naval Policy between the Wars, Vol. I, London, 1968, pp-81-4; 
V. H. Rothwell: British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy, pp. 258-60. 
3. 'Air Power Requirements of the British Empire', GT 6477,9 December 1918, 
CAB 24/71. 
4. 'Military Commitments Remaining after Peace Has Been Signed', GT 6434, 
5 December 1918, CAB 24/71. 
5. G. W. Egerton: Great Britain and the Creation of the_LeaRue of Nations, 
P. 98. 
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even further in its opposition. It warned against any commitment to take 
military and naval action on behalf of the League and criticised those 
who, in the interests of general disarmament, were advocating the 
nationalisation of the armaments industry. When the British Empire 
delegation went to Paris in 1919 the maintenance of British naval power 
took priority over all other commitments including disarmament. 
Three days before the League of Nations Commission 
1 began its work, 
Lloyd George tried to impress on Britain's chief representative, Lord 
Robert Cecil, the importance of adhering to those principles which the 
Imperial War Cabinet had enunciated the previous December. Using a 
brief prepared by Philip Kerr, Lloyd George attacked proposals to impose 
on member states an obligation to honour a territorial guarantee and 
participate in collective action against aggression. 
2 Nevertheless, at 
its first meeting on 3 February 1919, the Commission adopted as the basis 
of its work an Anglo-American draft covenant which not only contained 
provisions for a territorial guarantee and collective sanctions but an 
article instructing the League Council to promote disarmament. On 
7 February a joint Admiralty, Army and Air Council memorandum protested 
against its provisions and argued that the limitation of armaments should 
be considered independently of the League. 
3 The First Lord of the 
Admiralty, Walter Long, went even further and took the Admiralty's 
objections to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. 
4 
He proposed three 
1. The League of Nations Commission was set up by the Peace Conference 
at its second plenary session on 25 January 1919 on the advice of 
the Council of Ten which at meetings on 13 and 23 January had agreed 
that the Peace Conference should give priority to the league question. 
2. Lothian Papers GD 40/17/54; G. W. Egerton: Great Britain and the 
Creation of the League of Nations, pp. 121-4. 
3. G. W. Egerton: Great Britain and ihe Creation of the League of Nations, 
P. 144. 
4. Long to Lloyd George, 14 February, 7 March 1919, Lloyd George Papers, 
F/33/2/12 and 22; G. W. Egerton: Great-Britain and the Creation of 
the League of Nations, p. 144; D. H. Miller: The Drafting of the 
Covenant, Vol. 1, New York, 1928, pp. 286-9; S. Roskill- Naval Policy 
between the Wars, Vol. 1, P. 84. 
amendments which, if they had been adopted, would have emasculated the 
disarmament provisions of the covenant. The first would have down-graded 
the League Council's proposals to recommendations which could be adopted 
or rejected by member states. The second proposed deleting the obligation 
not to exceed agreed limitations without the permission of the Council. 
The third stressed the importance of League Council decisions being 
unanimous. His memorandum also deprecated the League discussing dis- 
armament before it had demonstrated 'its power to afford security to 
its members'. It pointed out that the Admiralty, not a league of nations, 
had the constitutional responsibility to advise the British government as 
to the strength of Britain's naval forces. 
Cecil, who shared some of the Admiralty's misgivings, was able to 
reassure the British Empire delegation and Britain's Service representa- 
tives that no League disarmament plan would be implemented unless it had 
the unanimous approval of the Council in which Britain would have a veto. 
Ile, at the same time, tried, not altogether successfully, to persuade 
President Wilson to redraft the disarmament article to make it more 
acceptable to the British goverment. Eventually he was forced to defend 
it and, in particular, Wilson's insistence on making League disarmament 
proposals binding on member states. The Admiralty's plea that derogations 
by the simple procedure of 'giving notice' of an intention to depart from 
agreed limitations was also rejected. Others, too, in the British Empire 
delegation were critical of the article. Sir Robert Borden, though far 
from un ympathetic to disarmament, was doubtful whether it would ever be 
effective in bringing about a reduction in Armamente. 
1 
CAB 29/28,13th and 26th meetings of the British Empire delegation, 
13 March and 21 April 1919; G. W. Egerton: Great Britain and the 
Creation of the League of Nations, pp. 144-54. Cecil in A Great 
Experiment, London, 1941, p. 61 attributes the inclusion of Article 8 
in the Covenant to the insistence of the Dominion representatives at 
Paris. Both Borden and Hughes, however, voiced their criticisms of 
the article. Viscount Grey was also critical of the proposals. 
See K. Robbins; Sir Edward Grey, P. 351. 
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There was little enthusiasm within the British Empire delegation for 
the League Covenant which Wilson, Cecil and their advisers had fashioned. 
Hankey 1 decided that as the British Empire was worth a thousand leagues 
of nations he would reject the suggestion that he become the League's 
first Secretary-General. 2 No member of Lloyd George's government, with 
3 the exception of the uninfluential G. N. Barnes, pablicly voiced his 
support for the final version of the League Covenant. In May 1919 
Hankey wrote: 'The more we look at the famous Covenant the less we like 
it., 4 Plans were already afoot to use the Allied Supreme War Council as 
the principal forum for post-war diplomacy. When the Cabinet undertook a 
major review of British defence policy in August 1919 culminating in the 
enunciation of the Ten Year Rule, 
5 
no reference was made to the League 
of Nations. It was partly because they believed that the League would 
make no effective contribution to Britain's security that Lloyd George 
and his principal advisers at the Paris peace conference sought an 
agreed limitation of national armaments. If there were large armies the 
League of Nations would be unable to exercise a restraining influence. 
In July 1919 Lord Curzon told the House of Lords in a debate on the 
treaties of peace that so long as there were large standing armies 
governments might find it difficult to resist the temptation to use them 
to seize some coveted gain. 
6 
In an armed world the League could only 
1. Sir Maurice Hankey, Lord Hankey (1939), 1877-1963, Assistant Secretary 
of the Committee of Imperial Defence, 1908, Secretary, 1912-38, 
Secretary of the War Cabinet, 1916, Imperial War Cabinet, 1917-18, 
Secretary of the Cabinet, 1919-38. British Secretary to the Peace 
Conference, 1919. 
2. S. Roskill:. Hankey, Man of Secrets, Vol. II, p. 80. 
3. George Nicoll Barnes, 1859-1940, Minister Plenipotentiary at the 
Paris Peace Conference, General Secretary Amalgamated Society of 
Engineers, 1896-1908, Labour MP for Gorbals, Glasgow, 1906-22, 
Minister of Pensions, 1916-18. 
4. S. Roskill: Hankey, Vol. II, p. 88. 
5. See p. 171. 
6.35 HL Debs. 5th Series, cols. 171-2,3 July 1919. 
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make a minor contribution to the preservation of peace. 
Few apart from Cecil and the devotees of the league idea believed 
thýt the League of Nations would be an adequate substitute for the balance 
of power. It was widely recognised that, as in the past so in the future, 
equilibrium in Europe would depend. very largely on a balance of armed 
forces. Britain wanted a stable balance of power without the threat of 
escalating armaments expenditure. She could not afford the cost of com- 
petitive armaments in the straitened financial circumstances bequeathed 
her by the war. She sought an alternative: a balance of power based on 
arms limitation rather than arms competition. For the first time in 
Britain's history disarmament became an objective of British foreign 
policy despite the antipathy of the Service departments. In 1919 Lloyd 
George and his colleagues went to Paris to seek disarmament not through 
the unformed and untried League of Nations but through the diplomatic 
processes of the peace conference itself. They had three objectives: 
the disarmament of Germany, the limitation of American and, to some extent, 
Japanese naval power, and drastic reductions in the land armaments of 
France, her central and eastern European allies, and the other continental 
powers. 
On 21 January 1919, three days after the first plenary session of 
the conference, Balfour suggested in the Council of Ten that a commission 
should be set up to consider disarmament. 
I 
Two days later Lloyd George 
himself proposed 'that a Commission be appointed with two representatives 
apiece from each of the five Great Powers and five representatives to be 
elected by the other Powers represented at the Conference: - 
(1) to advise 
on an immediate and drastic reduction in the armed forces of the enemy, 
(2) to prepare a plan in connection with the League of Nations for a 
permanent reduction in the burden of military, naval and aerial forces 
and armaments. 
2 
1. CAB 28/6, IC 114. 
2. CAB 28/6, IC 117. 
--- I--, 1 
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Lloyd George's proposals met with an unsympathetic response from 
the other powers. When the peace conference set up commissions on 
25 January to draft proposals for a league of nations, an international 
labour organisation, reparations, international transit regulation, and 
the trial of war criminals no steps were taken to promote the cause of 
international disarmament. 
At the end of January acute industrial unrest broke out on Clydeside 
and Lloyd George was forced to return to England to deal with a serious 
industrial and political crisis at home. Balfour took over the leader- 
ship of the British Empire delegation and Philip Kerr remained in Paris 
to plead the cause of international disarmament and to keep Lloyd George 
briefed on major developments at the peace conference. When on 
14 February new armistice terms were imposed on Germany Kerr advised 
Lloyd George to explain them as 'the first great step in the demilitarisa- 
tion of the world'. 
1A 
few days later in a conversation with Colonel 
House Kerr expounded the view that there were two essential steps if 
Europe was to enjoy real security. The first was to break the habit 
of militarism in Europe. The second was to 'destroy armaments and 
interrupt conscription for five or six years'. Attributing these views 
to Lloyd George Kerr predicted that if this were done the peoples of 
Europe could be trusted to see that the armaments process was never 
restarted. 
2 
Neither House nor Wilson for that matter regarded disarma- 
ment as a matter of extreme urgency. They were much more reluctant 
than Lloyd George and Kerr to see the victor powers divest themselves 
of the military superiority which had given them victory in war. 
1. Kerr to Lloyd George, n. d., Lloyd George Papers, F/89/2/14. 
2. Kerr to Lloyd George, 18 February 1919, Lloyd George Papers, F/89/2/23- 
-- -" 1 
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When Lloyd George returned to Paris on 5 March 1919 Harold Nicolson 
1 
noted in his diary: 'Ll. G. is back. He is going to make a stand against 
the principle of compulsory military service., 
2 In 1918 Lloyd George had 
pledged himself to the Cabinet and the country to work for the abolition 
of conscription throughout Europe. He believed that if it was abolished 
in Germany it would be impossible to justify it elsewhere. After pre- 
liminary agreement had been reached in consultations between Clemenceau, 
House and Kerr on the principle of voluntary enlistment and the strength 
3 
of Germany's naval and military forces, Lloyd George proposed in the 
Council of Ten that Germany's naval, military and air forces should be 
raised entirely by voluntary enlistment, that the period of service 
should be twelve years, and that the strength of the German army and 
air force should not exceed two hundred thousand men. 
4 Despite the strong 
opposition of Foch and the other military representatives, the proposal 
was adopted though it was later decided to restrict Germany's army to 
one hundred thousand men and to deprive her of all military aviation. 
That same day Lloyd George boasted to Frances Stevensonp his secretary: 
'What I proposed practically amounts to the abolition of conscription 
in Europe. '5 
Lloyd George was to be sadly disappointed. The continental powers 
were wedded to the principle of conscription. The army was a school for 
citizenship and in those countries like France which prided themselves 
on their democratic credentials it was argued that military service was 
1. (Sir) Harold Nicolson, 1886-1968, diplomat and writer, son of the 
former Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, 
Sir Arthur Nicolson. (Lord Carnock), a member of the British delegation 
to the Paris peace conference, National Labour MP for Leicester, 
1935-45. 
2. H. Nicolson: Peacemaking. 1919, London, 1933, diary entry for 
6 March 1919, P. 278. 
3. Memorandum by P. Kerr, 7 March 1919, Lothian Papers, GD 40/17/1173. 
4. CAB 28/6,7 March 1919. 
5. A. J. P. Taylor (ed. ): Lloyd George. A Diary by Frances Stevenson, 
London, 1971, P. 170. 
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a burden which should fall equitably on the whole of the male population. 
Furthermore, conscripts were cheap. Volunteers were dear. It was doubt- 
ful whether most European governments would be able to lure sufficient 
volunteers into their armies to maintain the level of armed forces they 
deemed to be essential. 
In the last ten days of March the peace conference entered its most 
crucial stage. Bela Kun took over Budapest on 22 March. Central and 
Eastern Europe was in turmoil. There was serious labour unrest in 
Britain and Italy. By-election results in Britain revealed a mood of 
growing disenchantment with the Lloyd George government and an insistent 
demand for rapid demobilisation. 'I would vote for the devil himself if 
he promised to get me demobilised' a young soldier on leave from Prance 
told Lord Eustace Percy, the defeated Coalition candidate at the Central 
Hull by-election in March 1919.1 Deep and bitter differences divided 
the British and Americans on the one side from the French on the other 
over the future of the Rhineland and the Saar. The Italians were press- 
ing their claim to Fiume and additional territory on the Adriatic coast. 
Reparations continued to prove a contentious issue between the Americans 
and the other powers. There were ominous signs that the Anglo-American 
partnership, which the government had worked so hard to create, would 
founder over the question of naval armaments. It was against this 
background of turmoil and unrest that Lloyd George went into conference 
with his most intimate advisers, Hankey, Kerr and Sir Henry Wilson, at 
the Hotel de France et d'Angleterre at Fontainebleau on the weekend of 
22-24 March 1919. His purpose, according to one close observer, was 
'to think out the possibility of drastic changes which would give the 
whole peace settlement a more inspiring appearance and one more in 
Eustace Percy (Lord Percy of Newcastle): Some Memories, London, 1958, 
p. 74. 
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sympathy with the progressive forces making themselves felt all over the 
world'. 
1 
Although agreement had been reached two weeks earlier on the disarma- 
ment of Germany there were wide differences about its merits. Poch had 
warned the Allied Supreme War Council in January that Germany could never 
be effectively disarmed 
2 
and even Lloyd George had come to the conclusion 
that the permanent limitation of German. matgriel was an illusion. 'The 
jigs and gauges necessary for the manufacture of armaments and munitions 
could be concealed in one room., 
3 If Germany once again. chose to pursue 
a policy of world domination, Balfour wrote on 18 March 1919, it would 
tax all the statesmanship of the rest of the world to prevent a repetition 
of the calamities from which Europe was just emerging. The only radical 
cure was a change in the international system of the world. No manipula- 
tion of the Rhine frontier, Balfour declared, would make France anything 
more than a second-rate power, trembling at the nod of its great neighbour 
to the east. 
4 
Eight days earlier Balfour had alluded to a much more 
immediate problem than a resurgent Germany. If Germany was to have 
100,000 armed men while France, Poland and Czechoslovakia had as many 
as they liked, she would be completely at the mercy of her neighbours. 
5 
In a memorandum for Lloyd George written shortly before the Fontainebleau 
1. Sir William Wiseman to the Marquess of Reading, 23 March 1919, quoted 
by A. J. Mayer: Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking. Containment 
and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918-1919, London, 1968, P. 520. 
At the Council of Four on 27 March 1919 Lloyd George told his fellow 
delegates that though the English upper classes might still have an 
unbridled hatred of the Germans there had been a marked change in 
the attitude of other classes since the establishment of a democratic 
regime in Germany. If the peace terms were viewed as too moderate he 
would have great difficulties in Parliament but not from the working 
classes. 
2. CAB 28/6, IC 118, Minutes of the Supreme War Council, 24 January 1919. 
3. CAB 2316, IC 156, Minutes of the Supreme War Council, 7 March 1919. 
4. Lloyd George Papers, F/3/4/19- 
5. CAB 28/6, IC 158, Minutes of the Supreme War Council, 10 March 1919. 
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conference Hankey suggested that it should be plainly stated that the 
disarmament of Germany was part of the disarmament of the world. 
1 So 
far as the British Empire delegation was concerned the disarmament of 
Germany was the first stage in the demilitarisation of Europe and the 
world. 
In the Fontainebleau memorandum 
2 Lloyd George appealed to the other 
victor powers to make a peace settlement which was not only fair to them- 
selves but would be acceptable to a responsible German government intent 
on fulfilling its obligations. A settlement which contained no provoca- 
tions would constitute an alternative to Bolshevism and commend itself 
to all reasonable people in Europe. If the League of Nations was to 
provide an effective guarantee of international right and liberty it 
was essential that its leading members - the victor powers - should 
first reach an understanding about armaments. It was idle to endeavour 
to impose a -Permanent3 limitation of armaments upon Germany unless the 
victor powers were prepared to impose a limitation on themselves. 
Though he conceded that for the time being it would be necessary to 
retain considerable forces to deal with any military adventures by either 
Germany or Russia and 'to preserve liberty in the world', Lloyd George 
warned them that if the victors were to present a united front to the 
forces of reaction and revolution, they would have to arrive at an 
agreement to limit their armaments. Rivalries and jealousies over 
armaments would prevent the League from functioning effectively. The 
first condition of success for the League of Nations was a firm under- 
1. Lord Hankey: Su-oreme Control at the Paris Peace Conference, London, 
1963, P. 98. 
2. The memorandum was drafted by Kerr and approved by Lloyd George and 
his other advisers though it cannot have been acceptable in its 
entirety to F-M Sir Henry Wilson. Hankey suggests that Lloyd George 
also consulted Smuts (Supreme Control, p. 98) and some other writers 
have suggested that Edwin Montagu was also present. For Kerr's 
pencilled notes and draft memorandum, see Lothian Papers, GD 40/17/60 & 61. 
3. My italics. 
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standing between the British Empire, the United States, France and Italy 
that there would be no competitive building up of fleets and armies 
between themselves. It would only then be possible to ensure that both 
Germany and the smaller states of Europe undertook to limit their armaments 
and abolish conscription. He concluded: 'If the small nations are per- 
mitted to organise and maintain conscript armies running each to hundreds 
of thousands, boundary wars will be inevitable and all Europe will be 
drawn in. Unless we secure this universal limitation we shall achieve 
neither lasting peace nor the permanent observance of the limitation of 
German armaments we now seek to impose. ' 
1 
It has long been recognised that in the Fontainebleau memorandum 
Lloyd George was seeking to make the peace terms more acceptable to 
reasonable opinion in Germany and Europe as a whole. More recently it 
has been argued that one of Lloyd George's main purposes was to stem 
the Bolshevik tide which appeared to be sweeping across Europe. 
2 
Clemenceauls rejoinder to the memorandum on 31 March and the subsequent 
publication of both the memorandum and Clemenceau's reply at a time of 
acute Anglo-French antagonism some three years later have led many 
historians to assume that it was directed principally at the French 
government. It seems just as likely to have been aimed at Wilson and 
the American government. Wilson had, as yet, taken no steps to modify 
the 1916 and 1918 naval construction programmes undertaken to give the 
United States 'a navy second to none'. Britain was faced in March 1919 
with a serious challenge to her naval supremacy which she was ill-equipped 
to meet. As government expenditure rose to unprecedented levels in peace- 
time and the extent to which the war had undermined Britain's power and 
wealth dawned on the British government, Lloyd George had good reason 
for fearing a competitive arms race. 
1. Cmd. 1614,1922 and Cmd. 2169,1924. 
2. A. J. Mayer: Politics and Diplomacv_of PeacemakinR, passim. 
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Furthermore, Britain's influence in Europe would be dwarfed if 
France and the successor states were able to deploy vast military forces. 
Though it was unrealistic to expect them to abandon conscription it was 
not altogether utopian to strive for the limitation of land armaments in 
the new dawn of 1919. Memories of the pre-war Balkan wars were still 
fresh in people's minds. Britain had no desire to be drawn into a 
European war resulting from the petty squabbles between the successor 
states and their neighbours. Only reluctantly in the last year of the 
war had the Foreign Office accepted the inevitability of the break-up 
of the Austro-Hungarian empire. With the emergence of the successor 
states there were new dangers in Europe. Arms limitation seemed to 
many in Britain the necessary corollary of applying the principle of 
national self-determination to the map of Europe. 
In The League of Nations -A Practical Suggestion Smuts had proposed 
that the successor states, as a condition of their recognition and 
admission to the League, should agree to raise no military forces or 
acquire any armaments other than those decreed by the League itself. 
If such a policy was adopted, Smuts had argued, militarism would be 
scotched ab initio in all the new states. Purthermore, a great impetus 
would be given to the peace movement throughout the world because it 
would be much easier for the older states to adopt a policy of disarmament. 
When Cecil referred to Smuts' disarmament proposals at the Imperial War 
Cabinet on 30 December 1918, Lloyd George said that conscription should 
be forbidden in 'the friendly new States' created out of the territory 
of the Austro-Hungarian empire. 
1 
In March 1919 Balfour indirectly raised the question of the armaments 
of the successor states when he referred to the potential threat which 
CAB 23/42. The Imperial War Cabinet instructed the General Staff 
to consider the question of the armaments to be permitted to the 
successor states. 
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Poland and Czechoslovakia posed to German security. 
1 Though he was at 
pains to direct the attention of the Council of Ten to Germany's vulner- 
ability to attack he recognised as clearly as the French that if Germany 
was allowed to rearm she would in all probability strike eastward where 
the forces to deter her would be so much weaker than those in the west. 
2 
Such long term considerations, however, did not shape British policy 
towards the successor states. Britain was not alone in 1919 in thinking 
that Germany would not be a danger to the peace for a long time to come. 
3 
During the summer of 1919 the armaments of the successor states 
ceased to be a matter of academic interest. Fighting and unrest in 
Central Europe obliged the Council of Four to devote much of its time 
and attention to peacekeeping missions to bring peace and stability to 
the area. When the Council considered the military clauses of the Austrian 
peace treaty Lloyd George took the opportunity to condemn 'the miserable 
ambitions' and 'imperialistic enterprises' of the successor states. If 
Poland was allowed to have two million men under arms and Czechoslovakia 
another one and a half million, it would be 'an outrage on decency, fair- 
play and justice' to limit Austria's army to a few thousand and Germany's 
4 to one hundred thousand he told his fellow delegates. 
Clemenceau had little sympathy for Lloyd George's views. The French 
had been arguing for some time that a vigorous Polish army was the key to 
1.10 March 1919, Minutes of the Council of Ten, CAB 28/6. 
2. Memorandum for Lloyd George, 18 March 1919, Lloyd George Papers, 
F/3/4/19. 
3. Albert, King of the Belgians, told the Council of Four on 4 April 
1919 that Germany would not be a danger to the peace for twenty to 
twenty-five years. 
4. CAB 29/38,23 May 1919. At that same meeting of the Council of 
Four Lloyd George persuaded his colleagues to agree to making aid 
and assistance for Admiral Kolchak's government in Russia condi- tional upon a promise to join the League of Nations and co-operate 'with the other members in the limitation of armaments and of 
military organisation throughout the world'. He was not successful in making aid condition on a pledge to abolish conscription in Russia, however. 
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political stability in Eastern Europe. A strong Poland would not only 
check German expansion eastward but would also contain Russia and prevent 
the spread of Bolshevism. Clemenceau urged that it would be wrong to 
limit the armaments of the successor states without first hearing their 
own representatives. Accordingly, on 4 and 5 June Benes of Czechoslovakia, 
Bratiano of Roumania, Paderewski of Poland, Venizelos 
1 
of Greece, and 
Vesnitch of Yugoslavia were invited to put their case to the Council 
of Four. Both Wilson and Orlando were won over by their arguments. 
Lloyd George was isolated. The French view prevailed. Even Lloyd George 
was forced to concede that the limitation of armaments was out of the 
question until conditions stabilised. The Council of Four agreed that 
the limitation of the armaments of the successor states should await the 
establishment of the League of Nations. 
2 At a time when large reductions 
had already been made in Britain's own armed forces Lloyd George told 
Bratiano that it would not be long before Britain had a smaller army 
than Roumania. At the same time the Foreign Secretary was receiving 
representations to back the anti-Bolshevik Czech forces against Magyar 
incursions. 3 Instability in Central and Eastern Europe as much as the 
opposition of Clemenceau condemned this British initiative to sterility. 
No part of the Versailles treaty more closely mirrored Lloyd George's 
own thinking than the preamble to Part V: 'In order to render possible the 
initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, 
Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air 
clauses which follow. ' It was the explicit assumption of the British 
1. Venizelos had informed Cecil 'in January 1919 that he. was opposed to 
com-pulsory disarmament on the grounds that it was impracticable. 
Cecil Diary, 12 January 1919, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51131. 
2. CAB 29/39. 
3. Among those who tried to persuade Balfour to give his backing to the Czechs was Sir Samuel Hoare who as head of military missions to Italy and Russia between 1916 and 1919 gave considerable assist- 
ance to Benes, Masaryk and other Czech patriots. See Hoare to Balfour, 19 June 1919, Balfour Papers, BL Add. Mss. 49749. 
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Empire delegation that the disarmament of Germany would pave the way for 
the reduction of armaments throughout Europe. There would be no justifica- 
tion for large continental armies once Germany was disarmed. That view 
was expressed by Balfour, Cecil, Hankey, Kerr and Lloyd George in one 
form or another during the first two months of the peace conference. 
It was President Wilson, however, who proposed in the Council of Four 
on 26 April that the disarmament clauses of the treaty would be made 
more acceptable to German opinion if it was stated that they were intended 
to prepare the way for the general limitation of armaments. 
I When the 
draft treaty was communicated to the German government it was the dis- 
armament clauses with their preamble which drew from them the most 
subtle and ingenious response. On 29 May they sent the Council of Four 
a Note claiming that their acceptance of these clauses was ample proof 
that Germany had abandoned, once and for all, her 'militaristic' and 
'imperialistic' past. Disingenuously they called on the victor powers 
to abolish conscription and reduce their own armaments in the same 
proportions. The reply which Clemenceau sent on behalf of the Council 
of Four on 16 June only served to underline the relationship between 
German disarmament and general disarmament which the Allies had set out 
to define in the preamble to Part V. 
2 Few at the time foresaw that these 
words would subsequently rank as among the most controversial of the 
utterances made at the peace conference. In June 1919 they seemed to 
1. CAB 29/37. 
2. Clemenceauls reply contained the words: 'The Allied and Associated 
Powers wish to make it clear that their requirements in regard to 
German armaments were not made solely with the object of rendering 
it impossible for Germany to resume her policy of military aggression. 
They are also the first step towards the general reduction and 
limitation of armaments which they seek to bring about as one of the 
most fruitful preventives of war, and which it will be one of the 
first duties of the League of Nations to promote. ' The Council of 
Four appointed a committee consisting of Bourgeois of France, Cecil, 
House and the Marchese Imperiali of Italy to draft the reply to the 
German Note but it would appear that the wording was largely the 
work of Cecil's assistant, Philip Noel-Baker. See Cecil to Lloyd 
George, 7 June 1919, Lloyd George Papers, F/6/6/51. 
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represent a victory for British policy which the other victor powers 
were unable to prevent. 
Britain failed to secure the co-operation of the other great powers 
including the United States in its quest for arms limitation at the Paris 
peace conference. Not even the American delegation made disarmament a 
main priority. Wilson had gone to Paris in January 1919 with a set of 
priorities, in many respects, very different from those of Britain. 
When war had broken out in Europe in 1914 Wilson had declared 
America's neutrality and offered his services as a mediator. Three 
months earlier he had despatched Colonel House to Europe on a mission 
to bring about a rapprochement between Britain and Germany based on a 
naval arms limitation agreement, joint economic co-operation, and the 
harmonisation of American, British and German overseas investment policies. 
War in Europe was not in America's interests. The basic interest of the 
United States was her own national economic growth. Already in 1914 her 
national wealth exceeded that of Britain and Germany combined. Neverthe- 
less her overseas investments amounted to a mere two and a half billion 
dollars and her navy had been relegated to third place in the league of 
naval powers. Before his death in 1914 the great American writer on 
naval power, Captain Alfred Mahan, had convinced many influential 
Americans that the United States could not afford to neglect her maritime 
strength. Naval power and a chain of naval bases across the oceans of 
the world was the key to national power and greatness. The war rein- 
forced that lesson. American foreign commerce found itself at the 
mercy of Britain's naval blockade and Germany's submarine warfare. 
In 1916 Wilson was forced by the logic of events to take up Mahan's 
thesis to propose a navy second to none. 
As a great trading nation the United States had a vital interest 
in the maintenance of European peace and stable conditions throughout 
the world. In June 1915 a number of prominent Americans including 
---, I 
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ex-President Taft formed the League to Enforce Peace in order to advocate 
a league of nations whose members would, if necessary, use military force 
against an aggressor state which threatened the peace. Within a year the 
League had become one of the most effective pressure groups in the United 
States with a budget of $250,000 and chapters in forty-six states. In a 
much publicised speech in May 1916 Wilson embraced the League's programme 
and pledged American participation in the making of the post-war peace 
settlement. Wilson turned his back on America's isolationist past. 
'We are participants, whether we would or not, in the life of the world. 
The interests of all nations are our own also. We are partners with the 
rest. What affects mankind is inevitably our affair as well as the 
affair of the nations of Europe and Asia. ' Between 1916 and 1919 Wilson 
set out to exploit America's newly-discovered sense of national power and 
well-being in the interests of a new international order based on justice 
between peoples and the equality of sovereign states in a league of 
nations. In articulating the main themes of the New Diplomacy Wilson 
tried to enlist the support of the American people and win the allegiance 
of liberal and progressive opinion throughout Europe and the world. He 
believed that America's financial power backed by progressive opinion 
throughout the world would enable him to overcome the unenlightened 
opposition and obscurantism of the European great powers. 
On several occasions before America's entry into the war in April 
1917 Wilson made a strong plea for international disarmament. In his 
'peace without victory' speech to the Senate on 22 January 1917 he said 
that there could be no sense of safety and equality among the nations 
if great preponderating armaments were henceforth to be built up and 
maintained. 'The question of armaments, whether on land or sea, is the 
most immediately practical question connected with the future fortunes 
of nations and of mankind. ' As a belligerent America's commitment to 
disarmament became far less pronounced. In the fourth of the Fourteen 
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Points Wilson made a brief reference to the reduction of national armaments 
to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety but he made no other 
pronouncements on disarmament. 
In September 1917 Wilson set up 'The Inquiry' to prepare America's 
brief for the future peace conference under Colonel House's direction. 
House collected together one hundred and fifty scholars 
1 
who over a 
period of fifteen months produced two thousand reports and twelve hundred 
maps on practically every part of the world and every aspect of inter- 
national policy. Apart from a proposal to control armaments manufacture 
through the international regulation of nickel production and distribution 
The Inquiry came forward with few proposals for disarmament. 
2 Those 
studies which were made by the American administration took place under 
the auspices of the War Department. One member of the American General 
Staff, General Tasker H. Bliss, became a convinced advocate of arms 
limitation. In December 1918 Bliss wrote: 'If the war has not made us 
ready to disarm, God help us. ' Equal representation in a league of 
nations would not make sense if some nations were armed to the teeth 
while others remained militarily weak. 
3 Though that view was not disputed, 
disarmament was never accorded priority by the American Commission to 
Negotiate Peace at the Paris peace conference. The American attitude 
was well summed up by Major-General F. J. Kernan in a letter to the 
Secretary of the Commission, Joseph Grew, on 12 January 1919. 'The 
whole subject of the limitation of armaments is so interwoven with the 
question of a League of Nations and so dependent thereon that no 
1. Among those recruited to The Inquiry were the geographer, Isaiah 
Bowman, the historians; S. B. Fay, Charles H. Haskins, S. E. Morison 
and Wallace Notestein, and the specialists in international law and 
foreign affairs, Walter Lippmann, David Hunter Miller and James T. 
Shobýell. 
2. Lawrence E. Gelfand: The Inguiry. American Preparations for Peace, 
1917-1(419, New Haven, 1963, rassim. 
3. FRUS, PPC, 1, pp. 521-4. 
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profitable treatment is possible until the large subject upon which this 
one hangs has taken shape and has been in some definite manner agreed 
upon. ' 
1 
That position was consistently maintained by the United States 
delegation throughout the peace conference. 
It was inevitable that British and French interests would not always 
coincide in the peacemaking but, nevertheless, close Anglo-French 
co-operation was essential if British interests in Europe and the non- 
European world were to be safeguarded. Britain had no intention of 
abandoning the Anglo-French entente in favour of an exclusive Anglo- 
American partnership despite the Francophobe sentiments of some of 
Britain's leading statesmen. It was widely recognised that President 
Wilson had very little sympathy for some of Britain's aspirations and, 
furthermore, there were serious doubts whether he would be able to carry 
the American public with him in his peace programme. As early as November 
1918 Senator Lodge, the Republican leader, informed Balfour, the Foreign 
Secretary, that many Americans regarded Wilson's plans for a, league of 
2 
nations as 'hopelessly impracticable' . Another slant was put on the 
picture by Sir Eyre Crowe when he pointed out that 'our friend America 
3 
lives a long way off; France sits at our door' . 
The French differed from the British in thinking that Germany would 
remain for a long time to come a menace not only to France but to Europe 
as a whole. Poch looked across the Rhine with the eye of a Caesar or a 
Julian confronting what seemed to be an illimitable world of aggressive 
barbarism. 
4 
So long as Germany had immense demographic and economic 
advantages the limitation of her armed forces would not provide an adequate 
1. FRUS, PPC, 1, P. 326. 
2.25 November 1918, Balfour Papers, BL Add. Mss. 49742. 
3. Quoted by G. W. Egerton: Great Britain and the Creation of the 
Leap_ue of Nations, p. 87. 
4. A. J. Toynbee (ed. ): Survey of International Affairs, 19241 London, 
1926, p. 4. 
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guarantee of French security. France sought additional guarantees: the 
military occupation of the Rhineland, control of the Rhine bridgeheads 
and a system of military alliances with the successor states to the east 
of Germany. Both the British and the Americans were opposed to the 
occupation of the Rhineland and strenuously resisted French attempts 
to detach the Rhineland from the rest of Germany. On 10 March 1919 
Lloyd George warned the French that the occupation of any key points 
thought to be necessary for France's security would ultimately be a 
1 burden on Prance alone. The British were astonished that the French 
refused to admit that German disarmament, the creation of the League, 
and the demilitarisation of the Rhineland provided them with adequate 
security. Nevertheless to assuage French fears Lloyd George proposed 
an Anglo-American guarantee of France's security against German aggression 
but it was made clear to the French that it would only remain in force so 
long as the signatories considered that the League was incapable of 
affording France sufficient protection. 
The French never demonstrated the same degree of enthusiasm for 
the League of Nations as did important and influential sections of British 
and American opinion. Leon Bourgeois, the foremost French exponent of the 
league idea and France's chief representative on the peace conference's 
League of Nations Commission, did not enjoy the full confidence of the 
French government nor could he ever claim to represent the main stream 
of French opinion. 
2 It is not, therefore, surprising that his initiatives 
in the League of Nations Commission did not receive the full backing of 
1. Minutes of the Supreme War Council, 10 March 1919, CAB 28/6. 
2. On 27 February 1919 Cecil noted in his diary: 'Mandel came to lunch. 
He said the French were opposed to the League because they thought 
it meant disarmament and because they wanted 
* 
an alliance against 
Germany. I asked him why if they were against disarmament Bourgeois 
had proposed to make the disarmament proposals in the-Covenant 
stronger than they were but he had no answer except that Bourgeois 
had always been regarded as the advocate of the League of Nations. ' 
Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51131. 
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his more powerful colleagues in the French delegation. 
I Frenchmen 
never believed that the League would provide France with an effective 
guarantee of her security. In so far as they valued the League, they 
saw it as an enforcement agency to restrain Germany. 
When the preliminaries to the peace conference took place in the 
second week of January 1919 the French delegation failed to win the 
approval of the British and American delegations for their elaborately 
conceived agenda designed to secure France's vital interests before 
other issues were discussed. Instead they were forced to accept an 
agenda which gave priority to the establishment of a league of nations. 
Despite the pleas of the French, Italian and Belgian representatives, 
the League Commission, at its first session on 3 February 1919, adopted 
the Anglo-American draft covenant, the so-called Miller-Hurst draft, as 
the basis of its discussions. When subsequently the French moved a 
series of amendments they were strenuously opposed by the British and 
Americans. The Covenant which emerged from the Commission took very 
little account of French views. 
The French believed that disarmament would only be feasible if it 
was linked with the creation of an international force capable of 
enforcing League decisions. They, therefore, called for a League force 
'so superior to that of all nations or to that of all alliances that no 
nation or combination of nations' would be able to challenge or resist 
it. 2 Wilson opposed the proposal on the grounds that it would be a 
violation of the American constitution for the United States goverment 
On 28 February Cecil noted: 'He [Tardieul quite admitted that 
Bourgeois' amendments were useless. ' Cecil Papers BL Add. 'Mss. 51131. 
On another occasion Clemenceau and Tardieu explained Bourgeois' 
insistence on an international general staff and an inspection 
commission as a bargaining tactic related to France's negotiations 
with her allies on Germany's western boundaries. See D. H. Miller: 
The Drafting of the Covenant, Vol. II, pp. 220-1, and G. W. Egerton: 
Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations, p. 156. 
2. D. H. Miller: The Draftinp of the Covenant, Vol. II, pp. 291-2. 
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to put American forces under the control of an international authority 
and Cecil warned that the British people would never agree to maintain 
armed forces solely for League use. When Bourgeois, having unsuccess- 
fully tried on a number of subsequent occasions to win over the Anglo- 
Saxon powers to his proposal, modified it by substituting an international 
general staff with powers to prepare plans for military and naval. action 
on behalf of the League, Cecil went some way towards meeting him by pro- 
posing the creation of an armaments commission to advise the League 
Council on military, naval and air questions, a proposal which was later 
incorporated in the Covenant as Article 9. A third amendment, if it had 
been accepted, would have opened armament factories to international 
inspection and subjected the information on armaments supplied to the 
League by member governments to the scrutiny of an inspection and 
verification commission. The only minor success which the French with 
the assistance of the Italians scored in the Commission was the rejection 
of proposals for the abolition of conscription. 
The French conception of the League differed fundamentally from the 
British and in some respects from the American. The French regarded the 
League as a coercive instrument of the victor powers, designed to main- 
tain the peace settlement against those who would seek to challenge it. 
They sought to outlaw war by making arbitration compulsory but though 
they had the support of the Belgians, Greeks and Yugoslavs in the League 
Commission their efforts were to no avail. They believed that it was 
the responsibility of the League not merely to limit armaments but to 
see that member states maintained sufficient forces to uphold the 
League's authority. When Britain and America resisted their efforts 
to give the League the sanction of armed force, Clemenceau intimated 
that France would be obliged to look elsewhere for its security. 
In 1919 France unhesitatingly put her trust in the balance of 
military power. She had one overall objective: to increase French 
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power by reducing the territory, economic power and military resources of 
her mighty neighbour to the east. She set out to achieve this objective 
by seeking to impose on Germany territorial losses which would be to the 
detriment of her economic and military power, by economic penalties and 
reparations, by disarmament and the demilitarisation of the Rhineland, 
by detaching the Rhineland from the rest of Germany, by alliances with 
Poland and the other successor states, and by forging an alliance with 
Britain and Belgium which would make a repetition of the events of 
August 1914 impossible in the future. She, therefore, did all in her 
power to strengthen Poland and to resist British attempts to limit the 
size, power and armaments of the successor states. Conscious of her 
economic weakness and the importance of restoring national morale, 
France's statesmen put their faith in her military hegemony and the 
military power of those who had an interest in maintaining the 1919 
settlement. 
1 
Neither Italy nor Japan showed any strong desire to promote 
disarmament 2 and none of the smaller powers was prepared to enter into 
discussions about the limitation of armaments. If Gilbert Murray, the 
Chairman of the British League of Nations Union was right in stating, 
five years later, that 'in 1919 all nations genuinely wished to disarm 
and intended to do 80,3 none, with the exception of Britain, attempted 
to put disarmament on the conference agenda. All paid lip-service to 
the ideal of disarmament and even Clemenceau admitted that economic 
1. Marc Tractenburg 'Reparations at the Paris Peace Conference', Journal 
of Modern Histor-y, Vol. 51, No. 1, March 1979. D. R. Watson, 'The 
Making of the Treaty of Versailles' in Troubled Neighbours. Franco- 
British Relations in the Twentieth Century, edited by N. Waites, 
London, 1971. 
2. For an assessment of Japan's attitude to disarmament, see the 
memorandum by the US ambassador in Tokyo, 27 November 1918, FRUS, PPC, 
Vol. 1, p. 491. Italy's attitude is well summed up in Orlando's 
remarks to the Council of Four, 5 June 1919, CAB 29/39. 
3. Westminster Gazette, weekly edition, 7 June 1924. 
161 
circumstances would force France to reduce her army. 
1 Nevertheless, the 
predominant and prevailing view of the relationship between the level of 
national armaments and the peace settlement was put by Wilson when he 
said on 31 May 1919 'in the last analysis the military and naval strength 
of the great powers will be the final guarantee of the peace of the world., 
2 
The unsettled conditions of Europe in the summer of 1919 convinced the 
peacemakers, with the exception of Lloyd George, that the time was not 
ripe for an international agreement on the limitation of armaments. 
Lloyd George had no difficulty in carrying the British Empire 
delegation with him but the Cabinet at home was not entirely convinced 
that Britain's salvation lay in a general reduction of armaments which 
would limit Britain's own military and naval forces. Churchill told the 
Prime Minister that the difficulties of his task were so enormous that 
they could not be handled without the backing of a strong arMY3 and when 
he visited Paris in March 1919 he went out of his way to defend Foch's 
attitude to disarmament and the maintenance of large armies in Europe. 
4 
Not surprisingly Walter Long, the First Lord of the Admiralty, tried to 
persuade Lloyd George that the British public were prepared to make con- 
siderable sacrifices to ensure that Britain's position at sea was not 
5 imperilled . It was not only Churchill and Long, the two Service ministers, 
who expressed doubts about disarmament. Others too believed that the new 
Europe could not be built by nations which had prematurely disarmed. 
However, by the spring of 1919 other considerations led even Long to 
recognise that it was imperative to keep defence expenditure within 
1. Minutes of the Council of Four, 5 June 1919, CAB 29/39. 
2. Quoted by S. do Madariaga: Disarmament, London, 1929, p. 28. 
3. Churchill to Lloyd George, 29 January 1919, Lloyd George Papers, F/8/3/9. 
4. A. J. P. Taylor (ed. ): Lloyd George. A Diary by Frances Stevenson, 
diary entry for 9 March 1919, p. 171. 
5. Long to Lloyd George, 23 January and 13 March 1919, Lloyd George 
Papers, F/8/Z/7 and 26. 
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strict limits. There were dire warnings from the Treasury of the dangers 
of rising public expenditure. The spectre of Bolshevism haunted the 
imagination of Britain's ruling classes. Escalating armaments expenditure 
posed a threat to Britain's economic and social fabric. Long, twice in 
one week, congratulated Lloyd George on securing the abolition of German 
conscription and Bonar Law told his Cabinet colleagues that in pressing 
for disarmament Lloyd George 'had gone to the root of the matter' and 
should be backed at all costs. 
1 Lloyd George had the support of his two 
leading Conservative colleagues, Chamberlain and Bonar Law. Both were 
convinced that it was essential to reduce Britain's defence expenditure. 
Without all-round reductions in armaments by the other great powers it 
would be perilous for Britain to make large savings in her Service 
estimates. 
The First World War opened a new era in international relations. 
It was not only the Allied Supreme War Council but also other organisa- 
tions of wartime co-operation such as the Supreme Economic Council and 
the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council which had proved the utility 
of international co-operation to achieve specific objectives. France, 
too weak economically to stand by herself, banked on the continuation 
of these wartime agencies of economic co-operation when the war ended 
only to be disappointed by the United States' indifference. 
2 Hankey and 
other influential policy makers in Britain recognised the value of the 
new institutions of international co-operation forged in the war. 
Neither Britain nor America, however, took the initiative to build on 
these wartime foundations. Without investigating the obligations which 
the new European order imposed on them, they pursued two very different 
1. Long to Lloyd George, 13 and 19 March 1919, Lloyd George Papers, 
F/35/2/26 and 28. Jones to Hankey, 26 March 1919, in T. Jones: 
Whitehall Diary, Vol. 1, p. 82. 
2. M. Trachtenburg 'Reparations at the Paris Peace Conference' in 
Journal of Modern History, Vol. 51, No. 1, March 1979. 
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policies, disarmament on the one hand, and the establishment of the 
league on the other, evading the responsibilities which their victory 
in the war had imposed on them. 
There were other reasons besides Britain's refusal to shoulder new 
responsibilities in Europe for Lloyd George's failure to achieve a 
measure of European disarmament. He was the victim of his own propa- 
ganda and self-deception. The British had deceived themselves into 
thinking that had it not been for Prussian militarism there would have 
been no war in Europe in 1914. It was all too easy to assume that 
peace and disarmament would flow from the destruction of German military 
power. No one, however, believed that the disarmament of Germany could 
be enforced in perpetuity. German disarmament was, in the short term, 
a political necessity but in the long term the only useful purpose it 
could serve would be to pave the way for the demilitarisation of Europe. 
Other powers did not see Britain's intentions in the same light. 
In 1914 British naval power had been almost as great a cause of dis- 
quiet to other powers as German militarism had been to Britain and for 
the first two and a half years of the war it was seen in that light by 
the American government. Clemenceau pertinently pointed out to Lloyd 
George in his reply to the Fontainebleau memorandum that British power 
had been considerably enhanced by Germany's defeat and many Americans 
believed that the British Empire was the main beneficiary of the war. 
Had Lloyd George capped these successes by securing reductions in the 
size and power of the continental armies, he would have done much to 
ensure the hegemony of British naval power and Britain's ascendancy in 
Europe. A general limitation of armaments would have tipped the balance 
of power in Britain's favour and deprived France of the military hegemony 
in Europe which she had won at such great cost in the war. It would have 
also frozen the world balance of forces to the detriment of American 
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and Japanese ambitions. Such an objective could only have been secured 
at a price far higher than the British people were prepared to pay. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
BRITISH NAVAL DISARMAMENT POLICY. 1919-1931 
In 1900 few in Britain would have disputed the historic claim that 
it was the navy 1whereon under the good providence of God, the wealth, 
safety, and strength of the Kingdom chiefly depends'. Even Liberal 
advocates of disarmament believed that it was vital for Britain to 
retain her naval supremacy. When in the 1880s France and Russia began 
to challenge the position Britain had held on the high seas since 
Trafalgar, Lord George Hamilton, First Lord of the Admiralty in Salisbury's 
Cabinet, enunciated the Two-Power Standard: Britain should have a navy 
more powerful than the combined strength of the two next largest navies 
in the world. The economic basis of the Two-Power Standard was the fact 
that British exports until the late 1870s exceeded those of the two next 
largest trading nations in the international economy. Britain's naval 
strength reflected Britain's economic power. By 1914 the situation had 
changed. Both Germany and the United States were exporting as much as 
Britain and the wealth and productive capacity of the United States was 
greater than that of Britain and Germany combined. Furthermore, Britain 
was spending per capita more on armaments than either the United States 
or Germany. In the age of Wilhelm II and Tirpitz, Britain was paying an 
excessively high price for her naval supremacy. In the last years of peace, 
there vas a vocal and not politically insignificant lobby urging a large 
reduction in naval armaments. 
1- 
When the First World War ended in November 1918 Britain's fleet was 
See A. J. A. Morris: Radicalism-against War. 1906-1914, 
_passim, and K. G. Robbins: The Abolition of War, PP. 7-26. 
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equal in size to the combined strength of her allies 
1 
but though its main 
rival, Germany, had been defeated, its supremacy was not undisputed. The 
United States had set out in 1916 to build a navy bigger than Britain's 
and Japan had used the war years to expand her shipbuilding capacity and 
her naval power. In 1919 Japan's navy was the third largest in the world 
and the United States was poised to overtake Britain. 
If in 1914 Britain was over-extended in terms of the financial 
resources, capabilities and mental commitment of her people, in 1919 she 
faced the well-nigh impossible task of paying her way in the world, main- 
taining her power and prestige, and keeping her public expenditure within 
the strict limits dictated by the financial orthodoxy of the day. Saddled 
with colossal war-time debts and, therefore, vulnerable to the economic 
pressures of her chief creditor, the United States, unable to sell the 
same volume of goods abroad as she had done before the war, and burdened 
with world-wide commitments far in excess of those she had borne in 1914, 
she was in no position to engage in a new arms race to maintain her naval 
supremacy. Britain had little choice but to pursue a policy of all-round 
reductions in naval armaments in order to fend off a challenge to her 
naval power. Her policy at the Washington, Geneva and London naval con- 
ferences of 1921-22,1927 and 1930 was the inevitable response to changed 
circumstances. 
The British government became seriously alarmed by the growth of 
American naval power in the winter of 1919. Britain would be forced 
into a naval arms race she could not possibly win if America's ambition 
was to have a navy as strong as Britain's. Between November 1918 and 
April 1919 Lloyd George, Long-and Cecil warned the American government 
in different ways that Britain would spend her last shilling to ward off 
S. W. Roskill: Naval Policy between the Wars, Vol. 1, London, 1968, 
p. 71. 
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a threat to her naval supremacy. 
I 
Lloyd George went so far as to threaten 
withdrawing Britain's support for the League of Nations if the United 
States refused to come to terms over naval armaments. 
2 To conciliate 
Britain Wilson abandoned the 1918 naval construction programme and 
instructed Colonel House to assure the British government that 'there was 
no idea in the mind of the President of building a fleet in competition 
with Great Britain'. 
3 
He promised that as soon as the peace treaty was 
signed, the United States would enter into negotiations with Britain to 
limit the strengths of the two fleets. 
Britain and the United States agreed to a naval truce in April 1919. 
From various sources Britain learnt that the American government had 
neither the public backing, the money, nor the manpower for the implementa- 
tion of a vast naval expansion programme. The American people were no 
more willing than the British to shoulder the burden of a vast increase 
in naval armaments. In the last resort the 'Naval Battle of Paris' was 
a game of bluff and counter bluff. 
4 
No one was more influential in the policy-making processes of the 
inter-war years than Colonel Sir Maurice Hankey. Hankey had emerged 
during the war as a key member of Britain's policy-making elite. Between 
1908 and 1912 he had been assistant Secretary of the recently created 
Committee of Imperial Defence. Prom 1912 to 1938 as secretary of that 
committee he played a decisive part in formulating Britain's defence 
1. Col. House's Diary, 4 November 1918, quoted by J. X. McDonald 'Lloyd 
George and the Search for a Post-liar Naval Policy, 1919, in Llovd 
George, Twelve Essays, edited by A. J. P. Taylor, London, 1971, p. 191; 
Long's memorandum on his talks with Admiral Benson, 29 March 1919, 
Lloyd George Papers, F/192/1/4; Cecil to House, 8 April 1919, Cecil 
Papers, BL Add. Mss- 51094. 
2. Cecil Diary, 3 April 1919, and Cecil to Balfour, 5 April 1919, Cecil 
Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51131 and 51094. 
3. Memorandum on conversation with Col. House, 10 April 1919, Cecil Papers, 
BL Add. Mss. 51094. 
4. J. K. McDonald in Lloyd George, Twelve Essays, Pass m. 
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policies and in frustrating the efforts of those who sought to promote 
general disarmament. He maintained close contact with the Chiefs of Staff 
and the Service departments. On more than one occasion he saved them from 
policies which their civilian masters would have imposed on them. Though 
not always well informed on opinion within the three political parties, no 
man had a more intimate knowledge of the views and attitudes of the key 
policy makers in British politics. As Secretary to the Cabinet from 1916 
to 1938, he was in a unique position to observe and to influence the lead- 
ing figures in British political life. No study of British disarmament 
policy in the first decade of peace could ignore his formative role. 
1 
While staying with Lloyd George at Criccieth in North Wales in July 
1919 Hankey produced his momentous paper 'Towards a National policy,. 
2 
Hankey argued that there was no sense in basing British defence policy 
on the possibility of war with the United States because America's immense 
economic power guaranteed her victory in any contest with the British 
Empire. It was not enough, however, to persuade the Americans to modify 
their naval construction programme. That in itself would not lead to 
reductions in British naval expenditure. Criticising the Fighting Services' 
non-productive use of manpower and resources, Hankey called on the govern- 
ment to initiate talks for all-round naval disarmament. Within a month 
of his memorandum the government had taken a number of major policy 
decisions including its enunciation of the Ten Year Rule and its invitation 
to Viscount Grey to undertake a special mission to the United States to 
pave the way for a naval disarmament agreement. 
More than a month later Hankey wrote in his diary: 'Bankruptcy stares 
us in the face. We are confronted by overwhelming difficulties and can 
only meet them by drastic economies., 
3 
For several months Austen 
1. See especially S. Roskill: Hankey. Man of Secrets, Vols. II and III, 
London, 1972 and 1974, passim. 
2.17 July 1919, CAB 21/159. 
3. Hankey Diaries, 25 August 1919, Hankey Papers, 1/5. 
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Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer in Lloyd George's post-war 
Cabinet, had been fighting a losing battle to curb public expenditure. 
Hankey was in July 1919 articulating the growing concern of many in 
public life over Britain's capacity to maintain the Two-Power Standard 
in the straitened financial circumstances of the first year of peace. 
It is a strange irony that one who was to be regarded by many protagonists 
of disarmament as an arch militarist, should in the high summer of 1919 
be pleading for substantial reductions in naval armaments. 
Government expenditure had risen by 300 per cent and defence expendi- 
ture by 287.5 per cent between the financial years 1914-15 and 1919-20.1 
Furthermore, whereas in 1913, the last year of peace, Britain had a balance 
of payment surplus of 9237m., in 1919 she had a deficit of L182m. 
2 Never 
was the pressure for large cuts in defence expenditure greater than in 
the summer of 1919. 
Both the War Office and the Admiralty came in for severe criticism 
from the Treasury in the summer of 1919 but it was the Admiralty's proposed 
naval estimates of Z182m. for the coming financial year which Austen 
Chamberlain singled out for scrutiny in a Cabinet memorandum in July 1919. 
It would come as a profound shock to Parliament and the public, he wrote, 
that despite the surrender of the German, Austrian and Turkish fleets 
the Admiralty considered it necessary to maintain a fleet almost as 
large as the naval forces maintained to meet the German menace in 1914. 
Going on to discuss the prospects of war with each of the major European 
powers, the United States and Japan, Chamberlain concluded that war with 
any of them was most unlikely. At a time when Britain's financial position 
was 'very gravel and Britain was without a foe in the world, there was no 
1. Memorandum on public expenditure by Sir Warren Fisher, Permanent 
Under-Secretary to the Treasury, 16 June 1920, and Fisher to Lloyd 
George, 19 June 1920, Lloyd George Papers, F/17/1/1 and 4. 
2. The London and Cambridge Economic Service: Kev Statistics of the 
British Economv. 1200-1962,, London, n. d., P- 13. 
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justification for the level of expenditure which the Admiralty was 
proposing. 
I 
Reviewing the position in the Cabinet on 5 August 1919 Lloyd George 
said that the war had brought about a great change in Britain's standing 
in the world. Before the war Britain had been a creditor but as a conse- 
quence of the war she had become a debtor. For a great trading nation 
that was a fact of immense importance. Britain was living off capital 
because she was purchasing abroad more than she could pay for. It looked 
as if government expenditure in the coming year would be four times the 
pre-war level and yet the country was living on diminished resources and 
had lost a great part of the young manhood of the nation. It was clear 
that the country could not go on living as it was then doing. The govern- 
ment had to be prepared to take risks but it should not take risks with 
the health and prosperity of the British people. Britain had destroyed 
the only enemy she had had in Europe. If, therefore, the government 
continued to maintain an army, navy and air force larger than before the 
war, people would say that either the war had been a failure or that the 
government was making provision for fighting an imaginary foe. The 
Cabinet should decide what forces were needed for the next five or ten 
years and tell the Service departments against what risks they must 
provide. 
2 
Although Churchill and Long defended their departments against Lloyd 
George's implied criticisms, the Prime Ministeis analysis of the country's 
position went undisputed. Chamberlain said that he was sure that the Prime 
Minister had voiced the sentiments of all those present. As a result of 
the Cabinet's deliberations the Admiralty, the War Office and the India 
1. GT 7646,8 July 1919, CAB 24/83. See also Chamberlain to Long, 
25 March 1919, Chamberlain Papers, AC/25/2/7; GT 7729,18 July 1919, 
CAB 24/84; G 257,26 July 1919, CAB 24/5. 
2. WC 606A, 5 August 1919, CAB 23/15. 
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Office were instructed to formulate a statement on the responsibilities 
of the Fighting Services during the subsequent five or ten years and a 
committee was set up to review the expenditure of all government depart- 
ments. Out of these deliberations was born the Ten Year Rule, an instruc- 
tion to the three Fighting Services to frame their estimates and plan 
their requirements on the assumption that there would be no major war 
for at least ten years. 
The Ten Year Rule was later to come in for much criticism. It has 
been derided as 'a calamitous act of policy" and 
, 'the expression of a 
profoundly pacific feeling in the country which wished to forget war 
altogether'. 
2 
Though it can be argued in the light of developments in 
the 19303 
3 
that it was a mistaken policy, seen in the context of the 
situation facing Britain in 1919, it was an eminently sensible decision. 
Hankey, the Air Staff and the Admiralty had each discounted the possi- 
bility of another major war between first class powers for a long time 
to come. 
4 It was financial and not 'pacifist' considerations which 
dictated the policy adopted by the Cabinet in 1919. 
In the summer of 1919 the call for strict economy came with insistent 
urgency. On 26 July Chamberlain informed the Cabinet that the country was 
heading for a Z200m. deficit. 
5 A month later Hankey advised the Prime 
Minister to disband the Air Ministry and the Ministries of Food and 
Shipping and to force the Admiralty and War Office to make much larger 
reductions. 
6 
Even a year later the Treasury was telling Lloyd George 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
C. Barnett: The Collapse of British Power London, 1972, p. 278. 
A. C. Temperley: The Whispering Gallery of Europe, London, 1938P P- 170. 
The Ten Year Rule, renewed periodically up until the end of the decade, 
was finally rescinded in March 1932. 
Hankey told Balfour on 25 May 1916: 'It seemed reasonable to suppose 
that after the end of the present war financial and economic considera- 
tions will force peace on the world for at least a generation. ' 
Balfour Papers, BL Add. Mss. 49704 and CAB 27/626; Air Staff memorandum, 
GT 6477,9 December 1918, CAB 24/71; S. W. Roslcill: Naval Policy 
between the Wars, Vol. 1, p. 215. 
G 257, CAB 24/5. 
Hankey Diaries, 25 August 1919, Hankey Papers, 1/5. 
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that the only way in which public expenditure could be substantially 
reduced was by imposing economies on the Fighting Services. 
1 
Britain's economic recovery was to take priority over the claims 
of national and imperial defence. An Australian delegate at the Genoa 
conference criticised the British government for giving disarmed Germany 
an immense trading advantage by continuing to burden Britain with a huge 
defence bill. 2 High taxation, the extravagant demands of the Fighting 
Services, and unsettled conditions in Europe which, it was alleged, were 
being perpetuated by excessive armaments expenditure, were blamed by 
politicians and journalists alike for Britain's economic malaise. 
3 
This analysis was endorsed by the Brussels International Financial 
Conference in September 1920.4 Over eighty financial experts from 
thirty-nine countries concluded that extravagant government expenditure 
was largely to blame for the high cost of living and slow recovery in 
Europe. If the European economy was to revive it was imperative that 
governm nts reduced their expenditure and strictly limited defence 
expenditure. Preparations for war and the continuance of a war atmosphere 
were hampering the resumption of 'normal' trading relations in Europe. 
As unemployment rose in Britain to unprecedented heights and trade 
declined during the last half of 1920 and the first half of 1921,5 the 
Lloyd George government was subjected to an insidious Press campaign, 
led by Northcliffe's Daily Mail, against waste and Isquandermanial in 
1. Memorandum by Sir Warren Fisher, 16 June 1920, Lloyd George Papers, 
F/17/1/1. 
2. DBFP, First Series, Vol. XIX, No. 66. 
3. Far less attention was paid to the effects of the war, the creation 
of new frontiers, and the establishment of now currencies in dislocating 
Europe's trade. 
4. The Brussels conference was convened by the League of Nations. 
5. The post-war boom had resulted in a remarkable recovery in British 
exports which climbed from E963m. in 1919 to Z1569m. in 1920. Thanks 
to invisible exports of E422m. Britain had a surplus on her balance 
of payments account of Z235m. in 1920. When prices continued to rise 
and the government became alarmed at the fall in the value of sterling, it pushed up bank rate in April 1920 to 7 per cent and brought the 
post-war boom in Britain to an end. 
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the public services. Alarmed by the outcry for economy but against the 
wislýes of an important section of the Cabinet, 
1 Lloyd George appointed 
the Geddes Committee on National Expenditure in August 1921. In three 
successive reports this committee of businessmen recommended in February 
1922 cuts in government expenditure totalling over Z86m. of which E21m. 
were to come from the naval estimates, Z20m. from the army, and Z7.5m. 
from the air estimates. Strong protests from the Service departments 
led to the appointment of another committee, chaired by the Colonial 
Secretary, Winston Churchill, 2 to examine the impact the Geddes proposals 
would have on the armed services. Though the Churchill committee did not 
propose major modifications in the financial recommendations of the Geddes 
committee, Admiralty pressure subsequently succeeded in limiting the 
savings on the naval estimates to Z10-5m. The War Office and the Air 
Staff were not, however, so successful in deflecting the Geddes axe. 
3 
The government's economy measures were remarkably successful. The 
1922 estimates were Z75m. lower than the previous yearls. The Geddes 
axe led to further savings of Z64m. The 1922 budget was the first post- 
war budget to be below E1000m. The effects of the economies on the navy 
were minimal, however, because the Washington treaty slashed Britain's 
naval construction programme. 
The Washin7-ton Conference. 1921-1922 
Two years before the American government issued its invitations to 
the Washington conference the Admiralty had tacitly abandoned Britain's 
1. Fisher Diaries, 2 August 1921, Fisher Papers. 
2. Churchill had been both First Lord of the Admiralty and Secretary 
of State for War and Air. He was sympathetic to the Services' point 
of view and enjoyed a close relationship with Beatty who put the 
Admiralty's case. See S. Roskill: Churchill and-the Admirals, 
London, 1977, P. 75. 
3. P. Dennis: Decision by Default, London, 1972, pp. 12-13; 
C. L. Movat: Britain between the Wars, 1918-1940, London, 1955, 
pp. 130-1; S. Roskill: Naval Policy between the Wars, Vol. 1, 
pp. 230-33,336-41. 
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pretensions to undisputed naval supremacy. 
1 Grey set out on his special 
mission to Washington in September 1919 with instructions which clearly 
stated that Britain had no intention of asserting her naval supremacy in 
the western Atlantic or the Pacific and that in framing future naval 
estimates Britain would not take into consideration the strength of the 
United States fleet. 2 In presenting the naval estimates in March 1920 
Long implicitly repudiated the Two-Power Standard justifying himself 
with the observation: 'Look where you will, you will find it difficult 
today to find a possible enemy. 
3 Lloyd George instructed Long'Ei 
successor, Lord Lee of Fareham, in February 1921, to cut the naval estimates 
and curb the influence of the Sea Lords. 
4 
The Washington conference set 
the seal on a process which had begun two years earlier. 
No year of the inter-war years was more propitious for disarmament 
than 1921, the year of the Washington conference. When Senator Borah 
submitted a resolution to the United States Senate on 14 December 1920 
calling on the President of the United States to confer with Britain and 
Japan to secure a fifty per cent. reduction in the naval building programmes 
1. In presenting its revised estimates to the Cabinet in October 1919, 
the Admiralty warned: 'It must be clearly understood that Great 
Britain will no longer be supreme at sea. ' Adm. 167/56 quoted by 
S. W. Roskill: Naval Policy between the Wars, Vol. 1, pp. 215-6. 
2. It had been tacitly assumed since the 48th meeting of the CID on 
8 July 1904 that war with the United States was improbable and that 
no preparations need be made against that contingency. Grey reminded 
the government that the United States fleet had not been taken into 
consideration in framing pre-war naval policy. As J. K. McDonald in 
Lloyd George, Twelve Essays, edited by A. J. P. Taylor has pointed 
out, Grey not only insisted on writing his own instructions but 
effectively brought about a change of policy by so doing. 
3.126 HC Debs. 5th Series, col. 2300,17 March 1920. 
4. A. Clark (ed. ): A Good Innings. The Private Papers of Viscount Lee 
of Fareham, London, 1974, p. 204. Long had resigned through ill- 
health in February 1921. His successor, Arthur Hamilton Lee, first 
Viscount Lee of Fareham, 1868-1947, had been Conservative MP for 
Fareham, 1900-18, chief Opposition spokesman on naval affairs, 1906-14, 
an articulate champion of the dreadnought building programme and 
according to some authorities author of the slogan 'WE WANT EIGHT 
AND WE WON'T WAIT. He had spent part of his early career in the 
United States, had come to know President Theodore Roosevelt, and 
had become staunchly pro-American. 
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of the three principal naval powers, his proposal received a warm welcome 
not only in the United States but in Britain and Japan also. Congress 
refused to approve the completion of the 1916 naval construction programme 
and the Harding administration failed to persuade the Senate to drop the 
Borah resolution. 
1 Similar pressures were at work in Japan. The war-time 
boom had collapsed. Agreement with the United States was vital to save 
Japan from naval and military expenditure which threatened to consume 
over half the government's revenues. In January 1921 the prominent 
Japanese politician, Ozaki Yukio, after his expulsion from the Kenseikai 
party, attempted to stage a political comeback by holding mass rallies in 
favour of disarmament. Though he failed to carry the Diet with him, he 
had strong popular support and the backing of a number of major Japanese 
2 
newspapers. 
The Dominion statesmen who gathered in London in July 1921 for the 
first post-war imperial conference added their voice to those demanding 
naval disarmament. Smuts said that the most fatal mistake Britain could 
possibly make would be to enter into an arms race with the United States 
and the Australian prime minister, W. M. Hughes who had not been conspicu- 
ous in 1918 and 1919 in supporting disarmament and the league idea, asked 
the conference to give a lead to 'the world weary of war and staggering 
beneath its crushing burdens'. The conference called on the British 
government to seek a naval limitation agreement with the United States 
and to resolve those Far Eastern questions which threatened to divide 
the two nations. When they also made it abundantly clear that they were 
not prepared to make any sizeable contribution to financing imperial 
defence, despite their frequent references to the prime importance of 
1. W. R. Braisted: The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922, 
Austin, Texas, 1971, PP. 491-504. 
2.1. Nish 'Japan and Naval Aspects of the Washington Conference, in 
W. G. Beasley (ed. ): Modern Japan. Aspects of History, Literature 
and Society, London, 1975, p. 70. 
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British naval power in protecting imperial communication$, the British 
government found another reason for seeking a naval limitation agreement. 
Prominent Americans were not averse to warning Britain that her 
alliance with Japan 
2 
was a major impediment to naval disarmament. So 
long as the alliance continued there was a danger that the United States 
would not participate in a disarmament conference. The Anglo-Japanese 
alliance was unpopular in the United States because it was alleged that 
it strengthened Japan at the expense of American interests in the Far East. 
The United States government was apt to blame the failures of American 
diplomacy in Shantung and Siberia on the alliance. Both the United States 
and Japan had emerged from the First World War strengthened by the conflict 
and potential rivals in East Asia and the Pacific. The United States' 
decision to reject the 1919 Paris peace settlement set her free to focus 
her attention on the Par East and to extract from both Britain and Japan 
important concessions as the price for naval disarmament. It was, therefore, 
impossible for Britain to reach a settlement on naval armaments without 
resolving a host of issues relating to the relative strength and influence 
of the United States and Japan in the Far East. 
The war had made an immense impact on East Asia. It confirmed Japan's 
predominance in the Far East, led to the virtual elimination of Germany and 
Russia from the East Asian balance of power, and weakened British and 
French influence. In both China and Siberia conditions were far from 
stable. China was in the grip of civil war. Siberia was not under the 
effective control of Russia's Bolshevik rulers. During the war Britain 
had meekly accepted the growth of Japanese power on the mainland of Asia 
1. Cmd. 1474,1921, and CAB 32/2. 
2. Britain had made the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902 as a counterpoise 
to Russian and German influence. It was revised in 1905 and again in 
1911. It came up for review in 1921. Por a full discussion of the 
alliance, see I. Nish: The Anglo-Jaranese Alliance, London, 1966, and 
I. Nish: The Alliance 17n Decline, London, 1972. 
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and though she was not unduly perturbed by Japan's expansionist policies 
she could not be indifferent to the deterioration in Japanese-American 
relations which those policies, particularly in Shantung and Siberia, had 
caused. As British exporters struggled to regain those Asian markets 
they had lost to their Japanese competitors during the war and the Fareign 
Office began to adopt a sterner tone in its communications with the 
Japanese government over its policies in East Asia and the Pacific, it 
was not those policies themselves but their repercussions on Anglo- 
American relations which exercised the minds of British policy makers in 
the first years of peace. If China was the nub of Japanese-American 
relations the Anglo-Japanese alliance was the most contentious issue 
dividing the two Anglo-Saxon powers. 
In October 1919 the Admiralty had warned the Committee of Imperial 
Defence (CID) that in the days of financial stringency which lay ahead 
Britain would not be in a position to maintain a fleet equal to Japan's 
in Par Eastern waters. 
1 
Australia, New Zealand and Britain's possessions 
in the Pacific would be vulnerable to attack if the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance was not renewed. There were other reasons too why Japan's 
friendship was so vital to Britain. The war had revealed the weakness 
of Britain's position in India. Indian nationalists had looked, albeit 
unsuccessfully, to Japan for assistance and Britain had turned to Japan 
for naval support in the Indian Ocean. With British commercial interests 
in China under threat from resurgent Chinese nationalism it was imperative 
that Britain should retain Japan's goodwill. 
Though the Anglo-Japanese alliance was more popular in Japan than 
it was in Britain, when the Cabinet discussed its renewal on 30 May 1921 
Curzon, the Foreign Secretary, had no difficulty in putting a convincing 
FO 371/3822, Admiralty to CID, 31 October 1919, quoted by I. Nish: 
Alliance in Decline, pp. 234-5. 
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case for its retention. It was the Colonial Secretary, Churchill, 
voicing the strong views of the new Canadian prime minister, Arthur 
Meighen, who opposed renewal. When the British Empire delegation went 
to Washington in November 1921 the decision to abandon the alliance had 
already been taken by the Cabinet. Naval disarmament and good Anglo- 
American relations were to take precedence over the alliance and, perhaps, 
Britain's long-term interests in the Far East. I 
There was an element of illusion in the war scares which developed 
in Britain, the United States and Japan in 1921.2 The naval building 
programmes of the three powers, unlike those of Britain and Germany in 
the years before 1914, did not have the approval of public opinion and 
were to a large extent bargaining counters-designed to extract concessions 
from other powers. None the less the Washington conference was preceded 
by careful planning by the British, American and Japanese naval staffs. 
Those preparations in London led to the formulation of a British disarma- 
ment policy for the 1920s. It is no part of this study to discuss the 
negotiations which led to the conclusion of the Four Power Treaty which 
replaced the Anglo-Japanese alliance or the Nine Power Treaty concerning 
China nor will it be necessary to re-trace the main stages of the negoti- 
ations which led to the conclusion of the Naval Limitation Treaty concluded 
on 6 February 1922, all of which have been thoroughly investigated elsewhere. 
3 
1.1. Nish: Alliance in Decline, pp. 277-367 and M. D. Kennedy: The 
Estrangement of Great Britain and Japan, 1917-36, Manchester, 1969, 
pp. 48-59. 
2.1. Nish: Alliance in Decline, p. 282. 
3. The beat accounts of the conference are to be found in W. R. Braistea: 
The United States Nary in the Pacific, 1909-1922, PP. 567-666; 
S. W. Roskill: Naval Policy between the Wars, Vol. 1, PP. 300-30; 
H. and M. Sprout: Toward a New Order of Sea Power, Princeton, New 
Jersey, 1946; and J. C. Vinson: The Parchment Peace: the United 
States and the Washington Conference. 1921-1922, Athens, Georgia, 1955. 
For the general diplomatic background and Japanese policy in particular 
see M. 0. Fry: The Tllusions of Security. North Atlantic Diplomacy, 
1918-1922, Toronto, 1972; M. Ito and R. Pineau: The End of the ImDerial 
Japanese Navy. 1868-1941, New York, 1962; J. W. Morley : Jaran's 
Foreip-m Policy, 1868-1941, New York, 1974; and I Nish: Alliance in 
Decline. 
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Our main purpose is to assess the place which the conference occupies in 
the evolution of British disarmament policy. 
On 15 August the Cabinet entrusted the preparatory work for the 
conference to the CID suggesting that it be undertaken in 'the most serious 
and hopeful spirit'. 
1 
Before the Empire statesmen dispersed, Britain had 
already sent the American government a memorandum embodying her views on 
disarmament. 2 Her request for preliminary discussions with the United 
States, like her proposal for a separate conference in London to discuss 
Far Eastern and Pacific affairs, met with a negative response. Britain's 
Fighting Services set to work to prepare Britain's case for the Washington 
conference without any prior knowledge of American intentions. 
The Admiralty's views were collated by Rear Admiral Chatfield and 
sent to the CID on 5 October. In a prefatory note, Lord Lee wrote that 
the Admiralty were fully alive to the grave consequences of failure. 
Though they did not hesitate to express their own priorities they were in 
no doubt that the United States should take the initiative in making 
proposals at the conference. They stressed the importance of securing 
a numerical limitation of capital ships of post-Jutland design3 and 
suggested, in order to reduce construction programmes, that their replace- 
ment life should be fixed at twenty years. They drew attention to the 
importance of the proposed Singapore naval base and boldly asserted that 
the naval needs of the British Empire were far greater than those of any 
other power. Though they were aware of the opposition it would arouse, 
1. C. 67(21), 15 August 1921, CAB 23/26. 
2. Appendix 1, E 46 in CAB 32/2 and A 6282 in PO 371/5618. 
3. The term post-Jutland design was used for those battleships mounting 
1611 guns with improved armour plating and other innovations which 
were then being built by the United States and Japan. With the excep- 
tion of the Hood with its 15" Ouns, Britain's battleships were armed 
with guns of a maximum calibre of 14". The construction programme 
approved by the Cabinet in the previous July made provision for four 
post-Jutland design 16" gun battleships to be constructed in the 
financial year 1921-22 with others to follow in succeeding years. 
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they proposed the abolition of submarines, setting out the strategic 
advantages Britain, with its chain of naval bases across the world, 
would gain from abolition. They deprecated discussion of the rules of 
war and concluded that the conference's main purpose was 'to try and 
find some practical solution to the question of vast Budgets for naval 
and military purposest. 
Despite the fact that Britain in her memorandum to the American 
government had cast doubts upon the wisdom of discussing land and air 
armaments at the forthcoming disarmament conference, both the War Office 
and the Air Staff were invited to prepare memoranda on land and air dis- 
armament for the CID. Both were almost entirely negative. The General 
Staff painted a picture of Britain's military impotence which made talk 
of further reductions nonsensical 
2 
and the Air Staff, ignoring the conclu- 
sions reached by its own experts at the Paris peace conference in 1919, 
concluded that nothing could be done to limit air armaments because no 
satisfactory differentiation could be made between military and civil 
3 
aircraft . 
The Admiralty's proposals not unnaturally occupied the lion's share 
of the CID's time though in a brief discussion on air armaments an 
alarmist picture was drawn of the growing disparity between French and 
British air strength. 
4 Churchill, whose memory of the pre-war Anglo- 
German arms race proved to be most instructive, made two additional 
proposals. The first for reciprocal inspection of ships and dockyards 
1. CID Paper 277-B, 5 October 1921, CAB 4/7. 
2. CID Paper 276-B, 5 October 1921, CAB 4/7. 
3. CID Paper 279-B, 11 October 1921, CAB 4/7. The air experts at Paris 
in 1919 had concluded that such a differentiation could be made. 
Germany was deprived of military aviation but no attempt was made to 
prevent her building civil aircraft. 
4. CID, 145th Meeting, 14 October 1921, CAB Z/3. Balfour raised the 
matter. Chairing the CID he told its members that Britain was 
incapable of 'resisting an aerial invasion by the French'. It was 
decided, however, not to press the issue at the conference. 
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was rejected by the Admiralty who were 'loathe to share the fruit of 
expensive research ... with other powers'. The other, which owed much 
to his pre-war experience as First Lord of the Admiralty, was adopted 
by the CID. Britain would go to the conference table with a paper 
programme which she had no intention of implementing but which could be 
used as a bargaining counter to secure concessions from other powers. 
Lee's announcement to the Imperial Conference in July 1921 that Britain 
would lay down four capital ships in the financial year 1921-22 and 
another four in the following year paved the way for the deployment of 
these tactics. 
1 
Though Balfour, Britain's first delegate, was given considerable 
discretion over Far Eastern policy so far as disarmament was concerned 
the British Empire delegation went to Washington with a set of clearly 
defined objectives which had been fashioned in the months preceding the 
conference. Britain's first objective was to prevent competition in 
post-Jutland design capital ships. If the United States and Japan were 
to complete their construction programmes Britain would either be forced 
to cripple herself financially in order to maintain her superiority or 
see her large battle fleet rendered obsolete. No one was in any doubt 
about the consequences of Britain being relegated to second or, perhaps, 
third place in the league of naval powers. In a veiled reference to the 
American naval construction programme Lloyd George had told the House of 
Commons in July 1919 that if one country went on increasing its armaments 
Britain could only demonstrate her desire for disarmament by taking risks 
which no British statesman could afford to contemplate. 
2 Two years later 
he informed the 1921 Imperial Conference that Britain was building up her 
1. The funds were provided in the estimates approved by the Commons on 
21 March 1921. It was not until 20 July that the Cabinet sanctioned 
their construction [C. 60(21), CA. B 23/261. Lee gave details of the 
programme to the Imperial Conference on 29 July. The announcement 
was greeted without any expression of dissent. 
2.118 HC Debs. 5th Series, cols. 1040 and 1048,21 July 1919. 
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fleet because the prestige, honour and existence of the Empire required it. 
When the Empire's statesmen went to Geneva it was known that they repres- 
ented a first-class power. Britain would go to the brink of bankruptcy 
rather than sacrifice her naval power. The fleet was essential if 
Britain's position in the world was to be maintained. 
' Britain went to 
Washington to fend off a challenge to her naval power. 'It is assumed 
that the aim of the British Empire Delegation ... is to achieve the largest 
possible reduction in expenditure on armaments, Hankey wrote in October 
1921 in a brief for Britain's negotiators. 
2 At Washington in 1921, at 
Geneva in 1927, and in London in 1930P the Admiralty's proposals were 
inspired by Britain's paramount concern for economy. 
In 1921 the Admiralty had two immediate objectives: the numerical 
limitation of capital ships and the abolition of submarines. Though 
they were not averse to the limitation of aircraft carriers and total 
destroyer tonnage they were opposed to restrictions on other categories 
of warships. In the mid-1920s they were led to propose limitations on 
the maximum displacement aiid armament of those other categories, including 
cruisers, but throughout the decade they were implacably opposed to any 
restrictions which would prevent Britain building such numbers of commerce- 
protection vessels as she deemed necessary. 
The proposals which Charles E. Hughes, the American Secretary of 
State, outlined at the opening session of the Washington conference could 
scarcely have been more favourable to Britain. Their overall effect was 
to ensure Britain's numerical superiority in capital ships over the 
United States and other naval powers until the late 1930s. 
3 
1.20 July 1921, Meeting of the Prime Ministers of the Empire, CAB 32/2. 
2. CID Paper 280-B, 24 October 1921, CAB 30/1A. 
3. The. United States proposed that the three principal naval powers 
should scrap such numbers of older capital ships and those under 
construction so that Britain retained twenty-two, the United States 
eighteen, and Japan ton. Almost two decades would elapse before the 
5: 5: 3 ratio would apply to their respective battle fleets. 
[Contd. overleaf 
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Although the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Lee of Fareham, 
would have given Hughes' proposals an unqualified endorsement, 
1 
the 
First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet, Earl Beatty, Britain's principal 
naval adviser and a man of great influence in the years 1919 to 1927, 
made a number of reservations. His arguments won over his colleagues 
in the British Empire delegation but not the goverment in London. 
Beatty argued that a ten year naval holiday in capital ship construction 
would doom Britain's shipyards and armaments firms to decay and eventual 
extinction and as an alternative he suggested a three year naval holiday 
followed by a reduced building programme of two capital ships every three 
2 
years. 
His suggestion was strenuously opposed by Lloyd George, Churchill 
and others. Eventually the Foreign Secretary, Curzon, was forced to 
issue a stiff rebuke when Beatty and his staff tried to sabotage the 
Hughes proposal by pointing out to their American counterparts that it 
conferred an enormous benefit on Britain. Churchill warned the CID that 
if any ships were built during the ensuing decade the naval powers would 
be kept in a state of anxiety and rivalry. The views of the civilians 
prevailed. Public opinion in Britain was firmly behind the government. 
Though Beatty was able to call the tune in the summer of 1927 when the 
Geneva naval conference was deadlocked, he was not able to dictate to 
Fia. 3.1). 182, contd. 
Whereas the United States would be obliged to scrap fifteen ships 
under construction and Japan seven, Britain was only required to 
abandon the construction of the four 'super Hoods' on which practi- 
cally no work had, as yet, been undertaken. In the revised proposals 
designed to save the Japanese battleship Mutsu, Britain was allowed 
to retain two of the four ships she was to have scrapped. These 
were later named Rodnev and Nelson. 
1. A. Clark (ed. ): A Good Tnnings. The Private PaDers of Viscount 
Lee of Fareham, p. 214. 
2. DBFP, First Series, Vol. XIV, No. 417. Cf. Nos. 418,426 and 456. 
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the Lloyd George government in the late autim of 1921.1 
Beatty made two other reservations which won the support of the 
CID and Cabinet in London. Hughes had tentatively suggested that other 
categories of warship might be limited on the same principle as capital 
ships. While prepared to accept proportionate reductions in those classes 
of auxiliary vessel which could be regarded as complementary to battle 
fleets, Beatty insisted that Britain would require additional cruisers 
to protect her commerce. It was this claim for additional cruisers which 
six years later was to wreck the Geneva naval conference and was to 
embitter relations between the United States and Britain until Ramsay 
MacDonald imposed his will on the Admiralty in the late summer of 1929. 
The CID established the principle in response to Beatty's pleading that 
Britain's cruiser strength should not be based on the numbers maintained 
by other powers but on the length and variety of the sea communications 
over which Britain's food and vital supplies had to be transported. 
2 
Beatty also indicated his strong preference for the abolition of 
submarines and, should this be rejected, a large reduction in submarine 
numbers and tonnage. The Cabinet, on the recommendation of the CID, 
endorsed his views. Admiral Field told the CID on 14 November that a 
battleship of 35,000 tons - the maximum permissible displacement if the 
American proposals were to be adopted - would not have adequate protection 
against submarine attack. The battle fleets of the world would be at the 
mercy of large flotillas of submarines of improved design if submarines 
were allowed to proliferate. On 16 November Beatty, taking his cue from 
instructions just received from London, told the British Empire delegation 
1. Curzon wrote a personal letter to Balfour on 9 December 1921. See 
DBFP, First Series, Vol. XIV, No. 485. For Churchill's views see 
CID, 149th meeting, 14 November 1921, CAB 2,13. T. Jones: Whitehall 
Diary, Vol. 1, p. 191, diary entry for 15 November 1921, reports 
Lloyd George as saying: 'There must be no question of considering 
employment nor of building a small number of ships to keep the 
armament firms going. ' 
2. CID, 149th meeting, 14 November 1921, CAB 2/3. 
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that if the ten-year naval holiday was approved Britain 'should insist 
on the abolition of the submarine. 
' 
At the beginning of December the CID instructed the British Empire 
delegation to press for 'total abolition'. If they failed they were to 
warn the conference that Britain would insist on absolute freedom in the 
construction of surface warships of under 10,000 tons to protect her 
commerce. 
2 Having first sounded out the chairman of the conference, 
the American Secretary of State, the delegation complied with his request 
not to raise the issue in open session. Lord Lee put Britain's case to 
the Committee on Limitation of Armaments on 22 December but the delega- 
tion made sure that the British point of view received the maximum 
publicity by issuing verbatim reports to the American Press. So effective 
was their manipulation of the Press that postcards, letters, petitions 
demanding abolition flooded into Washington. 
Putting the case for abolition Lee argued somewhat disingenuously 
that 'it was against merchant ships alone' that submarines had achieved 
any real success in the First World War. He studiously avoided refer- 
ring to the Admiralty's fears that surface warships including capital 
ships would prove increasingly vulnerable to submarine attack. Submarines 
constituted as great a danger to Britain, Lee argued, as any faced by 
France on her eastern frontier because Britain only produced two-fifths 
of her food supplies and only kept enough stocks to feed her people for 
seven weeks. If submarines were retained, nations with large mercantile 
fleets would be forced to construct vast numbers of anti-submarine craft 
and there would be no relief for the overburdened taxpayer. Submarines 
might be cheap for the aggressor but they were very expensive for the 
victim. 
1. DBFP, First Series, Vol. XIV, Nos. 417,420 and 421; CAB 30/1A. 
2. CID, 152nd meeting, 1 December 1921, CAB Z/3- 
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The case for abolition was rejected by France, Italy and Japan whose 
delegates argued that submarines were a legitimate weapon of defence which 
a power deficient in capital ships could use to defend its coasts and sea 
communications. Britain received no support from the American delegation 
whose naval advisers were divided over the issue. Hughes' attempt to 
persuade the conference to accept a tonnage limitation also met with the 
outright opposition of the French. Britain had to rest content with the 
Root resolutions which attempted to regulate the conduct of submarines in 
time of war. 
I 
Britain had good reason for seeking the abolition of submarines. 
German submarines had sunk twelve million tons of merchant shipping and 
caused the death of twenty thousand non-combatants. German submarine 
warfare had outraged not only British but neutral opinion too. In Britain 
the abolitionist cause acquired something of the moral fervour of the 
anti-slavery crusade of a century earlier. Strong support for abolition 
came from the king, George V, 
2 
and that consistent critic of disarmament 
proposals, Sir Eyre Crowe .3 Britain had little to gain and much to lose 
from their retention and what was true of Britain was also true of the 
other principal naval powers though both the United States and Japan 
were slow to realise it. This in itself, however, does not explain why 
the Admiralty adopted the abolitionist cause with such vigour in the 
closing months of 1921. They had failed to secure abolition at the 1919 
Paris peace conference and, before the Washington conference convened, 
had reluctantly come to the conclusion that abolition was, for all intents 
and purposes, a lost cause. 
4 Having secured their main objective, the 
1. CAB 30/9. 
2. DBFP, First Series, Vol. XIV, No. 485, Note 3; S. W. Roskill: Naval 
Policy between the Wars, Vol. 1, P. 306. 
3. CID, 150th meeting, 23 November 1921, CAB 2,13. 
4. CID Paper 277-B, 5 October 1921, CAB 4/7. 
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limitation of capital ships in the first few days of the conference, it 
was not unnatural that they should seek to realise their only other goal. 
By championing the abolitionist cause they, at one and the same time, won 
the approval of the disarmament lobby in Britain and when abolition was 
rejected, strengthened their own case for additional auxiliary vessels 
to protect British commerce and assert British naval power in seas where 
Britain's battle fleet would no longer operate. 
Lloyd George was obliged to raise the submarine question again when 
he discussed disarmament with Briand ht the Cannes conference in January 
1922 but despite the pressure he was instructed to bring to bear on the 
French by his Cabinet colleagues at home his efforts were to no avail. 
H. A. L. Fisher summed up the attitude of many of his Cabinet colleagues 
when he wrote at the eýd of 1921: 'The French attitude on submarines 
fills me with despair. I have had some dealings with representatives 
of the French Admiralty at Geneva and a more unteachable set of men I 
have never come across, as vain as peacocks and eaten up with jealousy 
of us., 
1 
France's uncompromising rejection of the British case embittered 
relations between the two countries. Coupled with her unwillingness to 
discuss land armaments at the Washington conference it made Anglo-French 
co-operation over disarmament virtually impossible in the early 1920s. 
Though the technical experts made a very full investigation of the 
problems associated with land and air disarmament, the Washington confer- 
ence made no positive proposals. The conference's successes were entirely 
in the field of naval armaments and Par Eastern affairs. 
2 
With the single exception of her failure to secure an agreement 
over submarines, the terms of the Washington Naval Treaty were considered 
1. Fisher to Gilbert Murray, 31 December 1921, Fisher Papers. 
2. H. Latimer: Naval Disarmament, London, 1930, pp. 2-11,78-88 contains 
a succinct summary of the Washington conference and the text of the 
naval limitation treaty. 
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at the time wholly favourable to Britain. The American proposals had 
been greeted with gratitude and relief. They meant that the United States 
made the biggest sacrifices while Britain was called on to surrender very 
little of her freedom and practically nothing of her naval strength. 
The Washington treaties were to come in for severe criticism ten 
years later when Japan resumed her policy of expansion on the mainland 
of Asia. Both Britain and the United States paid a price for naval dis- 
armament but it would be wrong to exaggerate the concessions made to Japan. 
The standstill agreement on fortifications gave Japan naval hegemony in 
the western Pacific but there is no evidence that, had the Washington 
conference not taken place, the United States would have constructed 
naval bases in Guam and Manila or Britain at Hong Kong. Britain's 
decision to build a naval base at Singapore was taken before the Washington 
conference. Though ostensibly its purpose was to protect imperial coirmlini- 
cations, its justification was the possibility of war with Japan. So 
long as Britain was powerless to maintain a battle fleet in the Pacific 
the Singapore base would, however, be of little value in a war with 
Japan. The deterioration in relations between the Anglo-Saxon powers 
and Japan in the aftermath of the Great Depression had little to do with 
the Washington conference and the 1922 naval arms limitation treaty. 
The conference led to a considerable improvement in Japanese-kmerican 
relations and Anglo-American understanding. That this was subsequently 
undermined by the actions and policies of British, American and Japanese 
statesmen reacting to changed circum tances does not detract from the 
achievement itself. The conference's success owed much to the coincidence 
that there were powerful influences at work in London, Washington and 
Tokyo working for an arms limitation agreement and an improvement in 
the relations between the three powers. Most Japanese politicians and 
journalists recognised that it would be an enormous blessing if Japan's 
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naval and military expenditure could be reduced. 
1 'What was true of Japan 
was equally true of Britain and America. Never again was there to be such 
a unanimous demand for arms limitation and control as there was in Britain, 
the United States and Japan in the summer and autumn of 1921. Though 
Britain's policy in Ireland and Japan's in China had led to fierce 
resentment in the United States it was the prospect of a naval arms race 
which engrossed the attention of the public in all three countries. The 
United States' pre-eminence in the world of finance convinced British 
and Japanese statesmen of the prime importance of good relations with 
the American government. 
2 The conference symbolised America's emergence 
as the richest and most powerful nation on earth, wooed not only by 
Britain and Japan but by France and the other participating powers. In 
December 1920 Lloyd George had warned the Committee of Imperial Defence 
that if Britain began a naval building programme, the United States might 
press for the immediate repayment of the Z1000m. Britain owed her. 
3 The 
United States was the arbiter of both Britain's and Japan's destiny. She 
alone could ensure the success of a major disarmament conference. 
The conference had political repercussions at home. Though Lloyd 
George attended twenty-four post-war international conferences the 
delicate nature of the Irish negotiations in the autumn of 1921 and other 
domestic problems prevented him from leading the British Empire delegation 
at Washington and enhancing his reputation as an international negotiator. 
That responsibility fell on Lloyd George's most senior colleague. Balfour 
1.1. Nish: Alliance in Decline, P. 384. 
2. On 27 December 1921 Admiral Kato Tomosaburo sent the Navy Vice-Minister 
a memorandum which summed up Japan's reasons for agreeing to an arms 
limitation pact. 'One has to admit that, if one has no money, one 
cannot make war ... If we examine where funds can now be obtained, we 
cannot discover any country apart from the United States which can 
give us a loan... national defence is not a matter exclusively for 
soldiers. ' Quoted by I. Nish: Ja anese Foreipm Policv. 1869-1942, 
pp. 289-90 and in 'Japan and Naval Aspects of the Washington Conference' 
in. Modern Japan, ed. W. G. Beasley, pp. 67-80. 
3. CID, 134th meeting, 14 December 1920, CAB 2/3. 
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was a statesman of unrivalled experience and immense political stature. 
He had been in turn Prime Minister, First Lord of the Admiralty, Foreign 
Secretary and Lord President of the Council. With the assured backing 
of both his Conservative and Liberal colleagues there was never any like- 
lihood that his Washington handiwork would be repudiated by the Cabinet 
at home. Unlike his successor as Britain's principal negotiator in the 
disarmament negotiations of the years 1926 to 1927, Lord Cecil, he enjoyed 
an almost unequalled personal authority and the virtually unanimous sup- 
port of the public. He was in an immensely powerful position as a 
negotiator. His success earned him an earldom and the gratitude of the 
public. It gave credibility to Conservative claims to be supporters of 
disarmament. 
1 
The Washington treaties won almost universal praise in Britain and 
were far from unpopular in the United States and Japan. It did not seem 
too far-fetched for Curzon to claim that the treaties had laid a firm 
foundation for peace throughout the whole world 
2 
and for Balfour to 
describe them as an absolute and unmixed benefit to mankind. 
3 In October 
1923 Baldwin was to tell the Imperial Conference: 'I do not think I 
exaggerate if I say that the results achieved our most sanguine antici- 
pations. ' 
4 When the Commons approved the Washington treaty in July 1922 
Asquith said it commanded universal approbation and assent and Colonel 
J. C. Wedgwood, speaking on behalf of Labour Members, said it had the 
1. Both Balfour and Lee were members of the Conservative party but their 
views were not, at that time, wholly representative of the party. 
C. P. Scott believed that Balfour had become a Liberal in his old age 
and quoted Lloyd George as saying that in matters of foreign policy 
Balfour was more Liberal than Grey. T. Wilson (ed. ): The Political 
Diaries of C. P. Scott. 1911-1928, London, 1970, pp. 421 and 429. 
Lord Lee of Fareham was deprived of the welcome and kudos received 
by his senior colleague. He was the victim of a vendetta in the 
Northcliffe papers. 
2. DBFP, First Series, Vol. XIV, No. 578. 
3. K. Young: Arthur James Balfour, London, 1963, P. 420. 
4. CAB 3Z/9- Baldwin was referring to the achievements of the conference 
as a whole and not just to the limitation treaty. 
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united support of the House. 
' 
A Manchester Guardian editorial summed 
up the debate by saying that the general sense of the House was one of 
regret that it had not been possible to go further. 
2 
Britain had achieved most, if not all, her objectives without impos- 
ing sacrifices on other powers which were too costly or too humiliating 
for them to bear. Special care was taken to meet the special require- 
ments of France and Italy whose battle fleets were also restricted by 
the treaty. Its principal merit was that it prevented a wasteful com- 
petition in capital ship construction and in so doing saved the taxpayers 
of the five signatory powers financial expenditure which would not in any 
way have added to their security. 
In Japan, military and naval expenditure was reduced from forty- 
nine to thirty per cent. of government expenditure and in 1924 four 
divisions of the Japanese army were disbanded. 
3 
Throughout the 1920s 
the main objectives of Japanese foreign and defence policy were armaments 
control and co-operation with the Anglo-Saxon powers. According to 
H. L. Stimson, one of Japan's sternest critics, her conduct in the 1920s 
earned for her 'an exceptional record of good citizenship in the life of 
the world'. 
4 
Reporting the findings of the Cabinet Committee set up to examine 
the effects of the Geddes' Committee's proposals on the three Fighting 
Services, Churchill wrote in February 1922: 'We do not believe that so 
large a reduction in naval expenditure could have been recommended unless 
the Washington Conference had taken place ... if the Washington Conference 
1.156 HC Debs. 5th series, cola. 22-25 and 132,7 July 1922. The only 
dissentient note was struck by two Conservative MPs for dockyard 
constituencies, Sir B. Palle (Portsmouth, N. ) and Sir C. Kinloch- 
Cooke (Devonport). 
2.8 July 1922. 
3. J. B. Crowley in Jai)an's Foreign Poli2Z, 1868-1941, ed. J. W. Morley, 
pp. 38-43. 
4. H. L. Stimson: The Far Eastern Crisis. Recollections and Observations, New York, 1936, P- 36. 
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had failed ... we should have been confronted with a naval situation of 
great and growing tension, the last effort to relieve... by conference 
and agreement had definitely failed. It is hardly too much to say that 
the failure of the Washington Conference would have brought us within 
measurable distance of a great war in the Pacific ... We should have been 
confronted with a great increase in Japanese and American naval strength 
and this would have required of us the most rigorous efforts if we were 
not to resign ourselves to the second and third place among the world's 
naval Powers. ' 
1 Churchill was not alone in thinking that the Washington 
conference had delivered the British people from the menacing prospect 
of naval competition and international conflict. 
None the less the Washington treaty had its critics. Both Lord Robert 
Cecil and Philip Noel-Baker disliked the Washington precedent which was to 
tempt successive British governments in the years 1922 to 1935 to seek 
bilateral agreements with other naval powers. Like the French, Cecil 
and Noel-Baker believed that disarmament was the proper concern of the 
League and not of a small group of naval powers acting. independently of 
it. However, most people in Britain welcomed their government's endeavours 
to come to terms with the United States in the three naval conferences of 
1921-22,1927 and 1930. So long as the United States remained outside 
the League there appeared to be no other alternative. Others said with 
some justice in the aftermath of the conference that the great powers 
were spending more time and energy in devising means to increase the 
fighting strength of their navies than ever before. Some noted that the 
only categories of warship to be restricted were battleships and aircraft 
carriers, the one of doubtful utility in the new era of submarines and 
aerial bombardment, 
2 the other virtually new and untried in war. Sir 
1. CP 3692,4 February 1922, CAB 27/164. 
2. The CID Naval Shipbuilding Sub-Committee, set up by the government under the chairmanship of Bonar Law in December 1920, was divided on the issue 
and two prominent naval authorities, Admiral Sir Percy Scott and Admiral (Sir) Herbert Richmond, came out publicly against the battleship. In both Press and Parliament many questioned the wisdom of constructing new capital ships in the years immediately after the war. 
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Eyre Crowe suggested in June 1923 that Britain would not have signed the 
treaty had she not been motivated by a strong desire to save money and a 
sneaking suspicion that the days of the battleship were in the past. He 
questioned whether Britain had gained anything by her signature because 
almost eighteen months after the conclusion of the conference a number 
of powers had not then ratified their signature, a fact, he said, which 
should act as a warning against assuming that other powers were anxious 
to disarm. 1 
One restriction placed on the construction of warships by the 
Washington treatyp a 10,000 ton 811 gun limitation on cruisers, had unfore- 
seen and unfortunate consequences for Britain. When the proposal was 
unwittingly made by the Admiralty in November 1921 the largest cruisers 
in the world then under construction were the American 'Omaha' class 
warships of 7,050 tons and 6" guns. Ships of that size were more than 
adequate for Britain's needs. 10,000 ton 811 gun cruisers were an extrava- 
gance Britain could ill afford. The limit led to the construction of 
cruisers which were unnecessary for commerce protection and whose armament 
made them of considerable value in augmenting the fire power of those very 
battle fleets Britain had set out to restrict. 
In the summer of 1922 the Admiralty reacted to Japanese construction 
plans by demanding that Britain should build seventeen ships of this class. 
The United States naval authorities followed suit and by the mid-1920s the 
five signatory powers were engaged in a new naval arms race. It was 
ironically enough the decision of the first Labour government in 1924 to 
lay down five of these cruisers, a measure it justified as alleviating 
unemployment in the dockyard towns, which translated proposals into actual 
construction. When in the Spring of 1924 the Labour government instructed 
the Admiralty to devise new naval disarmament plans it was Beatty who 
1. FO 371/9419,24-26 June 1923. 
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tentatively suggested to his naval colleagues that Britain should propose 
a 7,000 ton 611 gun limitation for cruisers in any future disarmament 
negotiations. 
1 
When Churchill, much to his surprise, was appointed Chancellor of 
the Exchequer in November 1924, he set to work with great zeal and single- 
ness of purpose to reduce public expenditure and cut taxation. One of his 
first targets was the naval estimates. Convinced that there was not the 
slightest chance of war with a first-class naval power, including Japan, 
for another twenty years, 
2 
Churchill tried to get all new construction 
deleted from the estimates. 'The poacher in the naval interest of earlier 
times became the Treasury's gamekeeper. 
3 The Admiralty, however, took 
-the offensive and briefed the First Lord, W. C. Bridgeman, 
4 
and the 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, J. C. C. Davidson, 
5 
to persuade 
their fellow countrymen that Britain's cruiser strength was vital for the 
defence of the Empire's trade routes. They also found a valuable ally in 
Sir William Tyrrell of the Foreign Office who set out to persuade Austen 
Chamberlain that if Britain ceased to command a powerful navy the world 
would lose confidence in the British government and the Foreign Secretary's 
word would carry no weight with other powers. 
6 
Tyrrell's views were 
shared by a large and powerful section of the Conservative party. 
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'People forget', the Conservative MP for Barnard Castle, Cuthbert Headlam, 
wrote, 'that it is our possession of a first-rate fleet which is one of 
the main preventatives of war. ' 
1 
Similar views had been expressed by 
Earl Balfour over a year earlier. In a House of Lords debate in March 
1924 Balfour said that armaments were one of the most powerful means of 
preserving peace because they made a potential belligerent feel that war 
was not worthwhile. 
2 
An increasing number of Conservatives were return- 
ing to the view that if Britain wanted peace she must prepare for war. 
The Prime Minister was forced to intervene decisively whet Bridgeman 
and the Sea Lords threatened to resign and the party whips told him that 
if the navy was sacrificed on the altar of the Treasury it would mean the 
end of the Conservative party. 
3 Overruling not only Churchill but a 
majority of his Cabinet, Baldwin decided that two 811 gun cruisers should 
be laid down in October 1925, another two in February 1926, followed by 
two more in October 1926 and one in February 1927.4 It is doubtful 
whether Baldwin or any members of his Cabinet foresaw the impact this 
decision would make on Anglo-American relations in the following four 
years - 
The 1925 cruiser crisis, which has been described by one authority 
5 
as the most serious internal crisis of Baldwin's second administration, 
was seen by some contemporaries as a plot by Churchill and the 
ex-Coalitionists to unseat Baldwin. 
6 
Whether this was so or not, the 
navy lobby's victory was of considerable political significance. It 
1. Headlam Diaries, 16 July 1925. 
2.56 HL Debs. 5th Series, Col. 764,13 March 1924. 
3. R. R. James (ed. ): Memoirs of a Conservative, pp. 211-19; K. Middlemas 
and J. Barnes: Baldwin, London, 1969, P. 339; see also Bridgeman to 
Baldwin, 11 February 1925 and his handwritten memorandum 'The Political 
Case for the Admiralty' n. d., Baldwin Papers, Vol. 2. 
4. C-39(25), 22 July 1925, CAB 23/50. 
5. R. R. James (ed. ): Memoirs of a Conservative,, p. 211. 
6. Headlam Diaries, 23 July 1925. 
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represented an assertion of British imperial power at precisely the 
moment when Chamberlain was steering the Conservative party towards 
Europe via the negotiations leading to the Locarno agreements. 
It was also a reflection on the influence the Admiralty still wielded. 
Though they were fortunate in having as their political chiefs two of 
Baldwin's closest friends and advisers, 
1 
there can be no doubt about the 
power they themselves exercised. Haldane was so impressed with their 
influence that he told Beatrice Webb that they were powerful enough to 
overturn governments 
2 
and Churchill criticised them for giving less value 
for money than the other two Services because they were so accustomed to 
carrying all before them by threats of resignation. 
3 
By far the most powerful of the three Services, the Admiralty was 
also the most contemptuous of the League and Wilsonian internationalism. 
In 1910 they had made an ineffectual response to tentative American 
proposals for an international naval force 
4 
and when in 1919 Admiral 
Benson, Chief of the American Naval Staff, suggested that the British 
and American navies form an Anglo-American condominium of the world's 
oceans, Walter Long, the First Lord, rejected it out of hand. 
5 Believing 
that there was no substitute for the free and unfettered deployment of 
British naval power, the Admiralty were incapable of devising the 
imaginative proposals for a League naval force then being outlined by 
some members of the United States Navy's General Board. 
6 In 1924 it 
1. Baldwin's candidature in 1923 had been promoted by Davidson, Amery 
and Bridgeman. See D. Dilks in The Conservatives, ed. Lord Butler, 
London, 1977, p. 283. Davidson was perhaps the closest of all 
Baldwin's advisers but Bridgeman enjoyed a very close personal 
relationship to which his correspondence in the Baldwin Papers 
bears ample testimony. 
2. Haldane to Beatrice Webb, 23 January 1925, Passfield Papers. 
3. Churchill to Baldwin, 29 January 1928, Baldwin Papers, Vol. 2. 
4. G. E. C. Catlin 'The Roots of War' in Challenge to Death, London, 
1934, p. 34. 
5. Unsigned memorandumv 29 March 1919, to be attributed on internal 
evidence to Long, Lloyd George Papers, F/192/1/4- 
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was the Admiralty which first raised the standard of revolt against the 
Geneva Protocol, sending a staff officer to Geneva to thwart the efforts 
of the British delegation lest Britain's naval power be placed at the 
disposal of the League. 
1 
The navy was well served by a succession of First Lords who, with 
the exception of Lee and Chelmsford, 
2 
were men of considerable influence 
in the Conservative party. 
3 In Earl Beatty, the navy had a powerful and 
able champion as First Sea Lord in the years 1919 to 1927. It commanded 
the affection of the Conservative party, most of the Press, and a sizeable 
section of the public. None the less, there was some decline in its 
popular appeal. In 1920 the Navy League had 105 branches but by 1927 it 
had only 41.4 Though it was frequently said in the aftermath of victory 
that British sea power had brought about Germany's defeat, the navy's 
reputation had not emerged unscathed from the war. Writing to a friend 
on the day after the Armistice Beatty said: 'We are not going to win in 
the Council all that our great victory entitles us to., 
5 There had been 
no great ocular demonstration of British sea power comparable to Trafalgar 
and the great naval victories of past wars. It was increasingly difficult 
to persuade the public to spend vast sums on a navy whose role, however 
important, had been so unspectacular in the First World War. 
The Washington conference's success led others to seek disarmament 
1. See p. 259. 
2. P. J. N. Thesiger, 3rd Lord and let Viscount Chelmsford (1921), 
1868-1933, Viceroy of India, 1916-21, First Lord of the Admiralty 
in the first Labour government, 1924. 
3. Long had been a contender for the Conservative party leadership in 
1911 and Bridgeman was closely associated with Baldwin's rise to 
power. Amery was a man of considerable intellectual force whose 
imperialist philosophy was attractive to the bulk of Conservative 
opinion. 
4. Navy League: 25th Annual Re-port for the Year 1920, London, 1921, 
and 32nd Annual Report for the Year 1927, London, 1928. 
5. W. S. Chalmers: The Life and Letters of David, Earl Beatty, London, 
1951, P. 342. 
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on a regional or restricted basis. In December 1922 the Soviet Union 
convened a conference of Baltic and East European powers and in the 
following March a number of Latin American countries tried to reach an 
agreement over naval armaments at Santiago. In February 1924 the League 
summoned a conference at Rome to extend the principles of the Washington 
treaty to the naval forces of the rest of the world. The complete failure 
of all three conferences did not discourage the British and American 
governments from contemplating another naval disarmament conference. 
MacDonald did not disguise Britain's enthusiasm for the Washington 
precedent when he addressed the League Assembly in September 1924. When 
in 1924 and 1925 the United States made a number of tentative initiatives 
they were, however, quickly rebuffed by France. 
The Geneva Naval Disarmament Conference 
None the less in February 1927 President Coolidge invited the 
signatories of the Washington treaty to augment the work of the League 
of Nations Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, 
1 
which 
was at that time deadlocked over naval disarmament, to attend another 
naval disarmament conference, not in Washington, but in Geneva. The 
invitation was accepted by Britain and Japan but rejected by France and 
Italy. 
President Coolidge's initiative produced a mixed reaction in the 
Foreign Office. Alexander Cadogan, 2 who no doubt because of his responsi- 
bilities for disarmament within the Office had urged the government a few 
days earlier to take the lead, welcomed it. If the conference met with 
success, the naval powers would be in an unassailable position to urge 
1. See pp. 293-310. 
2. (Sir) Alexander George Cadogan, 1884-1968, Head of the League of 
Nations section of the Foreign Office, 1923-33, Deputy Under-Secretary 
of State, 1936-37, Permanent Under-Secretary of State, 1938-46, 
Permanent British representative at the United Nations, 1946-50. 
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land and air disarmament on other countries. 
1 
R. H. Campbell 2 took a 
totally different view. Britain had no need to fall in with Coolidge's 
plans which, Campbell believed, were almost entirely motivated by electoral 
and domestic considerations. 
3 He correctly predicted that land and air 
4 
disarmament would provide a more promising prospect. Austen Chamberlain 
had no doubts. No power had a greater interest in securing further 
limitation of naval armaments than Britain. Though he disliked Coolidge's 
suggestion that the 5: 5: 3 ratio should be extended to other categories, 
he'believed that Britain would be able to propose an alternative scheme. 
5 
Long before the Coolidge conference convened in Geneva in June 1927 
the Admiralty found themselves constrained to give considerable thought 
to further measures of naval disarmament. As the estimates were pared 
down from year to year by a parsimonious Treasury and House of Commons 
it became imperative to devise means of reducing the construction and 
maintenance costs of Britain's warships. In April 1924 Beatty proposed 
a reduction in the maximum permitted displacement and armament of battle- 
ships, cruisers, and other categories of warship. Further proposals were 
made in 1925 and 1926. The Coolidge initiative was warmly welcomed by 
the Admiralty. To create a favourable climate of opinion Bridgeman 
announced on 9 March 1927 that the government would not procee& with the 
construction of three cruisers scheduled in the 1925 programme. 
6 
Two 
1. DBFP, Series IA, Vol. III, No. 333. 
2. (Sir) Ronald Hugh Campbell, 1883-1953, Assistant Under-Secretary of 
State, 1906-11, Private Secretary to Lord Carnock, 1913-16, to Lord 
Hardinge, 1916-19, to Lord Curzon, 1919-20, Assistant Head of Western 
Department, 1920-28, Counsellor, 1928, Minister at Paris, 1929-35, 
Ambassador to Yugoslavia, 1935-39, to France, 1939-40, to Portugal, 
1940-45. 
3. Campbell believed that Coolidge, with an eye to the 1928 Congressional 
and Presidential elections, was embarrassed by the delay in implement- 
ing the US Navy's cruiser construction programme. 
4. DBFP, Series 1A, Vol. III, No. 334. 
5. Ibid., Note 3. 
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weeks before the government received Coolidge's invitation, Bridgeman 
submitted an Admiralty memorandum to the Prime Minister which contained 
a number of detailed proposals for reducing the maximum displacement and 
armament of all the main categories of warship. The Preparatory Commission, 
it declared, held out few prospects of success. At best it was likely to 
lead to further prolonged delay. Unless action was taken immediately 
naval expenditure in Britain was bound to rise from 1928 onwards. 
1 
The Admiralty's main purpose was to prevent a wasteful and expensive 
competition in warships which Britain could ill afford by reducing their 
size and extending their replacement life. There is no evidence that 
they shared the view of many of their contemporaries that an arms race 
inevitably led to war. 
The Coolidge initiative produced a very different response in the 
United States. Congress reversed an earlier decision not to provide 
funds for the completion of the 1924 cruiser construction programme. 
2 
Many held the view that in 1922 the United States had been cheated of 
her rightful prize - parity with Britain. Anti-British sentiment reared 
its head in Congress and the Press. The Chicago Tribune demanded the 
British West Indies as the price for an agreement. 
3 Accusations were 
later to be levelled at United States steel interests and armaments 
firms for the provocative tone of much of the American press. 
4 
Coolidge's invitation was well received in Japan. Though there 
were elements within the Japanese navy, led by the Commander-in-Chief, 
1. The memorandum was written by three Sea Lords, Admiral Sir Frederic 
Dreyer, the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Sir Frederick 
Field, Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, and Admiral Sir Ernle 
Chatfield, Third Sea Lord and Controller of the Navy. See S. Roskill: 
Naval Policy between the Wars,, Vol. 1, p. 499 and CID, 227th meeting, 
20 May 1927, CAB 2/5. 
2. DBFP, Series IA, Vol. III, No. 346. 
3. Ibid., No. 360. 
4. See Bridgeman's remarks at the second plenary session of the Geneva 
naval conference, 14 July 1927, CAB 27/350. 
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Admiral Kato Kanji, who were opposed not only to naval disarmament but 
to the policy of peaceful co-operation with the Anglo-Saxon powers, they 
were not powerful enough to influence the policy of the Tanaka government. 
Believing that the United States had gained a tactical advantage at 
Washington in November 1921 by springing their proposals on the conference 
without prior consultation with the other powers, the Admiralty persuaded 
the British government not to communicate its proposals in advance to the 
United States and Japan. They were regarded as so confidential that they 
were not even circulated to the Cabinet or the Dominion governments until 
a few days before the conference began. Their efforts were, none the less, 
in vain. Before the conference convened, the United States Navy and the 
American press had remarkably accurate forecasts of Britain's intentions. 
2 
In a discussion dominated by Beatty, the CID approved the Admiralty's 
proposals on 20 May 1927. They had two objectives: to reduce the size and 
armament of capital ships and to extend the Washington treaty to other 
categories of warship. Bridgeman gave a further justification. They 
would save the ExchequerC5m. a year in the next decade. 
3 
It was the second of the Admiralty's two objectives which was to 
prove Britain's undoing. As Bridgeman foresaw, if Britain was forced to 
justify her claim for cruisers - her 'absolute requirement' of seventy 
cruisers - the United States might make a similar claim for basically 
the same reasonst the protection of her world-wide commerce. Beatty 
conceded that if the United States and Japan were to claim the same 
1. J. B. Crowley in Japan's Foreign Policy. 1868-1941, ed. J. W. Morley, 
PP. 38-40; M. Ito and R. Fineau: The End of the Imperial Japanese 
Nazz, pp. 13-14; 1. Nish in Modern Japan, ed. W. G. Beasley, pp. 79-80; 
DBFP, Series IA, Vol. III, No- 335. 
2. CID, 227th meeting, 20 May 1927, CAB Z/5; C-34(27), 25 May 1927, 
CAB 23/55; S. Roskill, Naval Polic-y between the Wars, Vol. 1, PP-499-500- 
3. CID, 227th meeting, 20 May 1927, CAB 2/5. A month later Beatty boasted 
to his wife that he had so tied the hands of the British delegation 
that they would not be able to decide any important question without first referring it to him. Beatty to his wife, 17 June 1927, 
W. S. Chalmers: The Life and Lettera-of David. 
-Marl 
Beatty, P. 414. 
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number of cruisers as Britain, that figure, seventy, would have to be 
revised upwards. He failed to take seriously the warnings which had been 
received from the Americans, that they would demand parity in cruiser 
strength. 
1 
Preparatory work for the conference was also undertaken by the 
United States Navy. In the middle of April its General Board produced 
a massive report, decidedly anti-British in tone, which summed up American 
objectives at the conference as the avoidance of entangling alliances, the 
maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine, support for the Open Door policy in 
China, and the acquisition of a navy 'second to none'. It called for a 
strict limit on total tonnage of the three categories of auxiliary ships 
not limited by the Washington treaty - cruisers, destroyers and submarines - 
by the application of the 5: 5: 3 ratio. It rejected proposals to limit 
the number of ships and the maximum displacement of individual ships 
within each category to which the British attached such importance. It 
stated that the United States' main objective was equality with Britain. 
The United States should make its first objective an upper limit for total 
cruiser tonnage of 250,000 to 300,000 tons in the British and American 
fleets. 
2 
The opening statements by the principal delegates to the conference 
on 20 June 1927 heartened many supporters of disarmament. 
3 
Despite the 
fact that British and American objectives were so different, all three 
powers proposed substantial reductions and limitations. 'The scheme put 
forward by the Japanese, who at this time appear genuinely to have 
favoured a further limitation agreement, amounted to a total cessation 
1. CID, 227th meeting, 20 May 1927, CAB 2/5. 
2. J-B. Duroselle: Prom Wilson to Roosevelt. The Foreign Policy of the 
United States, 1913-1945, London, 1964, p. 160 et sea. S. Roskill: 
Naval Policy between the Wars, Vol. lt PP- 501-2. 
3. See, for instance, Philip Noel-Baker's optimistic assessment of the 
conference's prospects in Noel-Baker to Gilbert Murray, 21 June 1927, 
Gilbert Murray Papers. 
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of naval building. ' 
1 
On 28 June, however, Britain's chief naval repres- 
entative, Admiral Sir Frederick Field, 
2 
much to the dismay of the Americans, 
stated Britain's requirement in cruiser strength. With a minimum require- 
ment of seventy cruisers, Britain would be forced to ask for a total ton- 
nage of 600,000 tons unless there was a drastic limitation on the maximum 
displacement of individual ships. 
3 On 5 July Admiral Jones, the United 
States senior naval representative, countered the British proposals by 
demanding that either the other two delegations accepted a total cruiser 
tonnage limitation for Britain and the United States of 400,000 tons and 
granted the United States the right to build twenty-five 10,000 ton 811 
gun cruisers and complete freedom to mount 8" guns on any of her smaller 
cruisers or the United States would break off negotiations. 
4 
Both the 
British and the Americans adopted positions in the cruiser controversy 
which were virtually irreconcilable. 
The American demand for twenty-five 10,000 ton 8" gun cruisers was 
regarded in London as absolutely preposterous. When the American 
ambassaftý in London called on the Foreign Secretary on 8 July 'to prevent 
an impending calamity' by offering to use his personal influence with 
President Coolidge to bring about an agreement, Chamberlain was able to 
point out that Britain had fourteen cruisers of that type, whereas the 
United States had only two. If the United States persisted with her 
claim, Britain would demand the same number. She would then be faced 
with a construction programme which would more than wipe out the -00m. 
anticipated savings which her own proposals would have produced. If the 
1. S. Roskill: Naval Policy between the Wars, Vol. 1, P. 503. 
2. Admiral of the Fleet Sir Frederick Field, 1871-1945,3rd Sea Lord, 
1920-23, Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, 1925-28, C in C Mediterranean 
Fleet, 1928-30p First Sea Lord, 1930-33. Described by Roskill as 'the 
most colourless First Sea Lord' of the period. 
3. DBFP, Series 1A, Vol. III, No. 381. 
4. C-39(27), 6 July 1927, CAB 23/55, Appendix II; Bridgeman to Headlam, 
5 July 1927, Headlam Papers, D/He/41/29. 
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United States was prepared to reduce her demands, Britain would scrap 
some of her fourteen large cruisers not all of which had been completed. 
When Houghton said that small cruisers were useless to the United States 
because she lacked the naval bases Britain possessed and therefore needed 
large cruisers with a greater cruising radius, Chamberlain totally rejected 
his arguments. 
1 
The CID, to whom the Cabinet referred the cruiser issue, were agreed 
that the United States'proposals would lead to a vast expansion in the 
numbers of the most aggressive and expensive cruisers. 
2 
Differences 
arose, however, in the course of their discussions. Churchill thought 
that the government should not be unduly worried if the conference broke 
down. Chamberlain, on the other hand, thought that if the conference 
failed the prospects for a general disarmament conference would be poor. 
The American 'Big Navy' lobby would have a field day and Britain would 
be forced either to undertake a large construction programme or abandon 
the One-Power standard. siaing more with Churchill than with Chamberlain, 
the CID endorsed a statement, drafted by Balfour, which stated that 
Britain had no objection to the 5: 5: 3. ratio, being applied to large 
cruisers but she could not agree to any restriction being imposed on 
her freedom to protect her vital sea communications with whatever number 
of small cruisers she deemed necessary. 
3 
Admiral Jones' 'ultimatum' was tacitly repudiated by his own delega- 
tion and by 14 July the Americans had reduced their claim for large 
cruisers from twenty-five to twelve. 
4 On 9 July the principal delegates 
of the three powers agreed to adopt the advice of their experts and seek 
1. DBPP, Series IA, Vol. III, No. 412. 
2. The British government made a hard and fast distinction between those 
cruisers which they regarded as essentially offensive in character 
because of their speed, displacement and armament, and those smaller 
cruisers whose function was to protect commerce. 
3. CID, 228th meeting, 7 July 1927, CAB Z/5- 
CID, 229th meeting, 14 July 1927, CAB 2/5. 
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a solution not in a rigid limitation of total cruiser tonnage but by the 
publication of construction programmes. 
1 By this means Britain would 
have been able to claim the number she needed without forcing the United 
States, in the name of parity, to build exactly the same number. The 
Americans would have been free to build a larger number of 811 gun cruisers 
each year without overtaking Britain in total tonnage before 1936. This, 
plus a formal admission that the United States was entitled to parity, 
would, it seemed, have satisfied the American delegation. 
2 In London, 
however, the government stuck to the principle that a maximum tonnage 
stipulation should be included in any agreement to publish construction 
programmes for the period up to 1936.3 There was virtually no response 
in London to the conciliatory gestures of the American and Japanese 
delegations at Geneva. 
The Geneva naval conference led to deep divisions within the Cabinet 
and several threats of resignation of which only one, Viscount Cecil's, 
materialised. 
4 The Foreign Secretary unsuccessfully pleaded with the 
Prime Minister to abandon his visit with the Prince of Wales to Canada. 
With Baldwin out of the country, Britain's principal representatives, 
Bridgeman and Cecil, were outvoted and outmanoeuvred in the Cabinet. 
The conference was allowed to break down without any determined effort 
to reach an agreement with the United States. 
The conference failed for two principal reasons. Before the 
1. DBFP, Series IA, Vol. III, No. 416; Bridgeman to Baldwin, 9 and 10 
July 1927, Baldwin Papers, Vol. 150. 
2. DBFP, Series IA, Vol. III, No. 39Z- 
3. Ibid., No. 423. 
4. On 6 August 1927, Chamberlain informed Baldwin that there were four 
resigmations pending. Baldwin Papers, Vol. 115. 
5. In a hand-written letter on the morning of 22 July, Chamberlain 
pleaded with Baldwin to abandon his visit because, he said, the 
Prime Minister was the only person capable of holding the Cabinet 
together. Baldwin Papers, Vol. 130. Lord Eustace Percy has sug- 
gested that Baldwin went ahead with his visit because he attached 
such importance to guiding the Prince of Wales in his apprenticeship for kingship. Some-Memories,, P. 131. 
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conference began there were no preliminary consultations between the three 
powers. As early as 4 July the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, 
Cuthbert Headlam, put much of the blame for the difficulties Britain was 
encountering at Geneva on the Admiralty's failure to engage in preliminary 
parleying with the other two powers. 
1 The Admiralty kept their proposals 
funprecedently secret' and it was only on the Prime Minister's instructions 
that Cecil was shown them in advance of the conference. 
2 No one in Britain 
could have been in any doubt that sooner or later the Americans would 
achieve parity with Britain because they had the money to do so. It 
would have been more politic to admit with a good grace what Britain 
was powerless to prevent. In a letter to Chamberlain on 2 July Cecil 
recalled the advice of an old legal friend, 'Always admit what you know 
the other side can prove. ' It gave a good impression and did you no harm. 
3 
Perhaps if the Geneva conference had been held in the context of a wider 
political understanding between Britain and the United States that con- 
cession would have been made. 
Striking testimony to the influence wielded by Beatty and Hankey 
is afforded by the Cabinet's. volte face, over the question of parity. 
On 29 June Balfour drew his Cabinet colleagues' attention to America's 
determination to accept nothing less than parity in all categories of 
warship. He proposed that they should try to remove all misunderstanding 
by a public announcement stating categorically that Britain was not 
opposed to conceding parity to the United States. No one dissented 
from Balfour's proposal which was backed by the accumulated evidence 
of, several telegrams received in the Foreign Office. At a late stage 
in the Cabinet discussion, reference was made to Beatty's telegram sent 
1. Headlam. Diaries, 4 July 1927. 
2. Undated memorandum by Cecil's private secretary, Nevile Butler, 
FO 800/419. 
3. DBFP, Series IA, Vol. III, No. 392. 
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the previous evening asking the British delegation at Geneva 'not to 
adopt the principle of parity'. It was, therefore, decided not to 
pursue Balfour's proposal. 
1 
After the meeting Hankey put the Admiralty's point of view to 
Baldwin who had supported Balfour's original proposals. Later that day 
he expanded these arguments in letters to Baldwin and Balfour, which 
were markedly anti-American in tone. 
2 Between 29 June and 3 July Beatty 
and Hankey persuaded the Cabinet to abandon all thought of conceding 
parity to the United States. When they met on 4 July Beatty's advice 
was adopted almost in its entire'ty. 
3 
The opponents of parity were convinced that it spelt inferiority 
for Britain and superiority for the United States. It could not be 
conceded without damaging Britain's status as a world power. Like the 
Prench they believed that in most circumstances equality of armaments 
meant inequality of security. Whereas Prance resisted Germany's claim 
to equality of armaments because her superior war potential would con- 
vert that equality into military superiority, the British opponents of 
parity argued that because of Britain's economic vulnerability and 
exposed sea communications with her Empire, she needed a superiority in 
certain categories of warship. 
Anti-American sentiment also played a part. Baldwin, Balfour and 
Churchill had first-hand experience of those Anglo-American negotiations 
over war debts which had done so much to sour relations between the two 
countries. Baldwin disliked the Americans because they had replaced 
Britain as the chief creditor nation in the world and were threatening 
to replace her as the greatest naval power. The anti-British tone of 
1. C-37(27), 29 June 1927, CAB 23/55; DBFP, Series IA, Vol. III, 
Nos. 378 and 383. 
2. Hankey to Baldwin, 29 June 1927, Baldwin Papers, Vol. 130. 
3. C-38(27), 4 July 1927, CAB 23/55. 
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much of America's Press heightened those feelings and added to the diffi- 
culties of the negotiators at Geneva. 
The United States government was motivated by considerations of 
prestige and not by any desire to outbuild Britain. In 1928 a United 
States official informed a member of the Foreign Office that if Britain 
conceded parity the United States would not build up to actual equality 
of strength with Britain. He also asserted that Hugh Gibson, the United 
States's chief representative at the Geneva naval conference, had assured 
Bridgeman that in no circumstances would the United States build more 
10,000 ton 811 cruisers than Britain possessed. 
1 
The Admiralty failed to understand the motivation of American policy 
and never gave an adequate Justification for their doctrine of 'absolute 
requirements'. They did not explain why, if in 1921 they considered 
fifty cruisers adequate for the protection of the Empire's trade routes, 
2 
they needed seventy in 1927. Furthermore their insistence on a 611 gun 
limitation for small cruisers seems in the light of the experience of 
the Second World War to have been unnecessary. 
3 
The conference had been called, without consulting the League, to 
break the deadlock in the Preparatory Commission but it did nothing to 
smooth its efforts to achieve disarmament. The conference ignored the 
experience which the League had accumulated over the previous six years 
and did not avail itself of the services of the League Secretariat. By 
holding their deliberations in secret and allowing garbled versions to 
1. DBFP, Series IA, Vol. V, No. 492. 
2. CID, 152nd meeting, 1 December 1921, CAB 2/3. 'They concur with the 
suggestion of the First Sea Lora that the total number of cruisers 
for all purposes should be fixed tentatively at fifty. ' 
3. The United States naval authorities questioned the massive superiority 
of 8" gun cruisers over 611 gun cruisers which the Admiralty put at 
21 : 1. Twelve years later in December 1939 it was the 611 gun 
cruisers Alax and Achilles which rounded on the German pocket battle- 
ship Graf SDee after the 8" gan cruiser Exeter had been put out of 
action. 
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be leaked to the Press, the negotiators deprived themselves of the support 
of public opinion. War between the United States and Britain was regarded 
in both countries as unthinkable. There was strong support for disarmament 
in both the United States and Britain. If the conference had been held in 
public it is unlikely that informed opinion would have allowed the vast 
store of latent goodwill in the United States and Britain to waste away 
without a bold attempt being made to save the conference from disaster. 
No such attempt was made. Minor concessions by the British government 
would in all probability have produced an agreement. 
The conference's failure was the occasion, if not the pretext, for 
Cecil's resignation from the Baldwin Cabinet. In a letter to the Prime 
Minister on 9 August he claimed that there had been no disagreement in 
the delegation itself and that he had worked with Bridgeman and Field 
with one common purpose to reach an agreement. His differences were 
with a majority in the Cabinet who were not prepared to give disarmament 
the priority he felt it deserved. During the third session of the 
Preparatory Commission, he said, he had been obliged to uphold proposi- 
tions which were difficult to reconcile with a serious desire for disarma- 
ment and during the Cabinet discussions on the Geneva conference which he 
had attended between 21 and 26 July a number of his colleagues, including 
Churchill, had opposed any compromise which would have resulted in agree- 
ment. He, therefore, believed that there was no prospect of successful 
negotiations for the further limitation of armaments during the life-time 
of the Baldwin government. 
1 
Cecil's resignation was welcomed by Baldwin 
2 
and came as something 
1. Cecil to Baldwin, 9 August 1927, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51080. 
2. CAB 21/297 contains papers collected by Hankey on Baldwin's instructions 
which confirm Cecil's own contention that Baldwin did little to dissuade 
him from resigning. Chamberlain did make considerable efforts to pre- 
vent Cecil from resigning but during the previous three years there 
had been a number of disagreements over League rather than disarmament 
policy and on one previous occasion in 1926 Cecil had threatened 
resignation because of his differences with Chamberlain. 
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of a relief to the Foreign Secretary who had always found Cecil a prickly 
colleague. Whether Cecil was wise to resign is open to question. Within 
the Cabinet there was a small group of Ministers who genuinely wanted dis- 
armament. Cecil's resignation weakened their influence. 
The failure of the Geneva naval conference and Cecil's resignation 
from the Baldwin government highlight the basic weaknesses of British 
disarmament policy in the first decade of peace. A measure of success 
had been achieved at the Washington conference because public opinion in 
Britain, the United States and Japan was strongly in favour of disarmament 
and the three governments had the political will to achieve results. In 
1927 neither the Baldwin nor the Coolidge administrationý was sufficiently 
determined to reach an agreement to make one at all likely. In both 
countries influential opinion was divided. Only a small minority of opinion 
formers in Britain, the Observer, Philip Kerr and some others, regarded 
good relations with the United States as a first priority of British 
foreign policy. One consequence of the Baldwin government's preoccupation 
with such questions as British interests in-China, Egypt and the Middle 
East was its failure to appreciate the intimate connection between good 
Anglo-American relations and the progress of European pacification and 
disarmament. The most serious criticism which can be levelled at the 
second Baldwin government's foreign policy was its failure to come to 
terms with the United States. The 1923 war debt settlement laid the 
foundations for a comprehensive settlement of the outstanding differences 
between the two countries but the Baldwin government failed to seize the 
initiative or to capitalise on its assets. Anti-American sentiment so 
distorted its vision that vital opportunities were thrown away. 
1 
T. Jones: Whitehall Dia", Vol. II, PP. 131 and 177 for Baldwin's anti- 
American sentiments. For Chamberlain's distaste for America see his 
correspondence with Hilda and Ida Chamberlain, 19 June 1926,16 June (July) and 17 December 1927, Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC 5/l/386,420 
and 441. See also Chamberlain to Hugh F. Spender of the Christian 
Science Monitor, 10 January 1927: '1 am not myself in any hurry to see 
the United States join the League ... we might easily find that the only 
result of American participation was a deadlock in all critical questions., Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC 54/453. 
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Chamberlain only made half-hearted attempts to secure American co-operation 
in China. 1 Though there were faults on both sides of the Atlantic it was 
Britain which stood to gain most from good relations between the two 
countries. The failure of the Geneva conference was to a large extent 
symptomatic of the low priority accorded good Anglo-American relations 
by the Baldwin gover=ent. 
1927 brought little encouragement to the supporters of disarmament. 
At the close of the year the British naval attachg in Rome summed up the 
cynical reaction of many Italians to the Geneva naval conference and put 
his finger on the weakness in Britain's position with the comment: 'A 
very generally expressed view is that disarmament conferences are not 
inspired by genuine altruistic motives but are the insidious designs of 
those nations who possess as much of the world as they can want in order 
to hold their possessions with the least possible outlay on naval insurance. ' 
2 
The same point was shrewdly put by the Head of the Disarmament Section in 
the League Secretariat, Salvador de Madariaga: 
3 , We know that a disarma- 
ment conference-in the present state of development of the World Community 
is bound to turn out as an armaments conference. j4 In the first half of. 
1928 many members of Baldwin's government did not conceal their disenchant- 
ment with disarmament. 
5 
None the less Chamberlain and others in the Foreign Office came to 
recognise that an improvement in Anglo-American relations was a first 
priority of British foreign policy and that without concessions to the 
American point of view over naval armaments no improvement was possible. 
1. Lord Eustace Percy: Some Memories, pp. 140-1. 
2. DBFP, Series lk,, Vol. rV, Enclosure in No. 87. 
3. Salvador de Madariaga resigned as Read of the Disarmament Section 
at the end of 1927. 
4. S. de Madariaga: Disarmament, London, 1929, p. 89. - 
5. See, for instance, Lord Cushenduals remarks at Geneva and in Lincoln 
in March and April 1928, The Times, 24 March 1928, and the Manchest 
Guardian, 21 April 1928. 
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Sir Esme Howard, the British ambassador in Washington, told the Foreign 
Secretary that if Britain abandoned Belligerent Rights the major bone of 
contention between the two countries would disappear. During the Geneva 
conference Britain's naval representatives had been so preoccupied, 
arguing the case for cruisers to protect Britain's food supplies, that 
they had ignored American fears about the offensive role small cruisers 
might play in the enforcement of a blockade. 
1 
In a Cabinet memorandum 
in October 1927 Chamberlain tried unsuccessfully to persuade his 
colleagues to abandon Belligerent Rights which had never been recognised 
in international law. 2 Britain, he saidt could no longer ignore the rise 
of American financial and naval power. She would not be able to enforce 
a blockade against the interests of the United States in any future con- 
flict. 3 Chamberlain's memorandum stung Hankey? a passionate defender of 
Belligerent Rights, into action. Enlisting Balfour's support and canvass- 
ing his opinions widely, he made it virtually impossible for Chamberlain, 
though his views were shared by such influential members of the Cabinet 
as Churchill, to succeed. 
4 
When the Cabinet set up a committee to consider 
the question, Chamberlain's supporters were in a minority. The committee's 
deliberations were to continue to almost the end of Baldwin's second 
DBFP, Series IA, Vol. III, Nos. 503 and 504, Vol. IV, Nos. 209 and 215. 
It was'Britain's enforcement of Belligerent Rights between 1914 and 
1917 which most antagonised the Wilson administration and led to the 
decision in 1916 to build 'a navy second to none'. In his Fourteen 
Points speech in January 1918 Wilson stressed the doctrine of Freedom 
of the Seas and the rights of neutrals to trade with belligerents in 
time of war. - 
2. Britain's insistence on Belligerent Rights had given offence to the 
United-States and many neutral nations in the First World War. 
Britain claimed the right to intercept and detain neutral merchant 
ships and confiscate their cargoes if it could be shown that they 
were destined for an enemy country. Britain's position over 
Belligerent Rights remained unchanged until the outbreak of war in 
1939. 
3. CP 258(27), 26 October 1927, CAB 24/189; DBFP, Series IA, Vol. IV, No. 219. 
4. S. Roskill: Hankev. Man of Secrets, Vol. II, PP. 451-9; S. Roskill: 
Churchill and the dmirals, P. 80; CP 286(27)t 31 October/14 November 
1927, CAB 24/189. ' 
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administration. Belligerent Rights were not abandoned and when MacDonald 
replaced Baldwin, Hankey succeeded in persuading him to have a reference 
to them struck out of the joint communique' issued after his Rapidan talks 
with PresidentIffoover in October 1929* 
1 
As a direct consequence of the deterioration in Anglo-American 
relations and to overcome the deadlock in the League's Preparatory 
Commission, the Baldwin government was led in 1928 to consider some kind 
of compromise over naval armaments with the French government. The 
Anglo-French compromise of July 1928 was a vain attempt to bid for French 
support in the forthcoming world disarmament conference. 
2 
Behind the scenes Philip Kerr and a number of others worked privately 
to improve Anglo-American relations and to lay the foundations for an 
agreement over naval armaments. Seeking to exploit public interest in 
the Kellogg-Briand peace pact proposals Kerr sought to persuade Bridgeman, 
Chamberlain, Cushendun. and such influential members of the Foreign Office 
as R. L. Craigie and Sir Ronald Lindsay that a few minor concessions and 
political gestures would pave the way for an all-embracing agreement 
between the two countries in which naval disarmament would form the most 
important component. 
3 
At the same time he tried to persuade Kellogg, 
Hoover, the American ambaseador, in London and others that there were no 
serious differences dividing the two countries. 
4 Interpreting the 
1. C-57(27), 23 November 1927, CAB 23/55; Dalton Diaries, 25 October 1929; 
Hankey Diariest 15 November 1929; DBFP, Series TL, Vol. VI, NO. 444; 
D. Marquand: Ramsay MacDonald, London* 1977, P. 507; S. Roakill: 
Hankey. Man of Secreta, Vol. II, pp. 491-6. 
2. See PP. 312-17. 
3. Kerr to Bridgeman, 29 March 1928; Kerr U Austen Chamberlain, 
24 January 1928; Kerr to Cushendun, 16 August, 22 and 28 November 
1928; Kerr-to, Craigie, ý9 January 1929; Kerr to Lindsay, 18 December 
1928; Lothian Papers, GD 40/17/226, GD 40/17/2279 GD 46/17/2391 
GD 46/17/240, GD 40/i7/239 and GD 40/17/242. 
4. Kerr to Kellogg# 30 March 1928; Kerr to Hoover, n. d. (1928); Kerr 
to Houghtons 24 May 1928, Lothian Papers, GD 46/17/228, GD 40/17/88, 
and GD 40/17/228. 
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American point of view to the British government and British interests to 
the Americans Kerr contributed to the improvement in relationships between 
the two countries which occurred in 1929 but during the life-time of the 
Baldwin government his efforts and those of others like Js L. Garvin of 
the Observer were of no avail. Aware that the price of an agreement was 
naval parity, the government resisted his proposals. In December 1927 
Bridgeman informed him: 'The only agreement we could have got them to 
sign would have been one which either gave away our security or one which 
would have led to an increase in armaments amongst all naval powers' 
1 
and 
less than a year later Cushendun commented: 'I do not believe that we can 
make any agreement with the Americans in regard to the limitation of 
cruisers for they are so ignorant and so susp, cious. 12 Throughout 1928 
the Admiralty's counsels prevailed. 
During 1928, the American presidential election campaign provided 
a ready excuse for not entering into negotiations with the United States 
government. Between Chamberlain's return to the Foreign Office in ý 
December 1928 3 and the fall of the Baldwin government in June 1929, a 
few steps were taken to heal the wounds the Geneva naval conference and 
the Anglo-French compromise had inflicted on relations between the two 
countries but most of the initiatives came not from the British govern- 
ment but from the outgoing Coolidge administration and its successor. 
There was no strong, common desire within the Baldwin Cabinet to 
reach an agreement with the United States. Whilev on the one hand, 
1. Bridgeman to Kerr, 23 December 1927, Lothian Papers, GD 40/17/87- 
2. Cushendun to Kerr, 27 November 1928, Lothian Papers, GD 40/17/240- 
3. Chamberlain had been taken ill in July 1928 and had spent part of 
his convalescence in California. For the place Anglo-American 
relations assumed in his thoughts after his return to the Foreign 
Office, see Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 8 and 26 December 1928, 
and Chamberlain to Locker-Lampson, 12 February 1929: 'Our relations 
with America are now most urgent. They have occupied a very large 
part of my time and thought since my return. ' Austen Chamberlain 
Papers, AC 5/l/462 and 464, AC 55/303. 
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Chamberlain, Cushendun and the Foreign Office drew attention to the 
'widespread misgivings' in the country and their possible repercussions 
on the Conservative party's electoral fortunes If a bold attempt was not 
made to improve Anglo-American relations, 
1 Churchill prophesied that if 
concessions were made to the Americans which went against the strong 
feelings of rank-and-file Conservative opinion there would be a revolt 
in the constituencies of such a magnitude that the government would be 
overthrown. 
2 Bridgeman criticised the apologetic tone adopted by the 
Foreign Office and the assumption that it was Britain's duty to make 
concessions. 
3 
Neither Churchill nor Bridgeman, was prepared to recognise 
the changed balance of power between Britain and the United States. They 
were not alone. The evidence suggests that the Baldwin government would 
not have been prepared to make the necessary concessions had it been 
returned to power in May 1929. More than the conciliatory gesture of 
a f-17im. reduction in the naval estimates, announced by Bridgeman. in the 
Commons in March 1929, was required before an agreement could be reached. 
The second Labour government came to power in 1929 with a firm 
commitment to pursue disarmament and reach an agreement with the United 
States. The protracted negotiations between the British prime minister 
and the new American ambassador in London, General Charles Dawes, 
demonstrated that more than conciliatory gestures and public declarations 
of intent were necessary before an agreement was reached. It was 
MacDonald's singular achievement to carry the Admiralty with him in a 
major change of policy. Parity was conceded and Britain's 'absolute' 
reqtireipent in cruisers was scaled down from seventy to fifty. In 
1. DBFP, Series IA, Vol. V, No. 490. 
2. Ibid., No. 497. 
3. Bridgeman to Baldwin, 23 December 1928, Baldwin Papers, Vol. 163. 
See also Bridgeman's correspondence with Chamberlain between 
16 January and 13 May 1929 for the Admiralty' s intransigence and 
inconsistency. Austen Chamberlain Papers AC 55/47t 49,50,51 and 53- 
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February 1924 the first Labour government had implemented its predecessor's 
cruiser construction proposals and had done nothing to modify the 1923 air 
expansion scheme. MacDonald's second Labour government was not deterred 
by fears of an adverse political reaction to its radical initiatives. 
Such was MacDonald's own personal standing and the support in the country 
for an agreement that the only opposition came from Churchill in the 
Commons and Beatty and Stanhope in the Lords. 
1 
Unemployment had been a major issue in the 1929 general election 
campaign but on 10 July the new government decided to abandon work on 
two cruisers and a submarine depot ship then under construction and to 
cancel contracts for two additions to Britain's submarine fleet. Though 
the government tried to mitigate the effects of its action on dockyard 
employment by proposing the suspension of overtime working and the 
absorption of displaced labour into other occupations, the decision 
required considerable political courage* 
2 
The 1930 London Naval Disarmament Conference 
In the autumn of 1929 the current of opinion was flowing strongly 
in favour of disarmament. 
3 When Henderson appealed to the delegates at 
the Brighton conference of the Labour party to take up the crusade for 
4 disarmament, he received a prolonged, standing ovation. In both the 
British and American press MacDonald was hailed as a peacemaker. When 
the third major naval disarmament conference of the inter-war years was 
held in 1930, it was held not in Washington or Geneva but in London. 
1. S. Roskill: Hankey, Man of Secrets, Vol. II, P- 511; 75 HL Debs. 
i 
5th Series, cols. 1467-1488,18 December 1929. 
2. C. 24(29)9 10 July 1929, and C-30(29), 24 July 1929, CAB 23/61. 
3. On 29 June 1929 J. L. Garvin, the editor of the Observer, wrote 
to Lloyd George: 'Our big national majority is out and out with 
Hoover... for drastic reductions of navies. ' Lloyd George Papers, 
G/8/5/19- 
4. Labour Party: Report of the 29th Annual Conference,, London, n. d., 
p. 210; Dalton Diaries, 27 September -4 October 1929. 
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Such was MacDonald's own standing and the popular support for his 
government in 1929 
1 that he was able to impose his will on the Admiralty 
and conduct the negotiations with only a perfunctory reference to his 
Cabinet colleagues. A. V. Alexander, the First Lord of the Admiralty, 
was very much a junior and subordinate partner. Arthur Henderson, the 
Foreign Secretary, was virtually excluded from playing any part at all. 
The only serious criticism of his strategy came from Lord Cecil and 
Lloyd George. Both men saw the dangers of reaching an agreement over 
naval armaments before the Preparatory Commission had devised adequate 
plans for the limitation of land and air armaments. Cecil begged 
MacDonald to postpone the proposed Five Power Naval Conference until 
such time as the Preparatory Commission had completed its work. 
2 
In the closing months of 1929 the government had a choice between 
two alternative strategies. Whereas Cecil and Lloyd George believed 
that an immense effort should be made to impose some limit on the growth 
of European land and air armaments, the Labour government, and no doubt 
most of the country, thought that Britain's immediate objective was an 
agreement with the United States which would lead to a substantial 
measure of naval disarmament. Few shared Cecil's preoccupation with 
the European situation. The government believed that Britain could best 
serve the cause of general disarmament by securing large reductions in 
the fleets of the principal naval powers. On 10 August Noel-Baker wrote 
1. See, for example, J. L. Garvin to Lloyd George, 29 June 1929: '1 feel 
quite certain that Labour if given prematurely any kind of colourable 
excuse would triumph at the polls. They have wonderful cards if they 
know how to play. First a big hand in international politics# then 
an equally bi hand in "employment and empire" politics. ' Lloyd George 
Papers, G/8/5M. Both Lloyd George and Cuthbert Headlam predicted 
in September and October 1929 that if MacDonald dissolved Parliament 
he would win a good majority. Pee Headlam Diaries, 4 September 1929 
and Lloyd George to Churchill, 16 October 1929, Lloyd George Papers, 
G/4/4/24. 
2. Cecil to MacDonald, 4 and 7 August, 29 November 1929, Cecil Papers, 
. 
BL Add. Mee. 51081 and PRO 30/69/5/40; Lloyd George's speech to the 
Liberal Party Conference, 4 October 1929, Liberal Publications Depart- 
ment: Selection of Pamphlets and Leaflets. 1929, London, n. d., PP-35-43. 
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to Hugh Daltonp the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign 
Office, suggesting that once agreement had been reached with the Americans 
over cruisers, Britain should press for reductions in the battle fleets of 
the two powers. Four times as much could be saved by scrapping a battle- 
ship as could be saved by scrapping a cruiser and it was known that 
Hoover wanted to make cuts in the numbers of battleships. 
I In his book 
Disarmament published in 1926 Noel-Baker had argued that. the_. advent. of 
air power spelt the doom of capital ships. There was a strong case for 
reducing the ma imum size of warships to the lOpOOO ton 10" gun limita- 
tion imposed on Germany in the Versailles treaty and for extending the 
Washington treaty naval holiday in capital ship construction well beyond 
1931.2 
Noel-Baker was not alone in holding such views. In November Admiral 
Sir Herbert Richmond3 published two articles in The Times 
4 
advocating 
smaller battleships on the grounds that navies were for defence and all 
that was required by the great naval powers were ships capable of 
successfully challenging merchantmen armed with 6" guns, the maximum 
armament, in the experts' view, any merchant ship could carry. In the 
middle of December five admirals came together to draft a manifesto 
1. Noel-Baker to Dalton, 10 August 1929, (copy), Cecil Papers, BL Add. 
Mas. 51107. 
2. P. J. Noel-Baker: Disarmament, pp. 198,203-4# 207,211-12. 
3. Admiral Sir Herbert W. Richmond, 1871-1946, Captain of EMS Dreadnought, 
1908-10, Assistant Director of the Operations Division of the Admiralty 
War Staff, 1912, Director of the Training and Staff Duties Division, 
1918, C. in C. East Indies Station, 1923, Commandant of the Imperial 
Defence College, 1927. Richmond fell foul of the Sea Lords at the end 
of the war and was dismissed from the Naval Staff. Beatty, though he 
opposed the views which Richmond put before the Bonar Law Committee 
in 1921, had a high opinionýof--him. It was Richmond's proposals for 
the reorganisation of the NavalStaff which were adopted by the 
Admiralty. As a writer on naval affairs in the inter-war years he 
was highly regarded-and as a close relative of Sir Charles Trevelyan, 
President of the Board of Education in the two Labour governments of 
the-period,, he had an entree into the inner counsels of MacDonald's 
Cabinet. 
4.21 and 22 November 1929. 
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advocating the abolition of battleships but at the last moment had second 
thoughts about publication. 
1 
Others too spoke out in favour of abolition 
or a drastic reduction in the maximum size of capital ships. Lord Tyrrell, 
Britain's ambassador in Paris and former Permanent Under-Secretary at the 
Foreign Office, advocated abolition on the grounds that it would create 
an excellent impression in Europe and might even force the French to 
modify their position over submarines. 
2 Shortly before the London confer- 
ence opened in January 1930 The Times came out with an editorial advocating 
a large reduction in the maximum size of battleships. 
3 
Battleships had a symbolic significance both for the Admiralty and 
the protagonists of disarmament. Looking back on the inter-war years, 
Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, the military writer, commented that the naval 
authorities'of the time cherished battle fleets with a religious fervour. 
A battleship was to an admiral what a cathedral was to a bishop. 
4 Though 
the Admiralty favoured a reduction in the maximum size and armament of 
battleships they still regarded them as the ultimate measure of a navy's 
fighting strength. They also know that their American counterparts would 
not contemplate any lowering in the maximum limits set by the Washington 
treaty. The champions of disarmament, for their part, believed that 
nothing would do more to dethrone the Admiralty from their pinnacle of 
power than the abolition of battleships. 
5 
1. They were Admirals Richmond, Webb, Kerr, Allen and Drury-Love. 
See Dalton Diaries, 18 December 1929. 
2. Dalton Diaries, 10 Janilary 1930. 
3.12 January 1930. 
4. B. H. Liddell Hart: Memoirs, Vol. 1, London, 1965, pp. 325-6. 
5. Even outside the ranks of the disarmers there was much resentment 
over the power and influence wielded by the Sea Lords. Lord Tyrrell 
told Hugh Dalton that until their bluff was called and they were 
allowed to resign, as it was anticipated they would rather than 
agree to the abolition of battleships, the politicians would never 
be on top. k different view was held by R. L. Craigie of the Foreign 
Office's North American Department. A mass resignation would rally 
public support behind the navy and jeopardise disarmament. Dalton 
Diaries, 21 January 1930 and 30 December 1929. 
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In the two or three months before the opening of the London conference, 
Cecil, Dalton, Noel-Baker, Philip Snowden, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
and Sir Charles Trevelyan, the President of the Board of Education, worked 
behind the scenes for a drastic reduction in the size and number of 
battleships. They also argued that if Britain secured the abolition of 
the battleship at the London conference it would greatly strengthen her 
position at the world disarmament conference in putting the case for 
abolishing submarines. When, however, the Cabinet committee charged with 
preparing Britain's case for the London conference met on 13 December 1929 
their arguments were successfully resisted by the First Sea Lord, Admiral 
Sir Charles Madden. It was not possible, he said, to build battleships 
of less than 23,000 to 25,000 tons if they were to have the necessary 
5" to 6" armoured deck and underwater protection to resist bombs, plunging 
shells, torpedoes and mines. If battleships were abolishedt Britain 
would still need a main fleet to defend her trade-protection vessels. 
He dismissed the arguments of those who saw some connection between 
battleships and submarines and informed the committee that there was no 
likelihood of the United States agreeing to abolition. 
I Though Henderson 
lent his support to those seeking a drastic reduction in the battle fleets 
of the world both MacDonald and Alexander rallied to the Admiralty's 
defence. 2 However, on 14 January 2930 MacDonald and the vast majority 
of the Cabinet were von over by the abolitionist case. It was a 
memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Snowden, then absent from 
London at the Hague conference on reparations which seems to have produced 
a volts face in MacDonald's attitude. Attacking the Admiralty's construc- 
tion proposals, Snowden argued that the Prime Minister's visit to the 
United States in the previous October had aroused great expectations 
LNC(29)4,13 December 1929, and memorandum by Madden, 20 December 1929P 
CAB 29/117. 
2. LNC(29)5,9 January 1930, CAB 29/117. 
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and that there would be a terrible reaction when the public realised that 
Britain's proposals for the conference meant an increase in the estimates. 
The Liberals would raise a public outcry and there would be open rebellion 
on the Labour benches. Both the future of disarmament and the good faith 
of the Labour government were at stake. Though he would have liked to 
propose the abolition of battleships, which he regarded as useless adorn- 
ments, he would be content if Britain reduced her battle fleet from twenty 
to fourteen. I 
Ignoring the Admiralty's advice, the Cabinet reached the conclusion 
that the battleship was 'essentially and solely a ship of war' and that 
as political security in the world improved it must tend to disappear. 
They recommended that an attempt should be made at the conference to 
postpone all replacements until after 1935 so that the powers might, in 
the meantime, consider whether battleships could be abolished. 
2 Shortly 
after the opening of the conference the government published a White 
Paper 3 setting out its proposals for reducing the maximum tonnage and 
armament of capital ships and lengthening their replacement life. It 
declared: 'In the opinion of His Majesty's Government in the United 
Kingdom the battleship, in view of its tremendous size and cost, is 
of doubtful utility and the Government would wish to see an agreement 
by which the battleship would in due time disappear altogether from the 
fleets of the world. ' 
The Cabinet's conversion was probably due to other factors besides 
Snowden's memorandum. The encouragement of the Press, particularly 
The Times, and a petition signed by seventy-seven Labour MPs no doubt 
I. C-100), 14 January 1930 (Appendix), CAB 23/63. 
2. C-100), 14 January 1930P CAB 23/63. The Cabinet also concluded that 
fifty cruisers would be amply adequate to meet Britain's needs despite 
the belated second thoughts of some members of the Admiralty. Britain 
should be content with 15MOO tons of destroyer tonnage, 50,000 tons 
lower than the Admiralty had been advocating. 
3. Cmd. 3485,1930. 
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played a part. 
1 On the day after the Cabinet meeting MacDonald wrote 
in his diary: 'Our pronouncement must be... clearly In favour of reduction 
and the battleship gives us our chance. The world must Imow what we want 
and then we must strive to reach compromise bargains as good as we can get. ' 
2 
From the outset it was clear that the Americans would not accept 
Britain's capital ship proposals but it was agreed to extend the 
Washington naval holiday to 1936. Eventually the conference decided that 
Britain should scrap five capital ships, the United States three, and 
Japan one in accordance with the 5: 5: 3 ratio decided at Washington 
in 1922. Britain's other proposals met with little success. No reduction 
was made in the marimum displacement and armament of aircraft carriers 
nor was their replacement life lengthened as the Admiralty had proposed. 
A similar fate befell Britain's submarine proposals though a shift in 
American and Italian naval opinion enabled some slight progress to be 
made. All five powers agreed to limit the maximum displacement and 
armament of submarines and once again pledged themselves to abide by the 
accepted rules governing their conduct in time of war. Britain, the 
United States and Japan accepted parity in submarine strength and a 
strict limitation of their total cruiser and destroyer tonnage on a 
10 : 10 :7 ratio. France and Italy refused to accept any limitation 
of their total cruiser, destroyer and submarine strength until they had 
resolved the differences which divided them. 
3 
France's demands for additional guarantees of her security and 
Italy's unrealistic claims to parity with France made the conclusion 
of a meaningful five power treaty impossible. France's behaviour at 
the London conference and in the Committee of Eleven then meeting in 
1. Dalton Diaries, 20 January 1930. 
2. MacDonald Diaries, 15 JanuarY 1930, rRO 30/69/8/1. 
3. Accounts of the London naval conference are to be found in S. Roskill: 
NaviLl Polie-v between the Wars, Vol. II, and A. J. Toynbee; Surye-y of 
International Affairs. 
__1930. 
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Geneva 1 revived the Francophobia of the Labour Cabinet. MacDonald's 
government responded to French intransigence by pursuing a pro-Italian 
policy. 
2 Britain safeguarded her position in European waters by insist- 
ing on an escalator clause should France or Italy at some future date 
pose a challenge to her naval power. The London naval treaty of 
22 April 1930 was, for all intents and purposes, a three power agreement 
between the United States, Britain and Japan. The London naval conference 
had not improved the prospects for the final session of the League's 
Preparatory Commission. 
The London naval conference revealed the weakness of Britain's 
negotiating position. A Labour government fully committed to disarmament 
was neither able to persuade the United Statesýto change its attitude 
towards battleships nor bring pressure to bear upon the rrench govern- 
ment to accept an equitable settlement without giving Francs guarantees 
I 
of a kind which no British government of the inter-war years was prepared 
to concede. The most significant and beneficent result, the settlement 
of the cruiser controversy which had bedevilled Anglo-American relations 
for three years, owed more to the negotiations which preceded the confer- 
ence than to the conference itself. Though no decision was taken to 
abolish battleships and the Washington limits 
3 
remained in force# the 
extension of the naval holiday in capital ship construction to 1936 made 
it virtually certain that never again would the world witness the costly 
competition in capital ships of the decade before the First World War. 
Whether the London treaty, which only lasted five years, had any other 
beneficial results is open to question. Internal developments in Japan - 
the assassination of its chief protagonistt the prime minister Hamaguchi, 
1. See P. 271. 
2. MacDonald Diaries, 20 March 1930, PRO 30/69/8/1; DBFP, Second Series, 
Vol. 1, Nos. 158 and 160, Note 1. 
3. The Washington treaty made 35POOO tons and 16" guns their maximum displacement and armament. 
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the resignation of the Chief of Naval Staff, and the growing rift between 
the civilian government and its military and naval advisers - deprived it 
of any lasting influence on relations between Japan and the Anglo-Saxon 
powers. 
The 1930 London naval treaty was strongly criticised by the 
Conservative Opposition 
1 
and caused considerable uneasiness within the 
government's own ranks. 
2 Alexander was obliged to defend it as enhancing 
Britain's relative naval strength. He reminded the Conservative Opposition 
that in certain respects Britain was in a stronger position than she had 
been under the second Baldwin government because the United States and 
Japan had both accepted limits to the expansion of their auxiliary fleets. 
3 
Whereas in July 1929 the government had decided to curtail the construction 
programme in May and June 1930 it took decisions to lay down three cruisers, 
nine destroyers and a number of smaller craft. 
4 
It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of the London 
naval conference in the history of British disarmament policy. There 
can be no doubt that in the first nine months of the second Labour 
administration disarmament was a major objective of government policy. 
MacDonald and his Ministers used great resourcefulness in the pursuit of 
disarmament but by March 1930 their passion was spent. MacDonald was 
never again to give such single-minded devotion to the cause of disarma- 
ment. The conference led MacDonald to believe that Britain's dedication 
to the cause of peace and disarmament had been interpreted by other powers 
1. See, for example, the debates in the House of Commons on 15 May and 
2 June, 238 IIC'Debs. 5th Series, cols. 2098-2114 and 239 HC Debs. 
5th Series, Col. 1791. 
2. See Dalton Diaries, 13 April 1930 and Beatrice Webb Diaries, 
20 August 1930. 
3.238 HC Debs. 5th Series, cola. 2197-8,15 May 1930 and Alexander's 
notes for the government's reply to Lord Bridgeman in the House of 
Lords in Alexander Papers, AVAR 5/2, /9 and 10. 
4. FS(29)9 and 11,13 May and 3 June 1930, CAB 27/407; C-31(30)p 4 June 
1930, CAB 23/64. 
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as a sign of weakness. 
1 The abour government was determined to show 
other powers-that Britain was capable of building up to the limits set 
by the treaty. 2 
When Snowden informed the Cabinet on 14 January 1931 that with rising 
unemployment there was a danger that goverment expenditure would outran 
revenue there was no support for proposals to reduce the 1931 naval con- 
struction programme. Both the Prime Minister and the First Lord of the 
Admiralty told their colleagues that any further reductions would be a 
breach of faith. The Sea Lords had only agreed to the lower limit of 
fifty cruisers on the understanding that no further reductions would be 
made. Furthermore, unless Britain built up to the limits of the London 
treaty Britain could not expect to retain her prestige, even with Italy. 
If the government failed to appropriate funds for naval construction 
Britain would be deprived of bargaining power at the forthcoming world 
disarmament conference. 
3 
In the autumn of 1929 Cecil had contended that naval reductions by 
themselves would do little to secure peace and that a relatively weak 
British army had to be balanced by a relatively strong British navy if 
an unduly large share of international authority was not to pass to the 
continental land powers. 
4 Though it would be argued that the London 
1. MacDonald to Cecil, 13 August 1930, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51081; 
Dalton Diaries, 21 August 1930. The remarks which MacDonald made to 
Cecil in his letter on 13 August 1930 bear a remarkable similarity to 
those expressed by Hankey when staying with the Webbs on 25 February 
1930. MacDonald paid a gloving tribute to Hankey publicly and 
privately at the end of the London conference and there is some 
evidence to suggest that Hankey's views made a considerable impression 
on the Prime Minister. Both Cecil and Dalton suspected Hankey of 
having great influence on MacDonald at this time. See Dalton Diaries, 
21 March 1930 and Cecil to Noel-Baker, 9 May 1930, Cecil Papers, 
BL Add. Mss. 51107. 
2. As late as the winter of 1931 the government was taking this attitude. 
See, for example, PS(29)14,26 January 1931, CAB 27/407. 
3. C. 6(31)t 14 January and C-11(31), 4 February 1931, CAB 23/66; 
FS(29)14,26 January 1931, CAB 21/407. 
4. Cecil to MacDonald, 4 and 7 August, 17 December 1929, Cecil Papers, 
BL Add. Mss. 51081. 
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naval conference paved the way for the successful completion of the 
Preparatory Commission's work later in the year, there is some force 
in the contention that it was not so much the conference but the 
negotiations between MacDonald and Davos in the summer and autumn of 
1929 which removed the main stumbling block. The predilection of 
successive British governments for the Washington precedent led them 
to exaggerate the significance of limitation agreements between the 
principal naval powers. Though the Washington and London treaties 
reduced the burden which fell on taxpayers in Britain, the United States 
and Japan and smoothed relations between the three powers for a limited 
period, they did little to promote general disarmament. 
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CHMER SIX I 
DISARMAMENT AND EUROPEAN SECURITT 
Introdue ion 
The Paris peace conference did not usher in the reign of peace as 
many in Britain had hoped. There was no agreed limitation of armaments 
nor was peace fully restored to the war-ravaged continent of Europe. 
For more than three years much of Europe and the Near East remained in 
turmoil. Poland pursued aggressive policies towards Russia and Lithuania 
which the League was powerless to prevent. Hungary was restive, Italy 
disconsolate, and France and the successor states apprehensive lest 
German and Hungarian revanchism, plunge them once more into war. 
Britain herself confronted political and economic problems of almost 
unparalleled magnitude. In Ireland, India and the Middle East she faced 
the challenge of resurgent nationalism. Despite a short-lived post-war 
boom, her economy failed to recover from the war. Europe's economy 
remained depressed. To restore European peace and prosperity became 
the main objectives of British foreign policy. It was evident, however, 
that there could be no recovery without a greater measure of European 
security. To achieve that goal at the lowest possible cost was the main 
endeavour of British policy makers in the years 1919 to 1925. To some, 
though not all, it seemed obvious that a reduction in national armaments 
would do more to promote European peace, prosperity and security than 
any other single factor. Furthermore, many came to believe that dis- 
armament could be achieved painlessly without imposing any fresh burdens 
on the war-weary and war-impoverished British people. 
The First World War brought to the fore significant changes in 
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Britain's foreign policy-making process. During Lloyd George's tenure 
of power the Foreign Office was eclipsed and its advice sometimes ignored 
as the prime minister assumed the role of chief architect of British 
policy. Though Baldwin was only to play a minor role, all the other 
prime ministers of the inter-war years exercised a decisive influence 
on the formulation of British foreign policy. 
For a decade before the war, the Committee of Imperial Defence 
(CID) complemented the work of the Foreign Office. Such was the authority 
of its membership, ministerial and professional, that no government could 
ignore its advice. A fortnight after the outbreak of war C. P. Scott, 
the editor of the, Manchester Guardian, said that in matters of war and 
peace it was more powerful than 'the Government'. 
1 Though technically 
in aboyance'from November 1914 to February 1921, it played a key and 
decisive role in the formulation of Britain's disarmament policy. Its 
secretary, Sir Maurice Hankey, and its successive chairmen, in particular 
Balfour, Haldane and Salisbury, profoundly influenced the policy which 
Britain was to pursue in the 1920s. 
The Cabinet continued to have overall responsibility for Britain*s 
foreign and disarmament policy and not even Lloyd George could ignore 
their views. They drew heavily on the expert advice tendered by the 
Foreign Office and the Service departments. As economic issues assumed 
greater importance, they became increasingly dependent on the information 
and advice supplied by the Treasury and the Board of Trade in formulating 
that policy. 
The Learrue of Nations and Disarmament. 1920-1922 
The peace makers at Paris had bequeathed to the League of Nations 
an unambiguous and precise responsibility to bring about disarmament, 
but they had failed to vest the League with sufficient authority to 
C. P. Scott to E. D. Morel, 18 August 1914 in T. Wilson (ed. ): The 
Political Diaries of -C. 
P. Scott. 1211-1928, London, 1970, pp. 100-1. 
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make an adequate contribution to European security. They had laid at 
the door of the League Council a solemn responsibility to formulate 
plans for a reduction in armaments, but they had not provided it with 
powers to enforce its decisions. To assist it in its task of promoting 
disarmament, the League Council in May 1920 set up a Permanent Advisory 
Commission on Military Naval and Air Questions (the PAC) as foreshadowed 
in Article 9 of the Covenant. In December the PAC reported that any 
attempt to promote disarmament at that juncture would be premature. 
Dissatisfied with the Council's inaction and the negative attitude of 
the PAC the first League Assembly took two initiatives to bring about 
a reduction of armaments. In the first instance it recommended that 
another bodyv not dominated by the service advisers of the great powers 
as was the case with the PAC, should be created by'the League. The 
Council responded by setting up in February 1921 a Temporary Mixed 
Commission on Armaments (the TMC) to which it nominated a number of 
people prominent in the political and economic life of their own country 
to sit alongside some service representatives who possessed the requisite 
technical competence. The second initiative was to recommend that the 
League request its member states to give an undertaking not to exceed 
for the first two years following the next financial year the sum total 
of expenditure on their military, naval and air services provided for in 
the latter budget. 
Between April and September 1921, twenty-five member states, fifteen 
of them in Europe, responded to the League's request. Fourteent including 
Britain, I gave non-committal replies. Five, including Belgium and 
Czechoslovakia, promised to comply with the League's request. Six, 
including France and most of her eastern European allies, refused to 
LXC, 28 April 1921, CAB 27/98; C-38(21), 11 May 1921, CAB 23/25. 
The British government replied that it looked forvard to 'the 
possibility of further economies in the next two years'. 
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give any assurance whatsoever. Neither France nor the successor states, 
with the exception of Czechoslovakia, believed that the League was 
capable of making any contribution to their security. For that reason, 
they argued# they were not prepared to pledge themselves to limit their 
armaments. Discouraging though these replies were, some reductions were 
made by all the European powers in the years 1921 to 1924.1 No govern- 
ment was altogether exempt from those political and economic pressures 
which led successive British post-war governments to reduce expenditure 
on the armed services. Despite that fact, armaments expenditure con- 
tinued to consume a far higher proportion of Europe's wealth than her 
financial experts regarded as remotely acceptable* 
2 
British Economic and Military Weakneso 
and The Problem of French SecuritT 
Such were conditions on the continent of Europe in the first three 
years of peace that the continental land powers were not encouraged to 
follow Britain's example in making immense reductions in their military 
and air forces. Surveying the prospects for the coming year in January 
1921 Hankey wrotet 'New states from the Baltic to the Black Sea are each 
more greedy than their neighbours and will remain a danger to the peace 
of Europe for years to come. ' 
3 France might justify her army as necessary 
to prevent a German war of revenge but it was obvious that there were 
many other reasons for the high level of armaments in Europe besides 
the possibility of future German aggression. Britain, on the other hand, 
had so reduced her armed forces that her army was barely capable of meet- 
ing its imperial commitments and her air force was a mere shadow of its 
1. The reductions made by member states are set out in the first of the 
Armaments Tear Books which the League of Nations published in 1924. 
See League of Nations: Armaments Tear Book, A37 1924 IX. # Geneva, 1924. 
2. The point was made most forcefully by the Brussels Financial Confer- 
ence in 1920 and frequently throughout the early 1920s in memoranda 
and articles. See also J. W. Wheeler-Bennett: Information on the 
Reduction of Armaments', London, 1925, Pp. 33-45. 
3. Hankey Diaries, HNKY 1/5, January 1921. 
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former self. On 14 October 1921 Balfour informed the CID that France 
had forty-seven independent squadrons to Britain's three. Viewing the 
situation with 'profound alarm', he said that the fact was that Britain 
was incapable of resisting an aerial invasion by France. 
1 The contrast 
between British military impotence and the continental land powers' war 
capability was a cause for serious concern but it was the disparity 
between British and French air power which exercised the minds of British 
statesmen in the autumn of 1921. There were other considerations too. 
Many believed that the failure of the British economy to recover from 
the war was due very largely to the unsettled conditions on the continent 
of Europe which, it was allegedt stemmed from excessively high military 
expenditure and the tensions and uncertainty that expenditure produced. 
By 1921 it was widely believed that France held the key to European 
security and disarmament. When on 1 November the Cabinet approved the 
instructions for the British Empire delegation attending the Washington 
conferencep they turned their attention to the abortive Treaty of 
Guarantee which the United States and Britain had made with France on 
28 June 1919. Everything should be done, the Cabinet concluded, to 
persuade the United States to ratify the treaty and to take advantage 
of France's anxiety to secure a British guarantee in order to persuade 
her to agree to a limitation of air armaments. 
2 When Balfour, at the 
second plenary session of the conference, welcomed the American proposals 
for naval limitation he went on to plead not for a limitation of air 
power but to regret that no reference had been made to the limitation of 
land armaments which, he said, 'every man coming from Europe must feel 
to be a question of immense and almost paramount importance'. 
3 Six days 
1. CID, 145th meeting, 14 October 1921, CAB Z/3- 
2. C-83(21), CAB 23/27. The disparity between the British and French 
air forces had already been discussed by the CID. 
3. Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, Washingtont 1922, pp. 65-70. 
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later Briand took up Balfour's challenge in a speech which was to cause 
consternation in London. 
1 
Speaking at the plenary session on 21 Novemberv Briand claimed that 
France had done all she could to promote disarmament. So long as she 
was forced to stand alone against the threat of German aggression she 
could not make any further reduction in her armaments. 
2 
Two days later 
in the Committee on Limitation of Armaments he protested that unless 
the governments represented at the conference were prepared'to share 
the burdens and perils which had befallen France, they had no right to 
try and limit French armaments. 'If a definite proposal of collabora- 
tion were advanced, if it were a question of establishing in common an 
international force... disarmament might be considered. If the peoples 
of the world were as eager as was claimed to see armaments limited, 
their representatives should say: a danger exists, we recognise it; 
we will share it with you, shoulder to shoulder ... In that case France 
would fully agree to consider the problem of limitation of armaments., 
3 
Balfour's gratuitous reference to the limitation of land armaments 
must remain a mystery. Before the conference began the government had 
come to the conclusion that nothing could be done to promote land dis- 
armament. Briand's rejoinder not only caused anger in London but led 
to differences between the delegation in Washington and the government 
at home. It also opened up divisions in the ranks of the foreigný-policy 
making 'elite in Britain. 
In November 1921 the British goverment was unwilling to face the 
dilemina Briand had posed. Instead it chose to deny it. France had not 
reduced her armaments as Briand had claimed and the German danger to 
1. See, for example, the entry for 22 November 1921 in T. Jones: Whiteha 
Diarv, Vol. 1, P. 178 and C. 88(21), 22 November 1921, CAB 23/27. 
2. Conference-on the Limitation of Armaments, pp. 77-88. 
3- 2nd meeting, Committee on Limitation of Armaments, 23 November 1921, CAB 30/9. 
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which he had referred in such dramatic terms did not exist. Britain 
faced a far greater danger in the menace posed by submarines to her 
shipping. 
I The argument was not to rest there. When the Cabinet dis- 
cussed the text of Briand's speech it did so in the context of worsening 
Anglo-French relations. Earlier on the agenda they had considered the 
negotiations which Franklin-Bouillon, the French representative in 
Turkey, had been conducting with the Angora goverment and the view 
had been expressed that French policy constituted an act of gross 
betrayal of her British ally. In many other parts of the world French 
policies were inconsistent with British interests. So long as France 
and her 'Slavonic Satellites' maintained large armies, Europe would be 
unsettled and Britain's economic recovery retarded. If Britain was the 
only European power to be disarmed and France remained powerful on land, 
on the sea and in the air, British diplomatic influence would suffer 
and Britain would have to exist on the sufferance of her more powerful 
neighbour. 
2 On 23 November Curzon cabled Balfour: 'We feel strongly 
that question of land armaments cannot remain where it was left by 
published speeches of M. Briana and yourself., 
3 
The weakness of Britain's position was fully revealed on 23 November 
when Balfour, against his better judgement but with some support from the 
Italian foreign minister, Carlo Schanzer, launched a spirited attack on 
the French case. Britain, he said disingenuously, was not prepared to 
dissociate land from naval armaments. If nothing was done about land 
armaments there would be great disappointment in both Europe and America. 
When, however, the American Secretary of State, Hughes, asked him whether 
1. CID, 150th meeting, 23 November 1921, CAB Z/3; DBFP, First Series, 
Vol. XIVP Nos. 439,442 and 443. 
2. C. 88(21), 22 November 1921, CAB 23/27. 
3. DBFP. First Series, Vol. XIV, No. 442. See also No. 439. It is 
, clear that both telegrams were Intended to be a form of rebuke to Balfour for failing to stand up to Briand. 
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he had any proposals to make he was forced to admit that he had none. 
Briand was able to score at Balfour's expense. It was, he saidp the 
expression of empty, platonic aspirations which would bring disappoint- 
ment to the people of Europe. 
1 The following day Balfour vigorously 
protested against the instructions he had received. 
2 What sense was 
there, Balfour demanded, in wrangling over the size of the French army 
so long as Britain's naval supremacy remained unchallenged? 
Balfour was not alone in holding these views. Similar views were 
held by Churchill and Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff. When the CID met on 26 November Wilson said 
that it would be most inadvisable to press France. to reduce the size 
of her army at a time when the continent of Europe was in a state of 
chaos. It was fortunate that France, one of the most pacific nations 
in Europe, had the power to impose the orders of the Allied Supreme 
Council and Britain was exceptionally fortunata, to-have her as an ally. 
Though the CID accepted Wilson's point of view, Lloyd George, in a cable 
to Washington, totally ignored Wilson's arguments. Instead he castigated 
French military power, compared it with German militarism in 1914, and 
asserted that it constituted a grave threat to peace. Two days later, 
Churchill, who had chaired the CID in Balfour's absence, told the Prime 
Minister that it would come as an enormous shock to the British public 
who had six hundred thousand graves in France if their statesmen had to 
tell them that they had backed the wrong horse. 
3 
Lloyd George was not averse to a British guarantee to France so 
long as it was of a strictly limited character and led to a reduction 
1. Second meeting, Committee on Limitation of Armaments, 23 November 1921, 
CAB 30/9. 
2. DBFP, First Series, Vol. XIV, 110.448. 
3. CID, 151st meeting, 26 November 1921, CAB Z/3; DBFP, First Series, 
Vol. XIV, No. 452; Churchill to Lloyd Georgep 28 November 1921p 
Lloyd George Papers, P/10/1/48. 
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of French armaments. When Briand called on Lloyd George at Downing Street, 
on 21 December 1921, to discuss reparations, Russian reconstruction, and 
plans for an international economic conference, Briand raised the issue 
of disarmament. Aware of the irritation, apprehension andanxiety French 
policy at the Washington conference had produced in Britain, he informed 
Lloyd George that one of the first results of a firm British commitment 
to come to France's assistance in the event of unprovoked German aggression 
would be a large reduction in French armaments. He also assured him that 
disarmament was something which three-quarters of the French people 
wanted. 
1 
The discussions which Lloyd George held with Briand and his successor, 
Raymond Poincare, in January and February 1922 revealed how wide was the 
gulf which separated British and French views about European security. 
2 
Though differences over German reparations and the settlement which the 
allied powers should impose on Turkey bedevilled relations between the 
two countries, it was two fundamentally different attitudes to European 
security which made both the conclusion of an Anglo-French pact and a 
reduction in armaments impossible in the international climate of 1922. 
Those differences were never to be resolved. The issues which came to 
the fore in the first two months of 1922 were to remain central in the 
disarmament debate until the rise of Hitler transformed the European 
situation in the early 19308.3 
At the first session of the Cannes conference, called to discuss 
reparations and economic recovery, Briand pleaded for an 'accord' between 
1. DBFP, First Series, Vol. XV, No. 110. 
2. For a full discussion of the negotiations for an Anglo-French pact 
in 1922 see Anne Orde: Great Britain-and International Security, 
1920-1926, London, 1976, pp. 6-36. 
3. For an examination of the differing views of the British and French 
governments of the inter-war years over Germany, see W. M. Jordan: 
Great Britain. France and the German-Problem. 1918-1939, London, 
1943/1971, pp. 199-202., See also E. W. Bennett: German I Rearmament 
and the West. -1932-1933, 
Princeton, N. J., 1979, PP. 89-101,509-12. 
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Britain and France which would be a solid and serious agreement of long 
duration. Lloyd George, while freely admitting that Britain had a direct 
interest in preserving France against unprovoked German aggression, told 
Briand that an agreement would not long survive a large French subma ine 
programme. Briand retorted that no one in Britain seriously believed 
that French submarines would ever be used against British shipping. 
Lloyd George continued to warn Briand of the dangers of naval competition 
and made it a condition of any agreement with France that the British and 
French naval authorities should hold consultations'about their naval 
building programmes* 
1 
Subsequent discussions at Cannes, Paris and Boulogne demonstrated 
how peripheral was France's submarine programme to the main issues which 
divided the two countries. Both Briand, and Poineare refused to discuss 
disarmament until Britain concluded a military convention as specific in 
its reference to the military forces to be maintained as the Franco-Russian 
military convention of 1892. Alliances and military conventions were, 
however, anathema to post-war British opinion. It was widely believed 
that they had been a major cause of the 1914-1918 war and of Britain's 
involvement in it. Furthermore a military convention between Britain 
and France would allow France to determine the level of Britain's armed 
forces. For Britain it spelt not disarmament but rearmament though for 
France it was the sine gua non of both security and disarmament. Where 
would France stand, Poineare asked, if Britain, having given France a 
guarantee against German aggression, then disarmed? How could France 
calculate what forces she should retain unless she knew what forces 
Britain was prepared to bring to her assistance? 
2 To Lloyd George these 
vere hypothetical questions. It was nonsense to talk about German 
aggression as a likely contingency at a time when Germany was disamed 
1. DBIPP, First Series, Vol. XIX, No. 1; Cmd. 2169,1924. 
2. Ann Orde: Great Britain and International Security. 1920-1926, 
pp. 24-25. 
237 
and France possessed the largest army in Europe. If sometime in the 
future the military balance changed to the disadvantage of France there 
would be ample time to discuss the terms of a military convention. 
British disarmament policy was founded on the assumption that political 
gestures rather than military engagements would best promote European 
security. 
It was abundantly clear that, as in 1914 so in the future, Britain 
would not allow France to be overwhelmed by her more powerful neighbour 
to the east. Whether she gave France a guarantee or not she would come 
to her assistance because it was in her interests to do so. Thus, though 
she was Prepared to guarantee France against unprovoked German aggression 
she was not willing to guarantee the general peace of Europe. As many 
Frenchmen were not reluctant to point out, a guarantee of so limited a 
character was virtually worthless. Although a direct attack by Germany 
on France was unlikely, the chance of France being dragged into a war 
with Germany as a result of German aggression against France's allies, 
Poland and Czechoslovakia, or her violation of the demilitarised Rhine- 
land could never be ruled out. In that case France might find herself 
at war with Germany without any assurance of British assistance. Unless 
it formed part of a larger agreement, a British guarantee was a meaning- 
less gesture. To meet these criticisms Lloyd George began to contemplate 
a non-aggression pact which would embrace most of Europe including Germany, 
Hungary and Russia. 
1 
None the less European economic recovery remained the first priority 
of the British goverment in 1922. To promote it Lloyd George was willing 
to consider an Anglo-French pact, an agreement with the Soviet Union - 
even at the price of splitting his Cabinet, 
2 
and a European non-aggression 
1. DBFP, First Series, Vol. XJX, Nos. 1,5 and 6; CAB 21/239. 
2. Chamberlain to Lloyd George, 21 March; Lloyd George to Chamberlain, 
22 March; Chamberlain to Curzon, 24 March 1922; Austen Chamberlain 
Papers, AC 23/6/18,19 and 211 Dai1v Chronigle, 23 and 24 March 1922. 
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pact. Discussing such a pact with Briand at the Cannes conference in 
January 1922, Lloyd George claimed that it would be a powerful means of 
reducing armaments and Briand, said that Europe needed some more practical 
instrument to preserve peace than the League of Nations* 
1 
By 'peace' Lloyd George meant more than a pledge to refrain from 
aggression. 'Peace' implied both a relaxation of international tensions 
and a reduction of armaments. Without them both there could be no 
restoration ýf business confidence or any significant increase in the 
volume of trade. Disarmament had become an essential component of the 
government's economic strategy. If his government was to win back its 
credibility with the British electorate it had to show solid progress 
in realising these objectives. In Curzon's phrase disarmament was 'a 
universal aspiration as well as a universal need'. 
2 
When Lloyd George met Poincare at Boulogne on 25 February 1922 he 
told him that the British public attributed Britain's economic diffi- 
eulties to French policy and believed that two things stood in the way 
of real peace: the Versailles treaty and the exclusion of Russia from 
the comity of nations. Poincare reluctantly agreed to Russian partici- 
pation in the forthcoming Genoa economic conference but once again made 
it perfectly plain that France would not take part if treaty revision, 
reparations and disarmament were placed on the agenda. 
3 
Summing up Britain's objectives at the Genoa conference on 28 March 
Lloyd George said: 'Our first object should be to establish peace and 
our second object to establish commercial relations with Russia. 
4 
Although disarmament would not appear on the conference's agenda, Lloyd 
George and most of his Cabinet believed that improved relations with 
1. DBFP, First Series, Vol. XIXt No. 10. 
2. DBPP, First Series, Vol. XVI, No. 768 (28 December 1921). 
3. DBFP, First Series, Vol. XII, No. 34. 
4. C. 21(22), CAB 23/29. 
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Russia and the signature of a non-aggression pact would bring disarmament 
nearer. There was also some reason to believe that if Europe reduced her 
land armaments the United States might modify her economic and financial 
policies in Europe's favour, 
1 
The 1922 Genoa conference was a bitter disappointment to Lloyd George. 
Its failure was greeted with glee by his opponents and contributed to his 
own undoing. Russia was not brought back into the comity of nations nor 
was there any significant increase in trade with Russia and eastern Europe. 
Neither the cause of Anglo-French understanding nor European economic 
reconstruction was advanced as a result of its discussions. It would be 
some time before a British government again tried to promote the cause 
of European security and disarmament. If disarmament remained a universal 
need it ceased to be a universal aspiration of the British people. 
Though Lloyd George remained loyal to his undertakings not to raise 
disarmament at the conference and joined with the French in rebuking the 
Russian foreign minister, Georgy Chicherin, when he attempted to put dis- 
armament on the conference's agenda, he could not resist the temptation 
to denounce militarism at the opening session. Though'the fighting had 
ceased the snarling continued to unnerve the whole continent of Europe. 
2 
Unless the conference led to disarmament it would be a failure but before 
there could be any disarmament there had to be a basis for an understand- 
ing between the European powers. 
Despite the efforts of the French government and Lloyd George's 
willingness to comply with France's requests in order to secure other 
British interests, it was not possible to exclude disarmament altogether 
1. T. Jones to Lloyd George, 16 and 23 March 1922, Lloyd George Papers, 
F/26/1/16 and 22; T. Jones: Whitehall Dijjr-v, Vol. lo P. 195; 
Philadelphia Saturday Eveninz Post, 18 February 1922; J. T. Shotwell 
in International Conciliation, August 1924. 
2. DBFP, First Series, Vol. XIX, No. 67. 
3. Ibid., and J. S. Mille: The Genoa Conference, London, 19229 PP- 309 63-9. 
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from the consideration of the conference. The International Federation 
of Trade Unions forced the conference's Committee on Labour Questions 
to discuss the question by informing delegates that it was the unanimous 
conviction of workers' organisations throughout Europe that disarmament 
was a necessary condition for economic recovery* 
1 
Disarmament figured 
in the talks Lloyd George held with the Czech statesman, Eduard Beres, 
on 26 April and the preamble to the British draft of the proposed non- 
aggression pact which they discussed committed the high contracting 
parties to reductions in rational armaments. 
2 Britain tried to ensure 
German and Russian participation in any forthcoming League negotiations 
on disarmament and it was forcefully argued that Russian disarmament 
would do much to reduce fear and insecurity in eastern Europe and enhance 
the value of a non'aggression pact. 
3 
The Esher Plan and the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance 
During the course of 1922 the initiative in disarmament passed from 
I 
the British government to the League of Nations. In December 1921 the 
second League Assembly, at the instigation of Lord Robert Cecil4 but 
against the wishes of the British delegationo instructed the Temporary 
Mixed Commission on Armaments (TMC) to draft proposals for general dis- 
armament in the form of a treaty-5 In July 1922 Cecil and a French 
member of the TMC, Henri de Jouvenel, proposed four resolutions which 
1. British Empire delegation memorandum No. 311 and minutes of the fifth 
meeting of the Committee on Labour Questions, 2 May 1922, CAB 31/12. 
2. DBFP, First Series, Vol. XII, Nos 63 and 95. See also Box 11 in the 
Worthington-Evans Papers and CAB 
; 
1/239. 
3. DBFP, First Series, Vol. XII, No. 93 and memorandum on an anti- 
aggression pact, 1 May 1922, Lloyd George Papers, F/26/1/29. 
4. Cecil was in the anomalous position of representing South Africa at 
the League. He was at the time a severe critic of Lloyd George and 
his government, devoting some of his energies to attempts to persuade 
Viscount Grey to lead a Centre party which would challenge the 
political ascendancy and - in Cecil's view - dubious international 
morality of the Lloyd George coalition. 
5. Foreign Office memorandum, 4 April 1922, CAB 31/1; Hymans to Lloyd 
George, 13 April 1922, CAB 16/40. 
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indissolubly linked disarmament with security. These resolutions were 
adopted by the third League Assembly in September 1922 as Resolution XIV 
to provide the springboard for launching the draft Treaty of Mutual 
Assistance. 
I 
The first disarmament plan to emanate from the League was, however, 
the Esher Plan which Viscount Esher, 
2a British member of the TMC, put 
forward in 1922. Esher, who had been instrumental in setting up the CID 
in 1904, became a strong advocate of disarmament as a result of his 
experiences as a liaison officer between the British government and the 
French army during the First World War. Adopting the Washington treaty 
precedent of applying a ratio to limit armaments, Esher proposed that 
the armies of the European powers should be restricted by limiting their 
manpower. By excluding troops stationed outside Europe in colonial 
territories, his plan favoured imperial powers like Britain and France. 
It was none the less rejected by. a small sub-committee of the TMC 
because it made no recommendations to limit war material and ignored 
the question of security. 
Although Lloyd George took a copy of the Esher Plan to Boulogne 
in February 1922 for his meeting with Poincare, it at no stage received 
the endorsement of the British government. 
3 
It also came in for severe 
criticism in most sections of the British Press. Esher was described 
The four resolutions were: (1) no scheme for the reduction of armaments 
could be fully successful unless it was general, (2) many governments 
were unable to make sizeable reductions in their armaments unless they 
received in exchange a satisfactory guarantee of their security, , (3) a defensive)agreement, open to all countriest could provide such 
a guarantee, (4 previous consent to a reduction of armaments should 
be a prior condition for a treaty of guarantee. 
2. Reginald Baliol Brett, 2nd Viscount Esher (1899), 1852-1930, Lib. MP, 
Penryn, and Falmoutho 1880-85, member of royal commission to investi- 
gate the military preparations for and conduct of the South African 
war, 1902, chairman of the War Office reconstruction committee, 1903, 
joined the CID, 1904. 
3. Esher to O. S. B., 1 March 1922, Oliver, Viscount Esher (ed. ): The 
Journal* and Letters of-Reginald. Viscount Esher, Vol. IV, London, 
1938, pp. 276-7. 
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as 'an amiable and industrious nuisance" and it was alleged that his 
2 
scheme would make Britain 'a fifth-rate power' . 
The plan, nevertheless, is not without significance in the history 
of disarmament. It was the first attempt of the inter-war years to devise 
a unit of comparison. The limitation of manpower was to figure in many 
subsequent disarmament schemes including the last major disarmament- 
initiative of a British government of the inter-war years, the MacDonald 
Plan of March 1933.3 Its significance lies, however, not so much in its 
technical details but in its origins and sponsorship. 
4 It is one of a 
number of indications of how seriously disarmament was taken by prominent 
Englishmen well versed in military and naval, affairs in the aftermath of 
the First World War. The general limitation of armaments was not so 
much the panacea of the pacifists who had rejected the war in 1914 as 
the refuge of many who, in the years 1914 to 1918# had not only 
experienced the war at first hand but had been responsible for its 
conduct and direction. 
The draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, like the Esher Plan, owed 
much to the studies undertaken by the League of Nations Union in Britain 
during 1921.5 Though both were essentially English in their provenance 
neither won the support of the British goverment. Of the two, it was 
the draft Treaty which aroused the greater antagonism in the foreign 
policy-making establishment in London. Cecil with whom the draft 
1. Sunday Express, 9 July 1922. 
2. Daily Express, 10 -Tuly 1922; Evening-Standard, 13,14 and 15 July 1922. 
3- Presented to the World Disarmament Conference on 16 March 1933 it 
proposed that the number of effectives in the French, German, Italian 
and Polish armies should be fixed at 200,000 with France being allowed 
to retain an additional 200vOOO in her colonial territories. Russia, 
because of her greater area, population and frontiers, was allowed 
500,000. Unlike the Esher Plan, it proposed to limit the calibre of 
guns, the size of tanks, and naval and air armaments. 
4. See pp. 87-88,88n. 
5. See pp. 87-9. 
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Treaty was identified was in an anomalous position. Whereas Esher was 
a private individual who had once exercised great influence, 
1 Cecil was 
by May 1923 a senior Cabinet Minister in the Baldwin government. He had 
been brought back into the government to sit alongside colleagues who 
neither shared his enthusiasm for the League and disarmament nor held 
him in great esteem. Furthermore Cecil was disliked by the Foreign Office 
establishment and his relations with its political chief, Curzon, were 
strained. Cecil was regarded as a crank by the government's advisers 
and as a renegade by his Conservative colleagues. 
2 Few, if any, of his 
fellow delegates at Geneva, however, realised how little he represented 
the views of the British government. 
3 
The draft Treaty of Mutual Assistancep in its final form, 
4 
was a 
plan for a general defensive alliance buttressed by supplementary agree- 
ments between states which felt themselves to be in special danger of 
attack. It was designed both to complement a scheme for the limitation 
M. Howard in The Continental Commitment, London, 1972, P. 17 describes 
Esher as the, most influential adviser on defence policy of his day. 
His days of influence do not seem to have extended beyond the First 
World War. 
2. When Cecil first put forward his proposals in July 1922 he was not 
a member of the British government. His activities at Paris in 
1919 had not endeared him to the Foreign Office nor had his political 
excursions in the years of the Lloyd George post-war government won 
him the respect of the Conservative party. Hankey described him as 
'a crank' (Hankey Diaries, 11 November 1923) and Austen Chamberlain 
described him as a 'sentimentalist with some of the wisdom of a 
serpent' (T. Jones: Whitehall Diaý, Vol. I, P. 148). 
_ 
On 
7 February 1924 Chamberlain informed Baldwin that Cecil 'had ceased 
to be in any real sense a member of our Party'. Memorandum by 
Chamberlain on his meeting with leaders of the Conservative party, 
7 February 1924, Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC 35/4/5- 
3. See S. de Madariaga: Disarmament, p. 97. Had this been grasped, 
Madariaga argues, it would have saved many disappointments. 
4. The draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, as it was first known, met 
with criticism in France and from the League's PAC. In June 1923 
Col. Requin, who was a member of both the PAC and the TMC, presented 
an alternative scheme which put more emphasis on special defensive 
arrangements. The draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the name given to it in its final form, was a compromise between the original Cecil 
scheme and Requin's proposals which had not been acceptable in their 
entirety to the Japanese, Italian and Spanish representatives on the TMC. 
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and reduction of national armaments and to enable France and her allies 
to integrate into the League system those pacts which they had already 
concluded for their own security. The League of Nations had been set 
up to prevent a return to the pre-war system of alliances but France in 
the immediate post-war years had tried to combine her allegiance to the 
League with a system of defensive alliances to defend the 1919 peace 
settlement against those powers which wished to revise it. Left-wing 
opinion in Britain was strongly opposed to alliances and the Right viewed 
them with distrust. The draft Treaty was an attempt to marry France's 
predilection for special defensive arrangements with the British public's 
faith in the League system. 
Cecil first put forward his proposals in July 1922 at a time when 
the negotiations for an Anglo-French pact were virtually moribund and 
more than seven months had elapsed since the League Assembly had issued 
its instruction to the TMC to formulate plans for disarmament. Other 
than discuss the private manufacture of armaments and the exchange of 
information between nations the TMC, under its French chairman M. Viviani, 
had done nothing to promote disarmament since its inception in February 
1921. Cecil articulated the growing concern, particularly of the smaller 
nationsp that nothing was being done to limit armaments. 
The draft Treaty led to the first major debate on disarmament policy 
of the inter-war years. It was criticised by government departments 
because the burden of enforcement would fall on Britain. 
1 With the 
defection of the United States from the League, Britain had become the 
chief 'provider' or 'producer' of security. It was argued that it would 
lead not to a reduction but to an increase in British armaments. Britain 
with its world-wide possessions and interests would not benefit from its 
1. For a full account of the debate which took place within the govern- 
ment and the criticisms of the Service departments, the CIDO the 
Foreign Office, the Dominions and the Cabinet see Anne Orde: Grea 
Britain and International Security. 1920-1926, PP. 38-46. 
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provision limiting the obligation to render assistance to those states 
in the same continent as the victim of aggression. Furthermore, the 
Service departments doubted the efficacy of the supplementary defensive 
arrangements and, with the exception of Lord Robert Cecil, no one in the 
Cabinet believed that a general guarantee would lead to a reduction in 
national armaments. 
The case against the draft Treaty and disarmament agreements in 
general was ably put by the First Lord of the Admiralty, L. S. Amery, 
and the Permnnent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, Sir 
Eyre Crowe, who seven years earlier had provided the British goverment 
with a devastating critique of general disarmament agreements. 
1 
Amery, who was convinced that Britain's salvation lay in remaining 
aloof from continental entanglements, denied that armaments were a cause 
of war. It was idle to imagine that disarmament could achieve peace so 
long as there were clashes of interest in Europe. Sooner or later adjust- 
ments would be made to the 1919 settlement and it would be foolish for 
Britain to guarantee the status guo. In a world of such harsh realities 
the draft Treaty would lead to more, rather than less, armaments. 
2 
Crowe questioned whether it was either necessary or wise for Britain 
to monopolise the position of standard-bearer in the cause of disarmament. 
By disarming after the war she had reduced herself to military impotence 
and played into the hands of other powers. He doubted whether France 
would disarm even if she was given a guarantee of her security and he 
questioned whether outside the British Isles there was any large body 
of opinion which favoured disarmament. Wo one knew how long Germany 
would remain disarmed and the allied military authorities responsible 
for enforcing her disarmament knew that it would be impossible to prevent 
1. See pp. 123-4. 
2. CID, 171st and 173rd meetings 11 April and 29 June 1923, CAB 2/3; CP 311(23), 4 July 1923, CAB W161. 
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her reconstituting her army as it was certain she was already preparing 
to do. Furthermore, he doubted whether Russia would keep her word if 
she was persuaded to sign a disarmament treaty. 
1 
Cecil tried to win over his colleagues not by denying the diffi- 
culties or by minimising the price Britain would have to pay but by 
warning them that if they were to announce-that they were unable to 
support disarmament they would be defeated in the House of Commons and 
at the next general election. 
2 There was, however, little likelihood 
of the government adopting such a course and he was unwise to attempt 
to bludgeon his colleagues in this way. Aware of his lack of standing 
within the Conservative party he fell back on the support which he 
believed he could muster in the League of Nations Union which was at 
that time in the forefront of those advocating disarmament. He 
exaggerated public support for disarmament and misjudged the situation 
in the House of Commons. When a debate took place on disarmament less 
than a month later3 the government had a comfortable majority of 286 
votes to 169. None the less on the back benches and in the Press it 
was frequently assumed by outspoken advocates of disarmament that 
because Cecil was a member of the government, the draft Treaty had 
already received the government's imprimatur. 
Cecil did not deny that the obligations imposed by a general treaty 
of guarantee would add to Britain's commitments and he foresaw situations 
in which she would be required to render financial assistance, enforce a 
naval blockade or despatch small contingents of troops or aircraft. 
4 
1. 24-26 June 1923, FO 371/9419. 
2. CID, 173rd meeting, 29 June 1923, CAB Z/3- 
3. 167 HC Debe. 5th Series, cols. 75-182,23 July 1923. The debate was 
on a Labour motion deploring the growth in armaments expenditure and 
calling on the government to take immediate steps to summon an inter- 
national disarmament conference. The government was able to 
masquerade as the champion of the League because, in effect, the 
Labour motion was calling on the government to by-pass the League. 
4. CID, 173rd meeting, 29 June 1923, CAB Z/3- 
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He reminded them, however, that the draft Treaty could not come into force 
until signatory states had begun to reduce their armaments. As armaments 
were reduced so would the chances of aggression. If peace was secured 
what practical importance would Britain's new commitments have? Whatever 
Britain decided about the treaty, situations would arise, he prophesied, 
in which Britain would be dragged into war. The more effective the system 
of sanctions the less likely it was they would have to be applied and the 
greater the reduction of armaments that would be achieved. Such was the 
importance of the treaty that he was 'ready to advocate the acceptance of 
considerable obligations to secure it'* 
1 
Cecil tried to persuade his colleagues that they had to consider 
French as well as English opinion. Though the French had as great a 
distaste for excessive armaments as the Englishp they would always insist 
on adequate protection against sudden attack and the secret rearmament of 
their neighbours. With the failure of the 1919 treaty of guarantee the 
French had a genuine grievance which should be remedied. The attitude 
of the French people and their General Staff had changed during the 
previous year. Many observers were predicting a swing to the Left at 
the next general election 
2 
and the draft Treaty had won the approval of 
the General Staff. Any disarmament plan which had their support should 
not be lightly dismissed. 
3 
Cecil's arguments cut little ice with his colleagues who were more 
opposed to extending Britain's commitments than to promoting disarmament. 
Britain was 'not in a position to subscribe to a policy of disarmament', 
Curzon said. 
4 Cecil was no more successful in persuading the Labour 
1. W 4750,15 June 1923, FO 371/9419; CID Paper 431-B, CAB 4/10- 
2. Cecil's prediction proved correct. In May 1924 the Cartel des 
Gauches won the French general election. 
3. Cecil to Curzon, 28 November and 21 December 1923, FO 371/9421 
and Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51077. 
4. Curzon at the 173rd meeting of the CID, 29 June 1923, CAB 2/3. 
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party to take a sympathetic view. In February 1923, almost a year before 
he took office and long before he was in a position to be influenced by 
Service advisers or the Foreign Office, MacDonald told Cecil that the 
draft Treaty would only succeed in raising around the League of Nations 
such a baffling network of understandings and arrangements as to increase 
jealousy and fear, and perpetuate militarism. 
I 
It was the first Labour 
gover=ent which in July 1924 notified the League of Nations that Britain 
could not endorse the draft Treaty. 
The decision was a popular one. With the exception of the League of 
Nations Union# most Liberals and such organs of Liberal opinion as the 
Daily News, 
2 The Nation, 
3 
and The Economist 
4 
it had few supporters. 
With some exceptions in the initial stages of the debate, the Conservative 
and Labour press was hostile to it. 
5 There was much truth in Gilbert 
Murray's comment that militarists and pacifists both hated the treaty, 
the one because it threatened to reduce armaments, the other because it 
contemplated war. 
6 
The statement issued by the Executive Committee of 
the Union of Democratic Control in August 1924, would not have been dis- 
puted by either the Conservative or the Labour party. 'The Treaty would 
make not for disarmament and peace but for greater armaments and war., 
7 
The discussions which took place over the draft Treaty during the 
summer of 1923 are a revealing commentary on the prevailing mood of 
1. MacDonald to Cecil, 22 February 1923, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51OB1. 
Cecil made another attempt to persuade MacDonald to take a favourable 
view of the draft Treaty after MacDonald came to power, see Cecil to 
MacDonald, 26 February 1924, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51081. 
2.24 July, 18,19 and 20 September 1923,21 July 1924. 
3.8 March 1924. 
4.2 August 1924. 
5. The Times, 24 July 1923, Daily Telegraph, 5 and 9 August 1923 and 
even the Morning Post, 9 and 10 August 1923 made some initially 
favourable comments. They soon changed their tuns. 
6. Westminster Gazette (weekly edition), 5 April 1924. 
7. Yorkshire Post, 7 August 1924. 
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disenchantment with diaramament and the international order to emerge 
from the war. There was some substance in Cecil's complaints about the 
indifference and obstruction he encountered in Whitehall. A Foreign Office 
official commended the appointment of a Lieutenant Colonel Oppenheim to 
the TMC because of his strong views 'on the impracticability not'to say 
folly of disarmament and pacifism'. 
' Others like Balfour and Hankey, 
who had supported disarmament in 1919, began to air their misgivings. 
France's occupation of the Ruhr convinced most of Cecil's colleagues 
that disarmament was not a sensible policy in 1923. It would be mis- 
construed as a sign of weakness. The strength of France's land and air 
forces and Britain's relative weakness on the land and in the air revived 
the latent Francophobia of the British people. 1923 was a most imoppor- 
tune year to promote a treaty designed to augment Prance's security. 
Furthermore, the League's failure to penalise Italy for her bombardment 
and occupation of Corfu in August 1923 did not enhance the prestige of 
the League or encourage belief in collective security. 
The debate within the government brought home to Britain's foreign 
policy-making establishment the price which Britain would have to pay 
if there was to be a reduction of European armaments but there is no 
evidence that it made any impact on the British people as a whole. 
Outside goverment circles few fully appreciated that a disarmed Europe 
might mean, at least for a time, a more highly armed Britain. As one 
Service memorandum put it, disarmament linked to security meant 
fadditional commitments of indefinite magnitude and uncertain application'. 
2 
That was an unpalatable policy for a nation struggling to regain its 
prosperity in the aftermath of a war which had demonstrated the cost 
of continental commitments. 
1. Memorandum by G. 11. Villiers, 28 June 1923, PO 371/9419. Villiers 
was head of the Western Department of the Foreign Office. 
2. CP 311(23), 3 July 1923, CAB 24/161. 
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In 1923 disarmament was not an important issue in British politics. 
The nation was preoccupied with the question of unemployment. Baldwin 
wrestled not only with the problems of the economy but with the divisions 
within the Conservative party which had resulted from the break-up of the 
Lloyd George coalition. In the autumn of 1923 he sought a mandate from 
the British people not to promote disarmament but tariff reform. Unlike 
Lloyd George he did not believe that disarmament would make any major 
contribution to British economic recovery. In this respect he did not 
differ essentially from the Labour party. Its 1923 general election 
manifesto contained only a perfunctory reference to disarmament. 
1 
In February 1924 Philip Kerr advised Lloyd George that domestic 
problems and above all relations between capital and labour had to take 
priority over international affairs. It had taken the United States ten 
years after the Civil War to got rid of war passions and it might take 
Europe even longer. 
2 With Britain dispirited by Francela'German policy 
and her support for Italy in the Corfu dispute, the international climate 
seemed singularly unfavourable to general disarmament. 
More time and thought was given to the task of improving Britain's 
defences than to disarmament in the years 1922 to 1924. An alarmist 
picture was painted by Balfour, Hankey, Hoare and others of the dire 
3 
consequences for London of Britain's inferiority in the air. In August 
1922 the Lloyd George government took the decision to spend an additional 
two million pounds on the air force and in June 1923 Baldwin announced a 
scheme to expand Britain's home-based air force to fifty-two squadrons 
1. F. W. S. Craig: British General Election-Manifestos. IM-1945, 
Chichester, 1970, pp. 18-27. 
2.4 February 1924, Lloyd George Papers, G/lZ/5/2. 
3. CID, 145th meeting, 14 October 1921, CAB Z/3; C. 18(22), 15 March 1922, 
CAB 23/29; Hankey to Lloyd George, 21 March and 28 July 1922, Lloyd 
George Papers, P/26/1 and F/26/i/9; 1. Young: Arthur Jameg Balfour 
p. 437. 
251 
of which only eighteen would be composed of fighter aircraft. 
' Britain's 
policy was to deter attack by the threat of retaliation from her bomber 
squadrons and, if possible, to persuade France and Italy to sign a 
limitation agreement. In all but the Labour party the decision was a 
popular one. It was approved by some of the staunchest supporters of 
disarmament. One of them, Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, said 
that it had been a blunder to reduce the size of Britain's air force 
immediately after the war without first securing an air limitation 
agreement. If Britain went to a disarmament conference with an air force 
too weak to protect herself, France would have the whip hand. An increase 
in Britain's air force was an essential step towards any agreement for 
the reduction of armaments. 
2 
The decision to expand the air force was endorsed by the 1923 
Imperial Conference but the Marquess of Salisb reminded Dominion 
statesmen that the policy of the British government remained the limita- 
tion of armaments. That objective, however, could only be achieved if 
Britain herself possessed 'a background of power'. If Britain, by 
strengthening her bargaining position, could induce other countries to 
reduce their armaments, she would limit the forces she would have to 
contend with in any future conflict. Unrealisable though that goal 
proved to be, no British statesman ever put the practical objective of 
British disarmament policy more succinctly. 
4 
Salisbury's brother, Lord Robert Cecil, for all his advocacy of 
1.157 HC Debs. 5th Series, Col. 1662,3 August 1922, and 165 HC Debs. 
5th Series, Col. 2142,26 June 1923. 
2. Daily News, 28 June 1923. 
3. James Gascoyhe-Cecil, 4th Marquess of Salisbury, 1861-1947, 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1900-3# 
Lord Privy Seal, 1903-5, President of the Board of Trade, 1905, Lord President of the Council, 1922-24, Lord Privy Seal, 1924-29, 
Leader of the House of Lords, 1925-29. Salisbury spoke to the Imperial Conference in his capacity as Chairman of the CID. 
4. Minutes of the 1923 Imperial Conference, CAB 3Z/9- 
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disarmament did not seek to evade the issue. In the autumn of 1922 he 
raised a hornets' nest by suggesting that the League create a bomber 
force to retaliate against any nation which had the temerity to use the 
air weapon in a sudden act of aggression. 
1 
Cecil consistently argued 
that without providing some form of security it was useless to expect 
nations to disarm but his proposal, none the less, ran counter to the 
arguments he had deployed in 1919 at the Paris peace conference in 
resisting French demands that the League should be endowed with its own 
armed forces. 
Cecil warned that there was nothing to prevent France sending two 
thousand aircraft across the Channel to destroy London. It was far 
easier to make secret preparations for an air strike than to plan 
aggression by land or sea. Aircraft were small and easy to conceal, and 
commercial aircraft could be converted into bombers with comparative ease. 
Cecil's solution was that each member of the League should earmark con- 
siderable numbers of aircraft to crush any power which ventured to 
deliver a sudden attack from the air. 
2 Cecil was not a member of the 
government at the time and there is no evidence that the goverment ever 
considered such a proposal. It is of some significance, none the less, 
that both advocates of League action and those who put their trust 
entirely in national armaments believed that the only defence against 
air attack was the threat of retaliation. Deterrence was a more 
appropriate policy than disarmament. 
The first Labour governmentp which came to power in Tanuary 19249 
did not waver from that policy. Lord Haldane, who as Chairman of the 
3 CID described himself as 'practically Xinister of Defence', told the 
1. Westminster Gazette, 30 September and 6 October 1922. 
2. Cecil to Smuts, 6 October 1922, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51076. 
3. Haldane to his mother, Mrs. Mary Haldane, 25 January 1924, Haldane 
Papers, Vol. 6007. 
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House of Lords that the policy of the goverment was to keep up the 
defences of the country so as to be in a better position to negotiate* 
The Labour government did not court weakness by pursuing unilateral dis- 
armament though it was prepared to shelve work on the Singapore naval 
base in the interests of improving the climate of opinion in the Par East. 
MacDonald 2 did not view the outlook for disarmament in a rosy light. 
It was a distant prospect which would have to await an improvement in 
Anglo-French relations. 
3 
Despite French preferences for linking a settle- 
ment of the reparation question with European security, MacDonald refused 
to consider either security or disarmament until agreement had been 
reached over reparations. In the first part of the year he worked hard 
to establish a good working relationship with Poincare but it was the 
victory of the Cartel des Gauches in the French elections of May 1924 
which led to closer relations between the British and French governments. 
The highly successful London conference on reparations in July-August 
1924 was preceded by lengthy discussions between MacDonald and the new 
French prime minister, Edouard Herriot. 
4 
Its success established 
MacDonald's own reputation 
5 
and paved the way for a new initiative to 
link disarmament and security. 
With inadequate preparation and wearied by the protracted negoti- 
ations and Cabinet dissensions over the London conference on reparations, 
1.56 HL Debs. 5th Series, col. 78,12 February 1924. 
2. MacDonald combined the office of Prime Minister with that of Foreign 
Secretary, a task which demanded more stamina than he, and certainly 
most men, possessed. 
3. MacDonald Diaries, 3 February 1924, MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/8/1; 
MacDonald to Cecil, 25 February 1924, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51081; 
The Times, 3 March 1924 (text of MacDonala, s letter to Poincare, 
21 February 1924). 
4. For a full discussion of these talks see Anne Orde: Great Britain-and 
Tnternational-Securit-v. 1920-1926,, Pp. 58-65. 
5. See, for instance, Hankey to Haldane, 20 August 1924, Haldane Papers, 
Vol. 5916: 'Make no mistake it was Ramsay MacDonald's Conference... 
He ran it in his own way... I 
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MacDonald went to Geneva in September 1924 as the first British prime 
minister to address the League of Nations. 
1 
His speech to the League Assembly on 4 September 1924 can have 
come as little surprise to those who had followed his pronouncements 
on foreign policy since the days in August 1914 when he had broken with 
many of his colleagues to help found the Union of Democratic Control. 
Military alliances could never bring security. Pacts or no pacts, smaller 
nations would be crushed if the world once again put its faith in military 
organisation. The alternative was a League to which nations looked not 
because its arm was strong but because its nature was just. In arbitra- 
tion lay the best hopes for peace. Praising the recent initiatives of 
the Danish government 
2 
and the achievements of the Washington conference 
he intimated that Britain would welcome another American initiative over 
naval disarmament but that only a European conference could find a solu- 
tion to the problem of land armaments. Before a disarmament conference 
was held the ground would have to be well prepared and he suggested a 
League preparatory commission, with German and Russian participation, 
3 to undertake that work. 
MacDonald's speech was not well received 
4 but Herriot's subsequent 
endorsement of MacDonald's emphasis on arbitration led to the drafting 
of the Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes. A period of close collaboration between Britain and France 
MacDonald Diariest 21 September 1924p MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/8/1; 
Cecil to Noel-Baker, 9 February 1925, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51106; 
D. Marquand: Ramsay MacDonald, London, 1977, PP. 342-51; Anne Orde: 
Great Britain and International Security. 1920-1926, p. 69. 
2. The newly elected social democratic government had earlier that year 
introduced legislation# subsequently rejected, to disband its armed 
forces. 
3. League of Nations: Records of the-Fifth Assembly. Special Supplement 
No. 
_U, 
Geneva, 19249, PP. 41-5. 
4. S. de Madariaga: Morning without Noont Farnborough, 1974, PP. 54-5. 'Ramsay MacDonald was disastrous... was blind to the fact that his 
audience was composed of hard-boiled diplomats, officials, lawyers, 
and experts who held his cheap eloquence in contempt... because they felt it to be insincere. ' See also Lhe Times, 6 September 1924. 
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led to what seemed to many contemporaries one of the most promising 
initiatives of the inter-war years. 
The Geneva Protocol 
On 6 September MacDonald and Herriot jointly presented the Assembly 
with a resolution linking arbitration, security and disarmament. It 
called on the Assembly's Third Committee to re-examine the problem of 
security and disarmament, 
I 
paying special heed to the observations of 
member governments on the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, and its 
First Committee to examine the Optional Clause in the Statute of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice 
2 together with those articles 
in the Covenant which dealt with the settlement of disputes. 
3 That same 
day the two delegations began their private talks which resulted in the 
Geneva Protocol. 4 
Whereas the draft Treaty had been primarily concerned with the pro- 
vision of military assistance to victims of aggression, the Geneva 
Protocol's main purpose was to provide exhaustively for the compulsory 
settlement of all international disputes. 
5 It was, however, far more 
explicit in its provisions for disarmament. Article XVII bound its 
signatories to take part in an international disarmament conference at 
1. In his speech to the Assembly Herriot had reminded his audience that 
the intentions of Article 8 of the Covenant were both security and 
disarmament. 
2. MacDonald had referred approvingly to the Optional Clause in his 
Assembly speech but in July Haldane had expressed his opposition 
and Beatty had voiced the Admiralty's anxieties. See CID, 187th 
meeting, 28 July 1924, CAB 2/4. Haldane wrote a memorandum, later 
to be unearthed and used by Austen Chamberlain in 1926, arguing the 
case against its acceptance. His memorandum and Beatty's fears had 
been aroused by a speech by Lord Parmoor in the House of Lords on 
24 July 1924 suggesting that the jurisdiction of the Court should 
be made compulsory. The Optional Clauset Article 36 in the Statute, 
obliged states to recognise the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court 
in four classes of legal disputes. 
3. League of Nations: Records of the-Fifth Assemblv. Special Supplement 
No. 21, pp. 77-9. 
4. Le Temps, 7 September 1924. 
5. A. J. Toynbee: Survey of International Affairs. 1924, London, 1926, p. 49. 
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Geneva on 15 June 1925 and Article XXI decreed that the Protocol would 
not come into force until a plan for the reduction of armaments had been 
adopted. Should that plan not be implemented, the League Council was 
obliged to declare the Protocol null and -void. If a signatory state 
defaulted on its obligations under the disarmament plan, it would cease 
to be a beneficiary of the Protocol. 
1 
1924 witnessed not only a change of government in both Britain and 
France but. a subtle transformation in the attitude of the French people. 
International reactions to the Ruhr occupation and France's hard line 
policy towards Germany led the French nation to question whether reliance 
on military power and military engagements to the exclusion of all other 
consideratiomeould guarantee French security. None the lessp in all 
the discussions between the British and French delegations and in the 
Assembly's committees, the French insisted that arbitration, security 
and disarmament were indissolubly linked and that they would not take 
part in a disarmament conference unless they first received guarantees 
of their own security. 
On the British side the detailed work of implementing the Assembly 
resolution was left to Lord Parmoor 
2 
and Arthur Henderson,, the leaders 
1. For two contemporary estimates, see P. J, Noel-Baker: The-Geneva 
Protocol, London, 1925 and D. H. Miller: The Geneva Protocol, New 
York, 1925. For a short summary of the Protocol's provisions and 
the attitude of the British government to it, see Anne Orde: lGreat Britain and International Securit-v. 1920-1926, pp. 68-80. 
2. Charles Alfred Cripps, Lord Parmoor (1914), 1852-1941, barrister 
and churchman, von four Firsts at New College, Oxford, in History, 
Mathematics, Jurisprudence and Civil Laws became a QC in 1890 with 
a lucrative practice, Cons. MP for Stroud, 1895-1900, Stretford, 
1901-5, Wycombe, 1910-14, opposed British participation in the war 
in 19149 championed conscientious objectors, supported Lansdowne's 
peace letter and early attempts to found a league of nations, 
chaired the post-war 'Fight the Famine' Council, Lord President of 
the Council and Minister responsible for League affairs, 1924, Lord 
President and Leader of the House of Lords, 1929-31. He aroused 
considerable criticism in 1924, not just in the Admiralty. Cecil 
told Murray on 8 March 1924 that he was 'most depressing as a League Minister' and Beatrice Webb, the sister of his first wife, noted in her diary on 21 July 1925: 'He was not a success in the Labour Cabinet 
and we wondered why IRM asked him in - it was not our doing, though, 
of course, it was assumed to be so. ' 
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of the British delegation. 
1 
As the days went by they moved closer to 
the French position and drew down upon themselves the wrath of the 
Admiralty in London and a section of the British Press. Parmoor, who 
in the first days of the Assembly had embarrassed his colleagues by his 
'pure pacifism', began to accept the need for sanctions. 
2 Apparently 
unaware of how strenuously successive British governments, with the full 
backing of the Foreign Office and the Service departments, had resisted 
automatic sanctions and a generous interpretation of Article 16, 
Henderson3 argued that the obligations in what was to become Article XI 
of the Protocol were already implicit in Article 16 of the Covenant. 
If members of the League were not prepared to give military or naval 
assistance to a victim of aggression and did exactly as they pleased, 
aggressors would go scot-free and small states would always be at the 
mercy of a powerful neighbour. 
4 
Though they were prepared to move towards the French position on 
sanctions and security, Parmoor and Henderson were determined to make 
the price of their 'surrender' a firm commitment to disarmament. On 
IS September a great battle took place between the two delegations as 
to whether the Protocol's arbitration and security provisions should 
1. MacDonald left Geneva on 7 September. Parmoor and Henderson were 
assisted by Sir Cecil Hurst and Philip Noel-Baker who both played 
a notable role in the drafting of the Protocol. Noel-Baker had gone 
to Geneva as the secre'tary to Gilbert Murray, another of the delegates, 
but during the course of the Assembly he virtually became Henderson's 
personal assistant. 
2. Murray to Cecil, 5 September 1924, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51132; 
see also adverse criticism in MacDonald Diaries, 21 September 1924, 
MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/8/1. For his pro-sanction remarks see 
Le Temps, 12 September 1924. 
3. Arthur Henderson, 1863--ý1935, was Rome Secretary in the 1924 government. 
As Secretary of the Labour party and a leading member of the Labour and 
Socialist International - he was President in 1928 - Henderson was a 
powerful figure in both the British and the European socialist 
movements. 
4. League of Nations: Record of the Fifth Assembly. Special SUpplement 
No. 26, P. 42 and FO 371/10570. 
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come into force regardless of the success or failure of the disarmament 
conference. The French contended that they should. The British said 
that they should not. After a lengthy discussion, the British view 
prevailed. Parmoor argued that in accepting compulsory arbitration and 
'the heavy obligations in regard to sanctions', states were surrendering 
part of their sovereignty. Britain would only accept such sacrifices if 
they formed part of a scheme for disarmament. Responsibilities such as 
these could only be discharged in a disarmed Europe. 
1 
The Admiralty were certainly not prepared to discharge such onerous 
obligations even in a disarmed world. When the draft Protocol reached 
London, they mounted a campaign against it. On 20 September they sent 
the Foreign Office a strongly worded memorandum opposing any provision 
which would oblige Britain to participate in the enforcement of a blockade 
or in rendering naval assistance to a state whose sea comminications were 
threatened by an aggressor. They could not 'protest too strongly against 
the British fleet being placed in such a dangerous position'. Such 
responsibilities were totally incompatible with the one-power standard. 
2 
That same weekend, L. S. Amery, a former First Lord, attracted consider- 
able publicity by an article in the Sunday Times3 and a speech in his 
Sparkbrook constituency subjecting the terms of the Protocol to searching 
criticism. 
4 On Sunday, 21 September, a day set aside by the Labour party, 
the TUC and the International Federation of Trade Unions for demonstra- 
tions against war, MacDonald reacted to Admiralty protests, and the campaign 
in the Press, by instructing Parmoor to inform the French that the Protocol 
would have to be considered by the goverment and approved by Parliament 
before the British government could fully endorse it. 
1. PO 371/10570. 
2. Ibid. 
3.21 September 1924. 
4. The Times, 22 September 1924; Le Temps, 22 September 1924. 
5. FO 371/10570 and C-51(24), 29 September 1924, CAB 23/48. 
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The Admiralty sought to exert the maximum pressure on the Prime 
Minister, the Cabinet and the British delegation at Geneva. On 27 September 
they despatched Captain (later Admiral Sir) Dudley Pound to Geneva to try, 
albeit unsuccessfully, to persuade Parmoor and Henderson to make changes 
in the approved text of the Protocol. 
1 
The Protocol was only briefly discussed by the Cabinet and the CID 
before the Labour government fell from power. 
2 MacDonald assured its 
critics in the Cabinet that the government would not be committed by any 
action taken by their delegation at Geneva. When on 9 October the Cabinet 
approved the text of the King's speech proroguing Parliament they endorsed 
a reference to the Protocol which described it as 'an important advance on 
the road to the reduction of armaments' which, it was hoped, would 'lead 
to the first practical measure for lightening the heavy burdens' under 
which the nations of the world were labouring. 
3 There was no hint that 
the government might find it necessary to repudiate it. 
Doubts have been expressed by historians and others over the half 
century since 1924 whether the Labour government would have carried the 
Protocol if it had survived. 
4 Chelmsford, Haldane 
5 
and Wedgwood 
6 
1. Chelmsford to MacDonald, 26 September 1924, FO 371/10570; CP 456(24), 
27 September 1924, CAB 24/168; Chelmsford to Haldane, 27 September 
1924, Haldane Papers, Vol. 5916; Dalton Diaries, 15 March and 
4 December 1928. 
2. Minutes of a meeting of Ministers 22 September 1924, CAB 23/48; 
C-51(24), 29 September 1924, CAB 
i3/48; CID, 188th meeting, 
2 October 1924, CAB Z/3- 
3. C-55(24), 9 October 1924, CAB 23/48. 
4. See, for example, Anne Orde: Great Britain and International Security, 
1920-1926, p. 69. 
5. In the House of Lords on 16 November 1927 Haldane said: 'I did not 
like the Protocol just because it involved so many agreements and 
I may say I never was a party to any suggestion for us to sign it. ' 
69 EL Debs. 5th Series, cols. 104-5. 
6. Wedgwood was Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. He wrote in Clarion 
on 30 January 1925 'The Protocol involves the risk of war and not the 
security of peace. ' See also his remarks at the Labour party confer- 
ence, Report of the 25th Annual Conferencet London, n. d. (1925), p. 257. 
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within the Cabinet were opposed to it. Snowden eventually adopted a 
hostile attitude to it. 
1 
J. H. Thomas, the Colonial Secretary, had proved 
extremely susceptible to Admiralty pressures in February 1924 
2 
and might 
well have felt obliged to voice the opposition of the Dominion governments. 
On the other hand it seems highly likely that MacDonald would have sup- 
ported it though perhaps only in an amended form. 
3 It was strongly 
supported by the League of Nations Union and most of the Liberal party. 
4 
The evidence seems to suggest that it would have commanded a majority in 
the Commons but that if the government had tried to meet the criticisms 
of the Service departments it would have been so emasculated as to make 
it worthless to France and the 'consumers' of security. 
Before the new Foreign Secretary, Austen Chamberlain, notified the 
League Council in March 1925 that the British government could not accept 
the Geneva Protocol, it was subjected to exhaustive study in the Foreign 
Office, the Service departments and the CID. They were virtually 
5 
unanimous in condemning it as were also the Dominion governments. The 
Protocol had few friends in the Conservative party. Its October 1924 
general election manifesto had warned the electorate that it would be 
1. Re-vn! 21ds News, 4 September 1927 and Manchester Guardian, 14 September 
1927. 
2. W. S. Chalmers: The Life and Letters of David. Earl Beatty, P. 395. 
3. A. C. Temperley: The-WhisDering Gallery of Europe, London, 1938, p. 29 
took the view that MacDonald would have rejected it but the evidence 
of his speeches and correspondence in the years 1925 to 1927 leads 
to a different conclusion. See pp. 69-70. 
4. Lloyd George was opposed to it describing it as 'a booby-trap for 
Great Britain baited with arbitration'. However, 11. A. L. Fisher 
took the view that the Labour party were behind it and quoted 
Henderson, a somewhat biased authority, to the effect that 'the 
Labour Party are going for the Protocol full steam ahead and say 
it is very popular in the country and that its advocacy is... good 
political business'. It would seem that MacDonald certainly came 
to that conclusion too. See Fisher to Lloyd George, 20 March 1925, 
Lloyd George Papers, G/7/1/3- 
5. For a full account of the Baldwin government's scrutiny of the Protocol and the attitude of the Dominion governments see Anne Orde: Great Britain and International Securit_V. 1920-1926,, pp. 70-80. 
necessary to subject it to very careful scrutiny 
1 
and even Cecil was 
critical of it. He was dubious about its arbitration procedures and was 
fearful lest it virtually convert the League into some kind of super-state 
so ruling out all chance of the United States joining the League for a 
generation. 
2 Nevertheless because it had the support of some of Europe's 
ablest statesmen, had already been signed by ten states, and had won the 
general approval of another forty-seven, Cecil believed that it could not 
be rejected out of hand, 
3a 
view which the Foreign Secretary also shared. 
4 
With all its defects, Cecil thought that it was not beyond redemption. 
Its deficiencies could be remedied by appropriate amendments. Britain was 
pledged to the hilt to promote general disarmament and that objective was 
worth considerable effort and some sacrifices, Cecil suggested, because 
without it Britain could never enjoy real security. If there was no 
disarmament, sooner or later she would be caught up in another arms race. 
She would profit immensely if she could persuade the Prench to reduce 
their air force and agree to the limitation of submarines and cruisers. 
Armed strength was a relative matter. If Britain persuaded other nations 
to follow her example in reducing their armaments, so much greater would 
her relative military strength be. It should not be assumed that the 
Dominions were an irremovable barrier to the acceptance of the 
1. F. W. S. Craig: British General Election Manifestos. 1918-1945, pp. 28-42. 
2. Cecil to Murray, 25 September 1924, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51132. 
3.17 November 1924, FO 800/256. Chamberlain had asked Cecil on 
11 November to make no public statements on the Protocol until the 
government had had an opportunity to examine it. Cecil had returned 
to office in Baldwin's second administration as Chancellor of the 
Duchy of Lancaster with the same responsibility for League affairs 
as he had had in Baldwin's first administration in 1923. He cannot 
have endeared himself to his leader by his opposition to protection in 1923. In order of Cabinet precedence he returned to government in a more lowly office though his function remained the same and 
gave him a voice in the Cabinet. 
4. CID, 192nd meeting, 16 December 1924, CAB 2/4. 
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Protocol. 1 Their true opinion should be ascertained and a special committee, 
representative of both the Dominions and all sections of British life, 
established to examine the Protocol. 
2 
Adopting Cecil's suggestion, Chamberlain tried without success to 
persuade Baldwin to appoint a widely-representative committee to which 
4 both Grey and Haldane would be invited to formulate a national policy 
on the Protocol. 
5 
The only exhaustive examination of the Protocol, 
however, took place in a sub-committee of the CID. 
The Conservative government rejected the Protocol because it was 
opposed to compulsory arbitration and automatic sanctions. Like MacDonald 
and most of the Labour party, Baldwin and his colleagues believed that 
moral force, not military power, was the League's principal weapon and 
that the pacification of Europe would be brought about by conciliation 
and discussion rather than by a battery of sanctions. Britain, further- 
more, could not safeguard her world-wide imperial interests or her vital 
interests in western Europe if there was an ever-present danger of being 
dragged into a European war over Lithuania or Latvia or Poland or 
1. In June 1924 Cecil had remonstrated with MacDonald for conceding 
to the Dominion governments 'a liberum veto' in the formulation of 
British foreign policy. Cecil to MacDonald, 19 and 23 June 1924, 
Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51081. Cecil and his friend, Philip 
Noel-Baker, believed that too much attention was being paid to 
Dominion susceptibilities. The constitutional position was obscure 
and in The Present Juridical Status-of-the British Dominions-in 
International Law, London, 1929, Noel-Baker as an authority on inter- 
national law tried to produce an authoritative statement on the con- 
stitutional relationship between Great Britain and the Dominions. 
It is worth noting that the Dominions were not parties to either 
the abortive Treaty of Guarantee in 1919 or the Locarno treaties 
of 1925. 
2.17 November 1924, FO/256. Cecil had tried to persuade MacDonald 
to set up a similar body in October 1924. 
3. Grey had voiced his support for the principles of the Protocol but 
he was not in a strong position to commit the Liberal party. 
4. Haldane was opposed to the Protocol and was not, therefore, repres- 
entative of the Labour party. 
5. Chamberlain to Baldwin, 25 November 1924, Austen Chamberlain Papers, 
AC 35/l/12. Chamberlain also suggested that the Dominions should be brought Into these discussions but at a later stage. 
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Bessarabia. With the single exception of Sir James Headlam. -Morley, its 
Historical Adviser, no one in the Foreign Office believed that Britain 
should pledge herself to defend any European frontiers other than the 
eastern boundaries of France and the Low Countries. He alone had the 
vision to see that Britain had a direct interest in the peace and stability 
of central and eastern Europe. None the less it was generally recognised 
that Britain ought to try to replace the Geneva Protocol by some form of 
mutual security pact restricted to western Europe. 
Locarno 
The Locarno conference in October 1925 brought to a successful con- 
elusion more than six months of patient diplomacy in which Britain's 
Foreign Secretary played the major role. Though the conference adopted 
a treaty of mutual guarantee binding Belgium, Britain, France, Germany 
and Italy to uphold the status guo in the Rhineland and along the Belgian- 
German and Franco-German frontiers it did nothing to promote disarmament. 
The German delegation pressed the cause for general disarmament but the 
conference contented itself in its final protocol with an anodyne commit- 
ment to pursue disarmament at some future and unspecified date. The 
British Cabinet had concluded on 2 March 1925 
2 that a mutual security 
pact between France, Germany, Belgium, Britain and Italy might lead to 
a reduction of armaments but Chamberlain did not seek to make disarmament 
a condition of Britain's signature of a security pact. In defending his 
policy in the Commons on 24 June he said that if the powers succeeded in 
removing fear they would remove one major obstacle to disarmament. There 
was nothing to be gained from devoting time and energy to detailed pro- 
visions for disarmament because economic factors would force countries 
to make reductions in armaments as soon as they felt secure. 
3 
1. Anne Orde: Great Britain and International-Security. 1920-1926, pp. 74-80; 
A. Volfers: Britain and France between two Wars, pp. 254-6, New Haven, 1940. 
2. C. 12(25), 2 March 1925, CAB 23/49. 
3.185 HC Debs. 5th Series, cols. 1566-7,24 June 1925. 
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There was nothing new in Chamberlain's line of argument. Smuts 
had predicted in January 1921 that financial pressures would solve the 
armaments problem. 
1 
Cecil had warned the Secretary of State for War, 
Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, in August 1922 that economic circumstances 
would compel nations to reduce their armaments. He might have added 
that they had already done so in Britain. In fact he predicted what 
the history of the 1920s was to demonstrate, that poor countries would 
make immense sacrifices to maintain huge armies at a time when the 
wealthier, democratic countries of western Europe were disarming. 
2 
Cecil foresaw a situation arising in Britain when financial pressures 
would be so great that the government would over-rule its Service advisers 
to make wholesale and drastic reductions which put the country in jeopardy. 
It was for that reason among others that he preached general disarmament 
by international agreement in and out of season. 
3 Piecemeal reduction in 
armaments brought about by economic pressures would disrupt the balance 
of power and tilt it in favour of the least democratic countries of Europe. 
Only mutual and balanced force reductions could save the democracies from 
the adverse consequences of those electoral and economic pressures which 
threatened their armed forces. 
The Labour party neither accepted Chamberlain's prognosis nor did 
it entirely share Cecil's views. MacDonald, following Chamberlain's 
statement to the Commons on 24 June, said that he profoundly disagreed 
with the Foreign Secretary. Ignoring recent British history and implicitly 
exaggerating the power of the military In Britain and other countries, 
MacDonald said that he did not believe that any nation would reduce its 
armaments 'by a ship or a gun' as a result of economic pressures. With 
1. Smuts to Cecil, 14 January 1921, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mos. 51076. 
2. Cecil to Worthington-Evans, 14 August 1922, Cecil Papers, BL Add. 
Mos. 51095. 
3. Cecil to Churchill, 24 July 1925, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51097. 
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its national existence at stake no nation was going to say that it had 
spent twenty per cent. too much on armaments, let us reduce it. There 
would be no disarmament without a disarmament conference 
1 
because no 
country would voiuntarily reduce its armaments without securing similar 
reductions in other countries. Without disarmament no security pact would 
produce real security. 
2A 
fortnight after the conclusion of the Locarno 
3 
conference Noel-Baker , to whom MacDonald was much indebted at this time 
for advice on disarmament and foreign policy, commented that the treaty 
of mutual guarantee was 'the Treaty of Mutual Assistance minus, alas, 
4 
disarmament' . Britain had given a guarantee to France and 
Belgium 
without insisting on disarmament as a guid Dro guo. 
Both Baldwin and Chamberlain assured the Commons during the first 
half of 1925 that Britain was willing to join with other powers to secure 
5 
general disarmament, and partly to placate Cecil, Chamberlain informed 
Briand in July that the British government would welcome a practical 
advance towards the limitation of armaments at the forthcoming 1925 
League Assembly. 
6 
None the less the Balawin Cabinet showed little interest 
in disarmament during the months leading to the signature of the Locarno 
treaties. It was Amery who articulated the views of his colleagues on 
disarmament at a meeting of the CID in February 1925. Disarmament could 
only come about by creating the right atmosphere. Public opinion would 
ultimately produce the necessary confidence if it was allowed to operate 
through a League of Nations untrammelled by sanctions and systems of 
1. The Geneva Protocol had provided for a disarmament conference to be 
convened at Geneva nine days earlier on 15 June. 
2.185 HC Dabs. 5th Series, Colo. 1579-81. 
3. See Noel-Baker's memoranda for and correspondence with MacDonald 
on 23 and 25 May, 3 July 1925, MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/5/36, 
4. Noel-Baker to Gilbert Murray, 30 October 1925, Gilbert Murray Papers. 
5.181 HC Dabs. 5th Series, col. 2258,18 March 1925 and 185 HC Dabs. 
5th Series, col. 1654,24 June 1925. 
6. C 8604/459/18,2 July 1925 quoted in CP 324(25), 2 July 1925, CAB 24/174. 
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security. Institutionalised procedures would prevent rather than promote 
disarmament. 1 When in July Cecil proposed that the recently formed League 
of, Nations Co-ordination Committee 
2 
be entrusted with the task of conduct- 
ing a searching enquiry into the principles of disarmament, Chamberlain 
opposed the proposal. 
3 He did not think that any progress could be made 
towards disarmament until the basic condition for success, a greater 
measure of security, had been achieved. Even if the western security 
pact was concluded, Europe would still be insecure because nothing would 
have been done to remove eastern Europe's fear of Bolshevik Russia. 
Without apparently being aware of the contradiction in his own argument, 
Chamberlain went on to forecast that disarmament would follow the signature 
of a western security pact. Economic pressures would force 'a great reduc- 
tion' in armaments on a not unwilling France. However, such reductions 
would not necessarily be in Britain's interests so long as Russia 
remained strong. In any case, Cecil's proposal would be wrong. For 
Britain to take the initiative without the certainty of success would be 
courting disaster but there was wisdom in Cecil's suggestion that Britain's 
Service advisers should be instructed to devise proposals which Britain 
could propose at the most opportune moment. The Cabinet aided with 
Chamberlain. No effective progress could be made until the pact was 
concluded but an expert enquiry should be set up to formulate principles 
to guide the government in any future disarmament negotiations. 
4 
L CID, 195th meeting, 13 February 1925, CAB 2/4. 
2. The Co-ordination Committee, comprising both military and civilian 
personnel, had been set up to replace the TMC. 
3. Cecil's memorandum is CP 329(25)t 6 July 1925, CAB 24/174. 
Chamberlain's rejoinder is CP 357(25)t 16 July 1925, CAB 24/174. 
4. C-39(25), 22 July 1925, CAB 23/50. A week later Hankey drafted a 
Note to the Chiefs of Staff reminding them that Britain was pledged by the Covenant and Versailles Treaty to further measures of dis- 
armament and it was, therefore, essential for the government to be 
well briefed when the negotiations began. CID Paper 627-B in 
CAB 16161 and CP 365(25), 27 July 1925, CAB 24/174. 
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Disarmament was an important issue at the Sixth League Assembly 
in September 1925. Throughout the deliberations of the Assembly's Third 
Committee, Britain's delegates had the unenviable task of urging caution 
and thus laying themselves open to the charge of obstruction. France 
took the lead in advocating disarmament and such was the momentum 
generated by France and some of the smaller nations that on 25 September 
the Assembly adopted a resolution calling on the League Council to 
initiate a preparatory study for a disarmament conference. 
1 
The significance of the Locarno treaties was widely and wildly 
exaggerated in Britain. It was assumed that the prospects of a major 
European war had been banished for the foreseeable future. To show how 
seriously the government took the Locarno, settlement the Cabinet decided 
to postpone the completion date of the 1923 air expansion programme from 
1930 to 1935 and the CID, 'in view of the great advance in the pacifica- 
tion of Europe resulting from Locarnol, abandoned its endeavours to 
educate the public about the dangers of air raids. 
2 In their annual 
review of imperial defence in 1926 the Chiefs of Staff said that the 
'Washington and Locarno treaties had reduced the risks of war in those 
parts of the world where Britain was most vulnerable. They even sug- 
gested that the threat of aerial bombardment to London and the South 
of England had been 'reduced to a minimum'. 
3 They made no plans, however, 
to implement Britain's guarantee. It could well be asked how plans could 
be made to bring immediate military assistance to Belgium, France or 
Germany in such different circumstances. It is not, therefore, altogether 
DBFP, Series IA, Vol. 1, No. 42; Granville to Chamberlain, 
24 September 1925, FO 371/11067; CID Paper 631-B, in CAB 16/61; 
Drury-Love to MacDonald, 20 September 1925, MacDonald Papers, 
PRO 30/69/5/36; The Times, 23 September 1925. 
2. C-57(25), 3 December 1925, and C-58(25), 9 December 1925, CAB 23/51; 
CID, 208th meeting, 26 January 1926, CAB Z/4- 
3. COS 41,22 June 1926, CAB 53/12. 
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surprising that no such optimistic assessments of the beneficial effects 
of Locarno vere to emanate from the French military authorities. 
1 
The government did not forget that the Final Protocol of the Locarno 
conference had committed its signatories 'to give their sincere co-operation 
to the work relating to disarmament already undertaken by the League of 
Nations and to-seek the realisation thereof in a general agreement'. On 
18 November Chamberlain informed the Commons that the Locarno treaties 
had made disarmament practicable and given it a degree of urgency. 
2 
When there was a three months' delay in 1926 in the opening of the 
Preparatory Commission3 Chamberlain expressed his impatience. He told 
the French ambassador in London that a large section of British public 
opinion would feel that the Locarno treaties had been robbed of almost 
all their merit if no progress was made towards disarmament. 
4 Pive months 
earlier he had tried to persuade the Polish government that the Locarno 
treaties justified large cuts in Poland's military expenditure. 
5 
The goverment knew it could not ignore the strong and growing 
public support for the League and disarmament and for a brief period in 
1. Cf. the anonymous article 'A Propos du D4'sarmement' in Revue des 
Deux Mondes, 1 May 1926 and Foch's description of Locarno as a 
'soporifiquel quoted by J. H. Morgan: Assize-of Arms, Vol. 1, 
London, 1945, p, xi. A slightly more optimistic assessment was 
made by the Quai d'Orsay in July 1931 in its memorandum on disarma- 
ment: 'in a particularly sensitive European area, and one of vital 
interest to France, the signing of the Locarno Agreement ... made for 
France, as well as for the other Powers adjacent to that area, a 
great additional contribution to the guarantees of security result- 
ing from the strict observance of the Treaties Eof Peace]. ' LeaRue 
of Nations Conference for the Limitation and-Reduction of Armaments, 
Document 1X, 9, Geneva, 1932. 
2.188 HC Debs. 5th Series, col. 423,18 November 1925. 
3. In response to the Sixth Assembly resolution on 25 September 1925 
calling for a preparatory study for a disarmament conferencet the 
League Council on 12 December fixed the composition of a Preparatory 
Commission for the Disarmament Conference and decided that it should 
begin its work on 15 February 1926. Its opening session was post- 
poned to 18 May 1926 as a result of represestations from France, 
Italy, Japan, Czechoslovakia and Uruguay who were anxious that it 
should not begin its work without German and Russian participation. 
4. DBFP, Series IA, Vol. 1, No. 430. 
5. Ibid., No. 57. 
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the afterglow of Locarno it gave the impression that it would bend all 
its energies to support the League's endeavours to achieve disarmament 
despite its own preference for regional or limited agreements on the 
lines of the Washington treaty. Two factors deprived Britain of the 
opportunity of giving a firm and, perhaps, decisive lead in the Preparatory 
Commission: the obstruction of the Service departments and her unwilling- 
ness to go beyond the locarno commitments. From the beginning of the 
Preparatory Commission Britain's delegation resisted every attempt to 
link disarmament with further guarantees of European security. That 
stance did not change when the Labour party returned to power in 1929. 
1930 
The 1930 London naval conference provided France with another oppor- 
tunity to demand additional security guarantees as the price for an arms 
limitation agreement. Before the conference began the MacDonald Cabinet 
set themselves to resist French demands. 
1 The insistency of France's 
delegation only served to reinforce their determination. Henderson even 
went so far as to say that he would not be bounced by the French into 
any new Geneva Protocol. 
2 France's rejection of Italy's claim to naval 
parity coupled with her demands for a Mediterranean mutual security pact 
a Mediterranean Locarno was how some contemporaries described it - made a 
five power naval limitation agreement unattainable. MacDonald's govern- 
ment refused to see that France would never rest content with the provi- 
sions of the Covenant and the Locarno treaties and that she would insist 
on additional guarantees if she was required to surrender her margin of 
superiority over Italy. On 16 February 1930 MacDonald summed up his own 
attitude: 'Whilst willing to discuss security and Ean3 understanding 
relating to it# I am determined not to drift into the position in which 
Grey found himself [in 19141. That gives France a free hand in determining 
I. C-1(30)v 14 January 1930, CAB 23/63. 
2. Noel-Baker to Cecil, 27 February 1930, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mas. 51107. 
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European policy with Great Britain a bound follower or pawn subordinate 
in the game. ' 
1A 
Mediterranean agreement couched in terms acceptable to 
France would never be conceded by a government headed by one of the most 
outspoken critics of Gray's pre-war diplomacy. 
There were those within the foreign policy-making establishment who 
did not accept that policy. Behind the scenes Noel-Baker, with the 
assistance of Robert Vansittart, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State 
at the Foreign Office and R. L. Craigie, the head of the American depart- 
ment, worked to find a formula which would satisfy both the British and 
French governments. Vansittart believed that a Franco-British understand- 
ing was essential if the status auo in Europe was to be preserved and the 
standing and prestige of the League upheld. 
2 Though they had some assist- 
3 
ance from Dwight Morrow of the American delegation, their efforts were to 
no avail. In Britain a strong isolationist tide had set in and neither 
MacDonald nor Henderson was immune to its influence. 
4 Franeophobia was 
once again in the ascendant. MacDonald concluded that France would not 
allow Europe to disarm. 'The French mentality is exactly what it was 
before the war.... It allows no value for political security. It thinks 
in guns and bayonets.... War is the central fact of its mind., 
5 
There were faults on both sides of the Channel. In 1930 the French 
were not slow to exploit their new-found economic strength which contrasted 
so much with Britain's predicament. Britain's ambassador in Paris believed 
that France was determined to extract those guarantees she had failed to 
secure when the franc was weak. This was, however, peripheral to the 
main issue. The London naval conference brought into sharp relief the 
1. MacDonald Diaries, 16 February 1930, MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/8/1. 
2. Dalton Diaries, 13,21 and 24 March# 7 April 1930. 
3. H. Nicolson: Dwight Morrow,, London, 1935, PP. 372-6. 
4. Dalton Diaries, 7 April 1930. 
5. MacDonald Diaries, 12 and 14 February, 20 March 1930, MacDonald Papers, 
PRO 30/69/8/1. 
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differences which divided the two countries in their approach to security 
and disarmament. 
Geneva was also the scene of Anglo-French differences in the winter 
of 1930 when the League took up the perennial question of Covenant 
revision. Ever since the signature of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in Paris 
in August 1928 renouncing war as an instrument of national policy it had 
frequently been suggested that an attempt should be made to harmonies the 
Covenant with the Peace Pact. Whereas the Pact outlawed war, the Covenant, 
in certain circumstances, implicitly legitimised it. At the 1929 League 
Assembly Britain unwisely suggested that a fresh attempt might be made 
to amend the Covenant. At the Assembly's request the League Council 
set up the Committee of Eleven to propose amendments to Articles 12 to 
15. Ceeil, 'who had been opposed to raising the issue at the 1929 League 
Assembly, worked to prevent a breach with France in the Committee but 
when news of one of the Committee's recommendations, a proposal to amend 
Article 15 so that in some circumstances arbitration would be both 
obligatory and enforceable, reached London it sparked off another round 
of controversy over sanctions and produced a hostile reaction in Whitehall. 
Philip Kerr and Austen Chamberlain aired their objections to League 
enforcement procedures in the correspondence column of The Times, 
I 
pleading the view that prevention was better than punishment and bringing 
once more into the open those differences over security which divided 
Britain from France. The government rejected the Committee of Eleven's 
report and at the 1930 League Assembly Henderson announced that as far 
as Britain was concerned a disarmament agreement was a precondition for 
any radical revision of the Covenant. 
2 
Britain made a far from cordial response in the summer of 1930 to 
1.20 and 27 February 1930. 
2. D. Carlton: MacDonald versus Henderson, London, 1970, pp. 87-91. 
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Briand's proposals for European unity despite the promise they held out 
of liberalising trade in Europe - an attractive prospect to a Labour 
government wedded to Free Trade and struggling to find markets for 
Britain's ailing export industries. No more favourable was the govern- 
ment's reaction to France's claim in July 1931 that 'the general reduction 
of armaments lays upon the stronger and less threatened Powers fresh 
responsibilities which they cannot eludel. 
1 
It was Britain's refusal 
to recognise such a responsibility which had prevented agreement in the 
more auspicious climate of the 1920s. 
From 1919 to 1931 Britain's statesman were haunted by memories of 
the sequence of events between the making of the Entente Cordiale in 1904 
and the final denouement of the July Crisis in 1914 which had drawn Britain 
into war. A few of them had had a hand in those events. All of them 
2 
believed that they had learnt the lessons of history* 
It was impossible to ignore the fact, however, that conditions in 
Europe posed a serious threat to peace. Britain could not stand aloof 
from the continent as many of her citizens wished. Too many vital British 
interests were at stake. France, it was believed, held the key to 
European peace and security. If she felt securet the process of European 
pacification and regeneration would begin. Nations would reduce their 
armaments, the European economy would prosper, and peace would be secure, 
A guarantee of French security was the minimum price Britain could expect 
to pay to secure these gains but as early as September 1922 Balfour 
pointed out that France would not be content with anything the British 
1. Tyrrell to Henderson, 15 July 1931, CAB 21/347. 
2. The point was well made by Philip Kerr in a letter to the American 
Secretary of State, F. B. Kellogg, on 30 March 1928. 'The last 
world war'Was really predetermined between 1902 and 1906 when the 
Chamberlain proposals to Germany were rejected and the Entente was 
formed, and the foundations of naval competition were laid. ' 
Lothian Papers, GD 40/17/228. There were numerous allusions to 
Grey's foreign policy and the consequences of the Entente in the 
discussions of the second Labour Cabinet in February and March 1930. 
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Empire was prepared to give. 
1 
By 1927 others began to question whether 
France could change the mood of Europe. The Franco-German problem was 
far from being the only cause of European insecurity. 'The further one 
travels East', Alexander Cadogan, the head of the Foreign Office's League 
of Nations sectionp wrote in October 1927, 'the more the Russian menace 
hangs over Europe. ' 
2 Three years later MacDonald questioned whether a 
guarantee was worth the price. Would it not make Britain 'the bound 
follower' of France? A guarantee, he suggested, would not only deprive 
Britain of her freedom of diplomatic manoeuvre but would strengthen 
French diplomacy at Britain's expense. 
It had been said unwearyingly since 1922 that disarmament would 
flow, some said automatically, from a sense of security but by 1927 
serious doubts were being expressed whether general guarantees or even 
regional agreements would ever provide sufficient security to induce 
states to reduce their armaments. The Locarno signatories had not been 
led to conclude a regional disarmament agreement. 
3 In February 1928 
Chamberlain, perhaps unwittingly, put his finger on the basic weakness 
and dishonesty in Britain's position. The essence of the Locarno treaty, 
he said, was reconciliation between old enemies and not the guarantee of 
a third power. 
4 
Throughout the 1920s Britain offered gestures not 
guarantees. 
1.15 September 1922, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51095. 
2. CP 256(27), 26 October 1927, CAB 24/189. 
3. In three memoranda in May, August and October 1927, Alexander Cadogan 
expressed his misgivings. 'Is it possible to believe that even a 
Protocol', he asked, 'would effect such a radical improvement as to 
change the whole mood of Europe? ' CP 256(27), 26 October 1927, 
CAB 24/189, Cf. DBPP, Series IA, Vol. III, Nos. 200 and 300. 
4.10 February 1928, CAB 27/361. 
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CELPTER SEVEN 
THE PREPARATORT COMMISSION AND PREPARATIONS 
FOR THE WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE 
The League of Nations had been in existence for six years when the 
]Preparatory Commission began its work in May 1926. Other than collect 
a vast store of information about armaments expenditurep the arms trade, 
chemical and bacteriological warfare, and the armed strength of the 
powers, the League) had done little more than request its members to 
limit their defence budgets and comment on schemes linking disarmament 
with regional security. Its inaction produced frustration especially 
in Britain, Scandinavia and Holland where pro-League sentiment was 
strong. Such was the disappointment in Britain that in July 1923 the 
Labour Opposition in the House of Commons asked the British government 
to by-pass the League and summon a world disarmament conference. The 
Assembly's request to the Council in September 1925 to make a preparatory 
study for a disarmament conference reflected the growing impatience of a 
large section of League opinion. 
The Locarno conference had not then taken place and the Assembly 
recognised that a disarmament conference would have to await an improve- 
ment in general security. When the League Council met in the following 
December the Locarno treaties had been signed. A practical step had at 
last been taken to promote European security. The work of disarmament 
could begin. 
The Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference was 
charged not with determining armament levels but with establishing the 
principles which should govern a disarmament convention. It was to 
consist of delegations from the ten states represented on the League 
----I 
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Council, the three great powers not then members of the League, Germany, 
Russia and the United States, and Bulgaria, Finland, Holland, Poland, 
Roumania and Yugoslavia, states which because of their geographical 
position and special circumstances had an exceptional interest in dis- 
armament. As a result of subsequent co-options, the Commission was by 
1930 to have delegations from twenty-seven states. 
The League Council at its December 1925 meeting also approved a -0 
set of seven questions, based on British and French drafts, for the 
Commission's consideration. 
(1) What was to be understood by the expression 'armaments'? 
(2) Was it practicable to limit a country's ultimate war strength? 
(3) What units of comparison could be devised to compare the armaments 
Of one country against those of another? 
Was it possible to distinguish between 'offensive' and 'defensive' 
weapons? 
What geographical and other factors should be taken into considera- 
tion in limiting a nation's armaments? 
Was it possible to differentiate between civil and military aircraft? 
(7) To what extent was regional disarmament stemming from regional 
security agreements practicable, and would it promote general 
disarmament? 
It would be impossible to understand British disarmament policy in 
the Locarno era without reference to the main objectives of Britain's 
foreign policy as they were then perceived by those responsible for its 
formulation and execution. A Foreign Office memorandum in April 1926 
stated that as a great power with far-flung possessions and commercial 
interests in every part of the world, Britain's sole object was to keep 
what she had and to live in peace. Wars, rumours of wars, quarrels and 
friction, wherever they occurred, spelt loss and harm to British interests. 
Whatever else might be the outcome of a disturbance of the peace, it was 
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almost certain that Britain would be the loser. 
' Replying to the 
Ponsonby Peace Letter 2 on 16 December 1927, Baldwin claimed that the 
whole foreign policy of his government was inspired by one purpose - 
the maintenance of peace and the prevention of war. It was for that 
reason that support for the League and the development of its authority 
had been the constant preoccupation of his government. 
3 Though Britain's 
policy makers recognised that there were defects in the 1919 peace 
settlement they had no desire to revise it except in so far as it might 
be possible to remove the grievances of other powers. The preservation 
of the status guo and the balance of power were vital British interests. 
Though these objectives commanded almost universal assent there 
were differences of emphasis and a wide divergence of views as to how 
beat they should be pursued. In 1922 there had been complete unanimity 
within the Cabinet that Britain should fight to preserve free access 
4 through the Dardanelles. In a celebrated letter to The Times, Bonar 
Law challenged the Cabinet and went on to win a general election in 
which, apparently, the electorate repudiated that policy. "We cannot 
alone act as the policeman of the world.... The financial and social 
condition of this country makes that impossible. '5 It would be said 
incessantly and with authority that Britain's commitments all over the 
world outran her capacity to fulfil them yet whether she liked it or not 
she could not evade the role of world policeman. Britain was an imperial 
power with extra-colonial interests she felt obliged to defend. In 
1. COS Paper No- 36,16 April 1926, CAB 53/12 printed in DBFP, Series IA, 
Vol. 1, Appendix, drafted by Mr. T. D. Gregory. 
2. The Ponsonby Peace Letter vas a statement, addressed to the Prime 
Minister and signed by 128,770 people, declaring that the signatories 
would refuse to support or render war service to any government which 
resorted to arms. It was sponsored by Arthur Ponsouby, MP, the 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the 
1924 Labour government. 
3. The Times, 21 December 1927. 
4. J. G. Darwin 'The Chanak Crisis and the British Cabinet' in Hist 
Vol. 65, No. 213, February 1980, p. 48. 
5.7 October 1922. 
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January 1927 Chamberlain told Lloyd George: 'We cannot allow ourselves 
to be hustled or driven from Shanghai as we were from Hankow. 1 The 
consequences of a disaster in Shanghai for Britain's position in the 
Far East, India, Afghanistan, Persia and even Turkey were far too serious 
to contemplate. 
' If a disproportionate amount of the Cabinet's time and 
the Foreign Secretary's energies between 1924 and 1927 was taken up with 
recurrent crises in Egypt and China it was in part due to Britain's 
priorities. However much she might champion the League and the cause of 
peace she was first and foremost an imperial power. To many of her 
people she appeared to be a poorly armed policeman in an unruly world. 
It is not altogether surprising that her Press took comfort when she 
successfully asserted her imperial will. 
2 
Britain was also part of Europe. When Chamberlain told a Conserva- 
tive audience in May 1926: 'Our policy in international affairs, as in 
national concerns, is a policy of peace and reconciliation', he had his 
sights firmly fixed on Europe. A peaceful Europe could only be built 
on the basis of a close and cordial friendship with France, common 
understanding and co-operation with Italy, and reconciliation with 
Germany and Britains other former enemies. 
3 There was no chance of 
Britain enjoying cordial relations with Germany, France and Italy unless 
they felt secure. Britain's policy in Europe was to promotoi harmonious 
relations between these three powers and to assist them in their search 
for security without burdening herself with commitments her people were 
loathe to undertake. So long as Europe was insecure, Germany would be 
tempted to sow dissension among the ranks of her former enemies and 
1. Chamberlain to Lloyd George, 19 January 1927, Lloyd George Papers, 
G/4/3/3- 
2. Par more space was devoted by Britain's Press to the despatch of 
troops to Shanghai and the movements of her cruiser squadron in 
the China Sea in the years 1926 to 1927 than to the proceedings 
of the Preparatory Commission at Geneva. 
3. Daily TelegraDh, 1 May 1926. 
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prepare for a war of revenge. France would seek her salvation in 
military power and military alliances and Britain would lose all influence 
over French policy. From 1919 onwards Britain sought the rehabilitation 
of a peaceful Germany in a Europe which was not dominated by any one 
power, a Franco-German understanding which would remove one major cause 
of war, and a resolution of those differences which divided France and 
Italy in the Mediterranean and Central and South-Eastern Europe. If 
harmonious relations existed between Germany, France and Italy, Russia 
could be virtually ignored but if Germany was at odds with France, a 
Russo-German combination would become a menacing prospect. To secure 
these objectives Britain sought a substantial share in shaping the policy 
of Europe. 
It has been said that the foreign policy of the second Baldwin 
government was to make the League work for all it was worth but for no 
more, to supplement it with limited regional commitments rather than 
global ones, and to keep in step with France while conducting an orderly 
retreat from the Peace of Versailles. 
1 Of these three objective s, the 
second assumed major significance because of its bearing on the other 
two. Chamberlain and his colleagues believed that the Locarno treaties 
had introduced a wholly new spirit into relations between Germany and 
her former enemies. In 1929 Churchill was to write: 'Since Locarno 
hope rests on a surer foundation-' There was good reason to believe, 
so Churchill thought, that the period of revulsion from war would be 
long-lasting. 
2 
Locarno was seen as a victory for British ideas of compromise and 
conciliation over continental ideas of compulsion* 
3 To a remarkable 
extent Chamberlain succeeded in persuading France to adopt a policy of 
1. Lord Eustace Percy: Some Memories, PP. 133-4. 
2. W. S. Churchill: The World Crisis,, Vol. V, The Aftermath, p. 459. 
3. DBFP, Series IA, Vol, 1, Appendix. 
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apaisement. It was the British view that Germany's wholehearted support 
for the Locarno settlement was far more important than the meticulous 
execution of the Versailles treaty. To secure her support, the Inter- 
Allied Control Commission was wound up, the economic clauses of the treaty 
were allowed to expire, the Rhineland occupation was terminated five years 
early, Germany was admitted to the League and re-admitted to the concert 
of Europe. In Britain's view none of these things would ensure lasting 
peace if, while Germany remained disarmed, her neighbours were free to 
deploy unlimited military power. Chamberlain as much as Cecil believed 
that the pressure for rearmament in Germany would assume unmanageable 
proportions if a general disarmament agreement was not concluded within 
a relatively short space of time. 
1 Furthermore, a rearmed Germany would 
ultimately constitute as great a menace to Britain as to Prance. 
2 
Put in its crudest form, policy makers in Britain believed that 
without general disarmament the Locarno treaties would ultimately fail 
to bring about European pacification. The threat to peace came not so 
much from the insecurity of France and the successor states as from the 
maintenance of excessive armaments. 
3 So long as Europe was divided into 
armed and disarmed states, resentment and jealousy would breed hostility 
and war. Disarmament, on the other hand, would promote Franco-German 
reconciliation, Franco-Italian understanding, and general European 
security. If at some future date Britain was forced to intervene in 
Europe's quarrels to throw her weight into the scales on behalf of peace, 
the effectiveness of her intervention would be in inverse proportion to 
the sice of Europe's armies and air forces. British disarmament policy 
was designed to minimise the risks of war and maximise Britain's role 
1, DBFP, Series IA, Vol. I, No. 264, Note 5 and No. 326. 
2. Ibid., Appendix. 
3. Draft Instructions to Viscount Cecil for His Guidance in Attending 
the Preparatory Commission, May 1926. CP 177(26), 27 April 1926, 
CAB 24/179; FO 371/11883; DBFP, Series IA, Vol. II, No. 2, Note 2. 
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in shaping European policy. Its weakness lay in its assessment of 
French and German intentions. 
To maintain-the European balance of power, Britain felt obliged 
from 1919 onwards to try and counteract French influence. None the less 
however much suspicion French policies might create there were always 
those in Britain who regarded French military power as the best guarantee 
of European stability and Britain's own interests in Europe. 'So far as 
French armaments are concerned, we can be certain that they will not be 
used against us' was the Foreign Office view in April 1926.1 A War 
Office memorandum for the Foreign Office ended with the words: 'The 
General Staff repeat that their mistrust and apprehension about Germany 
remain undiminished. They regard the German nation as primitive people, 
scientifically equipped. The General Staff have no fear of France; 
their fear is for France. ' 2 
If the German nation was irreconcilable and the German government 
bent on revising the Versailles treaty, if need be by force of arms, 
Franco-German reconciliation was a sterile hope and general disarmament 
a futile policy. Lingering doubts about Germany's intentions called 
into question the whole basis of British disarmament policy. In so 
far as that policy was designed to set within strict limits the military 
and air power of France and the successor states it was of doubtful 
wisdom if Europe's prime need was a bulwark against German expansion. 
If on the other hand Germany was prepared to work for peaceful change, 
French fears were unjustified and French military power dangerous and 
unnecessary. General disarmament would strengthen the authority of the 
League and further the cause of peace. There was some confusion and 
1. DBFP, Series IA, Vol. I, Appendix. 
2.6 January 1925, PO 371/3018. 
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and uncertainty in London as to which was the correct assessment. 
1 
If British policy makers were uncertain about French and German 
intentions they were even more doubtful about the Soviet Union. Though 
she had not fully recovered from the revolution and civil war, she posed 
a potential threat to her eastern European neighbours and Britain's own 
interests in Asia. 2 It was impossible for western Europe to make sub- 
stantial progress towards disarmament without the co-operation of 
eastern Europe. To rob the eastern European powers of their arms was 
to pave the way for Soviet expansion. Doubting the good faith of the 
Soviet government, British policy makers were far from single-minded 
in their desire for Russian participation in the Preparatory Commission. 
Doubts about Soviet intentions led to further doubts about general 
disarmament. 
There were none the less solid gains to be secured from European 
disarmament. The more peaceful Europe became the freer Britain would 
be to protect her world-wide interests. So long as she could move 
troops and ships speedily and freely from one part of the world to 
another her navy would remain a flexible instrument of imperial power. 
Without firing a shot, she could land troops, overawe local populations, 
win friends and influence people. Her navy was a warrant of intent for 
British diplomacy. 3 It symbolised Britain's power. To safeguard and 
enhance that power was one of the chief objectives of her disarmament policy. 
1. E. W. Bennett in German Rearmament--and the West. 1932-1933 has con- 
vincingly shown that Britain and the United States did not want to 
believe that German military power was reviving. For that reason, 
more than any other, they failed to fathom Germany's long-range 
intentions. 
2. See, for example, CID Paper 655-B, 15 December 1925, CAB 4/14 entitled 
'The Extension of Soviet Influence in Asia'. Britain's misfortunes in 
China were attributed to Russian influence. It accused the Soviet 
Union of increasing its defence budget by fifty per cent. at a time 
when the nations of Europe were 'bent on reduction of expenditure 
on armaments'. The paper took little account of the depreciation 
of the rouble in making its assessment. 
3. C. I. Hamilton 'Navies and Foreign Policy' in Historical Journal, 
Vol. 21, No. 4, December 1978. 
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In March 1925 Chamberlain told the Commons that it rested with the 
British Empire to determine whether there should be war or peace, 
' but 
in the second half of the 1920s Britain's main contribution to the con- 
solidation of world peace was made through the League of Nations and not 
through the assertion of imperial power. As Chamberlain was to tell the 
1926 Imperial Conference, the League bad become a permanent factor in 
international politics which no country could ignore. 
2 No one played 
a more important role in the transformation of the League from being 
merely 'a beautiful dream' to a thing of practical value in international 
relations than Austen Chamberlain. 
3 By his regular attendance at the 
quarterly meetings of the Council and the-annual meetings of the Assembly, 
Chamberlain helped to mks the League what Britain in 1919 had intended 
it should be, a standing conference of the powers andp in particular, 
the great powers. It is not, therefore, altogether surprising to dis- 
cover that when the Foreign Office was instructed in 1926 to list in 
relative order of importance Britainle, commitments. it began, with the 
Covenant of the League of Nations. 
4 
Though Britain was keen to develop the authority of the League, 
Chamberlain and the Baldwin government were, far from, convinced that the 
League was the beat instrument for promoting disarmament. Admirably 
suited to the work of international conciliation it was not held in high 
regard as an agency for disarmament. 
Suspicious of institutionalised procedures and reluctant to delegate 
authority to its officials, the government relied too much on Chamberlain's 
1.182 HC Debs. 5th Series, cols. 307-22,24 March 1925. 
2.20 October 1926, CAB 32/46. 
3. A. E. Zimmern: The League-of Nations and the Rule of Law, P. 360. 
4. DBFP, Series IA, Vol. I, Appendix. 
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personal diplomacy. 
1 
In the Locarno era the League system worked because 
a few individuals, notably Chamberlain, Briand and Stresemann, trusted 
each other and spoke with sufficient authority to commit their countries. 
Personal ties brought agreement and the gulf between Geneva and the 
capitals of the great powers was bridged because the actors on the Geneva 
stage commanded the respect of their colleagues at home and to a limited 
extent infected them with the Geneva spirit which they themselves had 
Imbibed. With the departure of Chamberlain and Stresemann. from the 
Geneva scene in 1929 that era came to an end. Though those personal 
factors exercised a benign influence in the Council, they were virtually 
non-existent in the Preparatory Commission. Furthermore, the British 
government did not empower Cecil, Cushendun and its expert advisers with 
sufficient authority to take those bold and imaginative initiatives without 
which progress was well nigh impossible. 
Setting the risks, both domestic and external, which Britain faced 
in the post-war world against the depleted resources she was able to 
command led British governments to pursue a policy of general disarmament. 
To secure the agreement of other powers to reduce their armaments it was 
necessary to offer them some inducements. The dilemma Britain faced in 
the 1920s was that the fever the resources she commanded, the fewer the 
inducements she had to offer. 
See, for example, Austen Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 15 October 
19270 'England will never be popular on the Continent ... but we are 
resp; cted and trusted, our sympathy is courted, our advice and our 
help continuously sought... Poincare' appeals for my help to make the 
Greeks see reason and settle their debts to France' and 17 December 
1928: 'If Stresemann, Briand and I were left alone to find a solution, 
I think we should manage to secure the evacuation of the Rhineland 
within a reasonable time' and to Ida Chamberlain, 9 July 1928: 'He 
[King Alfonso of Spain] remarked that I was the League and when I 
modestly deprecated this exaggerated view, replied "No, it's not 
the League, it's you, you. You just talk to a man for five minutes 
and then he turns right round and does what you want. " Well, it's 
a useful reputation to have. * Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC 5/l/434, 
459 and 463. For an examination of Chamberlain's personal relations 
with Mussolini see Peter Edwards 'The Austen Chamberlain-Mussolini 
Meetings', Historical Journal, Vol. XIV, No. 1,1971. 
Disarmament was never a top priority of the second Baldwin government. 
The work of the Preparatory Commission was eclipsed by the day-to-day 
pressures of domestic and foreign events. These were the years of the 
coal stoppage, the General Strike and the endemic problems of Britain's 
export industries. Britain's relations with Egypt and China dominated 
the Cabinet's agenda. Far more consternation was caused by the 
Kuomintang's challenge to British interests in China and Britain's 
humiliating eviction from Hankow than by the disarmament deadlock in 
Geneva. Short term considerations took precedence over long term goals. 
From 1919 onwards the British goverment was reluctant to leave 
disarmament in the hands of the League. Chamberlain and most of his 
colleagues deprecated large, grandiose schemes for disarmament. 
I 
Preferring the precedent set by the Washington conference, they did not 
welcome the establishment of the Preparatory Commission. Only reluctantly 
did Chamberlain concede that Britain would be obliged to seek disarmament 
through the League of Nations. 
Nevertheless, at the beginning of 1926 Chamberlain was not pessi- 
mistic about the prospects for disarmament. Locarno had made a measure 
of French disarmament possible. 
2 In the aftermath of Locarno Britain's 
prestige stood high. If she knew what she wanted, her voice would be 
decisive in the forthcoming disarmament negotiations. 
3 Though dubious 
about Russia's intentions and anxious about the threat she posed to the 
states on her western borders Chamberlain believed that Russian partici- 
pation in the work of the Preparatory Commission was vital. 
4 
Once the 
1. CID, 206th meeting, 30 November 1925, CAB 2/4; CP 454(25), 31 October 
1925, CAB 24/175; DBFP, Series IA, Vol. 1, No. 42. 
2. CID, 205th meeting, 17 November 1925, CAB 2/4. 
3. CP 454(25), 31 October 1925, CAB 24/175. 
4. CID, 205th meeting, 17 November 1925, CAB 2/4; CID, 217th meeting, 
11 November 1926, CAB Z/4- 
285 
Commission embarked on its task in May 1926 he was determined to do all 
in his power to see that it succeeded. When in July the United States 
reacted angrily to French intransigence, Chamberlain told the United 
States ambassador in London that the breakdown of the Preparatory 
Commission would be a calamity. 
1 Just over a year later when little 
progress had been made and the Geneva naval conference had resulted in 
failure, Chamberlain informed the Prime Minister that there was no 
subject of greater importance than disarmament for the standing of the 
government at home and abroad. 
2 
Chamberlain never regarded the idea of holding a great world dis- 
armament conference as the most practical approach to disarmament but 
there is no reason to think that he regarded disarmament as a wholly 
unattainable goal so long as the League was held in high esteem and ( 
the Locarno treaties gave Europe a foundation of security. 
3 Cecil recog- 
nised Chamberlain's commitment to disarmament. Shortly before his resig- 
nation in August 1927 he told him: 'You have always shown yourself as 
among those most favourable to the policy of disarmament. ' 
4 Where they 
differed was in the relative importance they attached to disarmament in 
preserving peace. Whereas Cecil believed that it was by far the most 
important factor, Chamberlain thought it was one, but not necessarily 
5 the most important, preventive of war . 
The other members of Baldwin's Cabinet were not outspoken champions 
of disarmament. Hoare showed some commitment to the cause and it is 
noteworthy that both Chamberlain and Cecil were more favourably disposed 
1. DBFP, Series IA, Vol. II, No. 78, Note 3. 
2. Chamberlain to Baldwin, 12 September 1927, Baldwin Papers, Vol. 129. 
3. Chamberlain to Cecil, 14 August 1927, Austen Chamberlain Papers, 
AC 54/94. 
4. Cecil to Chamberlain, 16 August 1927, Austen Chamberlain Papers, 
AC 54/95. 
5. Chamberlain to Cecil, 14 August 1927, Austen Chamberlain Papers, 
AC 54/94. 
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towards him than to the other two Service Ministers. Commenting on 
Baldwin's Cabinet appointments in November 1924, Chamberlain described 
him as 'very good' whereas Bridgeman and Worthington-Evans were merely 
'adequate'. 1 Hoare, who had been active in the League of Nations Union 
and in 1921 Deputy League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, was 
as Secretary of State for Air well aware of Britain's vulnerability to 
air attack. Even his Chief of Air Staff had said in April 1925*. 'If I 
had the casting vote, I would say "Abolish the air". 12 In March 1926 
Hoare wrote to Cecil urging concerted efforts by those in the government 
who wanted to achieve disarmament. 
3 There may have been others besides 
Cecil, -Chamberlain and Hoare but the evidence is lacking. 
Balfour, the most senior if not the most influential member of 
Baldwin's Cabinet, gave little support to disarmament. Though he had 
been an advocate of arms limitation after the war he had subsequently 
imbibed the pessimism of his friend and confidant, Sir Maurice Hankey. 
He told the CID in 1925 that with nothing to offer Britain would enter 
the disarmament negotiations in a weak position and that apart from the 
abolition of submarines she had nothing to gain. 
4 
Baldwin's own attitude in these years is dubious and ambiguous. 
Having chilled the spine of the British people by telling them that 
another war would spell the doom of western civilisation he did little 
to promote the League or disarmament. It is of some significance that 
in addressing the 1926 Imperial Conference a few months after the 
Preparatory Commission completed its first session he made no reference 
to disarmament and focused attention on the needs of imperial defence. 
5 
1. Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 9 November 1924P Austen Chamberlain 
Papers, AC 5/l/340- 
2. A. Boyle: Trenchard, London, 1962, PP. 519-20. 
3. Hoare to Cecil, 24 March 1926, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51083. 
4. CID, 205th meeting, 17 November 1925, CAB 2/4. 
5.19 October 1926, CAB 3Z/46. 
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No one in the first rank of British politics was more dedicated to 
the cause of disarmament than Viscount Cecil of Chelwood. The third son 
of the third Marquess of Salisbury, the last prime minister of Queen 
Victoria's reign, at no stage of his career was he truly representative 
of English Conservatism. Elected to Parliament in 1906 as Conservative 
MP for East Marylebone, for much of the eighteen years he was in the 
House of Commons he took a line at variance with his party and for some 
of that time was Independent Conservative MP for Hitchin. An able 
eccentric, tolerated by his colleagues because of his antecedents and 
abilities, he for a short time played a major role in the Conservative 
shadow cabinet. He was one of the Conservative MPs Asquith invited to 
Join his coalition government in May 1915 and by December 1916 he was 
sufficiently prominent to play alongside Chamberlain and Curzon a not 
insignificant part in the events which led to Asquith's replacement by 
Lloyd George. As Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign 
Office and later Minister responsible for the blockade, he was in effect 
deputy Foreign Secretary for the last two years of the war. Though he 
resigned from Lloyd George's government at the end of the war because 
his high Anglicanism would not permit him to support the disestablishment 
of the Church in Wales, he was invited to join the British Empire delega- 
tion at the Paris peace conference. From 1916 onwards he was the most 
ardent champion of the league of nations idea in British politics and his 
appointment as British representative on the peace conference's League of 
Nations Commission was recognition of that fact. Reference has already 
been made to his work at Paris and the negative attitude he then adopted 
to disarmament. 
Cecil became highly critical of the post-war Lloyd George coalition. 
For a time he flirted with the idea of helping to form a Centre party, a 
course of action which did not enhance his standing in the Conservative 
party. Most of his energies were devoted to work for the League at Geneva 
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and on behalf of the League of Nations Union in Britain. Party affili- 
ations became of secondary importance but in May 1923 Baldwin invited him 
to join his first administration as Lord Privy Seal. There can be little 
doubt that his return to ministerial office in so senior a position was 
due to his standing in the League movement. His opposition to protection 
in the autumn of 1923 and his indifference to party and electoral calcula- 
tions did not endear him to Baldwin and his colleagues. When he returned 
to office in November 1924 though his responsibilities were much the same 
as they had been in 1923 it was as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 
and not as Lord Privy Seal. However much influence he may have commanded 
in the country as a League figure he had little in the Cabinet and prob- 
ably even less among the rank and file of the Conservative party. 
Possessed of great dialectic skills - before entering Parliament he had 
taken silk in 1900 and established himself as a highly successful 
barrister at the Parliamentary Bar - and of abilities which dwarfed those 
of most of his colleagues, he lacked the skills and balanced judgement 
necessary to be effective in British politics. 
No goal of national policy was more important to Cecil than disarma- 
ment. In August 1927 he resigned from the Baldwin government not because 
of its refusal to make concessions to the Americans at the Geneva naval 
conference but because, in his opinion, it had continuously refused to 
give disarmament the priority it deserved. 
1 The choice facing Britain, 
he believed, was to place herself in the vanguard of the movement for 
disarmament or to oppose it by default or deliberate policy. 
2 Procras- 
tination would give Germany a pretext for rearmament and result in a 
disarmament scheme being foisted on Britain which was not in her beat 
interests. 3 Britain had nothing to lose and everything to gain by 
1. Cecil to Baldwin, 9 August 1927, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51080. 
2. CP 419(25), 5 October 1925, CAB 24/175. 
3. Cecil to Baldwin, 6 January 1926, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51080. 
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disarmament because in no conceivable circumstances would she be asked 
to make further reductions in her army though she might be required to 
reduce her naval and air forces. 
1 
On the contrary it was more likely 
that she would be pressed to increase her land forces. 
2 Britain's 
military weakness could only be remedied if other powers were induced 
to reduce their land forces. 
3 
Responsibility for the Preparatory Commission's success or failure, 
Cecil believed, would rest, as had been the case with some other great 
movements of the past, with the British Empire. 
4 No power had a greater 
interest in ensuring that international questions were discussed in a 
pacific atmosphere. 
5 
In July 1927 at the height of his controversy 
with Churchill over British policy at the Geneva naval conference Cecil 
told him: 'I regard a future war on a big scale as-certainly fatal to 
the British Empire whether we win or lose it, and probably also to 
European civilisation. 1 
6 
The Empire had many vital interests but for 
how many would the British public and the Dominions be prepared to fight? 
Would British public opinion support a war for the maintenance of Britain's 
position in Egypt or the status guo in Tangier? Events in China had demon- 
strated that Britain could not always uphold her interests without taking 
warlike measures. The public's reluctance to support such measures was 
a factor the government could not ignore. 
Public opinion in Cecil's view was the deciding factor in determin- 
ing how, much nations would reduce their armaments because no government 
would disarm unless an overwhelming majority of the public supported it. 
8 
I. CP 419(25), 5 October 1925, CAB 24/175. 
2. Cecil to Hankey, 24 August 1925, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss- 51088. 
3. CID, 217th meeting, 11 November 1926, CAB 2-/4- 
4. E 126,3 November 1926, CAB 32/47. 
5. CID, 217th meeting, 11 November 1926, CAB Z/4- 
6. Cecil to Churchill, 26 July 1927, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51073. 
7. CID, 217th meeting, 11 November 1926, CAB 2/4. 
a. 64 HL Debs. 5th Series, Col. 351,9 June 1926. 
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If the League system was to succeed a well-informed public opinion would 
have to play the part which a threat of resort to war had played in pre- 
war diplomacy. 
1 
Much time and energy would need to be spent in educating 
both public and professional opinion if the obstacles in the way of dis- 
armament were to be removed. The time might come, however, when public 
opinion compelled a reluctant government to disarm. 
2 Wevertheless, the 
Fighting Services needed to learn that, like the politicians, they were 
obliged to bow to public opinion. 
Cecil did not believe that the first world disarmament conference 
would achieve much but if a disarmament agreement was ratified and lasted 
for five years, the world would be a safer place at the end of that period 
than it had been at the beginning. 
4 'If as the result of continuous 
effort in the next few years', Cecil told Hankey in August 1925, 'we 
get some slight reduction of the French and Russian armies and perhaps 
those of some of the Slav powers also together with our general agreement 
not to expand for a period, that is more than I believe probable., 
5 The 
world would, take short, halting steps towards disarmament or none at all. 
Unless the British Empire made an enormous effort the process would never 
begin. 
Cecil believed that nothing could be done to try to limit the 
ultimate capacity of a nation to wage war -a view his colleagues came 
to share - but something could be done to reduce the chances of a nation 
delivering a knock-out blow at the outset of hostilities. 
6 
Wrestling with 
the problem which Crowe had posed in 1916: 'On what principle was one 
Cecil to Baldwino 31 March 1926, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51080. 
2.64 HL Debs. 5th Seriest col. 351P 9 June 1926. 
3. Cecil to Baldwint 5 December 19259 Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51030- 
4. DBFP, Series IA, Vol. III, No. 202. 
5. Cecil to Hankey, 24 August 1925, Cecil Paperst BL Add. Mss. 510sa- 
6. CID, 206th meeting, 30 November 1925, CAB Z/4- 
291 
nation to be asked to accept a lower standard of armaments than another? ' 
1 
Cecil at first came to the conclusion that the armaments of a state should 
be proportional to the international obligations it was prepared to accept. 
The larger its armaments the greater the assistance it would be pledged to 
render to a victim of aggression. 
2 Later he concluded that this was not a 
feasible solution. A much more practicable policy was to limit a nation's 
capability to deliver a knock-out blow by proscribing the most offensive 
weapons and by limiting its capacity to wage war by budgetary limitation. 
3 
If political and electoral considerations sometimes discouraged 
Cecil's Cabinet colleagues from fully expressing their scepticism, Sir 
Maurice Hankey felt no such inhibitions. We may assume that his opinions, 
which he never attempted to conceal, were fairly representative of an 
important section of right-wing political opinion in Britain and of a 
majority of Baldwin's Cabinet. 
In 1919 Hankey, like many others, had been prepared to endorse dis- 
armament to save Britain from economic ruin. By 1923 Britain had survived 
in the harsher economic conditions of the post-war international economy 
without suffering disaster. Hankey believed that reductions in Britain's 
defence budget and the general decline in the arms industry and ship- 
building had contributed to her post-war economic weakness. 
4 The iron 
and steel industry was depressed because the loss of warship orders, both 
British and foreign, was a serious handicap to it. He noted that the 
countries which spent most on armaments were the countries with the lowest 
*5 
unemployment, 
1.12 October 1916, FO 371/3082. See pp. 123-4. 
2. Cecil to Noel-Baker, 16 December 1925, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss- 51106. 
3. See, for example, his remarks in the CID Three Party Committee for the 
World Disarmament Conference, 7th meeting, 19 June 1931, CAB 16/102. 
4. Memorandum entitled 'An Introduction to the Study of Disarmament', 4 August 1925, accompanying Hankey to Cecil, 6 August 1925, Cecil 
Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51088. 
5. Undated memorandum probably written in 1930, Hankey Papers, ENKY 8/28. 
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Hankey challenged many of the basic assumption of those who advocated 
disarmament. In no subject, he said, had loose catchwords and phrases 
exercised so baneful an influence as in the study of war and peace. 
Disarmament was a quack medicine which had misled the British people* 
Political tensions and intolerable situations, not armaments, were 
the real causes of war. Armaments were only a secondary cause. Disputes 
between nations could not be settled by procedures similar to those used 
in settling disputes between individuals. The League of Nations might be 
an admirable instrument for maintaining the status guo but wars came about 
because the status guo needed changing. Only when the League demonstrated 
that it could bring about changes in the status-guo would it have proved 
its effectiveness. Germany had only been prevented from bringing about 
a forcible revision of her frontiers because of the superior armaments 
of her neighbours. A conference which either reduced the armaments of 
her neighbours to her level or raised her armaments to the general level 
of other countries would not make for peace. 
2 
Unlike Cecil, Hankey did not believe that war was an anachronism. 
Whatever policies Britain chose to pursue there would be wars in the 
future as there had been wars in the past. 
3 'Some of the propaganda of 
the extremists of the League of Nations Union' was 'pernicious' because 
it undermined the nation's military spirit. 
4 If by pursuing disarmament 
the government weakened-the nation's morale and destroyed its military 
prowess, when the challenge came Britain would not be able to defend 
herself nor would she be able to save civilisation. 
5 None the less, 
despite his contempt for disarmament propaganda, Hankey could not forbear 
1. Undated memorandum probably written in 1930, Hankey Papers, HNKY 8/28. 
2. Undated memoranda probably written in 1930 and 1931, Hankey Papers, HM 8/28. 
3. Hankey to Cecil, 18 August 1925, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51088. 
4. Hankey to Chamberlain, 21 August 1925, 
AC / / 6 
Austen Chamberlain Papers, 
24 7 1 . 
5. Hankey to Cecil, 18 August 1925, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51088. 
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from expressing anxiety lest there was no very considerable fall in the 
level of Europe's land and air armaments. 
1 
In July 1925, two months before the League Assembly requested the 
Council to establish the Preparatory Commission, Cecil persuaded the 
Cabinet to instruct the Service departments to begin the work of forma- 
lating Britain's policy for the world disarmament conference which, he 
believed, could not be long delayed. 
2 Little was done during the summer 
recess but on the day before the Assembly resolution Hankey reminded the 
Service Chiefs of the principles which he thought should guide British 
policy makers. 
3 
It was essential that Britain retained her freedom to 
move her forces as circumstances required. Budgetary limitation was an 
unsatisfactory method of limiting armaments because armaments expenditure 
could be concealed in a national budget. International inspection was 
unacceptable to Britain. Only such information about scales of armaments 
and construction programmes as was given to Parliament should be made 
available to international agencies. Britain should continue to oppose 
all attempts to regulate the conduct of war because recent experience 
had proved that such rules were unenforceable and were disadvantageous 
to the more law-abiding nations of the international comminity. In 
securing further naval disarmament, the principles adopted at the 
Washington conference should be applied but Britain should insist that 
full allowance be made for her special requirement for cruisers to 
protect the Empire's trade routes. Britain should continue to press for 
the abolition of submarines. As for land and air armaments, Britain 
could not expect the continental nations to abandon conscription or 
1. Undated memorandum probably written in 1931, Hankey Papers, HNKY 8/28. 
2. CP 329(25), 6 July 1925, CAB 24/174; C-39(25), 22 July 1925 and C. 41(25), 29 July 1925, CAB 23/50; CID Paper 627-B, CAB 16/61; 
CP 365(25), 27 July 1925, CAB 24/174. 
3. CID 628-B, 24 September 1925, CAB 16/61. Hankey was reiterating 
points he had made in his memorandum for the Washington conference in October 1921, see p. 182. 
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France to reduce her land forces until she received reliable guarantees 
of her frontier with Germany. 
I Nor should Britain contemplate any further 
reductions in her own land forces. As for air armaments, no satisfactory 
formula for their limitation had yet been devised. Britain should 
strenuously eschew all attempts to promote disarmament by applying the 
principle of mutual guarantee because experience proved that international 
co-operation by a large number of states was too cumbrous to be effective. 
Hankey's memorandum set the tone for the Services' response which 
with the exception of the Admiralty 
2 
was almost completely negative and 
unconstructive. If Britain was obliged to accept a limitation of air 
armaments, the Air Staff saidt it should only apply to metropolitan 
shore-based aircraft. Disarmament would not be brought about 'by complex 
and cunningly devised schemes', the War Office declared. Like Hankey the 
Services were determined that Britain should retain, so far as she could, 
3 
a free hand . 
A majority of Baldwin's Cabinet shared the Service departments' 
scepticism but however tempting it might be to abandon the quest for 
disarmament, that was not an option open to the British government. 
The public pressures were too great and Britain was pledged in the 
Covenant and the peace treaties to pursue disarmament, as the Cabinet 
themselves had pointed out to the Service departments in their instruc- 
tions the previous July. The Cabinet was, therefore, forced to act. 
On 17 November a CID Sub-Committee, chaired by Cecil and with non- 
ministerial representatives from the three Services, Treasury, Foreign 
Office, Dominion Office and India Office, began the work of formulating 
1. Hankey's memorandum was written before the Locarno conference was 
convened. 
2. The Admiralty proposed the abolition of submarines and restrictions 
on the maximum permitted tonnage and armament of aircraft carriers 
and cruisers. They also sought a limitation of total destroyer tonnage. 
3. CID Papers 634-B, 13 October 1925,644-B, 4 November 1925,641-B, 
4 November 1925, CAB 16161. 
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Britain's policy for the Preparatory Commission. 
I The policy which was 
hammered out in that sub-committee was a compromise between those who 
wished to resist disarmament because they believed that it was an 
impracticable policy for Britain to pursue and a small minority led by 
Cecil who regarded disarmament as the most important goal of national 
policy. 
British policy at the first session of the Preparatory Commission 
was formulated by the CID Sub-Committee on the Reduction and Limitation 
of Armaments which the Cabinet reconvened at the end of 1925. To counter 
what he regarded as the obstructive and unconstructive influence of the 
Service representatives Cecil persuaded Baldwin to make two ministerial 
appointments to the committee. Salisbury, Cecil's brother and the 
Chairman of the CID, was an obvious choice. Walter Elliot, the Under- 
Secretary for Health at the Scottish Office and later in the year to 
become Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, was a less obvious one. 
Elliot was an active member of the League of Nations Union and a con- 
sistent advocate of disarmament throughout the years 1925 to 1931. It 
is noteworthy that in September 1928, commenting on the up-and-coming 
junior ministers in the goverment, Churchill described Elliot as 'by 
far the best'. 2 He was to have a distinguished career in the National 
governments of the 1930s but though at one time tipped for the leader- 
ship of the Conservative party, he destroyed his chances by failing to 
dissociate himself in time from Neville Chamberlain's appeasement policy. 
The Sub-Committee's report, submitted in April 1926, represented 
the maximm concessions the Services were then prepared to make but 
fell far short of what Cecil desired. On naval armaments it made a 
number of specific proposals -a reduction in the displacement and 
C. 52(25)9 11 November 1925, CAB 23/51; CID, 205th meetingr 17 November 
1925, CAB Z/4- 
2. Churchill to Baldwin, 2 September 1928 quoted M. Gilbert: Winston S- Churchill, Vol. V, London, 1976, P. 301. 
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armament of cruisers and restrictions on the numbers, displacement and 
armament of submarines - but was far less constructive in its approach 
to land and air armaments. 
Recognising that the abolition of conscription -a traditional 
British objective - was totally unacceptable to the continental powers 
and believing that nothing would be gained by limiting the period of 
compulsory military service -a view which many authorities later rejected - 
the report recommended a straightforward limitation of effectives 
1 
with a 
vague reference to limiting the equipment appropriate to their use. The 
report skated over the difficulties which countries relying on conscrip- 
tion would experience and went on to reject both the direct limitation of 
material 
2 
and its indirect limitation by restrictions on budgetary expendi- 
ture. The former it said was unworkable, the latter too open to evasion. 
It did, howevert declare itself in favour of an exchange of budgetary 
statistics which, it said, would furnish a valuable additional check on 
national armaments. 
Departing from the unconstructive attitude adopted by the Air Ministry 
since 1921 the report recommended that an attempt should be made to differ- 
3 
entiate between civil and military aircraft. It suggested that the prob- 
lem would be simplified if a limitation agreement was restricted to first- 
line aircraft in home-based squadrons*4 If agreement was not possible 
1. Effectives was the term used to describe military personnel on full- 
time active service. 
2. Material, or its French equivalent materiel was used as the term to 
describe all types of military equipment, weapons and ammunition. 
3. The air representatives at Paris in 1919 had not foreseen any diffi- 
culty. Germany was forbidden military aircraft but she was allowed 
to develop her civil aviation. Though the French authorities con- 
tended that German civil aviation posed a potential threat to France, 
the Air Ministry took the view that no such threat existed. 
The restriction excluded not only aircraft used to police the more 
turbulent areas of the Middle East and East Africa etc. but also those 
held in reserve. Chamberlain later opposed the exclusion of aircraft 
held in reserve though Cecil sided with the Air Ministry and defended 
it on the grounds that a disarmament convention was only concerned with 
those aircraft available for a first strike at the outset of hostilities. The restriction also excluded aircraft stationed on aircraft carriers 
or other ships. 
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Britain should seek a separate agreement with her nearest rival, France. 
One section of the report referring to German armaments was deleted 
when it was strongly criticised by both Chamberlain and Cecil. The report 
had argued that a datum line based on post-war German armaments was prefer- 
able to calculations founded on the level of pro-war national armaments 
in determining armaments levels in other states. 
Unlike the French authorities, the Sub-Committee came to the conclu- 
sion that no distinction could be made between offensive and defensive 
weapons and that no scheme for international inspection and control of 
a disarmament convention would be satisfactory. Parliament would not be 
willing to pass the necessary enabling legislation and the experience of 
the Allied Control Commissions in the ex-enemy states in seeking to enforce 
disarmament was far from encouraging. 
British policy at Geneva should be to press for the reduction of 
armaments as being in itself an element of security. No attempt should 
be made to relate the reduction of armaments to the provision of mutual 
assistance but as an alternative to economic sanctions, a scheme to pro- 
vide financial assistance to the victims of aggression should be supported. 
The report was endorsed by the CID with one or two modifications. 
Cecil informed his colleagues that though he had chaired the Sub-Committee 
he was not altogether in agreement with the report. He regretted that the 
Sub-Committee had rejected all schemes for inspection and supervision. He 
thought that Britain would be obliged to agree to a measure of supervision 
and he could see no reason why, if a state was willing to accept investiga- 
tion to rebut a charge of infringing a disarmament convention, a commission 
should not be established to investigate it. He received no support from 
his colleagues, not even from Churchill. 
1 
Churchill had proposed a scheme of mutual inspection of dockyards before the Washington conference. CID, 145th meeting, 14 October 1921, CAB Z/3, see P. 180. 
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The CID authorised Cecil to draft his own instructions on the basis 
of the report and suggested that he hold informal talks with both the 
American and French ambassadors in London to try and harmonise British 
policy with that of the United States and France. 
' 
The Preparatory Commission did not make an auspicious beginning. 
The French revived the old controversies about mutual guarantees and 
both the Poles and the Finns came forward with schemes for regional 
security which threatened to deflect attention from disarmament itself. 
The Russians refused to send a delegation to Geneva because they had not 
yet settled their dispute with the Swiss government over the murder of 
their delegate to the 1923 Lausanne conference, Vaslav Vorovsky. 
The provision of mutual assistance was not the only issue to divide 
Britain and France. Because she commanded the loyalty and support of 
her European allies on the Preparatory Commission, France was able to 
secure a majority for many of her proposals. She successfully resisted 
British and German attempts to include trained reserves in a limitation 
agreement. Though Britain, the United States, Italy and Japan were all 
opposed to international inspection, France secured a majority in favour 
but when, however, the first reading text of the disarmament convention 
was approved in April 1927 the issue was carefully side-stepped. 
France was also able to block Britain's proposals for the limitation 
of naval tonnage by categories. To Britain it seemed that France was 
deliberately undermining the principles established at the Washington 
conference by mobilising the support of her allies to push through 
proposals which were totally unacceptable to the principal naval powers. 
For the minutes and report of the Sub-Committee, CID Paper 682-B, 
see CAB 4/14; the revised draft of the report on which Cecil's 
instructions were based is CP 165(25), 28 April 1925, CAB 24/179; 
the report was discussed by the CID at its 212th meetin on 19 April, 
ir CAB 2/4; Cecil's instructions are to be found i CP 177f25 27 April 1925, CAB 24/179; see also FO 371/11883 and DBFP, Series IA# Vol. II, No. 2, Note 2. 
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None the less, on a number of issues agreement was reached. This 
was frequently interpreted in London as a surrender to the French. More 
often than not the British delegation felt obliged to accept the French 
point of view because it was more logical and had the support of the 
majority of the Commission. Though little progress was made over naval 
disarmament there was a wide measure of agreement over the limitation of 
land and air armaments. Britain was forced to concede that a distinction 
could and should be made between offensive and defensive weapons and that 
civil aircraft could be evaluated as an element in a nation's air strength. 
Suspicions lingered on but when and where private consultations were 
held between the British and Prench delegations differences narrowed. As 
one British delegate put it 'the French have always been more reasonable Y 
when sitting round a small table, and the smaller powers welcome a clear 
lead'. 1 Cecil was prepared to go further. Adopting a point of view not 
altogether different from that urged upon him by his colleagues in the 
CID before the Commission began its work, Cecil wrote: 'My impression 
has always been that we ought to arrive at some arrangement whereby the 
French should take the lead on land and, perhaps, air questions but we 
should do so on naval questions. 
2 Only by bargaining and compromise 
could their differences be resolved. The question was were the naval 
authorities in London and Paris sufficiently flexible to permit agreement? 
The Preparatory Commission's slow progress led to strong criticism 
in the 1926 League Assembly and the Council was requested to summon a 
world disarmament conference before the Assembly next convened in 
September 1927. At its second session that same month the Preparatory 
Commission instructed its two sub-commissions, 
3 
to which it had entrusted 
1. DBYP, Series IA, Vol. II, No. 144. 
2. Ibid. 
3. In May 1926 the Preparatory Commission appointed two committees, Sub-Commission 'A' whose personnel was identical to the'PAC with the addition of German and American Service personnel, and Sub- Commission IBI, made up of experts on the economic aspects of disarmament. Sub-Commission 'A' was entrusted with the technical questions relating to land, sea and air armaments. 
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the work of providing answers to the Council's questionnaire, to expedite 
its work. In November the Commission was able to publish the one hundred 
and seventy-six page report of its Sub-Commission 'Al, which provided a 
mass of technical information for a disarmament convention, and on 
23 December 1926 the Council directed the Commission to draw up an agenda 
for a forthcoming world disarmament conference. 
Despite the differences which divided the British and French delega- 
tions it was possible at the beginning of 1927 for Cecil and his supporters 
to look back on the first two sessions of the Preparatory Commission and, 
in particular, the detailed examination of the technicalities of disarma- 
ment undertaken by Sub-Commission 'A, with some satisfaction. Agreement 
had been reached on a whole range of questions and the obstacles over 
outstanding questions did not seem insuperable. Furthermore, the prestige 
of the League stood high. Relations between France and Germany had con- 
tinued to improve. Britain's relations with the United States were better, 
according to one expert, 
1 than at any time since the war. In Britain, 
the government's authority had been strengthened by its handling of the 
General Strike. Exports were rising and unemployment was falling. The 
British government was in a strong position to make a major contribution 
towards determining the rate of progress towards disarmament. 
Both Cecil and Cadogan came to the conclusion that a British draft 
convention might serve a useful purpose in expediting the work of the 
Preparatory Commission at its third session in March 1927. They also 
recognised that it would be in Britain's best interests if her own 
particular viewpoint was embodied in a draft convention. 
2 
Cecil's draft made several concessions to the Services' point of 
1. R. L. Craigie, Head of the Foreign Office's American section, in an 
assessment in November 1928. DBPP, Series IA, Vol. V, Annexe to 
No. 490. 
2. DBFP, Series IA, Vol. III, No. 10. Cadogan as Read of the Foreign 
Office's League of Nations section was responsible for disarmament 
policy. 
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view which were not entirely to his liking. Whereas navies and air 
forces would be restricted by a limitation on numbers and armament of 
ships and aircraft, that is by a-limitation of material, armies would 
be limited by restricting the number of troops serving with the colours 
at any one time, that is by a limitation of effectives. He regretted 
that the convention contained no proposals for limiting the material 
an army would have at its disposal. He was far from happy about the 
exclusion of ship-based aircraft and aircraft stationed abroad. He 
believed that the government's refusal to consider any scheme to enforce 
a disarmament convention foolish and indefensible. 
1 
The draft made a number of concessions to the French which were 
not acceptable either to the Service departments or to Cecil's 
ministerial colleagues. Despite the War Office'$ sympathy for France# 
its Director of Military Operations criticised Cecil for excluding 
trained reserves. 
2A 
provision requiring signatories to give notice of 
any intention to increase their defence expenditure was so severely 
criticised by Baldwin, Bridgeman, Chamberlaint Hankey, Hoare and 
Salisbury that it was deleted. An article providing for budgetary 
limitation met with such strong criticism from the Secretary of State 
for War that it was struck out. With these emendations the draft con- 
vention was approved by the CID but not before Britain's opposition to 
'inquisitorial commissions' had once again been reiterated. 
3 
On reaching Geneva, Cecil privately showed the draft to a number 
of leading delegates, including Joseph Paul-Boncour, the head of the 
French delegation. Paul-Boncour was critical because it ignored the 
question of supervision and inspection. If Russia signed a disarmament 
: L. DBFP, Series IA, Vol. III, No. 37; CP 79(27), 7 March 1927, CAB 24/185. 
2. CAB 21/305. 
3. CID, 222nd meeting, 4 March 1927, CAB 2/5. 
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treaty, he asked, would the British government be prepared to accept her 
assurances without any form of inspection? 
1 
The French also produced a draft convention which proposed a limita- 
tion of Personnel in all three Services and drew a distinction between 
personnel stationed at home and those garrisoned abroad with separate 
quotas for each. It excluded trained reserves but not aircraft held in 
reserve. It proposed the limitation of total naval tonnage and rejected 
the limitation of warships by categories. It called for budgetary 
limitation and demanded that the enforcement of a disarmament treaty 
should be entrusted to a commission with wide-ranging powers of inspection 
and control. 
2 
'When the Commission debated the two drafts there were few who were 
not prepared to concede that the French had the best of the arguments. 
The French had studied disarmament more carefully than other nations. 
Their two Service departments, the War Ministry and the Ministry of 
Marine, had employed some of their best brains on research into disarma- 
ment and the Qual, d'Orsay had its own competent specialists in disarmament. 
3 
It would be easy to exaggerate the differences in the attitude of 
the two countries to peace and disarmament. France was not immune from 
those pressures which led British governments to reduce defence expendi- 
ture and seek general disarmament. The French defended conscription not 
only because it was democratic and egalitarian but also because it meant 
that every Frenchman and every French family had a personal interest in 
preventing war. 
4 France in the 1920s was a nation in psychological 
1. D13FP, Series IA, Vol. III, No. 43- 
2. Ibid., Nos. 67 and 85. 
3. A. C. Temperley: The WhisDering Galler-Y of Europe, Pp. 50 and 64. 
4. See the remarks of the French ambassador in London, de Fleuriau, 
to Lord Cushendun in January 1928, DBPP, Series IA, Vol. IV, 
No. 257. 
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revolt against the blood-tax of military service and the horrors of 
the 1914-1918 war. 
1 
Fear of war and a sense of its futility drove many 
Frenchmen into the ranks of the pacifists. 
2 Popular and financial 
pressures forced the French government to create an almost entirely 
new military organisation. By 1928 compulsory military service had 
been reduced from three years to one year. By a slow evolution the 
French army was transformed into a militia-type force only capable of 
defensive warfare. Offensive warfare was so severely censured that 
France was obliged to adopt a defensive posture. In the early 19303 
a considerable proportion of her defence budget was spent not on weapons 
of war but on the construction of the Naginot Line which the evacuation 
of the Rhineland had made essential for her security. 
Military expenditure between 1920 and 1926 failed to keep pace 
with inflation. Funds voted by the Chamber were never appropriated. 
Military programmes were not properly implemented and the army was 
starved of equipment. Though rebellions in Syria and Morocco forced 
France to spend more on her overseas garrisons than she had done before 
1914, far less was expended on the army at home. 
3 An anonymous writer 
in a responsible French journal could claim in 1926 that France had 
reduced her military expenditure compared with pre-war by forty per 
cent. and her army by one third. 
4 
There were those within the French General Staff who saw the logic 
of disarmament. General Maurice Gamelint whose victory over the Druse 
rebellion in Syria in 1926 so enbanced his military reputation that by 
2.931 he had been promoted to Army Chief of Staff, believed that only 
1. P. C. F. Bankwitz: Maxime WevRand and Civil-Militarv Relations in 
Modern France, Cambridge, Mass., 1967, P. 44. 
2. R. D. Challener: The F ench Theory of the Nation in Arms. 1866-1939, 
New York, 1955, pp. 218-19. 
3. R. D. Challener, PP. 138-46; J. Minart: Le Drame du Desarmement 
Frangais, Paris, 1960, PP. 13-18; D. C. Wattt Too-Serious a Busine-s 
pp. 35-7. 
4. 'A Propos du Desarmement', Revue des_Deux Mondes, May 1926. 
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an efficient international control of armaments could prevent Germany 
violating the Versailles treaty and the world slithering into another 
arms race. Aware of public support for disarmament he feared that if 
the World Disarmament Conference failed, the army would be blamed and 
France would be isolated. France could not afford to put her faith in 
her own military power because she could not compete in a gruelling arms 
race with an industrially and demographically superior Germany. Gamelin's 
views were not shared by his immediate predecessor, General Maxims Weygand. 
Weygand optimistically believed that a rearmed Germany could be held at 
the Maginot Line and that France, therefore, had much more to gain from 
maintaining her own military power intact than from either arms control 
or collective security. 
2 
A large section of French public opinion was strongly behind dis- 
armament but it lacked powerful leaders as well as the means for action. 
3 
There was no organisation in France comparable to the League of Nations 
Union in Britain. Nevertheless, France formulated a coherent disarmament 
policy for the Preparatory Commission and the World Disarmament Conference. 
There was a consistency in France's attitude to disarmament in the 
years 1919 to 1931. Writing in the Daily Herald in January 1930 Paul- 
Boncour summed it up in words which echoed the views enunciated by Leon 
Bourgeois at the Paris peace conference in 1919. 'There can be no real 
and complete disarmament until the world realises the necessity of an 
international force at the service of the League of Nations.... This 
is France's point of view and it is the only one that can lead to real 
disarmament., 4 In a memorandum for the World Disarmament Conference 
1. General Weygand was appointed Chief of the General Staff in January 
1931 by Andrg Maginot, Minister of War in Tardieuls Cabinet. Within 
a month of his appointment left-wing criticism forced his resignation 
and In February lie was replaced by Gamelin. 
2. P. C. 
-F. 
Bankwitz: Marime W and and Civil-Militarv Relations in 
Modern France, PP. 50-54. 
3. M. Baumont: The Origin "f the Second World War translated by 
S. de C. Ferguson, New Haven and London, 1978, p. 24. 
4.13 January 1930. 
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communicated to the League and other powers in July 1931 
1 the French 
government stressed the inter-relationship of common action to defend 
the peace, procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes, and arms 
limitation. It rejected the notion that there could be any levelling 
or automatic equalisation of armed forces on the grounds that equality 
of armaments between two states would only be justifiable in the unlikely 
event that their geographical situation and other circumstances were 
identical. Germany's claim to equality of armaments could thus be set 
aside. 
Never enamoured with the Washington precedent, French governments 
insisted that land, sea and air forces were interdependent and could not 
be treated separately. Like Britain, however, France stressed her own 
special requirements. She needed not only sufficient forces to protect 
French territory against aggression but also military forces to maintain 
law and order in her overseas empire together with adequate naval forces 
to protect communications between her scattered colonial territories. 
There were other similarities between the two countries. Like 
Britain, France had emerged from the war weakened by her ordeal. She 
was acutely conscious of her economic and demographic weakness and 
plagued with an inferiority complex which provoked a passion for security. 
Her prime need was to rebuild her war-ravaged economy and restore her 
lost morale behind secure frontiers. The Maginot Line mentality of the 
French was the counterpart of the 'never again' isolationism of the 
English. 2 
1. LeaRue of Nations Conference for-the Reduction and Limitation of 
Armaments, Geneva, 1932, Doc=ents, IX, 9. 
2. M. Baumont: The Origins Of the Second World Wjr, pp. 6-16; J. Nere: 
The-Foreign Policl of France from 1914 to lq45, London and Boston, 1975, Passim; M. Trachtenburg: 'Reparations at the Paris Peace 
Conference' in Journal of Modern Histor-y, Vol. 51, No. 1, March 1979; 
D. R. Watson 'The Making of the Treaty of Versailles' in Troubled 
Neighbours ed. N. Waites, London, 1971. 
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There were differences too. It was these differences which made 
agreement over disarmament unattainable. Within a matter of months of 
the 1918 armistice the French, not without good reason, began to suspect 
the British of seeking to cheat France of the fruits of victory by sparing 
Germany the consequences of her defeat. Whereas France saw Germany as a 
potential enemy, Britain saw her as a future customer and at worst a 
rival competitor. With increasing intensity the French felt that though 
they had won the war they were losing the peace. Shortly-before his 
death in 1929 Clemenceau, whom the French had accused of being duped by 
Lloyd George at Paris in 1919, wrotet 'We must have the courage to pre- 
pare for it [warlo instead of frittering away our strength in lies that 
no one believes. ' 
I 
Clemenceau reflected an important section of opinion which was dis- 
illusioned with the League and the policy of reconciliation which Briand, 
Chamberlain and Stresemann had pursued in the second half of the decade. 
With some justification they felt that Chamberlain and Stresemann were 
trying to substitute a community of relatively disarmed European states 
for the armed preponderance which France and her continental allies had 
enjoyed since 1919. Until France received copper-bottomed guarantees of 
her security they believed that it would be folly to allow her army and 
those of her allies to be reduced. So long as the French army was the 
only organised peace-keeping force in Europe a favourable military balance 
was more important that disarmament. As Painleve put it: 'Une France 
,2 de'sarmee no serait un, exemple mais une tentation . 
At the third session of the Preparatory Commission in March and April 
1927, Cecil found himself in the embarrassing position of having to defend 
propositions which he believed to be indefensible. It was comparatively 
1. G. Clemenceau: Grandeur 
- 
and Misery of Victory translated by 
F. M. Atkinson, New York, 1930, pp. 384-5. 
2. J. Minario. Le Drame du De'sarmement Francais, p. ii. 
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easy for the French to drum up support for their own counter proposals 
by misrepresenting Britain's position as a ruse to maintain her naval 
supremacy and exempt her air force from limitation while insisting on 
reductions in continental armies. Cecil was obliged to resist the 
limitation of naval and air personnel and in opposing the latter he found 
himself in a minority of one with the United States and Japan siding with 
France and the Little Entente. He was also required to resist proposals 
to limit ship-based aircraft and aircraft in training establishments 
which could at a momýntls notice be switched to combatant use. 
1 
Cecil's overall strategy was to make concessions to the French over 
issues which he regarded as of minor importance in the hope that he would 
be able to persuade them to concede to the British view on naval armaments. 
He was understandably angry when the obtuseness, obstinacy and insularity 
of the Admiralty and the Air Ministry threatened to cut the ground from 
beneath his feet. 2 
Cecil had strong allies in the Cabinet. Salisbury, who as Chairman 
of the CID and Lord Privy Seal was far from being a minor figure, worked 
deftly behind the scenes to bring about a change of heart in the Service 
departments. Chamberlain gave Cecil loyal support. Baldwin, though no 
great friend to disarmament, had some sympathy for Cecil's predicament 
and understood the implications of the Service departments' obstructionism. 
Together Baldwin, Chamberlain and Salisbury were able to wrest concessions 
from the Services and win the backing of the CID and the Cabinet but not 
before some damage had been done to Britain's standing in the Preparatory 
Commission. Despite these concessions Cecil continued to feel handicapped 
by the comparative indifference of many of his colleagues and their 
1. DBFP, Series IA, Vol. III, Nos. 85,89,89 Note 3,91,92,99,100, 
103,104,106,111,112 and 115. 
2. Cecil to Salisbury, 30 March 1927, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51086; 
DBFP, Series IA, Vol. III, No. 106. 
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failure to appreciate that the sands of time were running out. 
I 
Under strong pressure from the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary 
and the Chairman of the CID, the Admiralty and Air Ministry gave way and 
agreed to the limitation of naval and air personnel. 
2 The Air Ministry 
made a number of other concessions. Ship-based aircraft and aircraft in 
training establishments, so long as they were of combat type, should be 
limited and a French compromise proposal combining limitation by horsepower 
with a limitation of aircraft numbers could also be accepted. 
3 
Naval disarmament was the major stumbling block in the third session 
of the Preparatory Commission. Cecil, in common with his professional 
advisers at Geneva, thought the French proposals totally unacceptable. 
He discovered, however, that raul-Boncour was privately convinced of the 
validity of the British case. With Chamberlain's assistance he sought to 
put pressure on the French government to compromise. On 6 April the French 
put forward a new set of proposals and Cecil advised Baldwin: 'I feel we 
are giving away nothing of value by accepting them in the form I suggest., 
4 
The French proposed that fleets should be divided into three categories: 
those of over 500,000 tons which would be limited on the lines of the 
Washington naval treatyp those of between 100,000 and 500,000 tons which 
would be limited by total tonnage, and those of under 100,000 tons which 
would not be limited in any way. The second class, fleets with a total 
tonnage of between 100,000 and 500,000 tons, would have a further 
1. Cecil to Baldwin, 6 April, Cecil to Salisbury, 30 Marcho 8 April, 
Salisbury to Cecil, 3 and 5 April 1927, Cecil Papers BL Add. Mss. 
51080 and 51086; Salisbury to Chamberlain, 13,14 and 15 April 1927, 
Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC 54/437; Cecil to Chamberlain, 30 April 
1927 Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC 54/81; Campbell to Hankey, 31 March 
1927: CAB 21/305. DBFP, Series IA, Vol. III, Nos. 101,106,148. 
2. CID, 224th meeting, 4 April 1927, CAB 2/5. Salisbury to Cecil, 5 April 
1927, Cecil Papers, BL 51086. On 8 April Cecil wrote to his brother: 
'Please tell the Prime Minister how grateful I am to him for his 
backing. ' 
3. Cecil to Hoare, 8 April and Hoare to Cecil, 11 April 1927, Cecil Papers, 
BL Add. Mss. 51083. DEEP, Series IA, Vol. III, Nos. 116,124,130 and 140. 
4. Cecil to Baldwin, 6 April 1927, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51080. 
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restriction placed on them which was of major importance to Britain. 
Each power in that class would be required to submit a detailed construc- 
tion progra=e from which it would not be permissible to deviate without 
giving at least one year's notice. Cecil and his chief naval adviser, 
Admiral Aubrey Smith, believed that Britain would have nothing to fear 
because she would be fully informed of France's or any other power's 
intentions so long as their fleet was more than a token force. In practice 
only ten or twelve thousand tons of construction tonnage might be trans- 
ferred from one category to another in any one year and that in itself 
could not cause any uncertainty to worry the British naval authorities. 
I 
Cecil was nevertheless, obliged to announce in the Preparatory 
Commission on 11 April that the French compromise proposals were 
unacceptable to the British government. 
2 He, none the lesat continued 
to bring pressure to bear upon his colleagues in London to secure a change 
of heart. The new French proposals had the support of the overwhelming 
majority of the Commission including the Japanese, Argentinians and 
Chileans who had formerly supported Britain's proposals. American 
opposition to the proposals was half-hearted and a year later abandoned. 
Of the principal naval powers only Italy disapproved of them but on the 
grounds that they made too many concessions to the British point of view. 
Cecil believed that if Britain was prepared to discuss them it would be 
possible to persuade the French to accept a maximum displacement and 
armament limitation for individual ships in each category. 
3 
1. DBFP, Series IA, Vol. III, Nos. 120,139P 148. 
2. The Admiralty speciously argued that if any nation had the right to 
build vessels which were not subject to limitation there could be no 
security for Britain nor would there be any check on competitive 
building. They described the French proposal to permit changes in 
construction programmes as 'dangerous and unacceptable' and insisted 
that instead of the four categories of warship which the French had 
suggested, there should be five. See DBPP, Series IA, Vol. III, 
Nos. 126 and 142. 
3. DBFP, Series IA, Vol. III, No., 148. A. J. Toynbee: Survey of International Affairs. 1927, London, 1929, p. 16. 
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Salisbury tried to steer the Admiralty towards accepting the French 
compromise by proposing a solution which anticipated the Admiralty's own 
proposals in the closing stages of the Geneva naval conference. His 
proposals evoked no response from the Admiralty and he was reluctantly 
to concludet as his brother had done some time earlier, that the Admiralty 
were for some unknown reason determined to wreck the Preparatory Commission. 
Consequently Britain went into the Geneva naval disarmament conference 
in June 1927 with the United States and Japan without having secured any 
limitation of French and Italian naval armaments other than those imposed 
by the 1922 Washington treaty. The British government knew that French 
naval policy had been formulated with little or no reference to Britain's 
requirements and that Prance's main preoccupation was the possibility of 
an Italian attack on her lines of comminication with her North African 
colonies. 
2 Whereas there was a resurgence of Francophobia in the British 
government with Hankey describing the latest French mobilisation plans as 
'the greatest scheme for organisation of a nation for war that has ever 
3 been attempted in the history of the world', the British rejection of 
the French compromise resulted in an anti-British campaign in the French 
press with Cecil's action being compared to Chamberlain's rejection of 
the Protocol in March 1925. Paul-Boncour was led to conclude that it 
was useless to show a conciliatory spirit. 
4 When the session was brought 
to an end in the last week of April the French had seen not only their 
naval compromise rejected but budgetary limitation and international 
inspection and control set aside. 
Salisbury to Cecil, 9 and 16 April 19Z7, Baldwin to Cecil, 12 April 
1927, Cecil to Salisbury, 12 April 1927, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 
51080 and 51086; DBFP, Series IA, Vol. III, No. 148; Salisbury to 
Chamberlain, 15 April 1927, Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC 54/440. 
2. Cecil to Salisbury, 8 April 1927, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss- 51086; 
Salisbury to Chamberlain, 13 April 1927, Austen Chamberlain Papers, 
AC 54/437; DBFP,, Series IA, Vol. III, Nos. 149 and 201. 
3. Hankey to Cecil, 7 April 1927, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss- 51088- 
4. A. J. ToyAee: Survey of International Affairs. 1927, p. 16. 
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Writing two years later in 1929, de Madariaga, 
1 
who in 1927 had been 
head of the League Secretariat's disarmament section, was severely critical 
of the attitude adopted by Britain. He singled out for special criticism 
her refusal to accept what he described as 'the very reasonable proposal' 
the French had put forward to break the deadlock over naval disarmament. 
He was equally critical of the British government's refusal to accept 
budgetary limitation which he regarded as an indispensable part of a 
disarmament convention. It was significant, he said, that the adversaries 
of budgetary limitation, notably Britain and the United States, were among 
the most wealthy nations of the world. On other issues he berated the 
British for their indifference to the best and most responsible opinion 
in the world. Britain's attitude was an obstacle to progress. Gloomily 
he summed up the results of the session: 'Disarmament revealed its true 
nature as a mere symptom of politics, that is, of power. The debates of 
the Commission forced every nation to take the attitude which the require- 
ments of her power dictated. 12 
After the disappointments and frustrations of the Preparatory Com- 
mission's third session and the fiasco of the Geneva naval conference, 
the great powers, with the exception of Germany and Russia, were reluctant 
to proceed with the work of disarmament. At the short-lived fourth session 
of the Commission, 30 November to 3 December 1927, the Russian delegatiozx3 
put forward proposals for total and immediate disarmament. Regarded in 
1. Salvador de Madariaga was far from being an Anglophobe. In 1927 he 
had already lived in London for a short period during the war and he 
was to return to England to spend most of the remainder of his long 
life as a Spanish exile. See S. de Madariaga: Morning without Noon, 
Memoirs, Farnborough, 1974. 
2. S. de Madariaga: Disarmament, London, 1929v pp. 171-86. Britain 
subsequently accepted budgetary limitation and a number of proposals 
she had rejected in 1927. 
3. The Russians took their seat at the Preparatory Commission for the 
first time in November 1927, having patched up their quarrel with 
the Swiss government following the latter's failure to apprehend 
the assassins of Vaslav Vorowsky, the Russian delegate to the 1923 
Lausanne conference. 
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the West as a propaganda move on Russia's part, the proposal was conveni- 
ently set aside though it was revived in a modified form at the fifth 
session in March 1928. 
In the aftermath of the Geneva naval conference both the Foreign 
Office and the Cabinet committee appointed to formulate disarmament 
policy 
1 
adopted an almost wholly negative attitude to disarmament. One 
Foreign Office memorandum said that it was 'positively undesirable' for 
Britain to take the lead over disarmament. 
2 Chamberlain and Hoare, 
however, continued to press their colleagues to promote disarmament. 
3 
Chamberlain tried in vain to persuade the Service departments to reconsider 
their attitude to international inspection and control. 
4 When the 
Salisbury Cabinet committee reported in February 1928 it was forced to 
admit that progress in air disarmament was blocked 'by the difference 
between ourselves and other countries on the question of international 
control. In regard to this question, however, the committee are not 
able to recommend any concession. ' 
5 
From the middle of 1928 onwards the Cabinet was forced to consider 
some of the electoral and international consequences of a wholly negative 
attitude to disarmament. In Britain the League of Nations Union had 
mounted its campaign in favour of disarmament. Abroad relations with 
both the United States and France were poor. In June Cushendun, who 
1. The Cabinet committee consisted of Salisbury (Chairman), Bridgeman, 
Cushendun, Hoare, Sir Douglas Hogg, the Attorney-General and from 
March 1928 as Lord Hailsham, Lord Chancellor, and Worthington-Evans. 
2. DBFP, Series IA, Vol. IV, No. 211, Annex III. The writer was 
R. H. Campbell of the Western Department. 
3. See especially Chamberlain's letter to Baldwin, 12 September 1927, 
following his lunch-time conversations with him at Talliores on Lake 
Annecy the previous day, Baldwin Papers, Vol. 129; Hoare's Cabinet 
Paper, 6 October 1927, CP 234(27), CAB 24/188, attacking the govern- 
ment's negative attitude which was discussed at the Cabinet on 
12 October 1927, C-50(27ý, CAB 23/55; see also Chamberlain's comments 
on the negative attitude adopted by Cadogan of the Foreign Office in 
DBFP, Series IA, Vol. IV* No. 219 and Annex II to No. 219. 
4.13 February 1928, CAB 27/361. 
5. CP 44(28), 14 February 1928, CAB 27/361. 
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had replaced Cecil as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, drew his 
colleagues' attention to the serious repercussions of a failure to achieve 
disarmament on British and German opinion, 
1 
and in October Hoare warned 
the Prime Minister that it would be mad to throw in their hand and 
dissociate themselves from the Preparatory Commission so near to a general 
election. 
During the first three sessions of the Preparatory Commission the 
British and French delegations learnt that if they were in agreement, 
the smaller powers would generally follow their lead. Anglo-French 
differences were largely responsible for the deadlock in the Commission. 
There could be no real progress until the two countries resolved their 
differences. At the fourth session of the Commission Britain's chief 
military representative, Major-General A. C. Temperleyt learnt from his 
French opposite number, Colonel Requin, that though France might make 
some concessions she would never agree to the limitation of trained 
reserves because they were such a vital factor in her national defence . 
In January 1928 Cushendun reminded the French ambassador in London 
that if France felt strongly about trained reserves, Britain felt equally 
strongly about the rigid limitation of warships by categories because only 
in that way was it possible to eliminate the factor of surprise which was 
such an all-important element in war. 
4 Negotiations between representatives 
of the two governments at ministerial and non-ministerial level continued 
until agreement was reached on 27 July. 
5 Three days later Chamberlain 
announced in the House of Commons that Britain and France had reached 
an agreement over naval armaments and the same day the American, Japanese 
and Italian governments were notified though no reference was made to the 
1. C-34(28), 22 June 1928, CAB 23/58. 
2. Hoare to Baldwin, 15 October 1928, Baldwin Papers, Vol. 115. 
3. DBFP, Series IL, Vol. IV, Enclosure in No. 233. 
4. Ibid., No. 257. 
5. Ibid., Vol. V, No. 427. 
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fact that Britain had agreed to abandon her opposition to the exclusion 
of trained reserves from a limitation agreement. 
1 Britain and France 
agreed to a fourfold classification of warships which would exempt from 
limitation 6" gun cruisers and submarines of under 600 tons. The com- 
promise was bitterly assailed in Germany, Italy and the United States 
and aroused anger in the Labour and Liberal parties in Britain. It 
caused a further deterioration in Anglo-American relations and because 
it was totally unacceptable to both the United States and Italy, had 
to be abandoned. 
The government's folly belies a simple explanation. It was to be 
severely censured by friend and foe alike. It appeared unprincipled 
and opportunist. It seemed to invite increases rather than reductions 
in armaments. The British side of the bargain had been unequivocally 
rejected by the United States at the Geneva naval disarmament conference 
a year earlier. To antagonise the United States so gratuitously seemed 
absurdly foolish yet in one respect the compromise illustrates the 
sensitivity of the Baldwin Cabinet to world as much as British opinion. 
In February 1928 Cushendun warned his colleagues that Britain was 
constantly being represented at Geneva as attempting to obstruct progress 
in regard to security and disarmament. It was essential that the govern- 
ment should do something to refute these accusations. 
2 There were several 
indications that the French were more favourably disposed to the British 
point of view and keen to see progress over disarmament. 
3 If this did 
not bring about an advance towards disarmament and the Preparatory 
Commission remained deadlocked, it was vital that responsibility for 
the deadlock should not rest with Britain. There was always a danger 
1.220 RC Debs. 5th Series, Col. 1837,30 July 1928; CAB 21/321. 
2.10 February 1928, CAB 27/361. 
3. DBFP, Series IA, Vol. IV, No. 91 and Note 5 to No. 91; Cf. Nos. 267 
and 283. See also Noel-Baker to Cecil, 2 April 1928, Cecil Papers, 
BL Add. Mss. 51107. 
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that the United States and Prance might come to terms over naval dis- 
armament and leave Britain isolated. The United States' acceptance in 
April 1928 of the 1927 French compromise proposals was an ominous warning. 
It was of supreme importance to have French support in something which 
was of such vital significance for Britain, an adequate cruiser force, 
to protect her lines of communication. In March Chamberlain tried to 
persuade his colleagues that it was essential to end Britain's diplomatic 
isolation. Gaining French support for her naval proposals should be 
given first priority. 
1 
Conversations with Carl von Schubert, the German State Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs, further convinced Chamberlain of the importance of reach- 
ing an agreement with France in order to end the deadlock in the Preparatory 
Commission. Von Schubert had warned him that unless the Commission 
achieved some practical results fairly soon the German government would 
no longer be able to restrain public opinion. Many Germans had come to 
the conclusion that disarmament was a sham. 
2 Paul-Boncour shared 
Chamberlain's concern. Unless progress was made, Germany would repudiate 
the disarmament clauses of the Versailles treaty. 
3 If that happened, 
Chamberlain warned his colleagues in a memorandum on 9 June, he could 
not predict the consequences for the immediate or future peace of the 
world. Germany had accepted them under duress and had more or less 
respected them in the hope that they would prove to be the first steps 
to a general limitation of armaments. The moment that expectation was 
definitely falsified, she would not feel herself under any obligation 
to observe them. No League investigation, nothing indeed short of 
violence, would prevent them from becoming a dead letter. In the light 
of such considerations, had relative naval strengths quite the significance 
1.12 March 1928, CAB 27/361 (Reduction and Limitation of Armaments 
(Cabinet) Committee); C-14(28), 13 March 1928, CAB 23/57. 
2. DBFP, Series IA, Vol. V, No, 55. 
3. Ibid., No. 376. 
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the Cabinet appeared to be attaching to them? He had never favoured the 
approach to disarmament adopted by the League but past decisions committed 
them to that road. If the disarmament negotiations failed, one consequence 
would probably be the rearmament of Germany. 
1 
There were considerable differences within the Cabinet. Salisbury 
was opposed to the formula because he believed that the Admiralty's pro- 
posals, which formed its basic ingredient, would embitter relations with 
the United States. 2 Britain's task was to find a middle course which 
would secure better relations with the United States while at the same 
time averting a crisis in Germany. 
3 When, however, Chamberlain suggested 
a new initiative to reach agreement with the Americans his suggestion was 
rejected on the grounds that it would lead to renewed demands for parity 
4 
with Britain. As a result the Cabinet was driven to reconsider a separate 
agreement with France. Opposition to the compromise was neutralised by 
the incongruous alliance of Chamberlain and Bridgeman, the former promot- 
ing it because he believed it would lead to improved relations with 
France and progress with disarmament, the latter because it would deflect 
the Commission from limiting those warships on which Britain relied for 
commerce protection. 
At the fateful Cabinet of 22 June Salisbury identified three objec- 
tives of Britain's policy: keeping in step with Franceg avoiding friction 
with the United States, and preventing Germany from denouncing the disarma- 
5 
ment clauses of the Versailles treaty. Anti-American sentiment in the 
Cabinet ensured that the first took priority over the second while the 
1. DBFP, Series IA, Vol. V, No. 377. 
2. CP 44(28), 14 February 1928, CAB 27/361 contains the recommendations 
of the Salisbury Committee of which the rejection of the Admiralty 
proposals was the most important. On 17 February, Cushendun persuaded 
the Cabinet to reject the advice, C. 8(28), CAB 2V57- 
3. CP 193(28), 18 June 1928, CAB 24/195; DBFP, Series IA, Vol. V, No. 385. 
4. C-34(28), 22 Juns 1928, CAB 23/58. 
5. C-34(28), 22 June 1928, CAB 23/58. 
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third was almost forgotten. A majority, misjudging American opinion, 
wrongly assumed that if Britain and France came to terms, the United States 
would be forced to step into line. Their failure to cultivate good relations 
with the United States is one of the most serious criticisms which can be 
levelled at the second Baldwin Cabinet 
1 but it was in the last resort 
fear of diplomatic isolation in Europe which led them to make so serious 
an error of judgement. 
When the delegates gathered for the sixth session of the Preparatory 
Commission in April 1929 two years had elapsed since the first reading of 
the draft disarmament convention. The fourth and fifth sessions had 
achieved virtually nothing. The Russians had been persuaded to withdraw 
their proposals for total and immediate disarmament and a second set for 
proportionate reductions in existing armaments was neatly shelved on the 
grounds that the Preparatory Commission was concerned not with figures 
but with methods. The decision to postpone the second reading of the 
convention to allow more time for discussion evoked strong protests 
from the German delegation who also tried to get the world disarmament 
conference convened in 1928. At the Lugano meeting of the League Council 
in December 1928 the powers agreed that no useful purpose would be served 
by convening the sixth session of the Preparatory Commission until after 
President Hoover's inauguration in March 1929. That postponement enabled 
the British government to make some modifications in its disarmament 
policy and reappraise the role its Service advisers had been playing 
in the formulation of that policy. 
Though Chamberlain had aired his misgivings about the role the 
Service departments were playing in the formulation of Britain's 
The criticism is well made in Lord Eustace Percyz Some Memories. 
pp. 138-43. Percy was President of the Board of Education in the 
Baldwin Cabinet. For a discussion of the two schools of thought, 
the continental commitment and Atlanticism, or an alliance of the 
Anglo-Saxon powers, see M. Howard: The Continental Commitment and D. C. Watt: Personalities and Rolicies,, p. 211 et seg. 
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disarmament policy as early as September 1927 
1 
it was not until the winter 
of 1929 that the Foreign Office began to challenge that role. The basic 
assumption implicit though never explicitly stated in all the discussions 
of the CID and its sub-committees was that British disarmament policy was 
an aspect of Britain's defence policy. In the winter months of 1929 the 
Foreign Office indirectly posed the question whether disarmament policy 
was not really an aspect of foreign policy and whether, therefore, British 
foreign policy should be subservient to Britain's defence needs as these 
were perceived and evaluated by her Service departments. 
In a Cabinet Paper on 20 February 1929 Cushendun took the Service 
departments to task for both opposing the direct limitation of material 
and objecting to a German proposal that the Preparatory Commission should 
publish data relating to effectives, material and expenditure. If other 
powers were prepared to give the information called for in the German 
proposals, Cushendun asked, was there any valid reason why Britain should 
not do the same? 
2 
Two weeks earlier Cadogan, whose scepticism about dis- 
armament had not made him a natural enemy of the Service departments, had 
written: 'If we are to go ahead we must get the Cabinet to sit on the 
Service Departments. ' 3 In March Cushendun began a Cabinet Paper with 
the words: 'It is becoming clear that unless the Cabinet is prepared to 
override the views of the Service Departments no advance is possible at 
the Preparatory Commission. 4 
If British policy at the sixth session of the Preparatory Commission 
was to press for discussion of the non-naval clauses of the draft disarma- 
ment convention it was imperative that Britain should have a policy for 
the limitation of non-naval material. No such policy existed. Britain 
1. Chamberlain to Baldwin, 12 September 1927, Baldwin Papers, Vol. 129. 
2. DBFP, Series Ik, Vol. VI, No. 370. 
3. Cadogan to Butler, 8 February 1929, FO 800/419. 
4. DBFP, Series IA, Vol- VI, No. 376. 
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stood virtually alone in opposing both budgetary limitation, which the 
whole of the continent with the exception of Germany favoured, and direct 
limitation which had the support of Germany and the United States. The 
Admiralty and the Air Ministry were totally opposed to budgetary limita- 
tion and the War Office was opposed to both methods on the grounds that 
they could not forecast the needs of the British army at a time when 
units were being mechanised. 
1 They were not, however, entirely oblivious 
to the dangers of procrastination. In a CID paper in December 1928 the 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff warned that one consequence of the 
Preparatory Commission failing to reach an agreement might be the 
rearmament of Germany and her emergence as a first-class military power. 
2 
Cushendun exploited these fears. If a breakdown in the Preparatory 
Commission might lead to German rearmament was it not worthwhile incurring 
some minor risks and ignoring a few imaginary foes if a very real and 
serious danger could thereby be averted? No one in the War Office had 
demonstrated that the British Empire would suffer from Britain pursuing 
a more conciliatory policy at Geneva. Even such Conservative organs as 
The Times and The Observer were exhorting the government to give a bolder 
lead. The policy which the War Office were asking the government to 
pursue entailed not co-operation but isolation. 
3 
The choice was put by Cadogan in a more cogent form. Britain could 
not go on leading a double life, preaching disarmament on the one hand 
and impeding its progress on the other. The arguments put forward in 
Whitehall did not cut much ice in Geneva. It was not clear why other 
nations could accept proposals which Britain felt forced to reject. To 
From being adamantly opposed to budgetary limitation the War Office 
had in the autumn of 1927 come to accept the limitation of total 
expenditure on personnel and material but that did, not go far enough to satisfy the continental powers. 
2. CID Paper 926-B, CAB 4/18 discussed by the CID, 239th meeting, 13 December 1928, CAB Z/5- 
3. DBFP, Series IA, Vol. VI, No. 376. 
3267! 
judge from some War Office statements, it would seem that Britain had 
secured a-lead in 'mechanisation' and was determined to remain ahead at 
all costs. --If Britain was convinced that by maintaining secrecy she 
could steal a march on other powers then she would, of course, have to 
prevaricate in the Preparatory Commission but was there not a chance 
that other powers might learn the same lesson and enter into competition 
with her? 
Minuting Cadogan's memorandum, the new Permanent Under-Secretary 
of State at the Foreign Office, Sir Ronald Lindsay, 
2 
called on the Cabinet 
to brush aside the opposition of the Service departments. Disarmament was 
the most important question of the day. It was the accepted policy of the 
government but the Service departments had prevented the formulation of 
constructive proposals. Britain should give a lead by formulating and 
publishing her own armaments programme for a five-year period and invit- 
ing others to do the same. 
3 
The Service departments abandoned their opposition and the Cabinet 
adopted the German government's publicity proposals. 
4 Though the decision 
did not represent a major shift of policy it did reveal a new sense of 
urgency. Largely because, of the lead taken by the Foreign Office, con- 
cessions had been wrung from the Service departments. 
Cushendun left for Geneva on 12 April 1929. His instructions were 
to seek to dissuade his follow delegates from discussing naval armaments, 
to do all he could to promote land and air disarmament, and to try to 
1. DBFP, Series IA, Vol. VI, No. 379. 
2. Sir Ronald Lindsay, 1877-1945, had been British ambassador in Berlin 
from 1926 to 1928 and was, therefore, more aware of continental 
opinion. In 1930 he succeeded Sir Esme Howard as British ambassador in Washington. 
3. DBFP, Series IA, Vol. VI, Note 6 to No. 379. 
4. C-13(29), 26 March 1929, CAB 23/60. The Cabinet endorsed decisions taken by its Disarmament committee on 22 March. See CP 91(29), 
CAB 2 361. 
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persuade other states to formulate and publicise their armament programmes 
with a view to the conclusion of a 'publicity' convention. 
1 By giving 
advance notice of Britain's proposals to the now American administration 
a good impression was created in Washington. 
2 
The sixth session of the Preparatory Commission made more progress 
than any of its delegates had dared to hope but that progress was made 
as a result of concessions which left the German, Russian and other 
delegations profoundly dissatisfied. A German proposal for the abolition 
of bombing was rejected by a majority vote. In the interests of concili- 
ation and agreement the United States and Britain abandoned their opposi- 
tion to the exclusion of trained reserves and France refrained from 
insisting on budgetary limitation and international inspection and control. 
A speech by the American chief delegate, Hugh Gibson, on 22 April held out 
the promise of an agreement with Britain over naval armaments and did much 
to pave the way for the Anglo-American naval compromise of the following 
3 
autumn. A second reading was given to a large part of the text of the 
disarmament convention though consideration of the limitation of naval 
effectives and material was postponed until agreement was reached on the 
outstanding questions dividing the principal naval powers. There was 
agreement on the principles governing the limitation of land and air 
effectives, air material and chemical and bacteriological warfare. 
Britain gave notice of her intention to ratify both the 1925 Gas Protocol 
and the 1925 Protocol for the Control of the International Trade in Arms, 
Munitions and Implements of War. The Commission would reconvene when 
the outstanding differences between the naval powers had been resolved. 
Before the Preparatory Commission resumed its task in November 1930, 
1. C. 16(29), 11 April 1929, CAB 23/60. 
2. C-13(29), 26 March 1929, CAB 23/60 and DBFP, Series IA, Vol. VI, 
Nos. 383,386 and 390. 
3. See p. 215. 
322' 
the second Baldwin government had been defeated in the May 1929 general 
election and replaced by MacDonald's second Labour government. The years 
of the second Baldwin administration, 1924 to 1929, were the years of 
hope and promise in the inter-war history of the European continent. 
Chamberlain's League policy and the Locarno agreements created opportunities 
which did not exist before 1925. If it was in Britain's best interests that 
the Preparatory Commission, which was only concerned with the principles of 
disarmament, should reach an agreement the wisdom of allowing the Service 
departments to impede its progress must be called in question. Though it 
was their constitutional responsibility to plan for every contingency it 
is doubtful whether, had they been prepared to make concessions, those 
concessions would have adversely affected Britain's naval, military and 
air power or her diplomatic prestige and authority. Moreover, there is 
scarcely any evidence of the Service departments attempting to work out 
the implications of Chamberlain's pro-League policy. Some of the responsi- 
bility for that omission must rest with the prime minister himself who took 
little interest in foreign affairs in general and disarmament in particular. 
Disarmament was accorded a low priority and it is difficult to resist the 
conclusion that opportunities were lost which were not to occur again. 
Whether a disarmament agreement would have been concluded had Britain's 
policy been more conciliatory is a matter for speculation. What is 
scarcely in doubt is that British policy in the Preparatory Commission 
did not fully reflect the aims and objectives of Chamberlain's foreign 
policy. It is not, therefore, surprising that it was so severely censured 
See, for example, the comments of Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick who acted as 
secretary to a Cabinet disarmament committee over which Baldwin pre- 
sided. Kirkpatrick came to the conclusion that Baldwin's main concern 
was to keep the peace between his colleagues. I. Kirkpatrick: The 
Inner Circle, London, 1959, PP. 38-9. Milder criticism of Baldwin's 
attitude to foreign affairs is to be found in Lord Eustace Percy: 
Some Memories, P. 132. Percy suggests that Baldwin had admirable 
middle-sightedness but lacked far-sightedness and that the same 
criticism could be applied to his Cabinet as a whole. 
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riot only by the government's opponents but by impartial observers such 
as the former head of the League Secretariat's Disarmament Section. 
1 
The Second Labour Government and-Disarmament 
There is no reason to doubt the MacDonald Cabinet's commitment to 
disarmament though within a year of taking office, other more pressing 
considerations had overwhelmed and overshadowed it. Labour and the 
Natio had committed the Labour party to a radical programme of disarma- 
ment. 
2 One of Dalton's first actions on becoming Parliamentary Under- 
Secretary of State at the Foreign Office was to have copies distributed 
to various heads of departments. 
3 The Foreign Office team, Henderson, 
Dalton, Noel-Baker and Cecil, 
4 
were strongly committed to disarmament 
and were in a position to bring to their task expertise and experience 
which made them formidable in debate with their professional advisers 
and in countering opposition from the Service departments. Though Lord 
Thomson, the Secretary of State for Air, tried on behalf of the Services 
to exert pressure on the Cabinet, there was no one of Haldane's calibre 
to champion their cause. In these respects the situation in 1929 
5 
was 
far more auspicious for disarmament and the conduct of a Labour foreign 
policy than haa been the case in 1924 but none the less the two years of 
the second Labour government were most inauspicious for disarmament and 
1. S. de Madariaga, (Disarmament, pp. 256-8) accused Britain, next to 
the United States, of bearing the heaviest responsibility for the 
slow pace of disarmament. 
2. Labour Party: Labour and the Nation, London, 1928, p. 45. See PP. 71-2. 
3. H. Dalton: Call Back Yesterday, London, 1953, pp. 223-4. 
4. Lord Cecil was invited by MacDonald to advise the government on 
League affairs. He was given a room in the Poreign Office and was 
a member of the British delegation to the League Assemblies in 1929 
and 1930. He also headed Britain's delegation to the Preparatory 
Commission in November 1930. Though he never joined the Labour 
party he acted as if he was a member of MacDonald's government and 
played a notable role in the formulation of its disarmament policy. 
His position, none the less, was anomalous and has few, if any, 
parallels. 
5. The second Labour government, though lacking an overall majority, 
was in a much stronger parliamentary position with its 288 Labour 
MPs than the 1924 government which had almost a hundred fewer MPs 
to support it. 
3 24 
an 'internationalist' foreign policy. Within six months of coming to 
office the death of Stresemann and the Wall Street Crash foreshadowed 
fundamental changes in the European situation and the international 
economy. 
Although MacDonald was able to devote a large part of his time during 
the first six months of the Labour government to seeking a naval arms 
limitation agreement with the United States, Henderson was so absorbed 
in the day-to-day business of the Foreign Office and his duties as 
Secretary of the Labour party that he was not in a position to give much 
attention to disarmament. German reparations, the evacuation of the 
Rhineland, relations with Egypt, Russia and China presented problems 
which called for immediate action. 
1 None the less Henderson gave his 
full backing to Cecil, Dalton and Noel-Baker in their efforts to work 
out a practical programme for the Labour government. 
In the last week of July 1929, with the assistance of Dalton, Noel- 
Baker, Sir Cecil Hurst, the Foreign Office's chief legal adviser, and 
Cadogan, Cecil drafted a memorandum containing specific proposals on 
arbitration, security and disarmament. 
2 In addition to recommending 
support for the Optional Clause, the General Act on Arbitration, Concili- 
ation and Judicial Settlement, the Convention on Financial Assistance to 
States Victims of aggression, and the Treaty to Strengthen the Means of 
3 Preventing War, Cecil proposed that the government should ratify the 
1. For an account of the foreign policy of the second Labour government 
and Henderson's work as Foreign Secretary see D. Carlton: MacDonald 
versus Henderson, London, 1970. 
2. DBFP, Series IA, Vol. VI, Annex to No. 437. The memorandum took the 
form of recommendations for Britain's delegation to the 1929 League 
Assembly. 
The General Act, the Convention on Financial Assistance and the 
Treaty to Strengthen the Means of Preventing War had been drafted 
by the League Council and the Preparatory Commission's Arbitration 
and Security Committee at the request of the League Assembly. See 
A. J. Toynbee: Survey of International Affairs. 1928, pp. 81-93 
and D. Carlton: MacDonald versus Henderson, pp. 75--8,93. 
325 
1925 Arms Traffic Convention 1 and promote an Arms Manufacture Convention 
so that manufacture as well as trade in arms-would be brought under some 
form of control. 
Suggesting that the government's overall objective should be the 
progressive reduction of the manpower, material and money available to 
the land, sea and air forces of the nations of the world, Cecil took the 
opportunity to press for those forms of disarmament which the Baldwin 
government had rejected: the limitation of material either directly by 
enumeration or indirectly by budgetary control and the establishment of 
a competent international authority with adequate powers to enforce a 
disarmament convention. He also called on the government to press for 
the convening of the Preparatory Commission in the autumn of 1929 and 
the world disarmament conference no later than October 1930. 
Brushing aside objections by Lindsay and Cadogan that the Service 
departments should first be consulted, Henderson forwarded the memorandum 
to the Prime Minister for his approval. 
2 All Cecil's recommendations 
relating to disarmament MacDonald approved without reservation. 
In August advocates of disarmament were much heartened by an interview 
MacDonald gave to Isaac Marcusson of the Philadelphia Saturday Evening Post 
which appeared in the Daily Herald. 
3 Eager to allay suspicions in the 
United States and pave the way for a naval disarmament agreement, 
MacDonald did not content himself with a few broad generalisations about 
disarmament. Much to Noel-Baker's delight 4 he committed himself to a 
specific programme of disarmament bearing such close resemblance to 
Cecil's memorandum as to convince its author that its proposals would 
1. See P. 321. 
2. DBFP, Series IA, Vol. VI, Note 2 to No. 437; Cecil to Noel-Baker, 
I August 1929, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mas. 51107. 
3.3 August 1929. 
4. Noel-Baker to Cecil, 14,20 and 23 August 1929, Cecil Papers, BL 
Add. Mss. 51107; see also Cecil to MacDonald, 28 August 1929, Cecil 
Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51081. 
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not be ignored. An effective disarmament treaty, MacDonald informed 
Marcusson, had not only to limit the personnel in all three Services but 
also trained reserves, the number in the annual contingent, and their 
period of service. It should also limit the number of heavy guns, tanks 
and military aircraft as well as the arms and ammunition a state could 
hold in readiness for war. Naval armaments should be limited by categories 
of warship and a disarmament convention should contain a ban on the use of 
chemical and bacteriological warfare. It should also limit the amount a 
state could spend on armaments and also contain provision for international 
supervision, the international control of civil aviation, and the effective 
national and international control of the manufacture and trade in arms. 
Cecil had been more favourably disposed towards France and French 
demands for security than most of his Conservative Cabinet colleagues 
in the years 1923 to 1927 but by 1929 he was becoming seriously alarmed 
by trends in French policy. During a tour of three European capitals in 
May and June he detected a hardening in the French attitude to disarmament 
and his suspicions were to some extent confirmed by conversations which 
Noel-Baker had with Renie Massigli, the head of the League of Nations 
section at the Quai d'Orsay, during the Hague conference on reparations. 
1 
He regretted that France had dropped its insistence on budgetary limita- 
tion and international control at the April session of the Preparatory 
Commission and thought that if Britain failed to promote general disarma- 
ment, the German problem would remain unsolved and France would bend all 
her efforts to secure the land and air hegemony of Europe. For these 
reasons Cecil begged MacDonald to postpone the proposed Five-Power Naval 
League of Nations Union memorandum SG 2799: an Account of a Tour of 
Madrid, Paris and Berlin, May-June 1929, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 
51146; Noel-Baker to Cecil, 10 August 1929, Cecil Papers, BL Add. 
Mss. 51107. Ten days later Noel-Baker was able to report that Massigli had modified his position and was more favourably disposed to the point of view which both Cecil and Noel-Baker shared. 
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Conference until such time as the Preparatory Commission had completed 
its work and to take steps at the 1929 League Assembly to challenge those 
decisions taken by the Preparatory Commission in the previous April which 
he regarded as retrograde. 
I 
Cecil did not succeed in persuading the Prime Minister to postpone 
the London Naval Conference but he did win his backing for a League 
Assembly resolution which called on the Preparatory Commission to 
reconsider its attitude to land disarmament. Though Cecil's resolution 
came up against stiff resistance from the French and was withdrawn in 
favour of a compromise resolution proposed by the Greek delegation, the 
Preparatory Commission was as a result forced to reconsider its attitude 
to budgetary limitation and the direct limitation of material when in 
November 1930 it met to complete its work. The labours of Cecil, Dalton 
and Noel-Baker had not been entirely in vain. 
2 
MacDonald made one other response to the promptings of Cecil and 
the disarmers in the Foreign Office by appointing a CID Sub-Committee 
in December 1929 to study the problems which would arise when the 
Preparatory Commission was reconvened. Of its eleven members four came 
from the Foreign Office, three from the Service departments and four 
from the Dominions. 3 Between December 1929 and July 1930 the committee 
subjected the clauses of the draft disarmament convention to meticulous 
1. Cecil to MacDonald, 4 and 28 August 1929, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 
51081. 
2. D. Carlton: MacDonald versus Henderson, PP- 81-3; A. J. Toynbee: 
Survey of International Affairs. 1929, PP. 31-4. 
3. The four Foreign Office members were Henderson, Cecil, Dalton and 
Noel-Baker. The three Service members were C. 0. Ammon, Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Admiralty, Earl De La Warr, Parliamentary Under- 
Secretary of State at the War Office, and F. Montague, the Parlia- 
mentary Under-Secretary of State for Air. The Dominions were repres- 
ented by the Australian Minister of Trade and Customs who was then in London, the High Commissioners of New Zealand and South Africa, and a 
representative of the Irish government in London. Due to pressure of 
other work, Henderson, who had been appointed by MacDonald to chair the committee, was seldom able to attend and his place as chairman was taken by Cecil. 
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examination. Never before had a CID sub-committee gone so fully into 
the technicalities of disarmament and never had a committee been so 
dominated by the disarmers, who were too well briefed to be daunted by 
the technical arguments of the Service advisers. 
Though the War Office successfully resisted Noel-Baker's plea for 
the abolition of tanks they did agree to the limitation of heavy guns. 
Their objections to the exclusion of trained reserves from a limitation 
agreement were brushed aside and the committee concluded that a consider- 
able reduction of the period of service' to the Swiss, Dutch and Scandi- 
navian levels 'would really reduce armies to a defensive level and render 
aggression difficult'. There was no disagreement over the limitation of 
personnel in all three Services and the Air Ministry albeit momentarily 
agreed to a horsepower limitation for aircraft. Only budgetary limitation 
remained in dispute and had to be referred to the Cabinet. 
1 
In the aftermath of the 1930 London naval conference there was a 
hardening in the Labour government's attitude to disarmament. Cecil 
unsuccessfully tried to persuade MacDonald to press for an early meeting 
of the Preparatory Commission. 
2 No doubt influenced by Hankeyo MacDonald 
was convinced that Britain's 'peace determination' was being interpreted 
on the continent as evidence of British weakness. 
3 As unemployment soared 
above two million the MacDonald Cabinet became more sensitive to such 
1. The sub-committee's minutes and report are in CAB 16/98. 
2. Cecil to Malcolm MacDonald, 27 April and J. R. MacDonald to Cecil, 
3 May 1930, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51081. 
3. See Hankey's remarks to the Webbs, 25 February 1930: 'The Japanese, 
Italian and French delegates [to the London conference] are convinced 
that our desire to limit armaments is based on our feeling "down and 
out". ' Beatrice Webb Diaries, 25 February 1930. Cf. MacDonald to 
Cecil, 13 August 1930: 'There is a fundamental weakness in our inter- 
national transactions, and that is a lowering of the position which 
this country has held for so long in the eyes of the world... We shall have to be very careful not to allow our peace determination to be 
interpreted by unfriendly people to mean that we have got flabby and 
useless. ' Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51081. Cecil, Cadogan and Dalton all suspected Hankey's influence as being largely responsible for MacDonald's change of heart. See Dalton Diaries, 21 March and 21 August 1930 and Cecil to Noel-Baker, 9 May 1930, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51107. 
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charges and to the plight of the unemployed, especially those in the 
dockyard towns. 
1 MacDonald declined to attend the 1930 League Assembly 
but Henderson, on behalf of the government, made it plain that Britain 
would not enter into any fresh commitments or any extension of existing 
commitments until an arms limitation agreement was adopted. 
Of the disarmament issues which faced the second Labour government 
none proved more contentious than the budgetary limitation of armaments. 
During the first decade of peace successive British governments had 
opposed budgetary limitation on the grounds that it was unworkable and 
not in Britain's best interests. In 1927 a different attitude emerged 
in the War Office and Cecil, who at the April session of the Preparatory 
Commission had opposed it, became convinced that, given the opposition 
of Britain and a number of other key powers to international inspection 
and control, it was a more satisfactory method of arms control than the 
direct limitation of armaments by enumeration. Talk of easy evasion 
was, therefore, far more applicable to direct limitation than to the 
control of budgetary expenditure. He also knew that the French would 
never agree to direct limitation because it would destroy their superiority 
over Germany and Italy which they had carefully acquired in the years since 
1919. However, it was events in Germany, above all the construction of 
the pocket battleship Ersatz-Preussen later renamed the Deutschland and 
the writings of her military authorities, which more than anything else 
convinced the British goverment that Britain's opposition had been unwise. 
Authorities such as Hans von Seeckt in Germany and Basil Liddell Hart in 
Britain predicted that wars in the future would be won by relatively 
See, for example, the attitude of the Cabinet's Fighting Services 
Committee to naval construction in 1930 and 1931 compared with the 
stance adopted in 1929 and the relaxation in the regulations govern- 
ing the sale of armaments to foreign powers during 1930. CAB 27 407 
and C-55(30), 24 September and C. 57(30), 1 October 1930, CAB 23/ 5- 
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small armies expensively equipped. 
I 
It dawned on British policy makers 
that the victors in 1919 had made a serious mistake in not placing any 
restrictions on Germany's arms budget. By 1930 the Foreign Office, the 
Treasury, the War Office and the Admiralty were certain that budgetary 
limitation was in Britain's best interests but the Air Ministry remained 
implacably opposed to it. 
In the CID sub-committee on the reduction and limitation of armaments 
the Air Ministry's opposition to budgetary limitation had been unrelenting. 
The Secretary of State for Air, Lord Thomson, was strenuously opposed to 
budgetary limitation because he believed that Britain should pin. her 
faith on a relatively small fleeý of aircraft (and ships), excelling in 
quality rather than quantity. 
2 Shortly before his death in the R101 air 
crash Thomson wrote to the Prime Minister putting the case against the 
strict budgetary limitation of each separate arm. 
3 To placate the Air 
Ministry the CID recommended in September 1930 that another committee 
be appointed to investigate the special difficulties the Air Force would 
experience if the principle was applied to air armaments. 
4 A few days 
earlier Cecil wrote to Henderson to stiffen his resolve to resist any 
compromise. 
5 He pointed out that the direct limitation of air material 
would be an ineffective way of preventing unbridled competition in air 
power because the real danger lay in expensive developments. The War 
Office, fearing that funds at some future date might be transferred from 
the army and navy to the air force, brought their influence to bear in 
favour of budgetary limitation and against virement. 
6 
1. In fact most German military experts did not think of rearmament 
primarily in terms of war material but rather as an exercise in 
mobilising Germany's manpower for war. See E. W. Bennett: German 
Rearmament and the West. 1932-1933, Passim. 
2. Beatrice Webb Diaries, 23 September 1929. 
3. Henderson to MacDonald, 1 October 1930, FO 800/282. 
4. CID, 250th meeting, 29 September 1930, CAB 2,15- 
5. Cecil to Henderson# 24 September 1930, FO 800/282. 
6. Shaw to Henderson, 24 September 1930, PO 800/282. 
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On 15 October the Cabinet approved the principle of budgetary 
limitation but at the same time adopted the CID recommendation that 
another committee should examine its application to the Air Force. 
1 
2 The Air Ministry continued to oppose it and Lord Amulree, Thomson's 
successor, warned the Cabinet on 6 November that one consequence of the 
budgetary limitation of military aircraft might be the development of 
civil aircraft eminently adaptable for military use. In that case, 
London, deprived of adequate fighter protection, would be vulnerable 
to attack by civil aircraft which had been secretly converted into bombers. 
The Cabinet were unimpressed. It was fatuous to argue in one context that 
civil aircraft were of no military value*and on another occasion to conjure 
up the spectre of the Capital wide open to attack from the self-same 
machines. The Cabinet reiterated its decision that Britain should adhere 
3 to budgetary limitation. 
Cecil's instructions for the final session of the Preparatory 
Commission endorsed the principle of budgetary limitation but from 
R. L. Craigie he learnt that the Prime Minister had not fully approved 
the Cabinet's decision. Craigie reported a conversation in which MacDonald 
had described budgetary limitation as worse than useless. 
4 Cecil had 
already incurred criticism for anticipating the government's conversion 
by announcing in the Third Committee of the 1929 League Assembly that 
Britain intended to press for budgetary limitation 'on all occasions 
and with the utmost vigour,. 
5 He had vindicated himself by quoting the 
Prime Minister's approval of his July 1929 Foreign Office memorandump 
6 
1. C. 60(30), 15 October 1930, CAB 23/65. 
2. W. W. Mackenzie, Lord Amulree (1929), 1860-1942, barrister, President 
of the Industrial Court, 1919-25, Secretary of State for Air, 1930-31; 
supported MacDonald in the Cabinet crisis of August 1931. 
3. C. 66(30), 6 November 1930, CAB 23/65. 
4. Cecil to Noel-Baker, 11 November 1930, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51107. 
5. Cecil to Henderson, 24 September, Minute by Cadogan, 13 October, 
Minute by Selby, 14 October 1930, FO 800/282. 
6. DBFP, Series IAt Vol. VI, Annex to No. 437,29 July 1929. 
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which had explicitly recommended budgetary limitation, and his verbal 
assurances of support at Geneva in September 1929. Having secured 
instructions giving him authority to support budgetary limitation, 
Cecil felt quite free to ignore reports of the Prime Minister's dis- 
pleasure. 
The Final Session of the PreDarator-v Commission, 
November-December 1930 
The final session of the Preparatory Commission in November-December 
1930 could scarcely have began in less auspicious circumstances. France 
and Italy had not resolved their differences over naval armaments. The 
Stahlhelm, demonstrations in Coblenz and the results of the German elections 
on 14 September produced a strong reaction in France and revealed the 
strength of German nationalism. 
1 German public opinion appeared to be 
in open revolt against Stresemann's 'policy of fulfilment'. Italy had 
drawn closer to Germany and in the Third Committee of the 1930 League 
Assembly had supported German demands for the summoning of the world 
disarmament conference during 1931. As the world recession deepened 
internationalists were forced on to the defensive as aggressive nationalism 
became more strident. Some of the staunchest supporters of disarmament 
began to air their misgivings. 'Disarmament won't go' was how Gilbert 
Murray, the Chairman of the League of Nations Union, put it to the Prime 
Minister in a letter on 7 October 1930* 
2 
Cecil and the apostles of disarmament refused to be despondent. 
1. Events in Germany during 1930 produced alarm and despondency not only 
in France but in Britain too. Following the fall of MUller's 'Great 
Coalition' in March 1930, German foreign policy became less concili- 
atory as the Briining government had to bid against the Nationalists 
and National Socialists for public support. The National Socialists 
Increased their representation in the Reichstag from twelve to one 
hundred and seven seats in the September general election. Report- 
ing French reactions, Tyrrell, the British ambassador in Parist tried 
to impress on the British government the importance of not appearing 
indifferent to French demands for security. Tyrrell to Henderson, 
10 October 1930, FO 800/282. 
2. Murray to MacDonald, 7 October 1930, Gilbert Murray Papers. 
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It was not unrealistic to think that the world economic crisis would 
force governments to reduce defence expenditure. Already Mussolini had 
come to realise that Italy would profit more from disarmament than from 
an unbridled competition in armaments. 
1 
The Convention on Financial 
Assistance to States Victims of Aggression, signed by twenty-eight states 
including Britain at the 1930 League Assembly, was a stop forward because 
the British government had insisted that its provisions should be condi- 
tional upon disarmament. Britain still held the balance in Europe. 
There was no country, with the possible exception of Russia, which could 
afford to quarrel with her. 
2 It was still possible to believe that a 
strong British lead might curb the growth of German nationalism and give 
a boost to the disarmament movement in France. 
It was, however, well nigh impossible for Britain to act as honest 
broker between France and Germany. It was most unlikely that anything 
which was acceptable to France would be regarded as satisfactory by 
Germany. To support Germany against France was tantamount to voting 
for the indefinite postponement of the world disarmament conference. 
4 
By siding with France Britain added fuel to the flames of German 
nationalism. 
A majority of delegates at the 1929 session of the Preparatory 
Commission had given a second reading to those parts of the draft 
disarmament convention which dealt with the limitation of effectives 
1. In a speech on 5 June 1928 Mussolini expressed a hope for Franco- 
Italian detente and declared that 'the Italian government was ready 
to accept as the limit of its own armaments any figure whatever, 
even the lowest, provided it is not surpassed by any other European 
power. ' His speech and subsequent speeches on the same lines were 
followed by a more conciliatory stance on the part of General de 
Marinis in the Preparatory Commission and a number of gestures by 
Dino Grandi, Italy's foreign minister from 1929 to 1932, to promote 
disarmament. D. Mack Smith in Mussolini's Roman Em-pire (London, 1976) 
expresses the view that Italy's support for disarmament 'was probably 
quite sincere', P- 30. 
2. Cecil to MacDonald, 18 August 1930, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51081. 
3. A. J. Toynbee: Survey of International Affairs, 
-1930, 
London, 1931, p. 100n. 
4. Ibid., P. 99. 
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and chemical warfare. They had also agreed that the limitation of 
material could only be effected by publicising expenditure. The minority, 
led by Germany and Russia, expressed total dissatisfaction with these 
decisions and also the exclusion of trained reserves from limitation. 
Like the minority, Cecil was unhappy with the decisions taken at 
the 1929 session and at the opening meeting in November 1930 he called 
for the reconsideration of the whole convention. As a compromise it was 
decided that articles which had already received a second reading in 1929 
might be reconsidered if a majority favoured their reconsideration. When, 
however, Count Bernstorff, the chief German delegate, tried to persuade 
the Commission to reverse the 1929 decision to exclude trained reserves 
from limitationp Britain together with the United States and seven other 
powers decided to abstain and the amendment was defeated by twelve votes 
to six. Cecil had long reconciled himself to the fact that France and 
the conscriptionist states were so opposed to their limitation that it 
was pointless to pursue the matter. 
An even more contentious issue was the limitation of war material. 
The Italian delegate, Marinis, came out boldly in favour of a German 
proposal for direct limitation and also put up a strong case for the 
limitation of reserve stocks although a year earlier Italy had opposed 
this method of limitation. When the proposal was put to the vote, nine 
voted in favour and nine against. Cecil abstained knowing that it would 
never be accepted by France. In Britain he was severely censured by 
sections of the Liberal Press and the National Council for the Prevention 
of War for refusing to support Bernstorffla amendment. His own proposal 
for the budgetary limitation of war material was carried by a large 
majority but much to Cecil's disappointment a proposal for the budgetary 
limitation of air armaments was opposed by a majority which included 
France and her allies. 
Perhaps the most fateful decision taken by the Commission in the 
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whole of its four years was the adoption of a French amendment making 
the implementation of the convention conditional upon German's continued 
acceptance of the disarmament clauses of the Versailles treaty. That 
decision gave Bernstorff the excuse to denounce the convention as a whole. 
One contemporary British observer, Major-General A. C. Temperley, 
believed that Britain made a fatal mistake in voting for the French 
amendment. From that moment, in Temperley's view, the Disarmament 
Conference was doomed to inevitable failure. 
I 
Unlike most of his fellow delegates Cecil was not displeased with 
the draft disarmament convention and the work of the final session of 
the Preparatory Commission. He was highly critical of the German dele- 
gation, never believed that the Russians seriously desired disarmament 
but was favourably disposed towards the Italians whom, in the past, he 
had regarded as a serious impediment. 
2 Writing to Noel-Baker on 
29 November he said: 'Assuming the scheme which we elaborated in the 
Foreign Office3 was a good one, I think we have come marvellously well 
through the Preparatory Commission. In very few respects can it be said 
that the Preparatory Commissions scheme is worse than ours, and in some 
matters it seems an improvement. ' 
4 Although the convention was only a 
framework with its schedules left blank, it represented a large measure 
1. For an account of the final session of the Preparatory Commission 
see A. J. Toynbee: Survey of International Affairs. 1930, pp. 101-23 
and A. C. Temperley: The Whispering-Gallery of Eurore, PP. 131-40. 
Cecil's despatches to the Foreign Office are in FO 411/13. Report 
of the Preparator-Y Commission for the Disarmament Conference, 
Cmd. 3757,1931 contains the text of the convention, the reservations 
entered by individual powers, a commentary on the proceedings and the 
text, and a few of Cecil's despatches. Cecil's correspondence with 
Noel-Baker contains an illuminating and informative account of the 
session and throws a great deal of light on Cecil's own thinking. 
Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51107. 
2. Cecil to Noel-Baker, 3 December 1930, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51107. 
3. This was no doubt a reference to the memorandum of 29 July 1929 cited 
above, P. 324. 
4. Cecil to Noel-Baker, 29 November 1930P Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 51107. 
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of agreement as to what should be limited and how it should be limited. 
It rested with governments to give proof of their oft-repeated intention 
to reduce the burden of armaments. Provided goodwill was not lacking, 
the disarmament convention could be the first genuine step towards the 
disappearance of all aggressive armaments among the nations of the world. 
Cecil's conscious decision to side with the French and his pro- 
French stance was criticised in Britain. Henderson apparently believed 
that Cecil had given away too much to the French and had been unduly 
abrasive in his attitude to the German delegation, 
2 
Others were not so optimistic. The German, Swedish and American 
delegates expressed disappointment and profound dissatisfaction. Spokes- 
men from France and the Little Entente reverted to the theme of security. 
3 
In a broadcast to the United States Henderson admitted that the year was 
closing in an atmosphere of anxiety if not gloom. 
4 Dalton questioned the 
basic assumptions of British policy. 'We go on signing new bits of paper 
but who believes in the undertakings they enshrine? 15 
Preparations for the World Disarmament Conference 
Looking back on 1931 from the standpoint of October 1932 A. J. Toynbee 
christened it 'Annus Terribilis'. 
6 
At the beginning of 1931 there were 
two and a half million unemployed in Britain and in Germany nearly five 
million. At a Cabinet meeting on 14 January Snowden spoke to his 
colleagues about the worsening financial situation which was eventually 
to bring about the fall of the Labour government. It was recognised that 
large economies could only be achieved by changes in policy but in 
respect of defence, it was pointed out that the policy of the country 
1. Cecil to Henderson, 10 December 1930# Cmd. 3757t 1931. 
2. Viscount Cecil of Chelwood: All the Way, p. 
6 December 1930, Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss. 
196; Noel-Balcer to Cecil, 
51107. 
3. A. J. Toynbee: Survey of International-Affa irs. 1930, p. 122. 
4. M. A. Hamilton: Arthur Henderson, London, 1938, P- 341. 
5. Dalton Diaries, 29 December 1930. 
6. A. J. Toynbee: Survey of International Affa irs. 1931, London, 1932, p- 
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could not be drawn up in isolation from the policies of other countries, 
and that in view more particularly of the coming Disarmament Conference, 
great caution would have to be exercised in regard to reductions in the 
defence forces'. I No one dared to suggest that disarmament was the 
remedy for the economic crisis. When the government was forced to bow 
to Liberal pressure in the debate on the Conservative Opposition's vote 
of censure in February 1931 by appointing the May committee to examine 
public expenditure, no one anticipated that it would Beek large economies 
at the expense of the Service departments. 
2 
Such was the mood of disenchantment with past policies that Snowden's 
plea for reductions in the 1931 naval construction programme was completely 
ignored. The erstwhile pacifist Secretary of State for War, Tom Shaw, 
3 
called for 'a firm attitude' to counter any impression that Britain was 
on the verge of bankruptcy. Though a large construction programme was 
approved, Henderson did succeed in persuading the Cabinet to agree that 
none of the ships should be laid down before the world disarmament con- 
ference convened in 1932.4 
The January 1931 meeting of the League Council had fixed 2 February 
1932 as the opening date of the world disarmament conference. However 
weary the government might be of international well-doing it could not 
1. C. 6(31)p 14 January 1931, CAB 23/66. 
2. For the Labour government's response to the crisis see R. Skidelsky: 
Politicians and the Slump. the Labour Goverrment of 1929-1931, 
London, 1967. 
3. Tom Shaw, 1872-1938, Labour MP for Preston, 1918-1931, Minister of 
Labour, 1924, Secretary of State for War, 1929-31. A. C. Temperley 
records an intriguing story about Shaw's unwillingness to sanction 
the movement of troops to Palestine in 1929 because he was a pacifist. 
A. C. Temperley: The Whispering Galler-y of EuroP9, pp. 118-19. 
4. FS(29), 14 and 15,26 and-29 January 1931, CAB 27/407; C-11(31), 
4 February 1931, CAB 23/66; Dalton Diaries, 26 January 1931 et seg. 
and 5 February 1931. Concern about Britain's declining prestige 
was not confined to MacDonald, Shaw and Hankey. On 21 April 1931 
Beatrice Webb noted in her diary: 'There remains the fact that 
instructed foreigners are convinced that Great Britain is "down and 
out" as a great Power, and possibly on the eve of economic catastrophe leading to social revolution. ' She went on to say that the British 
people were becoming pacifist because their victory in the war had turned out to be a defeat. Beatrice Webb Diaries. 
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evade the responsibility of formulating British policy for the conference. 
On 4 February 1931 Henderson was appointed to chair a Cabinet committee 
charged with advising the Cabinet on the policy Britain should pursue. 
His suggestion that the other two political parties should be invited 
to co-operate in shaping British policy was also endorsed and MacDonald 
entered into correspondence with Baldwin and Lloyd George to enlist the 
co-operation of the Conservative and Liberal parties. 
The Cabinet Committee on Disarmament held three meetings in February 
and March in a vain effort to hammer out the main lines of British policy 
before the other two parties Joined their deliberations. At its first 
meeting on 12 February there were strong differences of opinion. 
Snowden did not share Henderson's enthusiasm for budgetary limitation. 
The view which emerged was that it would be necessary to combine some 
form of direct limitation of both personnel and material with the 
budgetary limitation of armaments. Henderson's plea for a percentage 
reduction, 
2 
produced a strong reaction in the Air Ministry. Amulree 
argued that as Britain was fifth among the world's air powers, it would 
be unreasonable for others to expect her to reduce her Air Estimates. 
3 
Four days later he wrote to Hankey, the secretary of the committee, 
dissenting from the conclusions recorded in the Minutes that 'there 
was general agreement that the Committee should aim at giving a lead 
to other Powers in the direction of a reduction of armaments'. 'I don't 
wish', Amulree wrote, 'to be recorded as assenting to so sweeping a 
proposition. ' 
Officials had been excluded from the first meeting of the Cabinet 
committee but when the Minutes reached the departments there was a quick 
1. C-11(31), 4 February 1931, CAB 23/66. 
2. On the same day, 12 February 1931P the League of Nations Union came 
out with a proposal for a twenty-five per cent. reduction in armaments. 
3. DPC(31)1,12 February 1931, CAB 21/347. 
4. Amulree to Hankey, 16 February 1931, CAB 21/347. 
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reaction from some of the government's advisers. C. L. Bullock, the 
Permanent Under-Secretary at the Air Ministry and Secretary to the Air 
Staff, immediately set to work to persuade the Secretary of State to 
call for a One-Power standard in the air and to oppose Henderson's 
percentage reduction proposal which he described as 'fantastic' and 
#out of touch with all practical realities'. It would be, in Bullock's 
opinion, an application of the principle 'to him that hath shall be given 
and from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath'. 
1 
Soliciting Hankey's helpq he pointed out that whereas in Britain a mere 
2-3 per cent of total goverment expenditure was spent on the air force, 
in the United States it was 4.25 per cent., in France 5 per cent., and in 
Italy 4 per cent. 
2 
In reply, Hankey encouraged him to prepare 'Some very 
powerful material' to circulate to the Committee at an opportune moment. 
It should be 'couched in terms sympathetic to the principle of disarmament' 
3 to avoid antagonism. At their second meeting the committee decided that 
it would be appropriate for nations which had already made reductions to 
claim special treatment. 
4 
Cecil, who had been invited to the second meeting at Henderson's 
request, made a spirited defence of the draft disarmament convention and 
budgetary limitation in particular. Referring to proposals for a Percentage 
reduction, Cecil said that though it might be an appropriate basis for an 
agreement between the great powers it should not be applied to those 
countries which had already disarmed or small countries like Denmark 
which had practically no armaments at all. When Alexander, Snowden, 
Thomas and even Henderson raised objections to budgetary limitation and 
percentage reductions, Cecil said they were of the greatest importance 
1. Rough draft of a memorandum, 17 February 1931, CAB 21/347. 
2. Bullock to Hankey, 18 February 1931, CAB 21/347. 
3. Hankey to Bullock, 20 February 1931, CAB 21/347. 
4. DPC(31)2,18 February 1931, CAB 21/347. 
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because they struck a popular note by enlisting the taxpayer on the 
side of disarmament. 
1 
The Cabinet committee held only one other meeting on 12 March before 
it was submerged in the proceedings of the Three Party Committee on Dis- 
armament. It had reached no conclusions of any practical value but it 
had served to alert the government's Service advisers to some of the 
arguments which the advocates of disarmament would deploy when the Three 
Party Committee began the task of formulating a disarmament policy 
acceptable to all shades of political opinion in Britain. Henderson's 
proposal had inadvertently focused attention on the strongest weapon in 
the Services' armoury, the widely divergent trends in the armaments 
expenditure of the great powers. 
2 
For a short time the morale of the disarmers revivea when Henderson 
and Alexander returned from, 'Paris 
and Rome with the Franco-Italian Bases 
of Agreement. In the euphoric atmosphere of the moment Dalton wrote: 
'The World Disarmament Conference looks as though it might really succeed 
now. 
3 The rejoicing was short-lived. Before the end of March it became 
clear that France's interpretation differed radically from that of the 
British and the Italians. France assumed, amongst other things, that 
the agreement entitled her to replace over-age tonnage before the London 
naval treaty expired in December 1936, something which neither Britain 
nor Italy could concede. 
4 
1. DPC(31)2,18 February 1931, CAB 21/347. 
2. See, for example, the memoranda by the Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff, 13 and 25 March 1931, DPC(3l)7 
and 8, CAB 21/347. 
3. Dalton Diaries, 6 March 1931. 
4. DBFP, Second Series, Vol. II, No- 326; Dalton Diaries, 23 March, 
14 and 24 April 1931; C. 21(31), 31 March 1931, CAB 23/66. Alexander 
and Henderson crowned the patient diplomacy which R. L. Craigie had 
conducted over many months in Paris and Rome. Austen Chamberlain 
believed that Henderson hurried back too soon from Rome and that a 
few days' more careful drafting might have saved him subsequent dis- 
appointment and ill-success. If he was right it is a commentary on 
the pressures which prevented Henderson from giving adequate time to 
the complexities of disarmament. See Austen Chamberlain to Ida 
Chamberlain, 25 April 1931, Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC 5/l/537. 
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The Three Party Committee held its first meeting On 18 March. 
It was Lloyd George who came nearest to dominating its first and subse- 
quent meetings. MacDonald laconically noted in his diary: 1L. G. propa- 
2 
gandist as usual and will have much to say' . Unaware that the Services 
had already set to work to inundate the committee with a flood of 
statistics, arguments and data to prove how much better armed were other 
countries in comparison with Britain, Lloyd George called for the fullest 
information possible on the peace establishments, reserves and equipment 
of the principal European armies and similar information on the world's 
navies. The Service departments were accordingly instructed to provide 
the committee with data on the land, sea and air forces of eleven countries, 
and an appreciation of their fighting potential. 
3 
A recurrent theme running through all their deliberations was what 
most regarded as the unwarranted expansion of French military and air 
power. Although Chamberlain and Shaw defended France's military prepara- 
tions 
4 
and even Lloyd George conceded that she should be allowed a 
superiority in military strength to enable her to resist a German attack, 
5 
the prevailing view was that French policy constituted a serious obstacle 
to disarmament. Milne's assertion that France had no intention of dis- 
arming went unchallenged. 
6 
Even Henderson for a time had doubts about 
1. MacDonald (Chairman), Alexander, Amalree, Hendersonp Shaw, Snowden, 
Thomas from the governmentt Austen Chamberlain, Sir Samuel Hoare, 
Anthony Eden and Sir Thomas Inskip from the Conservative party, and 
Lloyd George, Sir Herbert Samuel and the Marquis of Lothian (Philip 
Kerr) from the Liberals. Cecil was also a member but he was not one 
of Baldwin's nominees. Baldwin declined to serve on the committee 
as apparently did Lord Hailsham. also. 
2. MacDonald Diaries, 18 March 1931, PRO 30/69/8/1. For Lloyd George's 
role in the committee see MacDonald to Hendersont 15 May 1931P 
FO 800/283, MacDonald's diary entry for 7 May 1931 and Austen 
Chamberlain to Hilda and Ida Chamberlain, 12 and 21 June, 18 July 
1931, Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC 5/1/540,543,548. 
3. The eleven countries were Britain, France, Italy, Russia, Poland, 
Germany, Czechoslovakia, Roumania, Yugoslavia, the United States 
and Japan, CAB 16/102. 
4.7 May 1931, CAB 16/102. 
5.19 June 1931, CAB 16/102. 
6.7 May 1931, CAB 16/102. Milne was Chief of the Imperial General Staff- 
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France's intentions. 1 Tyrrell's Parisian viewpoint that never had the 
prospects for Anglo-French co-operation over disarmament been better 
would have struck most of the committee as wishful thinking. 
2 It was 
Hoare who first described disarmament as essentially a French problem. 
He coupled his strictures on French policy with a demand for an air 
parity agreement with France and Italy as he had done so frequently in 
the past. He pleaded for preliminary negotiations with the French to 
try to avert what he regarded as the almost inevitable failure at the 
disarmament conference. 
3 
Later he was to argue for budgetary limitation 
as the only means by which French armaments might be held in check. 
4 
The'War Office, which in the past had been more sympathetic to 
Prance than most sections of British opinion, ridiculed the claims 
recently made by Maginot5 in the Chamber of Deputies that France had 
disarmed. France had gone on increasing her armament expenditure since 
the franc was stabilised in 1926 and, though she had reduced the period 
of military service, she had not diminished her mobilisable forces by a 
single man. Her bluff had to be called. She held the key to disarmament. 
If she disarmed others would follow her example. 
6 
Similar views were 
held by the Admiralty and the Air Staff. Both alleged that France had 
doubled her expenditure over a five or six year period while Britain's 
had actually declined. 
7 London remained far more vulnerable to air 
attack than Paris so that equality in numbers would not give Britain 
1. Beatrice Webb Diaries, 18 April 1931. 
2. Tyrrell to Selby, 26 January 1931, FO 800/283. 
3.23 April 1931, CAB 16/102. 
4.7 May 1931, CAB 16/102. 
5. Andre Maginot was French Minister of War; his statement was made on 
24 February'1931- 
6. DPC(31)7,13 March 1931, CAB 21/347. 
7. DPC(31)8,25 March 1931, CAB 21/347 and CDC(31)2,10 April 1931, 
CAB 27/476. 
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equality in effective air strength. 
1 
France should be pressed to make 
large reductions in her air force but Britain might offer 'to reduce, 
or not to build up beyond' a figure which would give her a one-power 
standard. 
2 
Although an occasional reference was made to clandestine Germnn 
rearmament and France's legitimate fears of Germany's will to war and 
greater manpower and industrial efficiency, little thought was given 
to relating the size of France's military and air forces to her defence 
requirements and status as a great power. Salmond of the Air Staff 
admitted that France had maintained a large air force because she was 
convinced that overwhelming air superiority was necessary to enable her 
to smash the industrial resources of the Ruhr and hold up the German 
army should it undertake a race for the Rhine bridgeheads, but he went 
on to demand for Britain equality with France. He even went so far as 
to call for a maroin of technical superiority over the French to ensure 
that Britain really had equality in effective air strength. Ile justified 
his demands on the grounds that the vulnerability of the British Isles to 
air attack constituted the weakest point in the whole field of imperial 
defence. The point at issue was not so much whether Britain could, or 
should, build up to the strength of France but that her security demanded 
effective parity with France. However much Britain might believe that 
the French air force was maintained for security and not aggression, 
Britain could not continue indefinitely to depend on the goodwill of a 
neighbour. 
3 
On one or two occasions# Chamberlain and others attempted to counter 
the anti-French bias in so much that was being said and written on dis- 
armament. France's fortification of her eastern frontier, Chamberlain 
1. DC(P)11,27 April 1931, CAB 16/102. 
2. DPC(31)8,25 March 1931, CAB 21/347. 
3. DC(P)11,27 April 1931, CAB 16/102. 
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asserted, would redound to Britain's advantage. He went on to tell his 
colleagues that if the French knew that Britain was militarily strong, 
they might be a good deal more willing to effect reductions in their 
own forces. 
1 
In the Commons debate on disarmament, 29 June 1931, Chamberlain 
drew attention to the consequences which would follow a weakening of 
British armed strength. Britain would become dependent on other. nations 
and at the mercy of other powers. 'The weakness of Great Britain is not 
in the interests of European stability, European confidence or the peace 
of the world. ' With the exception of Churchill, no one in the debate 
attempted to apply the same criteria to France. Churchill alone 
championed French military power as being in the best interests of 
European peace. 
2 
The Marquess of Lothian, formerly Philip Kerr, probably expressed 
the view of a majority of the committee when he informed Lloyd George 
that no disarmament agreement was possible if Britain acquiesced in 
the French thesis that France could only reduce her armaments so long 
as she and her allies remained militarily predominant in Europe. Lothian 
had long believed that an anti-German entente with France was inimical to 
peace and that the only hope of preventing war was an Anglo-French-German 
combination, a view which MacDonald shared. 
3 Outlining a wide-ranging 
policy for Britain, which included the possibility of frontier revision 
in eastern Europe, he suggested that no power or group of powers in 
Europe should possess military preponderance and that every nation 
should be allowed defensive armaments but be strictly limited so far 
as offensive armaments were concerned. Britain should make it clear 
1.7 May 1931, CAB 16/102. 
2.254 HC Debs. 5th Series, cols. 962 and 1015-17# 29 June 1931- 
3. Kerr to MacDonald, 16 and 19 November 1928, Lothian Papers, 
GD 40/17/243. 
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that she was prepared to help police a disarmed world but would not bind 
herself to be dragged at the behest of others into a European war between 
nations armed to the teeth. 
1 
Running France a close second as the villain of the piece was Soviet 
Russia. Chamberlain raised the Russian bogey at the second meeting of 
the committee and quoted Milne's allegation that Russia's Five Year Plan 
2 
was 'largely military in conception' . Hoare added that although he 
used to think that the Russian danger could be discounted, the growth 
of Russian air power had forced him to change his mind. 
3 Chamberlain 
and Hoare were expressing views frequently aired by Conservative spokes- 
4 
men when seeking an excuse for not supporting the campaign for disarmament. 
A'few days later the Chief of the Air Staff reported that Russia had over 
a thousand aircraft poised to threaten British interests from the Khyber 
to Mosul. 'The success or failure of air limitation and disarmament 
mainly depends upon the attitude of France and Russia, the one preponderant 
in Western, the other in Eastern Europe. Russia may be the more probable 
enemy but geographical factors fortunately put limits to the damage that 
her air forces could inflict upon us in the present state of development., 
5 
About the same time a War Office memorandum set out to demonstrate that 
Russia had tripled her military expenditure between 1924-25 and 1930-31, 
a far larger increase in expenditure than that incurred by either France 
1. Lothian to Lloyd George, 15 May 1931, Lothian Papers, GD 40/17/257- 
2. In response to a request by Chamberlain, Milne amplified his views 
in a paper, 5 May 1931, CAB 16198. 
3.23 April 1931, CAB 16/102. 
4. The National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations' Election 
Notes-for Conservative Speakers and Workers, General Election, 1931, 
devoted over twenty pages to the Soviet Union. Among its many anti- 
Soviet comments: 'From the point of view of world peace nothing is 
more disturbing than the militarist campaign conducted by the Soviet 
government and the arrangements it is making to develop its military 
resources and train all sections of the population in the art of war. ' 
P- 395. Baldwin, Chamberlain and other Conservative speakers in the 
Commons debate on disarmament, 29 June 1931, referred to Russia's 
military expansion. 
5. DC(P)11,27 April 1931, CAB 16/102. 
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or the United States. 
1 All the eastern European states lived in dread 
of Russia and doubted the sincerity of her assurances that she was pre- 
pared to disarm. 
2 
The United States did not escape criticism. In January 1931 the 
United States government had been asked whether she wished to take part 
in preliminary conversations before the world disarmament conference 
convened. Stimson had replied that as the United States was not a land 
3 
power there was no point in her being involved in these discussions. 
In March 1931 the Chief of the Imperial General Staff took some delight 
in revealing the hypocrisy of the United States government. Whereas in 
Britain military expenditure had decreased by Z44m. since 1924, America's 
had increased by over Ellm. although she had no serious enemy to fear and 
few foreign commitments to honour. The United States showed no strong 
desire to disarm but lost no opportunity in rebuking others for their 
lack of goodwill in this respect. 
4 
The Chief of the Air Staff was no 
less scathing in his criticisms. United States expenditure on air 
armaments had increased by one hundred and fifty-nine per cent. s ince 
1925 and, whereas Britain had just over eight hundred aircraft of which 
only some four hundred constituted home-based, first-line machines, the 
United States had well over a thousand military aircraft. 
5 No one sug- 
gested that the United States had any aggressive intentions but the 
expansion of her armed forces provided the Chiefs of Staff with yet 
another reason for resisting disarmament. 
The common theme running through all the papers presented by the 
1. DC(P)15,22 April 1931, CAB 16/102. These calculations ignored the 
depreciation of the rouble. 
2. DPC(31)7,13 March 1931, CAB 21/347. 
3- 24/26 Jaywary 1931, CAB 21/347. 
4. DPC(31)7,13 March 1931, CAB 21/347. 
5. DC(P)II, 27 April 1931, CAB 161102. The expenditure figure included 
expenditure on civil aviation and was, therefore# scarcely relevant. 
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Chiefs of Staff was that Britain had disarmed while other powers had 
continued to increase their air, sea and land forces. Though there was 
an element of truth in this basic contention much of the evidence they 
supplied was misleading. British defence expenditure excluded items 
which were shown in the expenditure of many other powers. Whereas 
France included expenditure on troops stationed in North Africa and Syria, 
only a very small proportion of the military expenditure in the Colonies 
was shown in the War Office vote. A French Foreign Ministry memorandum 
was able to demonstrate that British defence expenditure had increased 
in real terms by tan per cent. between 1924 and 1930.1 In 1924 total 
British defence expenditure was E113,375,000. By 1925 it had risen to 
JC119,531,000 to fall back to AC116,468,000 in 1927, and in 1928 and 1929 
to approximately the 1924 level with a drop to, f-109,539,000 in 1930. 
However, between 1924 and 1930 the retail price index fall by ten per 
cent. and, more importantly for the armed forces, the wholesale price 
index by twenty-nine per cent. Though in money terms British defence 
expenditure fell by three and a half per cent. between 1924 and 1930, 
adjusted to the retail and wholesale price indices it rose by seven 
and thirty-five and a half per cent. respectively. 
2 
Only Lloyd George questioned the statistics supplied by the Chiefs 
of Staff which MacDonald used to such good effect in defending Britain's 
disarmament record in the Commons on 29 June 1931- 
3 Lloyd George pointed 
out that they underestimated Britain's armed strength and failed to explain 
that increased defence expenditure in other countries might be due to 
higher wages, allowances and similar factors. 
4 
1. Wigram to Henderson, 15 July 1931, CAB 21/347. 
2. See Appendix I. 
3.254 HO Debs. 5th Series, cols. 907-9. 
4.7 May 1931, CAB 16/102. A good illustration of the inadequacy of 
the statistics supplied them is afforded by the military budget of 
the Roumanian army for the years 1924 to 1927. Though army personnel 
only rose very slightly, army pay more than doubled. 
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One other consideration could not escape their notice. Existing 
ratios represented the strength which nations had freely accepted for 
themselves. Financial and other constraints might have played a part 
in determining armament levels but, with the exception of those states 
disarmed by the peace treaties, those levels had been voluntarily adopted 
by national governments. MacDonald's contention that it was ridiculous 
to talk about a twenty-five per cent. reduction for all because Britain 
had already made such a reduction might carry conviction with his 
colleagues on the committee 
1 but it was unlikely to convince other powers. 
An inevitable consequence of the emphasis the Chiefs of Staff placed 
on the defence expenditure of the powers, was to bring to the fore the 
question of budgetary limitation. Alexander, Chamberlain and Hoare, 
who did not dispute the validity of the statistics presented by the 
Service Chiefs, spoke in its favour. Lloyd George, who regarded their 
statistics as misleading if not tendentious, repudiated budgetary 
limitation. The majority nevertheless accepted Cecil's view that budgetary 
limitation was an essential component of an effective disarmament treaty. 
2 
Rightly or wrongly most of the committee regarded the Preparatory 
Commission's draft disarmament convention as French in origin and bias. 
On 21 May Lloyd George launched a strong attack on it. The Germans had 
been quite right to object to it. 
3 A. week earlier, in what Dalton 
described as a long rambling discussion in which all the participants 
said whatever came into their heads, 
4 
MacDonald suggested radical changes 
in the Versailles treaty to allow Germany to re-introduce conscription 
and build military aircraft. 
5 
Although Chamberlain, according to Dalton, 
1.21 May 1931, CAB 16/102. 
2.7 and 21 May 1931, CAB 16/102. 
3.21 May 1931, CAB 16/102. 
4. Dalton Diaries, 14 May 1931. Dalton was deputising for Henderson. 
Both Cecil and Lloyd George were also absent and of those present, 
only Samuel, according to Dalton, seemed to want disarmament. 
5.14 May 1931, CAB 16/102. 
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also favoured some modifications to allow Germany to introduce conscrip- 
tion, he later warned MacDonald that such a proposal might so antagonise 
France as to ruin the chances of the disarmament conference, a view 
which Hoare also shared. 
1 
Despite Chamberlain's warning, Lloyd George 
persuaded the committee to consider proposals which were at variance 
with the draft disarmament convention and were more acceptable to Germany 
than to France. 
Germany had repudiated the draft disarmament convention for three 
basic reasons. It kept her to the limits imposed on her by the Versailles 
treaty though other powers might only be obliged to make minor reductions, 
it excluded trained reserves from limitation, and it made no provision 
for the limitation of reserve stocks of war material. With the exception 
of Lloyd George, no one on the committee seriously contemplated re-opening 
the question of trained reserves but the majority came to the conclusion 
that unless war material in reserve was limited the disarmament treaty 
would be seriously defective. Milne, with some support from Alexander 
and Hoare, argued against it on the grounds that it would lead to the 
disclosure of serious deficiencies in Britain's defences. 
2 After careful 
consideration Chamberlain brushed aside these objections. On 12 June 
he informed the Committee that in his opinion the only effective check 
on the size to which an army could be expanded on the outbreak of war 
was a limitation of the war material it had at its disposal. Although 
it would be impossible to control small arms, he saw no reason why large 
3 
weapons such as tanks and heavy guns should not be included. It was 
impossible to contemplate a disarmament treaty which did not oblige its 
1.14 May . 1931, CAB 161102. Dalton 
Diaries, 14 May 1931. 
2.7 May 1931, CAB 16/102. 
3. Chamberlain's suggestion provoked a sharp rejoinder from the War 
Office. On 20 June they circulated a memorandum objecting to the 
limitation of tanks though not heavy guns on the grounds that it 
would be to the disadvanta of the small armies of industrialised 
states like Britain. DC(Pf43,20 June 1931, CAB 16/102. 
350 
signatories to disclose their stocks of war material. He had considered 
the Chiefs of Staff opposition to advertising Britain's weakness but he 
thought that risk should be taken. 
1 
At their meeting a week later, 
2 Lloyd George defined four basic 
objectives which he suggested should guide them in formulating British 
disarmament policy. Britain was firstly under an obligation to fulfil 
her treaty commitments and pledges to disarm. Secondly, she should seek 
such reductions in national armaments as to ensure that while each state 
could enjoy a reasonable security it did not possess sufficient military 
power to overwhelm its neighbour, a point which Lothian had put to him a 
month earlier. 
3 
Thirdly, Britain should try to see that if war broke 
out it would not be on such a scale as in 1914 and, fourthly, national 
armaments had to be reduced to such an extent that nations were forced 
to look not to their own military power but to the League of Nations 
for their security. He believed that the only method of achieving real 
disarmament was to apply the principles enshrined in the disarmament 
clauses of the Versailles treaty. He favoured the Russian proposal to 
the Preparatory Commission for a prescribed maximum limit for war 
material and the destruction of everything in excess of that limit. 
Lloyd George took a more optimistic view of the prospects for 
disarmament than most of his colleagues. He believed thilt, because of 
the economic situation, the time was propitious for disarmament. Most 
nations had declared themselves in its favour and if France stood out 
against it, she would be isolated. 
4 
Cecil's views, though differing on points of detail, were not 
altogether dissimilar. On a number of occasions he pleaded with Lloyd 
1.12 June 1931P CAB 16/102. 
2.19 June 19319 CAB 16/102. 
3. Lothian to Lloyd George, 15 May 1931, Lothian Papers, GD 40/17/257. 
4.19 June 1931, CAB 16/102. 
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George not to pursue the unrealisable goals of a limitation of trained 
reserves and the industrial capacity of a nation to wage war. He 
successfully persuaded him to abandon his opposition to budgetary limita- 
tion and the nine draft resolutions which Lloyd George formulated for the 
committee at the end of June were an amalgam of his own and Lloyd George's 
ideas. Like Lloyd George Cecil believed that the principles of the 
Versailles treaty should be applied to other nations by progressive 
stages. He told the committee that although he personally favoured the 
abolition of tanks, submarines and military aircraft together with a ten 
thousand ton limitation for all warships, it would be unwise to make such 
proposals until Britain had ascertained that they would have a large 
measure of support. 
1 
At Chamberlain's suggestion, 
2 Lloyd George was invited to formulate 
a number of resolutions embodying his four basic principles for the 
committee's consideration. On 29 June Lloyd George circulated the 
draft of nine resolutions 
3 
which the committee discussed and amended at 
their meeting on 2 July 1931. His first resolution repeated the principle 
enshrined in the first paragraph of Article 8 of the Covenant and his 
second called for such reductions in national armaments as to ensure 
that no nation would be able to overwhelm its neighbour. His third 
referred specifically to France and Germany. Lloyd George recognised 
that in the first stage of a disarmament convention countries like Prance 
with reasonable grounds for apprehension should be permitted to retain 
1.21 May, 12 and 19 June 1931, CAB 16/102. 
2.19 June 1931, CAB 16/102. Chamberlain regarded many of Lloyd George's 
proposals as impracticable but so long as they were opposed by MacDonald 
and the government members of the committee he was reassured. However, 
on 19 June he was alarmed when MacDonald swung round to Lloyd George's 
point of view. His suggestion seems to have been designed to prevent 
the committee from being side-tracked on to a course of action which 
would be divisive. On IS July he was able to report that during the last two meetings Lloyd George had become more reasonable. See 
Austen Chamberlain to Ida and Hilda Chamberlain, 21 and 26 June, 18 July 1931, Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC 5/l/543,544 and 548. 
3. DC(P)47,29 June 1931, CAB 16/102. 
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sufficient military strength to deter any attack. It was equally important 
to give Germany security otherwise she might be driven to leave the League 
of Nations and embark on rearmament. Lloyd George's fourth resolution 
said that the principle of combining security with a limitation of a 
nation's offensive power raised three different aspects of disarmament: 
(1) its total amount, (2) its character, and (3) whether alliances which 
threatened the security of other nations could be permitted. His fifth 
resolution suggested that, in order to prevent warfare in the future 
being as devastating as it had been in the recent past, armies should 
be limited in size and in the destructiveness of their weapons. The 
sixth asserted that the most successful methods so far evolved were those 
imposed on Germany and her allies, in 1919 but they would have to be 
supplemented by some form of budgetary limitation. The seventh advocated 
a ballot system to limit the effective strength of land and air personnel 
in those countries which relied on conscription. The eighth called for 
the limitation of material and material held in reserve as well as the 
machinery for its production. It also called on the British delegation 
to press for the elimination of weapons which were essentially offensive 
in character. The ninth and last of Lloyd George's resolutions declared: 
'The Delegation should constantly keep in view the essential principle 
that the strength of national armaments should be of a character that 
will force the nations to look for security less to armaments and more 
to the methods of the League of Nations, including disarmament. ' 
Chamberlain and Cecil presented a set of reasoned amendments when 
the committee discussed the resolutions on 2 July. 
I The final draft 2 
adopted by the committee on 15 July 1931 was a combination of the 
proposals made by Lloyd George, Chamberlain and Cecil, the three men, 
1. DC(P 47A and DC(P)47B, CAB 16/102; the date of Cecil's paper, DCM47B, is given as 7 July 1931. 
2. DC(P)50,15 July 1931P CAB 16/102. 
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who more than any other, were responsible for the form and content of 
British disarmament policy in the years 1919 to 1931. 
Chamberlain, Hoare and Thomas were strongly opposed to any distinc- 
tion being made between offensive and defensive weapons so the committee 
decided to eliminate references to such a distinction. In its place, 
was incorporated a sentence declaring that the military forces of a 
nation, whether personnel or material, available at the outbreak of war, 
should be limited in such a way as to make it unlikely that an aggressor 
would succeed with a knock-out blow. An opportunity would thus be given 
for the various methods of conciliation and pacification to be brought 
into play. They also struck out Lloyd George's references to alliances 
and the threat they might pose to other states, a ballot system to limit 
the effective strength of conscript armies, and a limitation of machinery 
for the production of war material. Instead of Lloyd George's call for a 
limitation of material and stocks of material held in reserve, they 
substituted a far more anaemic proposal for the publication of full 
information as to men and material held in reserve. They made two 
significant additions. The British delegates should make a full statement 
on the reductions which had already been effected by the United Kingdom 
and they should state that any further reductions by Britain must be 
part of an international agreement. They would bear in mind that it 
might be necessary to reconsider whether Britain's low level of armaments 
could be maintained at that level if other powers did not make comparable 
reductions. They also proposed tha. t the system of supervision imposed on 
Germany by the Versailles treaty should be replaced by the system outlined 
in the draft disarmament convention. 
1 
The Inter-Allied Commission of Military Control established to 
enforce the terms of the peace treaty had been withdrawn in 1927 
but disagreements between Britain and France in the years 1925 to 
1927 had prevented the establishment of a League regime of super- 
vision, as envisaged in the treaty, to take its place. 
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The 1931 Three Party Committee on Disarmament has no parallels in 
recent British political history. It was, as one of its Conservative 
members put it, a remarkable example of inter-party co-operation on a 
vital question of imperial policy. 
1 It ostensibly achieved what the 
League of Nations Union had set out to accomplish a decade earlier, a 
national consensus on disarmament which cut across party differencese 
2 
Contemporary observers witnessing the Commons disarmament debate on 
29 June 1931 and the League of Nations Union Albert Hall demonstration 
less than two weeks later can be forgiven for assuming that the three 
political parties were united in their desire for disarmament .3 It 
was ironical that at precisely the moment British public opinion should 
become convinced of the importance of general disarmament its leaders, 
4 
with very few exceptions , should come to feel so overwhelmed by the 
obstacles as to regard the exercise as largely futile. 'The more I 
read and hear the less do I see any way through the difficulties', 
Austen Chamberlain wrote on 12 June 1931.5 Though the Three Party 
Committee agreed on a specific set of proposals that agreement masked 
considerable differences of opinion and, more significantly, a mood of 
deep disenchantment with disarmament. If the British public was so 
insular as to be largely unaware of the dangerous trends of opinion in 
France and Germany their leaders were not entirely ignorant of the 
European situation. 
1. Sir Samuel Hoare, later Viscount Templewood. Viscount Templewood: 
Nine Troubled Years, London, 1954, P. 118. 
2. On 18 July 1931 Austen Chamberlain informed his sister, Ida 
Chamberlain: 'We have ... agreed on a statement of principles which 
has received the approval of our Conservative colleagues. ' 
Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC 5/l/548- 
3. The comments expressed by A. J. Toynbee in Survey of International 
Affairs. 1931 (London, 1932, p. 290) reveal7how easily informed 
observers were deceived by the unanimity of the political parties 
expressed on the public platform. 
4. It was the leaders of the Liberal party, Lloyd George, Samuel and 
Lothian, who refused to be overwhelmed by the difficulties. 
5. Austen Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, Austen Chamberlain Papers, 
AC 5/l/540- 
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There is nothing in the Minutes of the Three Party Committee which 
would lead us to question Chamberlain's assessment: 'From first to last 
the Government members of t1he Committee have not contributed a single 
word - literally not a single word - to the statement. ' 
1 MacDonald's 
diaries contain but two brief references to the committee and disarma- 
ment scarcely figures in them at all during the whole of'1931.2 
3 
Henderson, 'all blather and mush' so far as Chamberlain was concerned, 
did play a more significant role behind the scenes, keeping in close 
touch with the Liberals and working with Cecil to achieve practical 
results. 
4 
None the less it is an interesting reflection on contemporary 
politics that the two Opposition parties should play so prominent a part 
in the formulation of policy and that the Labour members, identified 
much more closely with disarmament in the public mind, should contribute 
so little. 
5 
Any assessment of the government's performance must be set beside 
the growing demoralisation of the Labour movement in the years 1930 to 
1. Austen Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 18 July 1931, Austen Chamberlain 
Papers, AC 5/l/548- 
2. MacDonald's only references to the committee are to the part Lloyd 
George chose to play, 18 March and 7 May 1931P PRO 30/69/8/1. 
3. Austen Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 18 July 1931, Austen 
Chamberlain Papers, AC 5/l/548- 
4. Dalton Diaries, 28 April and 3 June 1931; Lothian to Lloyd George, 
10 July 1931, Lothian Papers, GD 40/17/257- 
5. MacDonald threw some light on the role he had chosen to play when 
he informed Cecil on 6 July 1931 that it seemed to him that the 
country which went into the disarmament conference with a minimum 
of preconceived plans and figures would achieve the best results. 
Malcolm MacDonald a month later informed Cecil that his father 
favoured the abolition of certain weapons but was opposed to percentage 
reductions in defence expenditure. Cecil Papers, BL Add. Mss- 51031. 
It is noteworthy that on the Conservative side Hoare obtained the 
assistance of Basil Liddell Hart who, though a foremost military 
authority and writer, was active as an advocate of disarmament in 
League of Nations Union conferences in 1931 and 1932. See 
B. H. Liddell Hart: Memoirs, Vol. 1, London, 1965, PP. 183-4. 
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1931. ' Morale in the Labour party was low after Mosley's defection 
1 
and Trevelyan's resignation. 
2 Though few were aware of how serious 
the financial situation had become, mounting unemployment and the govern- 
ment's helplessness bred acute disillusionment. For a short time the 
spirits of the parliamentary Labour party and the Cabinet revived when 
Henderson and Alexander returned from Paris and Rome with the bases of 
a naval disarmament agreement between France and Italy and news of the 
Gandhi-Irwin talks reached London but there were no striking successes 
in foreign policy to compensate for the gloom and despondency on the 
domestic front. 3 
When the Three Party Committee completed its work an 15 July 1931 
Germany was in the grips of a serious financial crisis whose repercus- 
sions were to contribute to the fall of the second Labour goverment 
less than six weeks later. Disarmament was eclipsed, as it had been 
for some time, by other, more pressing considerations. Nevertheless 
the ramifications of the international financial crisis had a direct 
bearing on the government's attitude to disarmament. France's short- 
sighted refusal to accept the Hoover proposals for a one-year moratorium 
on all reparations payments and intergovernmental debts, coming as it 
did after her uncompromising opposition to proposals for an Austro- 
German Customs Union, angered and embittered MacDonald and did nothing 
to make the British goverment more sympathetic to France's disarmament 
1. Sir Oswald Mosley, who as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster had, 
under the Lord Privy Seal, J. H. Thomas, some responsibility for 
the formulation of unemployment policy, resigned in May 1930 when 
the Cabinet finally rejected his memorandum which contained a set 
of imaginative 'Keynesian' proposals to protect employment and 
create new jobs. When later he formed the New Party he took with 
him from the ranks of the parliamentary Labour party, albeit 
momentarily, four or five Labour MPs. 
2. Sir Charles Trevelyan, President of the Board of Education, resigned 
in March 1931 not simply because of the government's failure to 
raise the school-leaving age to fifteen but because he felt that the 
government was not applying socialist policies to meet the economic 
crisis. 
3. See especially Dalton's diary comments for 8 March 1931. 
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proposals of 15 July 1931. On 11 July MacDonald wrote: 'The behaviour 
of the French has been inconceivably atrocious ... when she found we were 
not to be her tool and partner, she tried to scratch us. We have put a 
virago into authority in Europe. ' 
1 
The events of JulY-August 1931 were 
to exacerbate relations between the two European countries on whom the 
success of the world disarmament conference would chiefly depend. 
The National government, formed in the last week of August 1931 
to solve Britain's financial crisis, at first felt in no position to 
take fresh initiatives in the field of disarmament. It approved its 
predecessor's decision to refer one or two outstanding questions to 
the Chiefs of Staff and appointed a non-ministerial inter-departmental 
committee to continue the preparatory work for the disarmament conference. 
2 
With the exception of the Foreign Office representatives, the members of 
that committee demonstrated an almost total lack of sympathy with dis- 
armament. 
3 
A far different attitude was adopted by the Cabinet committee set 
up after the National goverment won a resounding electoral victory on 
27 October 1931.4 Chaired by the new Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, 
they were more radical than any previous Cabinet or CID committee on 
disarmament. Only the uncompromising opposition of their professional 
Service advisers prevented them from advocating the abolition of 
1. MacDonald Diaries, 11 July 1931, PRO 30/69/8/1. 
2. C-48(31), 26 August 1931, CAB 23/67 and C-71(31), 6 October 1931, 
CAB 23/68. 
3. Their minutes and report, 27 November 1931, are in CAB 16/104. 
The committee was chaired by Cadogan and consisted of representatives 
from the Foreign Office, Treasury, Dominions Office, Colonial Office 
and the three Services. 
4. C-80(31), 20 November 1931, CAB 23/69. The committee consisted of 
the Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon (Chairman), the Secretary of 
State for War, Viscount Hailsham, the Secretary of State for the Dominions, J. 11. Thomas, the Secretary of State for Air, Marquess 
of Londonderry, and the First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Bolton 
Eyres-Monsell. 
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military aircraft and tanks and only the difficulty in setting a deadline 
from recommending an all-round percentage reduction in armaments. They 
frankly recognised that Britain's delegation would not be able to persuade 
other powers to reduce their armaments by telling them that Britain could 
make no further reductions. With little sense of realism they suggested 
that the only solution was to offer 'added' security on condition that 
the beneficiaries reduced their armaments to the same level as Britain 
or to a level which Britain regarded as satisfactory. Britain would 
thus have determined the level of armaments in those countries she 
proposed to assist, a suggestion which was not likely to commend itself 
to other powers. The report concluded by stating that the most practical 
contribution Britain could make to European security would be to partici- 
pate in a Locarno-style Mediterranean agreement. 
1 
Though the committee made seven positive proposals for disarmament 
2 
and recognised the connection between security and disarmament what they 
were prepared to offer was too little and too late. In the years 1927 
to 1930 when it was on the agenda of inýernational politics, a Locarno- 
style Mediterranean agreement would scarcely have satisfied either France 
or Italy. By 1931 it was largely irrelevant. The scene had shifted. 
3 
Germany's bid for equality of armaments occupied the centre of the stage. 
Only briefly and inadequately did the committee address themselves to 
this, the most crucial, issue facing the powers in the years 1931 to 1933. 
Their recommendations, which if they had been made five or ten years 
earlier might have made a significant contribution to the disarmament 
debate, had by 1931 been overtaken by events. 
1. CP 5(32), 11 January 1932, CAB 27/476. 
2. They proposed (1) the abolition of submarines, (2) a reduction in the 
ma im- displacement and armament of capital ships, (3) the abolition 
of gas and other chemical weapons, (4) the abolition of conscription, (5) the prohibition of land g=s of above a certain calibre, (6) budgetary limitation complemented b the other methods proposed 
in the draft disarmament convention, (75 the establishment of a 
permanent disarmament commission. 
3. E. W. Bennett: German Rearmament and the West, 1932-1933, _p&ssim. 
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C0NCLUS10N 
It was almost inevitable that disarmament should be embraced by a 
large and influential section of the pacifically-minded British people 
in the aftermath of the First World War. 
1 
All other preventives of war 
paled into insignificance for a generation which had come to believe 
that armaments caused war. It was not, however, the pressure of public 
opinion which set Britain on the road to disarmament. Within a matter 
of months of the end of the war the Lloyd George government had committed 
Britain in word and deed to a policy of disarmament. 
2 Long before the 
League of Nations Union or any other pressure group began to campaign 
for disarmament the Treasury, the Cabinet and even its Secretary, Sir 
Maurice Hankey, had become convinced that large reductions in national 
armaments were vital if Britain was to be saved from bankruptcy, another 
arms race and, perhaps, a second major war. 
3 It was not until 1921 that 
the League of Nations Union, the parliamentary spokesmen of the Independent 
Liberals and the Labour party, and the Press began to put strong pressure 
on the government to work for an arms limitation agreement. 
4 
In the 
autumn of 1921 disarmament was for a brief period a universal aspiration 
of the British people. It was not merely a response of a nation in deep 
revolt against the horrors of modern warfare. It was more importantly a 
consequence of Britain's reduced power, wealth and status in the post-war 
world. 
1. For the important distinction between pacificism and pacifism and the 
pacificist mood of the British people after 1918 see M. Ceadel: 
Pacifism in Britain. 
-1914-1945; 
The Defining of a Faith, Oxford, 1980, 
pp. 1-8,60-2. 
2. See pp. 142-53,170. 
3. See pp. 168-72. 
4. See pp. 22-25,49-50,74-5,84-7,173-91. 
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The case for disarmament was admirably put by Lloyd George to the 
Cabinet on 5 August 1919.1 It was to be put again by the Treasury more 
than tan years later on the eve of the 1930 London naval conference. 
'The Treasury submit that it is in the best interests of this countryp 
from a naval as well as a financial point of view, to secure an all-round 
reduction in the size of armaments. Our security in an emergency depends 
in the last resort on the superiority of our naval forces but we can no 
longer afford to spend as much as we have hitherto on our Navy; and 
unless other Powers can be induced to spend less, the danger is that our 
pre-eminence should be gradually taken from us, or that an overwhelming 
burden of expenditure should be imposed on the tax payer. *2 
Between 1919 and 1923 large reductions were made in Britain's defence 
expenditure. In 1918 Britain was the most powerful air power in the world. 
Within a few years of the end of the war she had sunk to fifth place in 
the league of air powers. 
3 Britain pursued a policy of piecemeal, 
unilateral disarmament. Whether these reductions seriously weakened 
British diplomacy is open to question. What is not in dispute is that 
well-informed observers such as Haldane, Sir Frederick Maurice and Sir 
4 William Tyrrell all believed this to be the case. From 1924 to 1931 
British defence expenditure rose steadily in real termS5 yet Hankey, 
MacDonald and several of his colleagues were convinced in 1930 that 
Britain's power and prestige had suffered as a result of the unilateral 
disarmament policies of successive British governmentse 
6 
1. See p. 170. 
2. CP 12(30), 16 December 1929, CAB 24/209. 
H. M. Hyde and G. R. F. Nuttall: Air Defence and the Civil Population, 
London, 1937, pp. 12-13; C. K. Webster and N. Frankland: The Straieplc 
Offensive AMinst Germany. 1939-1945, Vol. 1, London, 19J, pp. 52-64. 
4. Maurice; Haldane, The Life of Viscount Haldane of Cloan, 1915-1928, 
Vol. II, London, 1939, ppo 126,144 and 159; Daily News, 28 June 1923 
and p. 251 above; Ko Middlemas and J. Barnes: Baldwin, p. 206 and 
po 249 above. 
5. See Appendix I. 
6. See p. 328. 
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Although economy in public expenditure was the over-riding considera- 
tion in the formulation of British disarmament policy in the years 1919 to 
1931 other factors were of almost equal importance. Disarmament was a 
strategic device to reduce the military, naval and air capability of 
Britain's rivals and so enhance her own relative power. Any challenge 
which the United States and Japan might pose to British imperial interests 
would be diminished if they could be persuaded to limit their naval forces. 
Similarly Britain's influence in Europe would be in inverse proportion to 
the military might of France and the other continental land powers. 
Furthermore, the smaller the air forces maintained by her near neighbours 
on the continent of Europe the less vulnerable to air attack would Britain 
be. Disarmament was an essential component of Britain's foreign and defence 
policies. 
Only the United States, however, could ensure the success of a major 
disarmament conference. This was the lesson to be drawn from the 1921-1922 
Washington conference. 
1 Though American statesmen were prepared to make 
concessions in 1929 which paved the way for the conclusion of the London 
naval treaty in 1930, never again was the United States to use all the 
resources of her power, authority and influence to achieve an important 
arms limitation agreement. 
By 1922 it was clear that though the United States and Japan could 
be induced to limit their naval armaments the continental European powers 
were unwilling to enter into an arms limitation agreement without addi- 
tional guarantees of their security. By repudiating the 1919 peace 
settlement, including the Guarantee to France, the United States had 
removed the lynch pin of the League system on which international disarma- 
ment had been predicated by the architects of the Covenant. Only a 
minority of Englishmen were prepared to countenance ambitious schemes 
1. See P. 189. 
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like the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Geneva Protocol to 
shore up the edifice which the United States had undermined. Furthermore, 
Britain was reluctant to take any action which might bring her into con- 
flict with the United States or lead her to forfeit American goodwill, 
1 
As the disarmament movement gathered momentum, government and public 
alike drew back from commitments which might involve Britain in a multi- 
tude of quarrels. 
France's refusal to agree to the abolition of submarines at the 
Washington conference, the abysmal failure of the 1922 Genoa conference 
to promote European pacification, and the widening rift between Britain 
and France in the years 1922 and 1923 had a profound effect on British 
public opinion. Many became disenchanted with disarmament. Arms limita- 
tion ceased to have the same appeal to official and public opinion. 
Balfour, Hankey and other erstwhile advocates became sceptical, if not 
hostile. The Service departments and to some extent the Foreign Office 
obstructed progress. The Press was lukewarm. A section of the Conservative 
party did not conceal its contempt for disarmament and most Conservatives 
never gave the impression that they regarded disarmament as a matter of 
extreme urgency. 
2 
The Labour party was unable to formulate a disarmament 
policy which could command the full allegiance of both its internationalists 
and unilateralists. 
3 Both parties shied away from policies which involved 
continental commitments. Only the Liberals consistently championed general 
disarmament. 
4 
It is not, therefore, altogether surprising that in the 
middle years of the 1920s Britain's voice at Geneva was hesitant and 
uncertain. 
1. Though the second Baldwin goverment did very little to cultivate good 
Anglo-American relations its attitude to the Geneva Protocol was 
influenced by American susceptibilities. 
2. See PP. 50-3. 
3. See pp. 64-9. 
4. 
. 
See PP. 73-8. 
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No British government of the inter-war years made any attempt to 
equate Britain's armaments with her responsibilities under the League 
and Locarno. Though the Foreign Office placed Britain's responsibilities 
to the League at the head of its list of commitments in 1926,1 no Chiefs 
of Staff review of British defence needs set out to assess what these 
might mean in terms of British naval, military and air power. 
As the French right-wing political commentator Andre Geraud (Pertinax) 
pointed out to a Chatham House audience in November 1929, Britain expected 
Europe to behave like a family who, having lost their possessions in a 
fire, refused to renew their insurance premium on the grounds that their 
new home was built of fire-proof materials. British policy was based on 
the most favourable hypothesis. 
2 There is some force in the contention of 
one of the executants of British policy in the 1920s, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, 
who wrote a generation later: 'Never in our history has there been a more 
flagrant case of muddled thinking and self-deception. 
3 
Britain sought not so much to lay the foundations of a new inter- 
national order as to minimise the risks she would have to face in the 
post-war world. The danger which haunted the minds of the British people 
after 1918 was that armaments and armed alliances might spark off another 
arms race and plunge Britain into a second major conflict. Few, therefore, 
believed in elaborately conceived schemes for collective security. In 
December 1927 Baldwin responded to the Ponsonby Peace Letter4 by stating: 
ITou cannot strengthen the League by weakening the British Empire' and in 
the event of unprovoked aggression he promised that 'the mighty weight of 
Great Britain' would be thrown into the scales against the aggressor. 
5 
1. DBFP, Series IA, Vol. 1, Appendix. 
2. Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Vol. IX, No. 2. 
3.1. Kirkpatrick: The Inner Circle, London, 
. 1959, P. 38. 
4. See p. 111. 
5. The Times, 21 December 1927. 
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Subsequent British policies were to belie Baldwin's pledge. Though 
British defence expenditure more than trebled between 1932 and 1938 
Britain was no more disposed to guarantee the security of Europe in the 
1930s than she had been in the previous decade. Isolationist sentiment 
and an exaggerated sense of her weakness prevented Britain from intervening 
'prominently, promptly and with authority' on behalf of peace. Mini 
initiative might mean minimum provocation but it led to minimal success 
in maintaining peace. 
Outside Europe Britain no longer had the wealth and the political 
will to play the part of premier world power in a community of highly 
armed states. In the 1920s some advocates of disarmament saw that arms 
limitation might arrest Britain's decline as a world power and provide 
her with a new role before the loss of empire left her bereft of influence 
in the world. 
1 
When the Foreign Office scrutinised the Geneva Protocol 
in the winter of 1925, however, only its historical adviser, Sir James 
Headlam-Morley, suggested that Britain might have a direct and vital 
interest in the peace and stability of central and eastern Europe. 
2 
Mesmerised by her imperial role and resolved to avoid a repetition of 
the carnage she had suffered on the Western Front between 1914 and 1918, 
she neglected the claims of European security to focus her energies on 
the responsibilities of empire. Fourteen years later in 1939 she was 
obliged to honour a continental commitment and so hasten the dissolution 
of her empire. 
In 1914 Britain had gone to war to maintain the balance of power 
in Europe and to break the power of Prussian militarism. Throughout 
the war years Britain's statesmen believed that there could be no 
1. P. J. Noel-Baker: The Geneva Protocol,, PP. 3-4; Cf. P. J. Noel-Baker: 
Disarmament and the Coolidge Conference, London, 1927, PP. 33-43. 
2. J. Headlam-Morley: Studies in Diplomatic History, London, 1930t pp. 171-6*, 
Anne Orde: Great Britain and International Security. 1920-1926, pp-70-80- 
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enduring peace so long as there was a highly militarised society in the 
centre of Europe. 
1 
German militarism was not, however, eradicated in 
1918. It was to survive to sow the seeds of a second world war. In 
the 1920s those who had grown up amid the Victorian solidities of nine- 
teenth century England were among the last to understand those forces 
in German society which were undermining the 1919 peace settlement and 
the democratic order in Germany. 
It would be wrong, none the less, to exaggerate the extent to which 
violations of the Versailles treaty's disarmament clauses had the full 
support of the German people. Though the pacifist mood which swept 
through Germany in the first agony of defeat was of short duration most 
ordinary Germans did not want war. So consistent was the opposition of 
the Social Democrats in Prussia to rearmament that one of the main objec- 
tives of the Reichswehr was to destroy their power and influence. 
2 
Nevertheless, no democratic government in Germany could justify to its 
people a state of permanent military inferiority. 
When Noel-Baker asked Churchill in the Commons debate on disarmament 
in June 1931: 'Is he going to allow Germany to rearm? This is the funda- 
mental question in European politics today', 
3 he was pointing to a central 
dilemma of British policy in the years 1919 to 1931. Cecil, Chamberlain 
and others had frequently argued that unless a general disarmament agree- 
ment was concluded in a relatively short space of time the pressure for 
rearmament in Germany would assume unmanageable proportions. 
4 
It has 
been argued with some cogency that had a comprehensive disarmament agreement 
been concluded as late as 1932 it might well have averted a second world war. 
5 
1. See pp. 119 and 125. 
2. H. A. L. Fisher in The Background Issues of the War, Oxford, 1940, PP-10-11; E. W. Bennett: German Rearmament and the West, 1232-1933, pp. 89-91,507. 
3.254 HC Debs. 5th Series, col. 977,29 June 1931. 
4. See p. 279. 
5. B. H. Liddell Hart: Deterrence or Defence, London, 1960, pp. 250-1- 
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There were only two options open to Britain in the 1920s. One was 
to pursue a policy of 'preparedness' to complement 'the free hand' and 
'no commitments'. The other was to promote general disarmament and 
collective security with all the authority, power and influence at her 
command. The first was politically unacceptable to a parsimonious House 
of Commons and a 'Pacificist' public opinion. In addition, it risked 
the danger of provoking a new arms race in which Britain might be the 
eventual loser. The second would not have been readily accepted by 
public opinion. It involved huge risks and a high price but would these 
have been any greater than those she was forced to bear in the Second 
World War? By vacillating between the two policies, Britain neither had 
sufficient armaments to fend off a challenge to her empire nor did she 
make any significant contribution to general disarmament. 
In a Commons debate in July 1927 Dalton warned Chamberlain that 
there would be a terrible indictment to answer at the bar of history if 
through lack of vision, vigour, imagination and leadership the Baldwin 
Cabinet betrayed their trust. 
1 
More than fifty years later it is diffi- 
cult to find any adequate justification for the policy pursued by the 
second Baldwin government at the Geneva naval conference and in the 
League Preparatory Commission. 2 These were years of comparative tran- 
quillity and stability. The League was an established institution. There 
was growing support for the League and disarmament in Britain. The govern- 
ment had a large majority in the Commons and the support of the Opposition 
parties for pro-disarmament policies. War was universally regarded as an 
indefensible instrument of national policy. After Locarno Britain was to 
a large extent umpire and arbiter in the European balance of power. 
3 
1.208 HC Dabs. 5th Series, col. 1840,11 July 1927. 
2. See pp. 202-208,306-11. 
3. W. S. Churchill: The Second World War, Vol. I, The Gathering Storm, 
London, 1948, pp. 27-28. 
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With no great war clouds on the horizon these were the most auspicious 
years between the two world wars. It was absurd to refuse to concede 
parity to the United States in 1927.1 It was equally foolish to oppose 
international inspection in the Preparatory Co=ission. 
2 It was short- 
sighted to withhold support for budgetary limitation and the direct 
limitation of war materia, 
3 
which Britain was subsequently to advocate. 
It is difficult to see what Britain could have lost if she had agreed to 
these proposals in the Commission. Gibson's initiative in April 1929 
was to strengthen rather than weaken American diplomac and there is 
no reason to think that Britain's prestige would not also have been 
enhanced by bold, conditional offers at Geneva. 
By 1929, however, most of the Press, many of the spokesmen of the 
three political parties, and a number of highly organised pressure groups, 
including the League of Nations Union, were calling for concerted and 
determined efforts to achieve general disarmament. 
5 Between 1926 and 
1929 the League of Nations Union promoted one of the most successful 
campaigns in British political history to mobilise a large and articulate 
section of the population behind disarmament. 
6 
Such was the effectiveness 
of its agitation that it forced Britain's political leaders to treat 
disarmament as a matter of some urgency. 
In its first nine months in office the second Labour government 
respondedýreadily and energetically to the popular demand for disarmament 
but the partial failure of the London naval conference in 1930 demonstrated 
that more was required to achieve general disarmament than the will of the 
British people. The conference revealed the weakness of Britain's 
1. See p. 206. 
2. See pp. 293,297 and 301. 
3. See pp. 296,311-12. 
4. See P. 321. 
5. See PP. 35,38-40,78-9,116-17. 
6. See pp. 95-101. 
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negotiating position. She was unable to persuade the Unite& States to 
abolish or even reduce the size of battleships nor could she bring 
sufficient pressure to bear on France and Italy to accept an equitable 
settlement of their differences. 
1 From the summer of 1930 disarmament 
was no longer a first priority of the second Labour government. Other 
factors besides the London naval conference, including the deepening 
economic recession and Mosley's defection, contributed to the goverment's 
malaise. None the less the advocates of disarmament did not slacken their 
efforts. In the year preceding the world disarmament conference there was 
a great upsurge in popular support for disarmament. 
2 Popular emotions ran 
faster and further than expert opinion. That the world disarmament confer- 
ence came so near to success in the uncongenial international climate of 
1932 was due more to popular support than to any other single factor. 
Though the British people were not alone in articulating a strong popular 
demand for disarmament, in no other country of the world was the agitation 
so brilliantly organised and the arguments for disarmament so eloquently 
expressed. 
In the immediate post-war years when European society lay in ruins, 
its political and social fabric undermined by the war, conditions were 
not conducive to disarmament. These were, however, the years in which 
British diplomacy was directed towards securing a substantial reduction 
in national armaments. By the middle years of the 1920s Europe had to 
a large extent recovered from the war and its peoples and governments 
were more favourably disposed towards the limitation of armaments yet 
it was in these years that Britain did more to obstruct than promote 
international disarmament. 
1. See p. 223. 
2. See pp. 102-104. 
3. B. H. Liddell Hart: Deterrent or Defence, pp. 236,250-1, and Memoirs, Vol. 1, London, 1965, pp. 191-207; Philip Noel-Baker: The First World 
Disarmament Conference. 1932-1933,, pp. 77-134; A. C. Temperley: The 
Whispering Gallery of EuroDe, pp. 200-58; J. W. Wheeler-Bennett: The 
Disarmament Deadlock, London, 1934, PP. 32-34. 
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The disarmament movement in Britain failed not simply because condi- 
tions in Europe and the world made arms limitation without comprehensive 
security guarantees an elusive goal of international politics. For only 
two brief periods on the eve of the Washington conference and in the 
autumn of 1929 did disarmament capture the hearts and minds of the British 
people as a whole. Many Conservatives were indifferent to disarmament 
for much of the period. The Labour party discovered that arbitration 
was a more unifying peace prescription than disarmament. The disarmament 
movement was the product of Liberalism but Liberalism as a party was a 
spent force in British politics. Though the League of Nations Union 
attracted a large and influential following it failed to capture either 
of the parties of government. It was, moreover, essentially a middle 
class movement making only a peripheral impact on working class politics. 
Post-war British pacificism was essentially isolationist not inter- 
nationalist. 
1 
Consequently as in all other aspects of national policy 
the British people had the disarmament policy they were prepared to pay 
for and in the course of time reaped the consequences* 
2 
1. M. Ceadel: Pacifism in Britain, 1914-1945, pp. 6206. 
2. M. Beloff: Foreim Policy and the Democratic Process, Baltimore, 1955, 
P. 49. 
APPENDIX I 
A. 
BRITISH DEFENCE EXPENDITURE. 1919-1931 
Adjusted to the Wholesale Price Index 
Year 
Wholesale 
Price Index 
Actual Adjusted to Adjusted to Adjusted to 
Defence 1913 Prices 1919 Prices 1931 Prices Expenditure 
Em. FIM. RIM. Em. 
1913 27 77.1 77.1 197.0 80.0 
1919 69 620.2 242.7 620.2 251.7 
1920 83 277.6 90.3 230.8 93.6 
1921 53 175.2 89.3 228.1 92.6 
1922 43 116.4 73.1 186.8 75.8 
1923 43 110.6 69.4 177.5 72.0 
1924 45 113.4 68.0 173.9 70.6 
1925 43 119.5 75.0 191.8 77.8 
1926 40 115.3 77.8 198.9 80.7 
1927 38 116.5 82.8 211.5 85.8 
1928 38 113.7 80.8 206.5 83.8 
1929 37 113.3 82.7 211.3 85.7 
1930 32 109.5 92.4 236.1 95.8 
1931 28 106.9 103.1 263.4 106.9 
B. AdJusted to the Retail Price Index 
Retail Actual Adjusted to Adjusted to Adjusted to 
Year Price Index 
Defence 191 Prices 1919 Prices 1931 Prices 
ExiDenditure 
Em. Em. jem. iem. 
1913 21 77.1 77.1 187.2 128.5 
1919 51 620.2 255.4 620.2 425.6 
1920 58 277.6 100.5 244.1 167.5 
1921 53 175.2 69.4 168.6 115.7 
1922 43 116.4 56.8 138.1 94.7 
1923 41 110.6 56.6 137.6 94.4 
1924 41 113.4 58.1 141.1 96. a 
1925 41 119.5 61.2 148.7 102.0 
1926 40 115.3 60.5 147.0 100.9 
1927 39 116.5 62.7 152.3 104.6 
1928 39 113.7 61.2 148.7 102.0 
1929 39 113.3 61.0 148.2 101.7 
1930 37 109.5 62.1 150.9 103.6 
1931 35 106.9 64.1 155.8 106.9 
Sources: 315 HC Debs. 5th Series, cols. 230,257-8,21 July 1936 and 
Key Statistics of the British Economy. 1900-1962 produced by 
the London and Cambridge Economic Service for The Times Review 
of Industrv and Technolopnr. 
Notes: The wholesale price index is taken 
which though it covers goods in all 
predominance to raw material costs. 
cost of living index calculated by 
based on working class expenditure 
a far less useful measurement of re 
wholesale price index. 
from the Board of Trade Journal 
stages of processing gives 
The retail price index is a 
the Ministry of Labour and 
in 1914. It is, therefore, 
al defence costs than the 
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Total Central Government Exrenditure 
Notes and Sources 
(1) No reliable estimates of Polish defence expenditure 
available for 1923. 
(2) No figure for total central government expenditure 
in 1923 and 1924 available. 
(3) No estimates of Russian defence expenditure in 1923 
and 1929-30 available. 
(4) No reliable figures for German defence expenditure 
in 1923 are available. 
Sources 
League of Nations: Armaments Year-Book, Geneva, 1924-1932. 
B. R. Mitchell: European Historical Statistics. 1750-1970, 
London, 1975. 
Bureau of the Prime Minister's Office and Executive 
Office of the Statistical Commission: Japan's 
Statistical Year-Book, 1949, Tokyo, 1949. 
United States Department of Commerce: Historical 
Statistics of the United-States. Colonial-Times to 1970, 
Part II, Bureau of the Census, Washington, D. C., 1975. 
List of Countries 
Belgium (Be. 
Britain (Br. 
Czechoslovakia Cz. ý 
France Fr. 
Germany (Ge. 
Italy (it. 
Japan Ja. 
Poland Po. 
Roumania Ro. 
Russia (Ru. 
United States (us) 
Yugoslavia (Yu-) 
........... 
8()C), 000 
700,000 
600,000 
500,000 
400,000 
Ja 
200,000 
br 
Cz 
:, 10 
100,000 
Ge 
1:, e 
19 
Fr 
Po 
it 
Ja 
Ro 
br 
Cz 
&eU 
ý5() 
1930 numbers computed on a different basis from earlier estimates and, 
therefore, omitted. 
Source: League of Nations Armaments Year-Book, Geneva, 1924 - 1932. 
t#ft# 44-4,, t ++j 1 44 1 t t- , 
Gross Tonnage of 3ix Naval eowers. -1922 1913 
tons Great Britain. the United States . Japan 
2,200,000 1913 1919 
- 
1929 
-- TT TT 
2, OUO, 000 TI ij . 
1,800,000 
all 
t 
1,600,000 11 4 4ý 
1,400,000 , , 
r4T 
1,200,000 
1,000,000 
tit- 
800,000 
IT 
6oo, ooo 
400,000 
L 
200,000 tf -f t 
-- ill 
j j 
f 
Lj 
__ _ 
I br US Jap Br US Jap br US Jap 
4 1 
Between 1929 and 1930 the gross tonnage of the United States Navy 
T-t 1, 
t t 
was reduced from 1,304,000 to 1,038,000 ton s. 
4 
France, Russia. Ital-Y TT 
tons 1913 1919 1929 
b00,000 77 
600 000 
1 
, 
400,000 
ýi'l 1 1 
H41 
-ý4 4-j- 
2UO, UOO F1 
LLFTT 
WEL 7ý11 A4 210 x 297 rnm 
7- t Pr Ru it 
s Year-book, Geneva, 1924 1932. 
+4 
++ 4 
ttt; 
2 
375 
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY OP SOURCES CITED IN THE TEXT 
Unpublished Material 
Cabinet Office files 
Cabinet Minutes CAB 23 
Cabinet Papers CAB 24 
CID Minutes CAB 2 
CID Papers CAB 4 
CID Sub-Committee Minutes, Reports and Papers CAB 16 and CAB 21 
Minutes and Papers of Cabinet Committees CAB 27 
Minutes and Papers of the Council of Ten (Allied 
Supreme War Council at the Paris Peace Conference) CAB 28 
Minutes of the Council of Four, Paris Peace Conference CAB 29 
Minutes and Papers of the Washington Conference CAB 30 
Minutes and Papers of the Genoa Conference CAB 31 
Minutes and Papers of the Imperial Conferences CAB 32 
Minutes and Papers of the Chiefs of Staff CAB 53 
Foreim Office Files 
General Correspondence FO 371 
League of Nations Preparatory Commission FO 411 
Personal Correspondence of the Secretaries of State and 
Members of the Poreign Office FO 800 
Prime-Minister's Office PREM I 
Private PaDers 
Alexander of Hillsborough, Churchill College, Cambridge. 
Baldwin, University Library, Cambridge. 
Balfour, British Library. 
Bonar Law, House of Lords Record Office. 
Cecil of Chelwood, British Library. 
Austen Chamberlain, University Library, Birmingham. 
Dalton, British Library of Economics and Political Sci6nce. 
Pisher, Bodleian Library, Oxford. 
Haldane, National Library of Scotland. 
Hankey, Churchill College, Cambridge. 
Headlam, Durham County Record Office. 
Lloyd George, House of Lords Record Office. 
Lothian, Scottish Record Office. 
MacDonald, Public Record Office. 
Gilbert Nurray, Bodleian Library, Oxford. 
Passfield (including the Beatrice Webb Diaries), British 
Library of Economics and Political Science. 
Trevelyan, University of Newcastle upon Tyne Library. 
Willoughby de Broke, House of Lords Record Office. 
Worthington-Evans, Bodleian Library, Oxford. 
376 
Other Unpublished Material 
Minutes, Memoranda and Reports of the National Executive Committee 
of the Labour Party and its Advisory Committee on International 
Questions, Labour Party Library. 
Minutes, Memoranda and Reports of the League of Nations Union, 
British Library of Economics and Political Science. 
Chatham House Papers. 
Published Official Documents 
Great-Britain 
Documents on British ForeiRn Policv. 1919-1939 (DBFP), First Series, 
Series IA and Second Series. 
League of Nations 
Official Journal 
Reports of the Assembly, Plenary Meetings and Committees, 
Special Supplements of the Official Journal. 
Armaments Year-Book, 1924-1932. 
United States 
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS). 
Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, Washington, 1922. 
Pa. rliamentarv Debates 
House of Lords Debates, Fifth Series, Vols. 29-81. 
House of Commons Debates, Fifth Series, Vols. 118-260. 
Reports and Publications of the Major British Political Parties 
Labour Party: Reports of Annual Conferences. 
Labour Party: Labour and the Nation, London, 1928. 
Liberal Publication Department: Essays in Liberalism, London, 1922. 
Selections of Pamphlets and Leaflets. 
A Canvasser's Guide, London, 1928. 
National Unionist Association: Campaign Guides. 
National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations: 
Election Notes. 
Hints-for Si)eakers. 
Press 
Daily Herald, Dailv Maill Daily News, Daily T21egravh, Manghester 
Guardian, News Chronicle, Observer, Reynolds's News, Sunday Express, 
The Times. 
Other Publi hed Primarv Source 
F. W. S. Craig (ed. ): British General Election Manifestos. 1918-1945,, 
Chichester, 1970. 
P. Mantoux: The Paris Peace Conference. 1919, Proceedings of the 
Council of Four. March 24 - April 18, Geneva, 1964. 
ý-3377] 
Memoirs. Collected Letters. Diaries. Speeches and 
Autobiographical Studies 
ASQUITH, H. H. 'Justice-of Our Causeland 'The-Dut-v of Everyman', 
Four Speeches, London, 1914. 
AVON, Earl of The Eden Memoirs, Vol. 1. Facing the Dictators, 
London, 1962. 
BUTLER, R. A. 
(Lord Butler) 
The Art of-the Possible, London, 1971. 
CLARK, A. (ed. ) A Good Innings. The Private PaD ers of Viscount 
Lee of Fareham, London, 1974. 
CECIL, Viscount, A Great ExDeriment, London, 1941. 
of Chelwood All the Way, London, 1949. 
DALTON, H. Call Ba ck Yesterday, 1887-1931, London, 1953. 
ESHER, Oliver, Viscount (ed. ): The Journals and Letters of Reginald, 
Viscount Esher, Vol. IV, London, 1938. 
GREY, Viscount, Twentv-Five Years, London, 1925. 
of Fallodon 
HANCOCK, W. K., J. Van der Pool (ed. ): Selections from the Smuts Papers, 
Vols. III and IV, Cambridge, 1966. 
HANKEY, Lord Supreme Control at the Paris Peace Conference, 
London, 1963. 
HARRIS, H. Wilson Life So-Far, London, 1954. 
HART, B. H. Liddell Memoirs, Vol. 1, London, 1965. 
JAMES, R. R. (ed. ) Memoirs of a Conservative. J. C. C. Davidson's 
Memoirs and PaDers, London, 1969. 
JONES, E. R. (ed. ) Selected Sveeches on British Foreign Policy, 
1738-1914, London, 1914. 
JONES, T. Whitehall Diary, Vols. I and II, Londonp 1969, 
edited by K. Middlemas. 
K IRK PATRICK, I. The Inner Circle, London, 1959. 
LLOYD GEORGE, D. War Memoirs, Vols. I and II, London, 1934. 
MADARIAGA, S. de Morninz-without Noon, Memoirs, Farnborough, 1974. 
VICOLSON, H. Peacemaking, 1919, London, 1933. 
NOEL-BAKER, P. The First World Disarmament Conference. 1932-1931 
And Why It Failed, Oxford, 1979. 
PERCY, Eustace (Lord Percy of Newcastle): Some Memories, London, 1958. 
378 
RIDDELL, Lord Lord Riddell's-Intimate Diary of the Peace 
Conference and After. 1918-1923, London, 1933. 
STIMSON, H. L. The Par Eastern Crisis. Recollections and 
Observations, New York, 1936. 
TAYLOR, A. J. P. (ed. ) Llovd-George. A Diary by Frances-Stevenson, 
London, 1971. 
TEMPERLEY, A. C. The WhisperinR Gallery of Europe, Londonp 1938. 
TEMPLEWOOD, Viscount Nine Troubled Years, London, 1954. 
WILSON, T. (ed. ) The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott. -1911-1928, London, 1970. 
WOOLF, L. Begainninr, Again. An Autobiography of-the-Years, 
1911-1918, London, 1964. 
Secondary Works 
ANGELL, N. Europe's Optical Illusion, London, n. d. (1908) 
The Great Illusion, London, 1910. 
The Unseen Assassins, London, 1932. 
BAKER, E. B. and J. Allen Baker, A Memoir, London, 1927. NOEL-BAKER, P. J. 
BANKWITZ, P. C. P. Maximo WevRand and Civil-Militar-y-Relations in 
Modern France, Cambridge, Mass., 1967. 
BARNETT, C. The Collapse of British Power,, London, 1972. 
BAUMONT, M. The OriRins-of the Second World War, trans. 
S. de Ferguson, New Haven and London, 1978. 
BEALES, A. C. F. A History of Peace, London, 1931- 
BEASLEY, W. G. (ed. ) Modern Japan. Aspects of History, Literature 
and Society, London, 1975. 
BEATON, G. M. Twenty Years' Work in the War Resisters' 
International, London, 1945. 
BELOFF, M. Foreign Poliev and the Democratic Process, 
Baltimore, 1955. 
BENNETT, E. W. German Rearmament and the West. 1932-1933, 
Princeton, 1979. 
BOYLE, A. Trenchard, London, 1962. 
BRAISTED, W. R. The United States Nav-v in the Pacific. Mg-1922, 
Austin, Texas, 1971. 
BUSSEY, G. and TIMS, M. The Women's International Leagmie for Peage and Freedom. 1915-1965, London, 1965. 
-- -- ---, 1 379 , 
BUTLER, Lord (ed. ) The Conservatives, London, 1977. 
CAMPBELL, J. Lloyd George. The Goat in the-Wilderness, 
London, 2977. 
CARLTON, D. MacDonald v. Henderson, London, 1970. 
CEADEL, M. Pacifism in Britain. -1914-19 , 
Oxford, 1980. 
CECIL, Viscount, Challengme to Death, London, 1934. 
and others: 
CHALLENER, R. D. The French Theory of the Nation in Arms. 1866-1939, 
New York, 1955. 
CHALMERS, W. S. The Life and Letters of David. Earl Beatty., 
London, 1951. 
CHMERLAIN, W. J. Fighting-for Peace. The Story of the War 
Resistance Movement, London, 1929. 
CHAPUT, R. Disarmament-in British Foreign Policy, London, 1935. 
CHURCHILL, W. S. The World Crisis, Vol. 5, The Aftermath, 
London, 1929. 
The Second World War, Vol. 1, The Gathering 
Storm, London, 1948. 
CLEMENCEAU, G. Grandeur and Misery of Victory, trans. by 
F. M. Atkinson, New York, 1930. 
CROSBY, G. R. Disarmament and Peace in British Politics, 
1914-1919, Cambridge, Mass., 1957. 
DENNIS, P. Decision by Default. Peacetime Conscription and 
British Defence, 1919-1939, London, 1972. 
DURBIN, E. P. M. and. War and Democracy, London, 1938. CATLIN, G. E. C. (ed 
MOSELLE, T-B. From Wilson to Roosevelt. The Foreign Policy 
of the United States, 1913-1945, London, 1964. 
EGERTON, G. W. Great Britain and the Creation of the League 
of Nations, Chapel Hill, N. Carolina, 1978. 
FISHER, H. A. L. et al. The Background Issues of the War, Oxford, 1940. 
FRY, M. G. The Illusions of Securitv. North Atlantic 
Diplomacy, 1918-1922, Toronto, 1972. 
GELFAND, L. E. The Inauirv. American Preparations for Peace, 
1917-1919, New Haven, 1963. 
GILBERT, M. Winston Churchill, Vol. V, London, 1976. 
HAMILTON, X. A. Arthur Henderson, London, 1938. 
--380-ý 
HANCOCK, W. K. Smuts, Vol. II, Cambridge, 1968. 
HART, B. H. Liddell Deterrent or Defenae, London, 1960. 
HEADLAM-MORLEYj J. Studies in Diplomatic History, London, 1930. 
HENIG, R. B. The Leap7ue of Nations. Edinburgh, 1973. 
HINSISYt F. H. Power and the Pursuit of Peace, Cambridge, 1967. 
HOWARD, M. The Continental Commitment London, 1972. 
War in European History, London, 1976* 
War and the Liberal Conscience, London, 1978. 
HYDE, H. M. and 
NUTTALL, G. R. F. Air Defence and the Civil Population London, 1937-, 
INGRAM, K. Fifty Years of the National Peace Council. 1909-1958 
London, n. d. 
ITO, M. and PINEAU, R. The End of the Imperial-Japanese_Navy. 1868-1941 
New York, 1962, 
JAMES, R. R. Victor Cazalet, London, 1976. 
JORDAN, W. M. Great Britain. France and the German Problem 
London, 1943. 
MIMY, M. D. The Estrangement of Great Britain and Japan, 
1917-1936, Manchester, 1969* 
KOM, so Sir John Brunner, London, 1970. 
Asquith, London, 1976. 
LATIMER, He Naval Disarmamentp London, 1930- 
LYMAN# Re We The First Labour Govermnentp London, 1957- 
MACDONALD, J. R. National Defence, A Study in Militarism, 
London, 1917. 
MADARIAGA, S. de Disarmament London, 1929. 
KARQUAND, D. Ramsa-v MacDonald London, 1977- 
MARTINO L. W. Peace without Vic_tory, New Havent 1958- 
MAYER9 A. J. Politics-and Diplomacy of Peacemaking, London, 1968. 
MAURICE, F. Haldane, -, The Life of Viscount Haldane of Cloan, 
1915-1928, Vol. II, London, 1939. 
MIDDLEMAS, K. and 
BARNES, J. Baldwin, A Biography, London,, 1969. 
MILLER, D. H. The Geneva Protocol, Now York, 1925. 
The Drafting of the Covenant, Vols. I and 11, 
New York, 1928. 
38-111 
MILLS, J. S. The Genoa Conference, London, 1922. 
MINART, J. Le Drame du Dgsarmement Francais, Paris, 1960. 
MORGAN, J. H. Assize of Arms, London, 1945. 
MORLEY, J. W. (ed. ) Japan's Foreign Policv. 1868-1941, New York, 1974. 
MORRIS, A. J. A. Radicalism against War. 1906-1914, London, 1972. 
MOWAT, C. L. Britain between the Wars. 1918-1940, London, 1955. 
MURRAY, G. From the League to-the U. N., London, 1948. 
NELSON, H. I. Land and Power. British and Allied Policy on 
Germany's Frontiers, 1916-1919, London, 1963. 
NERE, J. The ForeiRn Poliev of France. 1914-1945, London 
and Boston, 1975. 
NICOLSON, H. Dwip_ht Morrow, London, 1935. 
NISH, I. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, London, 1966. 
Alliance in Decline, London, 1972. 
Ja-panese Foreign Policy, 1869-19 London, 1977. 
NOEL-BAKER, P. The Geneva Protocol, London, 1925. 
Disarmament, London, 1926. 
Disarmament and the Coolidge Conference, London, 1927. 
The Present Juridical Status of the-British 
Dominions in International Law, London, 1929. 
The Private Manufacture of Armaments, London, 1936. 
ORDE, A. Great Britain and International Securitv. 1920-1926, 
London, 1978. 
RAMSDEN, J. The ARe of Balfour and Baldwin. 1902-1940. 
A History of the Conservative Party, London and 
New York, 1978. 
ROBBINS, K. Sir Edward Grey, London, 1971. 
The Abolition-of War. The Peace Movement in 
Britain, 1914-1919, Cardiff, 1976. 
ROLPH, C. H. Kingsley. The Life, Letters and Diaries of 
Kingsley Martin, London, 1973. 
ROSKILL, S. Naval Poliev between the Wars, Vol. I, London, 1968. 
Hankey. Man of Secrets, Vol. II, London, 1972. 
Churchill and the Admirals, London, 1977. 
ROTHWELL, V. H. British War Aims and Peace-Diplomacy. 1914-1918, 
Oxford, 1971. 
382 
SKIDELSKY, R. Politicians and the Slump. The Labour Government 
of 1929-1931, London, 1967. 
SMITH, D. M. Mussolini's Roman Empire, London, 1976. 
SPROUT, H. and M. Towards-a New Order of Sea Power, Princeton, 1946. 
SWARTZ, M. The Union of Democratic Control in British 
Politics during World War One, Oxford, 1971. 
TAYLOR, A. J. P. The Troublemakers, London, 1957. 
(ed. ) Llovd George. Twelve Essays, London, 1971. 
TOYNBEE, A. J. (ed. ) Survey of International Affairs 
(1924-1931), 
London, 1926-1932. 
VINSON, J. C. The Parchment Peace. The United States and the 
Washington Conference, 1921-1922, Athens, Georgia, 
1955. 
WAITES, N. (ed. ) Troubled Neir-h-bo London, 1971. 
WATT, D. C. Personalities and Policies. Studies in the 
Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the 
Twentieth Century, London, 1965. 
Too Serious a Business. European Armed Forces 
and the Approach of the Second World War, 
London, 1975. 
WEBSTER, C. K. and The Strategic Offensive against Germany. 1939-1945, 
FRANKLAND, N. Vol. I, London, 1961. 
WHEELER-BENNETT, J. W. Information on the Reduction of Armaments, London, 1925. 
The Disarmament Deadlock, London, 1934. 
WIGHT, M. Power Politics, Harmondsworth, 1979. 
WOLFERS, A. Britain and France between the Wars, New Haven, 1940. 
YOUNG, K. Arthur James Balfour, London, 1963. 
ZIMRN, A. E. The Learrue of Nations and the Rule of Law, 
London, 1936. 
383 
Articles 
DARWIN, J. G. 'The Chanak Crisis and the British Cabinet'p 
History, February 1980. 
EDWARDS, P. 'The Austen Chamberlain - Mussolini Meetings', 
Historical Journal, March, 1971. 
HAMILTON, C. 'Navies and Foreign Policy', Historical Journal, 
December 1978. 
RUBINSTEIN, W. D. 'Henry Page Croft and the National Party, 1917-1922', 
Journal of Contemporary History, January 1974. 
TRACTENBURG, M. 'Reparations at the Paris Peace Conference', 
Journal of Modern Histor-v, Xarch 1979. 
(1) 
